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DAVID EIWAHD STEPHEN MACGREGOR
Ideology is interpreted broadly in this study as consciousness, 
where consciousness is the relation of knowledge to its object. This 
thesis investigates the connection between Hegel’s theory of conscious­
ness and society and Marx’s political and social thought. It shows 
that many discoveries, previously considered to be those of Marx alone, 
like surplus-value and the transition from capitalism to communism, 
were first developed and employed by Hegel. The study also demonstrates 
that key concepts, which remain only implicit in Marx, such as social 
class, alienation, revolutionizing praotice, contradiction and dialectic 
are given full theoretical form only In the works of Hegel, It examines 
and shows the strong similarities between Hegel’s and Marx’s theory of 
religion, capitalism and the state, and stresses that their theory 
details not the conditions for the emancipation of a class, but rather 
the liberation and freedom of the social individual. The dissertation 
explores the writings of the young Marx and Feuerbach and shows that 
Western Marxism, to its theoretical detriment, owes much more to them 
than it does to Hegel and the mature Marx. The connection between the 
philosophies of Kant and Feuerbach and the ideology of contemporary 
bourgeois society is demonstrated, as is the organic, if antagonistic, 
unity between the alienated consciousness of Western Marxism and that 
of its bourgeois opponent. Contemporary Marxist theory is subjected 
to critical analysis within the framework of a comprehensive account of 
dialectic method and exposition. The thesis concludes that social 
thought and political action might be enriched and extended through a 
new synthesis of Marx with Hegel.
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1 • Fegei and Marx
This study is an attempt to rescue Hegel's thought from the inter­
pretation imposed on It "by Marx, I will argue against Marx’s claim 
that the Hegelian dialectic "must be inverted,in order to discover the 
rational kernel within the mystical shell", There is no "mystificatory 
side" (llarx, 19761103* 102) to the Hegelian dialectic: Hegel's use of 
the dialectic method is identical with that of Marx,
In Capital, as is well known, Marx openly declares himself the 
pupil of Hegel (1976:103) —  and he is certainly Hegel’s foremost 
exponent and student. As I will show, Marx•s theory of modern capital­
ist society owes much more to Kegel than is generally recognized! but 
there are also many aspects of Hegel’s thought which Marx fails to 
explore or develop. Some of these aspects are Illuminated in the 
chapters which follow, including especially the dialectic method. 
"Hegel", notes Kehring, "is alleged to have said on his death bed about 
his pupils; only one of them understood me, and he misunderstood me," 
(1969:308) With hindsight ye can say that Kegel might almost have been 
thinking of Marx.
"The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Kegel’s hands", 
states Marx, "by no means prevents him from being the first to present 
its general - forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner."
2Paradoxically, however, Western Marxism has made no serious effort 
"to discover" the "rational form ... of the Hegelian dialectic".
(Marx, 1976:102-103) Usually the main effort goes in the opposite 
direction, and Marxist commentators on Hegel are everywhere distin­
guished by their negative and critical approach to his thought. Here 
—  as in many other respects —  they resemble their bourgeois counter­
parts, Nor is this resemblance accidental, since the prevailing 
consciousness or ideology of Western Marxism shares much the satre 
categories and an identical structure of thought with its bourgeois 
opponent. And Hegel’s dialectic method is from start to finish the 
enemy and destroyer of what he refers to as "the understanding", or 
bourgeois, mind. As Marx puts it, "the dialectic ... is a scandal and 
abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen ... being 
in its very essence critical and revolutionary." (1976:103)
Dialectic concerns ideology or consciousness, but the point of 
view taken of the concept of ideology in this study is somewhat 
different from the standard approach. Consciousness is "the relation
of bought to its object" (Hegel, 1954:184) \ false consciousness---'
or ideology in the pejorative sense of the term--- occurs when
consciousness believes itself to be alienated or external to its 
object. What Marx would call communist consciousness, or what Hegel
For the purpose of this study Western Marxism refers to the 
diverse traditions of contemporary Marxist thought, excluding Marxism 
as it is today officially conceived and practised in the socialist 
bloc. The work of the classical thinkers of the Russian Revolution, 
like Lenin and Trotsky, is treated here as part of the heritage cf 
Western Marxism. Alone among Westein Marxists, however, Lenin makes 
a genuine contribution to the xmderstanding of Hegel? the debt this 
study owes to Lenin’s commentary on Hegel in the Philosophical 
Notebooks (1963) will he readily apparent.
3terms "reason”, is a form of thought which perceives itself to be 
identical with its object. Both Western Marxist and bourgeois 
thinkers, however, conceive of thought as separate from or external to 
its object. "The ... accepted concept of logic", notes Hegel, "rests 
upon the assumed separation of the content of knowledge and the form 
of knowledge (or truth and certainty) —  a separation that is assumed 
once for all in ordinary consciousness." (1954*178) For the under­
standing mode of thought, there is a finished world existing outside, 
and independent, of thought; and the problem of knowledge is simply 
to gain access to the external world. This view, as I will argue, is 
the root of all ideology or false consciousness; it forms the dominant 
structure of thought in capitalist society •—  a structure which both 
Marxist and bourgeois have in common. For this type of consciousness, 
"Truth is supposed to be the agreement of thought with its object, and 
in order to bring about this agreement (for the agreement is not there 
by itself) thinking must accommodate and adapt itself to its object,"
(Hegel, 1954*179)
The notion that thought is Identical with the external world is, 
of course, dismissed by Marxist and bourgeois positivist alike aa "wild 
idealism”, "sheer metaphysics", ar.d so on. It is also opposed by •Kant'" 
who argues that "thought in its relation to the object of thought docs 
not go out of itself to its object, while the object, as a thing in 
itself, simply remains a something beyond thought”. (Hegel, 1954*179) 
The suggestion, however, that thought is identical w.tth its object 
does not entail a belief in the non-reality of the out sida world. The 
categories of thought are identical with the substance of the outside 
world, but they are also distinct from it. "A concrete thing", notes
Hegel, "is always very different from the abstract category as such". 
(1975?132) The notion that knowledge is identical with its object is 
the fundamental thesis of dialectic method. For the dialectic is 
based on the concept which Karx refers to as "revolutionizing prac­
tice", and which Hegel names, "ideality". This concept conceives 
thought and thinking as practical human activity, as the effort 
through which men and women translate their ideas about the external 
world into concrete reality. This is Hegel's meaning when he writes,
"To think is an expression which attributes especially to conscious­
ness the determination which it contains," (1954*187)
The concept of revolutionizing practice or ideality is best 
illustrated by a relation familiar to everyone: work. As Hegel 
suggests, "work and effort [are] the middle term between subjective 
and objective", (1976*126) Through work human beings transform the 
objects of the external world into things designed to satisfy their 
particular needs and desires. "Labour is, first of all," notes i'larx,
"a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his 
actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between him­
self and nature,; He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to 
his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate 
the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs". (1976:203) 
• Hegel observes that there are three phases or "moments" in the 
labour process, a process which he variously refers to in the 
Phenomenology of Mind (1967) as "the general process of negation", 
"action", and "extemalization". (e.g. 1967:424) The first moment, 
which Hegel calls, "purpose", occurs as an imaginative construction 
which consciousness applies to a given external reality. Included in
4
5this phase are the talents, abilities and character of the acting 
subject as well as the object to which the purpose is applied. Without 
these two elements of purpose, Hegel remarks, consciousness is only 
"nothing working away towards nothing". (1967:421) An example of 
purpose would be an artist's conception of the completed sculpture 
before he or she begins work on a chunk of stone.
The second phase of externalization, the "means", is the process
through which the purpose is "actualized", and includes all aspects of
the labour performed along with the object on which it is expended.
In the example of the artist, the means include the activity of
shaping the stone, the tools used by the artist, and the stone itself.
The third moment of extemalization is the completed or "manifested"
object, which appears now, "no longer as immediate or subjectively
presented purpose but as it is brought to light and established as
something other than and external to the acting subject". In the
example given above, the third moment i3 the completed statue which as
a real object manifests the original conception or purpose of the
artist. Hegel sums up the process of extemalization or work as
follows; "acting is simply transferring from a state not yet
explicitly expressed to one fully expressed". (1967:421)
Work is an aspect of practical human activity, ideality or
revolutionizing practice, But the chief element in work, as in all
ideality, is thought or human consciousness. Only the action of
thought separates human activity from.that of other animals. In a
passage deeply influenced by Hegel, llarx writes:
We presuppose labottr in a form in which it is an 
exclusively human characteristic. A spider 
conducts operations.which resemble those of a 
weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect
6to shame by the construction of her cells. But 
what distinguishes the worst architect from the 
best of bees is that the architect builds the 
cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax.
At the end of every labour process, a result 
emerges which had already been conceived by the 
worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally. Man not only effects a change of form 
in the materials of nature; he also realizes ... 
his own purpose in those materials. And this is 
a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the 
mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, 
and he must subordinate his will to it. This 
subordination is no mere momentary act. Apart 
from the exertion of the working organa, a 
purposeful will is required for the entire 
duration of the work. (1976*284)
The concept of ideality or revolutionizing practice as expressed 
in work is deceptively simple. In the course of this study I shall 
demonstrate that it lies behind all the passages in Hegel which critics 
decry as "metaphysical", "nonsense", "abstruse", and so on. It ia 
precisely through ideality that the social world of human beings mani­
fests what Hegel calls "objective thoughts". The social world is a
result of practical human activity---an activity which translates
"mere thoughts" into reality. "... In as far as it is allowed", notes 
Hegel, "that understanding, and reason, are of the world of objects ,,, 
in so far is it admitted that the determinations of thought also have 
objective validity and existence." (1954*187) recognition that human 
activity is precisely the concrete manifestation of thought leads Ilegel 
to write that, "logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science 
of things set and held in thoughts —  thoughts accredited able to 
express the essential reality of things." (1975*36)
Everyone acts on the assumption that thought represents the union 
of subjective and objective, .»e naturally assume that our ideas may be 
translated into objectivity through purposeful action. Everything we
7do is an illustration of this assumption. Yet this assumption is 
abandoned when we theoretically approach the relation of consciousness 
to its object. We place thought on one side, and conceive it to be a 
subjective reflection of what we place on the other side ■—  objective 
reality. "To say that Reason or Understanding is in the world", Hegel 
observes, "is equivalent in its import to the phrase 'Objective 
Thought'. The latter phrase however has the inconvenience that 
thought is usually confined to express what belongs to the mind or 
consciousness only, while objective is a term applied, at least 
primarily, only to the non-mental." {1975s37)
Ideality or revolutionizing practice is the means whereby mind or 
human consciousness shows itself to be "the absolutely concrete". The 
absolutely concrete, for Hegel, is something which in every aspect is 
identical with itself even in its distinction of itself from itself.
The mind of the sculptor, for example, remains a self-identical thing 
even while it distinguishes an aspect of itself —  the sculpture *—  
from itself, through sensuous human practice. Hegel refers to the 
mind or consciousness of the human individual as "the notion'* and the 
notion is "absolutely concrete ... when-it exists as notion distin­
guishing itself from its objectivity, which notwithstanding the 
distinction still continues to be its own, Everything else which is 
concrete, however rich it be, is not so identical with itself and 
therefore not so concrete on its own part ..." (1975’*229)
Thought is identical with concrete human activity and, therefore, 
even the most abstract theoretical constructs are also aspects of 
human ideality. Accordingly, the logical syllogism is simply a 
theoretical expression of, among other things, the concrete relation we
8call work. "The teleological relation", says Hegel, referring to 
work or ideality, "is a syllogism in which the subjective end [of the 
human individual] coalesces with the objectivity external to it, 
through a middle term which is the unity of both. This unity is on 
one hand the purposive action, on the other hand the Keans, i.e. 
objectivity made directly subservient to purpose." (1975;270) Hegel 
distinguishes the Keans (of production) from "the material or objec­
tivity which is pre-supposed", i.e., the raw material or object to be 
worked on. (1975:272) Accordingly, we have what Marx later calls,
"the simple elements of the labour process ... (1) purposeful activity, 
that is, work itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, 
and (3) the instruments of that work". (1976:284)
Dialectic concerns the relation of the individual with society. 
a relation Hegel calls, "the rational syllogism". (1975:245) Work or 
ideality is the means through which the individual makes him or herself 
identical with society. "All production is appropriation of nature on 
the part of an individual within and through a specific form of 
society." (Marx, 1973:87) The human individual is, for liegel and 
Marx, the social individualj : and the social individual is both iden­
tical with, as well as distinct from his or her social world, Marx 
expresses this notion in the Grundrisse as follows:
When we consider bourgeois society in the long view 
and as a whole, then the final result of the process 
of social production always appears as the society 
itself, i.e. the human being i tsslf in itn social 
relations. Everything that has a fixed form, such as 
the product etc,, appears as merely a moment, a 
vanishing moment, in this movement. The direct 
process of production itself here appears only as a 
moment. The conditions and objectifications of the 
process are themselves equally moments of it, and 
its only subjects are the individuals, but
9individuals in mutual relationships which they 
equally produce and produce anew. The constant 
process of their own movement, in which they 
renew themselves even as they renew the world of 
wealth they create, (1973*712; W  emphasis)
Marx’s formulation simply repeats, though in more concrete terras,
Hegel’s theory of the interchangeable relation of the individual with
society or the "universal”i
Everything is a Syllogism. Everything is a 
notion [i.e. a part of society), the existence 
of which is the differentiation of its members 
or functions, so that the universal [social] 
nature of the Notion [the human "being] gives 
itself external reality by means of particularity 
Ci.e. work or ideality], and thereby as a negative 
reflection-into-self, makes itself ... [a social] 
individual. Or conversely* the actual thing is 
an individual, which by means of particularity 
rises to universality and'makes itself identical 
with itself. The actual is one* but it is also 
the divergence from each other of the constituent 
elements of the Notion [society]; and the Syllogism 
represents the orbit of the intermediation of its 
elements, by which it realizes unity. (1975*
244- 245)
Through their ideality or revolutionizing practice in society 
individuals develop their natural capacities and talents, and also foim 
a concrete connection between themselves and society. "An individual", 
says Hegel, "cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by 
action." (1967*422) Or as Marx puts it, "Through this movement [the 
labour process]" the individual "acts upon external nature and changes 
it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. He 
develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the 
play of it3 forces to his own sovereign power." (1976*203)
The concept of work, or ideality, as developed by Ilegel and Marx, 
provides a ready example of two essential aspects of the dialectic* 
contradict:!on, and affirmation or transcendence. These concepts, of
10
course, will be developed further in the following chapters, but a 
preliminary acquaintance with them is nevertheless useful. The 
accepted notion of the dialectic is the dull formula "thesis, anti­
thesis, synthesis". This "dialectic triad" appears rarely in the work 
of either Hegel or Narx and, as it stands, says less than nothing 
about dialectic. Still, since it is a well-known formula, it may help 
the reader to comprehend dialectic movement. In the labour process, 
the "purpose" of the working subject is the "thesis". The objective 
reality on which that purpose is actively exercised is the "anti­
thesis", and the product of the labour process is the "synthesis".
The object confronting the individual represents a contradiction 
between his or her ideal notion of what the object should be. and what 
it actually i_s. And the activity of the individual is directed at 
surmounting this antithesis. The result of the labour process like 
that of all dialectic movement is affirmation or transcendence 
("Aufheben" in Hegel’s terminology). It is a positive or constructive 
result which contains in itself all the moments which joined together 
in its creation. The negative activity of labour —  an activity 
which confronts, opposes and transforms external reality also has a 
positive or affirmative result. The synthesis contains or suspends, 
the earlier moments of thesis and antithesis in itself. The positive 
aspect of dialectic in the labour process is emphasized by i'arx:
A machine which is not active in the labour 
process is useless. In addition, it falls prey to 
the destructive power of natural processes. Iron 
rusts; wood rots. Yarn with which we neither 
weave nor knit is cotton wasted. Living labour must 
seize on these things, awaken them from the dead, 
change them from merely possible into real and 
effective use-values. lathed in the fire of labour, 
appropriated as part of its organism, and infused
with vital energy for the performance of the 
functions appropriate to their concept and to their 
vocation in the process, they are Indeed consumed, 
but to some purpose, as elements in the formation 
of new use-values, new products, which are capable 
of entering into individual consumption as means 
of subsistence or into a new labour process as 
means of production. (1976s289-290)
The labour process not only provides an instructive illustration 
of dialectic; its form uhder capitalism also explains the alienation 
of consciousness from its object characteristic of the bourgeois and 
Western Marxist mind. The understanding consciousness is incapable of 
perceiving the unity of thought and being precisely because under 
capitalism this unity is concealed beneath the antagonistic relations 
of bourgeois society. Prom the point of view of the worker, the means 
of production and the commodities he or she produces are alien and 
foreign powers —— "objective facts" which rule the worker instead of 
being ruled by him or her. Even the purpose —  the design or plan of 
the thing to be produced is not the worker’s but someone else’c,
The entire labour process is external to the worker — ■ a realm of 
alienation. "... The fact", writes Marx, "that surplus labour is 
posited as surplus value [or profit] of capital means that the worker 
doea not appropriate the product of his own labour, that it appears to 
him as alien property; inversely, that alien labour appears as the 
property of capital." (19755469-70) For the worker, the labour process 
is simply the means to earn money and make a living; it lias nothing 
to do with the translation of his or her ideas into objective reality, 
Kotes Hegel,
The work i_s, i.e. it is for other individuals, and 
for them it is an external and alien'reality, in 
whose place they have .to put their own [work], in 
order to get by their action consciousness of their 
unity with reality. In other words, the interest
12
which they take in that work owing to their 
original constitution is other than the parti­
cular interest of this work, which is thereby 
turned into something different. The work is, 
thus, in general something transitory, which 
is extinguished by the counter-action of other 
powers and interests, and displays the reality 
of individuality in transitory form rather 
than as fulfilled and accomplished. (1907*427)
Nor is alienation confined simply to the consciousness of the 
worker. For the capitalist, also, the labour process is an external 
and alien reality —  and even more so in the case of the capitalist, 
since he or she does not take part in it. Moreover, the commodities 
produced are not intended for the personal consumption of the 
capitalist —- their design, quantity and quality are dictated by the 
needs of the market; and even if these needs are manipulated by the 
capitalist they are not those of the capitalist but rather of the 
consumers. The capitalist desires only to make a profit, just as the 
worker desires only to make a living. Both capitalist and worker 
subordinate their activity to ends external to that activity; every­
where there is on one side the objective fact and on the other the 
subjective value. The mystification of fact and value; the split 
between idea and reality; the discord between thought and being is 
the objective principle of capitalist society.
But if ideas are felt to be separate or external to reality, tho 
same division is introduced by the understanding mind between the 
individual and society. A3 a result, for bourgeois and Marxist 
thinkers alike, there is on the one hand, the isolated individual, and 
on the other, the social world, Tho alienation between the two is 
believed to be absolute. For the bourgeois thinker, the separation is 
rational and represents everything good in the world. For the Marxist,
13
the cleavage is a necessary product of the evils of capitalism} unity 
between the individual and society is "a mere 'ought to be"' (Hegel, 
1976:48) which must await the communist revolution. For Hegel and 
Marx, however, the union of the individual with society exists already 
in bourgeois society —  even if the inner harmony finds expression 
here only as outward conflict.
In a discussion of what Hegel calls the '"immediate' syllogism''
of the understanding, (which is simply the ordinary syllogism of formal
logic) he criticizes both the alienation of the individual from
bourgeois society, and also the distorted view of the relation between
thought and its object which this alienation entails:
In the 'immediate* Syllogism the several aspects of 
the notion confront one another abstractly, and 
stand in external relation only. We have first the 
two extremes, which are Individuality and Univer­
sality; and then the notion, as the mean for locking 
the two together, is in like manner only abstract 
Particularity. . In this way the extremes are put as 
independent and without affinity either towards one 
another or their mean. Such a Syllogism contains 
reason, hut in utter notionlessness —  the formal 
Syllogism of Understanding. In it the subject is 
coupled with an other character; or the universal 
by this mediation subsumes a subject external to it. ;
In the rational Syllogism, on the contrary, the 
. subject is by means of the mediation coupled with 
itself. In this manner it first comes to be a 
subject: or, in the subject we have the first gems 
of the rational Syllogism. (1975*245)
The separation or alienation of thought from its object in 
bourgeois society leads to the attribution of human qualityes to things, 
and to the treatment of human beings as objects. The result is a 
bizarre mixture of materialism and idealism in the understanding 
consciousness. "The crude materialism of the economists", notes Marx, 
"who regard as the natural properties of things what arc social rela­
tions of production among people, and qualities which things obtain
14
because they are subsumed under these relations, is at the same time 
just as crude an idealism, even fetishism, since it imputes social 
relations to things as inherent characteristics, and thus mystifies 
them." (1973s687) Mystification, however, does not stop with the 
bourgeois economists. It appears just as clearly in the abstract 
categories of Western Marxism, Throughout this study £  will emphasize 
that both Hegel and Marx are primarily concerned not with 'blass'1 or 
"class struggle”, as is Western Marxism, but with the self-emancipation 
of the social individual from the alienated structures of bourgeois 
society. The question of revolution is not the liberation of the pro­
letariat from the domination of the bourgeoisie, but the liberation of 
the social individual from the confines of an alienated society.
Class is an abstraction to which no concrete reality corresponds. It 
can be at once a crude materialist concept according to which "class" 
is an external reality existing apart from the individuals who compose 
it; or an equally crude idealist notion which imputes human charac­
teristics to an abstract category. The Western Marxist ideal of the 
working class simply does not exist; a fact demonstrated by the 
constant dissatisfaction of ’Western Marxists with what they perceive 
as a "bourgeois!fied" and "consumer!at" Western proletariat. Classes 
are groups of individuals defined in terms of property relations and 
function in society. Classes are an explanatory category, only in so 
far as that category says something about the concrete individuals 
grouped within it. For Western Marxism, however, the individual is an 
explanatory category only in so far as he or she says something about
class.
15
The abstract and alienated character of Western Marxism brings it 
closer to the materialism of Feuerbach and the young Marx than it is 
to either the mature Marx or Hegel. This study will demonstrate that 
the writings of Marx, especially the Grundrisse and Capital cannot be 
understood except as a dialogue with Hegel. As Franz Mehring puts it 
in his classic biography of Marx: "He went beyond Feuerbach by going 
back to Hegel," (1969:12?) Marx’s debt to Hegel, however, is much 
greater than even Marx himself appreciates. Marx employs Hegel’s 
dialectic method and with it he makes the same discoveries as Hegel 
had already made a generation before him: discoveries which include, 
as I_ will argue, the theory of surplus value and the transition of 
bourgeois society to the rational or communist state.
The argument of this study is not simply about a much misunder­
stood aspect of intellectual history. It concerns something more 
fundamental. . If I am correct, there are In Hegel a great treasure of 
Insights and theory which could help to broaden and enrich the entire 
approach of Western Marxism to the study of bourgeois society as well 
as to the phenomenon of bureaucratic socialism. .
Western Marxism has the advantage' over bourgeois thought in that 
it at least advances to a negative standpoint over against capitalist 
reality. Bourgeois and Marxist consciousness in this respect repre­
sent opposite sides of what Kant would call "an antinomy of pure 
reason", (1893s255“256) On one side is the bourgeois mind which 
advances the proposition that capitalism is just and reasonable; on 
the other side, the Marxist consciousness holds that capitalism 
represents everything bad and irrational. Much evidence may be, and 
is, gathered to support the conclusions of either side. But the
16
arguments remain in the grip of the limited categories of thought 
shared by both opponents. Nevertheless, the Marxist begins from the 
correct notion that a large proportion of the individuals within 
bourgeois society are condemned to an existence in which their 
influence over their own lives and their freedom are restricted and 
held fast by the alienated nature of capitalism. As Hegel suggests, 
"The side of the antinomy which asserts the concept of freedom," i.e., 
in this case Marxism, "... has the merit of implying the absolute 
starting point, though only the starting point, for the discovery of 
truth, while the other side goes no further than existence without 
the concept and therefore excludes the outlook of rationality and 
right altogether. » (1976:48)
2, Structure of the Study
Most works on Hegel make a rigid distinction between the meta­
physical and social aspects of his thought. Other studies'suggest that 
these aspects cannot be .separated'since each-throws light on the other 
—  they are supposed to be reciprocally related. Both these approaches 
are bound to miss what is essential in Hegel, His metaphysics and hin 
social thought are in fact dialectically related: they are identical 
and distinct, Hegel’s metaphysics deals with the categories of human 
thought which, he insists, reflect as well a3 create through concrete 
practice the social and natural universe of men and women. Consequently 
his investigation of the categories is also a theory of society and 
nature. I have tried to illustrate this argument with the example given
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above of Hegel's notion of the syllogism. Similarly, Hegel's concrete 
study of bourgeois society and the rational state in The Philosophy of 
Right (first published in 1821) is based on the theoretical framework 
and the dialectic method presented in his examination of the cate­
gories. ”... The doctrine of speculative logic”, Hegel writes in the 
Philosophy of Right, "is here presupposed ...” (1976ï36) The reader,
therefore, will find in this study no distinction between Hegel the 
metaphysician and Hegel the social theorist. The two liegels are really 
one.
Just as there is no separate philosophy and social theory in 
Hegel, there is also no rigid distinction between these two areas in 
the work of Marx, The codification of Marx as a philosopher (dialec­
tical materialism) and a social scientist (historical materialism) is 
even less justified with Marx than it is with Hegel since Marx produced 
no separate works giving a comprehensive philosophical outlook, The 
distinction between philosophy and social theory is in any case a 
product of the fantasies of the bourgeois mind,
Before 1845 the young Marx was deeply influenced, along with his 
mentor, Feuerbach, by,Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind (1967). This 
influence is, of course, also apparent in his mature work, I have 
deliberately used the Phenomenology in this Introduction in order to 
show the parallels between Capital and the Phenomenology, The Pheno­
menology, however, will be referred to only very rarely in the 
following chapters. Hegel himself observes in 1851 of the Phenomeno­
logy (which was first published in 1807) that it is a "characteristic 
early work not to be revised *—  relevant to the period in which it was 
written — - the abstract Absolute was dominant at the time of tho
18
Preface.'* (Quoted in Pindlay, 1975:vi-vii)
The Phenomenology is full of exciting passages and brilliant 
insights. But most of the substantive content of the work is contained 
and elaborated in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences 
(1830). Moreover, the Encyclopaedia is far richer in form and content 
than the earlier work. The so-called Lesser Logic (1975) (Part Cne of 
the Encyclopaedia) is a condensed and powerful version of the original 
Science of Logic ("Greater Logic") (1951) which went to press in the 
years 1812, 1813 and 1816. Most of the references in this study are to 
the Lesser Logic, but the Greater Logic (1951 and 1954) is also 
referred to. Part Three of the Encyclopaedia. The Philosophy of Mind 
(1969) is often ignored by Hegel scholars; but this much underrated 
volume is used extensively in this study. As Hegel himself declares 
(1976i21), the Philosophy of Right is based on "premisses ... expounded" 
in the Philosophy of Mind. Hegel’s three-volume Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy (1892, 1894, 1896) is vital to an understanding of his 
thought and I have made numerous references to it| the same is true, 
though to a lesser degree, of his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History. (1956)
Concentration on Hegel’s later works rather than on the Pheno­
menology is justified not only because their author considered them to 
be superior to it, but also because the mature Marx relies much more 
on them than on the Phenomenology. In Capital, for example, the 
Phenomenology is not cited even once; but there are references to the 
Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Right and the Greater Logic, More­
over, the Hegelian dialectic is perfected not in the Phenomenology or 
even the Greater Logic, but in the Encyclopaedia.
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This study advances from the most abstract social categories to 
the most concrete. The following chapter considers the "natural 
individual" as seen by Hegel and Marx —  the individual as he or she 
appears in primitive society and also as the individual matures and 
develops within the context of bourgeois society. The chapter con­
cludes with a preliminary investigation of contradiction and its 
relation to the development of the natural individual. The next two 
chapters are concerned with religion and Christianity, and show the 
connection of religious teachings with the revolutionary ethos of both 
Hegel and Marx. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the link between theories of 
knowledge and the social relations of capitalist society. They 
contain a discussion of Feuerbach, the young Marx and Kant, and also 
the radical theory of knowledge put forward by Hegel and Marx. In 
Chapters 7 and 8 the nexus of the property relations of bourgeois 
society with the notion and reality of the capitalist state are 
examined. The concluding chapter is an exposition of dialectic method 
and an overall critique of the prevailing theories of modern Western 
Marxism.
Kant observes that once it is completed, theoretical research 
which appeared very dubious when half-finished "is at last found to be 
in an unexpected way completely harmonious with that" which went before 
"provided this dubiousness is left out of sight for a while and only 
the business at hand is attended to until finished". Consequently he 
suggests that "writers would save themselves many errors and much 
labour lost (because spent on delusions) if they could only resolve to 
go to work with a little more ingenuousness." (1956*110) The struc­
ture of this study follows the form of its content. It is by no means
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the result of a pre-established intent. It began as an investigation 
of the relationship between Hegel ahd Marx; and this indeed is what 
it is. But most of the views about Hegel criticized in this study are 
ones I also used to hold. Thus, the movement of the form of this work 
is also the movement of my own discoveries and of a developing 
appreciation not only of Hegel but also of a new Marx. To say that I 
consciously employed the dialectic method would be false; but in 
retrospect, the method is really contained in it. For dialectic is, 
above all, a method of discovery.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREEDOM IN THE «NATURAL« INDIVIDUAL 
1, The Philosophy of Mind
Individual human consciousness is the active element in all social 
forma. It is only through the conscious activity of real, living 
human beings that society —  or in Hegel’s terminology, «objective 
mind" —  along with its systems of material production, art, philo­
sophy, and science, is constructed. "The individual", writes Hegel,
"is the absolute form." (Kaufmann, 1966*398) Society is the mani­
festation of reason or the Idea, and reason, in turn, "exists only in 
a subject and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is 
Thinking". (1969*223) Hegel puts this notion another way when he 
observes that the will of the individual "is the existential side of 
reason ... the act of developing the Idea, and of investing its self­
unfolding content with an existence which, as realising the idea, is 
actuality. It is thus ’Objective* Kind”. (1969*23$) Hegel’s view of 
the role of the individual is adopted by hia most influential "pupil", 
Marx, "Men in every century ..." writes Marx, are "... both the 
authors and the actors of their own drama." (PP*111) Since for Hegel 
conscious human activity is the source of social phenomena, the study 
of society should begin with an inquiry Into the nature of the human 
mind. It is to this inquiry that Hegel devotes the major part of the 
third section of the Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Mind. (l$C$)
22
Hegel's study of human consciousness differs radically from all 
earlier efforts to come to grips with the nature of mind, and has much 
to offer even to present-day theories of consciousness. For Hegel, 
each phase of human social development, such as ancient or feudal 
society, represents a particular form or stage in the development of 
individual human consciousness or ideology, "Every form in which 
the Idea is expressed is at the same time a passing or fleeting stage 
... " (1975*24) In Hegel's terminology, the Idea refers to a parti­
cular society, and also to the system of thought in which the social 
relations of the individual within that society are expressed.
"We thus", Hegel avers, "have two Ideas, the subjective Idea as
knowledge, and then the substantial and concrete Idea [society] ... "
What Hegel calls the "true speculative Idea, the Kotlon, In its
determinations ..." (1892*106) is the concrete appropriation and
expression in philosophy (or social science), of both the knowledge
and the social relations of a particular epoch, Hegel maintains,
however, that a new form of civilization is developing within "civil"
or present-day capitalist society (1976*84)1 in this advanced
societal form, the social relations of the individual will conform to
human and rational principles, so that the "subjective Idea", or
knowledge, will be Identical with the "concrete Idea", or society.
These two forms of the Idea, then, will be united within the "true
speculative Idea". "The Idea", Hegel declares,
turns out to be the thought which is completely identical 
with itself, and not Identical simply in the abstract, but 
also in its action of setting itself over against itself, 
so as to gain a being of its own, and yet of being in full 
possession of itself while it is in this other. (1975*2J)
As I will argue in the concluding chapters of this study, Hegel's
"true speculative Idea" is precisely what Karx means by communist
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society —  the rational community of associated individuals in which 
"the free development of each is the condition for the free develop­
ment of all1*. (Marx, 1969, I »127)
In his theory of human consciousness in The Philosophy of Mind,
Hegel explores the development of the mind of the human individual 
which he believes will eventually emerge within the rational, or 
communist, society, "We have to deal", Hegel explains,
with this unity of subjective principle [individual human 
rationality] and substance [society]t it constitutes the 
process of Mind that this individual one or independent 
existence of subject should put aside its immediate 
character and bring itself forth as identical with the 
substantial. Such an aim is pronounced to be the highest 
end attainable by Man, (1892*106)
The process Hegel refers to is elucidated by Marx where, in the
Grundrlsse, he suggests that the "final result of the process of
social production always appears as the society Itself, i.e. the
human being ... in its social relations. Everything that has a fixed
form, Buch as the product etc,, appears as merely a moment, a vanishing
moment, in this movement". Communist society, Marx suggests, will
annul what Hegel calls "the immediate character" of the individual by
providing "free time —  which is both idle time and time for higher
activity ..." This free time will transform "its possessor into a
different subject", a transformation which involves
both discipline, as regards the human being in the process 
of becoming! and, at the same time, practice, ... experi­
mental science, materially creative and objectifying 
science, as regards the human being who has become, In 
whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society.
(1973*712)
Hegel's exploration of mind, which places seminal insights on 
human psychology within a profound theoretical framework, should have 
established him as one of the forerunners of modern psychology. But ^
. : 7.' / 7  ; V:- ; ; : 77;'- V7.-R7777'
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If Hegel towered over his contemporaries in this field, his efforts 
have yet to be comprehended by, and assimilated into, the mainstream 
of theoretical psychology. The deep influence of Hegel’s theory of 
human consciousness on Marx is already evident in the Manuscripts of 
1844 (1964j174) and especially in the 1845 Theses on Feuerbach, where 
Marx observes that it was left to (Hegelian) idealism to develop "the 
active side" of "human sensuous activity, practice , whereas 
materialism saw society "only in the form of the object ... or of 
contemplation ..." (1969, 1*13) What impressed Marx most, of course, 
was Hegel's effort to study human consciousness as it appears in the 
context of society. For Hegel embraces Plato’s interpretation of the 
maxim, "know thyself", according to which human self-knowledge is 
best achieved not by concentrating on the individual alone but rather 
by looking at the social and political aspects of human life.
Hegel rejects the abstract systems of rational psychology which 
attempt to explain consciousness by treating it as a thing and 
debating whether the mind is "simple" or "complex", "mortal" or 
"eternal". Mind, for Hegel, "is not an inert being but, on the 
contrary, absolutely restless being, pure activity ..." The funda­
mental quality of consciousness is its "ideality" or "negativity", a 
quality completely overlooked by rational psychology. (1969*3) The 
ideality of mind, writes Hegel, is the "triumph over externality ... 
Every activity of mind is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what 
is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by 
this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, of what is 
external that it becomes mind." (1969*11) Ideality refers to the 
creative nature of human consciousness, and it is closely related to
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the notion of extemalization or work developed in the Phenomenology.
In this sense, ideality is "manifestation", the objective expression 
of the individual’s consciousness through his or her activity or 
practice in society. (1969s16—17) But ideality means something more 
than externalization, since it also refers to the ability of the 
human mind to capture in thought the essence and meaning of its social 
and natural world.
If Hegel is opposed to rational psychology he is equally wither­
ing in his critique of empirical theories of consciousness based on 
the teachings of Locke and Condillac, For these thinkers mind is 
simply the process of mentally abstracting from the objects received 
by the senses: thus people have the notion of time because they 
perceive its passing, and they have the idea of space because they 
actually see it. These theories, which inspired the French school of 
Ideologie headed by Deatutt de Tracy (Lichthelm, 1967&*7)» were based 
on a model which materialist philosophy shared with the natural 
sciences, and treated the mind as a complex of reciprocally related 
forces and faculties, For Hegel, however, "reciprocally related" 
means only "externally connected", and the protestations of empirical 
psychology that it treats mind as a "harmoniously integrated" 
totality, were only "high sounding but empty phrases". (1969*4)
According to Ilegel, a totality cannot be understood in terms of 
its constituent elements, whether or not these elements are recipro­
cally related. To study mind in its true nature as a living, organic 
unity means to see it in terms of its absolute necessity, its develop­
ment as a "self-originating and self-actualizing universal Notion". 
(1969*5) Empirical psychology accepts its material as given by
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experience and organizes it in accordance with the canons of a method 
designed to investigate phenomena without consciousness or intel­
ligence. Philosophy (or social science), however, must "comprehend 
mind as a necessary development of the eternal Idea and must let the 
science of mind, as constituted by its particular parts, unfold 
itself entirely from its Notion". (1969*5) For Hegel, the notion of 
mind, its essential feature, is liberty or freedom which he 
provisionally defines as "the absence of dependence on an Other, the 
relating of self to self". (1969*15) This notion is not Hegel’s 
subjective fancy or idea, rather It is the "absolutely immanent" 
quality of human consciousness. The idea of freedom is the "absolute 
ooncept" (1976:33)t it is the "actuality" of men and women, " ,—  not 
something which they have ... but which they are". (1969*240) Conse­
quently, to grasp the content and nature of mind, the observer has 
"merely to look on as it were, at the object's own development ..." 
and treat "the so-called faculties of mind ... as steps (in its own) 
liberation", (1969*5» 1B4)
The mode of study Hegel proposes to utilize in the investigation 
of human consciousness is precisely the dialectic method. The 
dialectic itself, and the method and manner of exposition related to 
it will be considered in detail in the final chapter of this study.
But it is useful to keep in mind at the outset its resemblance to the 
method Marx employs in Capital and elsewhere. For both thinkers the 
development of society and the individuals within it is considered in 
relation to a future epoch of absolute freedom and liberty, "The 
absolute goal ... of free mind", writes Hegel, "is to make freedom its 
object, i.e, to make freedom objective as much in the sense that
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freedom shall he the rational system of mind, as in the sense that
this system shall be the world of immediate actuality ..." {1976*32)
liriting under the impact of his renewed acquaintance with Hegel, Marx
states in the Theses on Feuerbach that "the standpoint of the old
materialism is ’civil’ society; the standpoint of the new is human
society, or socialized humanity". (1969» 1*15) Similarly in Capital.
bourgeois society is presented as a progressive and necessary stage in
the organic development of society towards the ideal of socialism; a
society where, after the "expropriators are expropriated", production
is carried out "by freely associated men, and is consequently regulated
by them in accordance with a settled plan". (1976*929* 173)
It is ironic in this context that Marx is praised in popular
accounts as a hard-headed realist while Hegel is taken to task for his 
*
idealism. Both Hegel and Marx recognize that the notion of freedom 
or liberty is a powerful element in human consciousness. As Hegel 
observes, "freedom is a ’fact of consciousness’", one which "anyone 
can discover in himself". (1976*21) Marx’s vision of communist 
society is itself rooted in fundamental notions about the conscious­
ness of men and women which are drawn directly fro® Hegel, but which 
Marx did not trouble to outline or elucidate in a systematic fashion, 
For example, in passages from the Poverty of Philosophy, which echo 
Hegel’s idea that the investigator has only to observe the development 
of mind toward its own liberation, Marx speaks of the "need for
Perhaps the most lucid account heretofore of the relationship 
between Hegel and Marx, Sydney Hook’s Fro® Hegel to Marx (1976), 
consistently hammers on this theme.
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universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the
individual". This tendency, in connection with the struggle of the
working class, has become so clear "that people have only to take note
of what is happening and become its mouthpiece", (PPj1J8, 120) More
than ten years later Marx returns to this theme in the Grundrlsse.
Here Marx observes that the determining element in the development of
society is not the economic factor —  even, to use Engels’s famous
formulation, "in the last instance" (Quoted in Althusser, 1969*111)
< —  but "the absolute working out of the creative potentialities of
men". What is social wealth, asks Marx,
other than the universality of individual needs, 
capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created 
through universal exchange. The full development of 
human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so- 
called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature?
The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, 
with no presupposition other than the previous historio 
development, which makes this totality of development, 
i.e. the development of all human powers as such the 
end in Itself ...? Where he does not reproduce himself 
in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives 
not to remain something he has become, but is in the 
absolute movement of becoming? (1975*488? ©y emphasis)
Marx’s "absolute movement of becoming" represents the development of
human freedom —  just as it does for Hegelj in fact the passage from
. the Grundrlsse is taken almost word for word from a description of
wealth in the Phenomenology (1967*523-525). But for Hegel as well as
for Marx, freedom as it exists in individual human consciousness, "is
itself only a notion a principle of mind and heart ..." As such
it has developed historically "into an objective phase, into xhe




The structure of the Philosophy of Wind reflects Hegel's 
intention to advance from the most primitive and basic elements of 
human consciousness to "rational and free mind" and its expression in 
the state, history, art and philosophy. The first section of the 
work, "Subjective Kind", deals with human consciousness proper and 
begins with a discussion of the physical and mental properties of the 
individual human being or soul. But Hegel's notion that the indi­
vidual cannot be understood apart from the society in which he or she 
is placed is at once evident from the title of the first section of 
"Subjective Kind"* "Anthropology. The Soul", The soul is, in Hegel's 
terminology, the arena of mind's implicitnessj in plain language it 
is the natural form in which individuals come into the world and over 
which they have no real control. We cannot choose the circumstances 
of our birth, our racial and national characteristics or qualities 
like mortality and the ageing process. Similarly, the pattern of our 
feelings and sensations, the cycle of sleep and waking, the affliction 
of insanity and so on, are aspects of the human condition and beyond 
our immediate influence. Accordingly, Hegel deals with these 
subjects and others like superstition and the supernatural in the 
Anthropology, Hegel’s influence on Karx is strikingly evident here as 
in many other aspects of the Philosophy of Kind, Thus in the plan for 
Narx's proposed but never completed study of the forms of state and 
forms of consciousness and their relation to the material basis of 
society, Marx writes* "The point of departure obviously from the 
natural characteristic* subjectively and objectively. Tribes, races, 
etc." (1973*110)
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The natural or primitive man and woman bears no resemblance for
Hegel to Rousseau's noble savage. It is in primitive society that
the individual is least free and self-determined. More than at any
other stage in the development of civilization, the human being is
here determined by and identical with his or her social and natural
surroundings. Hegel's view is accepted by Marxj "... Human beings
become individuals only through the process of history. He appears
originally as a species being ..., clan being, herd animal ..."
(1973*496) Since this stage of human society corresponds with the
lowest development of consciousness, Hegel's discussion of mind
begins with "universal natural soul" or primitive society. Universal
natural soul, however, is not separate from and independent of its
members? society, even in its most primitive phase when individuals
have the least autonomy is still nothing but the conscious activity
of the individuals who make it up. "Just as light", Hegel writes,
bursts asunder into an infinite host of stars, so too 
does the universal natural soul sunder itself into an 
infinite host of individual souls} only with this 
difference, that whereas light appears to have an 
existence independently of the stars, the universal 
natural soul attains actuality solely in individual 
souls. (1969*35)
Marx is no less adamant than Hegel in insisting on the primacy of the 
individual even in primitive society where, he remarks, the main 
concern is "the reproduction of the individual", (1973*485)
If the individual in primitive society lacks autonomy, this 
society itself is not far removed from the determining influence of 
nature; and so its members are prey to superstition and myth which 
attribute to natural events a supernatural significance. Individuals 
in less developed societies lack the intellectual confidence of their
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modern counterparts and therefore base their decisions on external 
phenomena rather than on the "prudent consideration of all the 
circumstances". Accordingly, superstition led the Greeks, for 
example, to determine their actions by the results of animal sacri­
fice and to imagine that there is "more in the animal’s entrails 
than there is to be seen in them". (1969*40) Hegel, however, 
refuses to deny altogether the validity of primitive and ancient 
beliefs. Just as there have been rare but undeniable instances of 
the supernatural in modern society, the intimate intercourse with 
nature experienced by earlier peoples must have inspired "a few real 
cases of ... what seems to be marvellous prophetic vision of coming 
conditions and of events arising therefrom". Nevertheless, "as 
mental freedom gets a deeper hold, even those few and slight suscep­
tibilities, based upon participation in the common life of nature, 
disappear". Only "animals and plants ... remain for ever subject to 
such influences". (1969*37)
Hegel’s account of mental life in primitive society is echoed in 
Capital where Marx connects the existence of myth and superstition 
with "the immaturity of man as an individual, when he has not yet 
t o m  himself loose from the umbilical cord of his natural species- 
connection with other men, or on direct relations of dominance and 
servitude". Reflecting the nineteenth-century milieu of triumphant 
positivism Marx declines to speculate on the validity of beliefs in 
the supernatural, but goes on to indicate their link with the "low 
stage of development of the productive powers of labour and corres­
pondingly limited relations between men within the process of 
creating and reproducing their material life, hence also limited
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relations between man and nature". Nevertheless, the continuity of
Marx's thought with that of Hegel is demonstrated rather than
refuted in Marx’s observation that
These real limitations tof material life] are reflected 
in the ancient worship of nature, and in other elements 
of tribal religions. The religious reflections of the 
real world can, in any case, vanish only when the 
practical relations of everyday life between man and 
man, and man and nature, generally present themselves 
to him in a transparent and rational form. (1976*173)
3» Human Nature
For Hegel, society is composed of and produced by Individuals.
But society itself cannot be reduced to the independent actions of 
isolated individuals, Ken and women are above all social beings, and 
their character and individuality are best explained in terms of the 
society in which they live. The peculiarly British notion that 
society consists of individuals pursuing their own selfish interests, 
which was formulated originally by Hobbes and Locke and later syste­
matized by such thinkers as Mill and Spencer, is itself a product of 
the British character. In Britain, notes Hegel, "the individual in 
all his relationships aims to be independent of others, his connection 
with the universal [society] bearing his own peculiar stamp". Thus, 
the British "recognize the rational lees in the form of universality 
than in that of individuality. That is why their poets rank higher 
than their philosophers". (1969*50) Hegel's view of the relationship 
between society and the individual is shared by Marx. In the 
Grundrisse, for example, Marx defines society as "the man in his
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social relations". Accordingly, society does not consist of isolated 
individuals, but rather "represents the sum of relations ... in which 
these individuals stand to each other, and of the connections between 
them". (1971*103)
By assuming a fundamental continuity between society and the 
individual, Hegel and Marx come out against notions of an unchanging 
human nature —  the view of men and women as basically selfish, 
driven by a need for power over others and so on. As Marx puts it,
"the human essence ... is the ensemble of social relations". (1969» 
1:14) There are, Hegel admits, certain innate qualities such as 
genius and talent which are more prominent in some individuals than 
others. But even these "are, to begin with, merely dispositions" 
which "if they are not to be wasted or squandered" must be developed 
in and through society. (1969*52) Qualities belonging to the moral 
sphere like truth, understanding and generosity, are "not innate but 
[are] to be produced in the individual by his own efforts". (1969*52) 
The presence or absence of moral qualities in individuals is a 
function of the general culture in which they live, not of an eternal 
human nature. The phenomena of greed and avarice, envy and jealousy 
"are of no importance whatever for ethics", and belong "in a natural 
history of mind"—  to which no doubt they will one day be completely 
confined. (1969*52) These accidental mannerisms of human conduct 
diminish in a highly developed cultural epoch "in just the same way 
that, in such a period, the shallow characters in comedies of a less 
culturally developed epoch —  the completely frivolous, the 
ridiculously absent-minded, the sordidly avaricious *—  become much 
rarer". (1969*52-53) The naive hypocrisy of a Tartuffe, for example,
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"haa more or less disappeared. This downright falsehood, this veneer 
of goodness, has now become too transparent not to be seen through, 
and the divorce between doing good with one hand and evil with the 
other no longer occurs, since advancing culture has weakened the 
opposition between these categories'*. (1 976i257)
Hegel's emphasis on the progressive effects of development in 
society and culture on the morality of the individual is aimed at 
Romantic notions about a by-gone golden age of human development, 
Marx, too, is suspicious of Romantic opinions which elevate the 
morality of previous epochs over that of the modern order. " ... The 
childish world of antiquity", he remarks, "appears on the one side 
loftier" than our own. "On the other side it really is loftier in 
all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought 
for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint! while the modern 
age gives no satisfaction! or, where it appears satisfied with 
itself, it is vulgar." (1973*487-488) As Rosdolsky observes, Karx's 
opposition to the Romantic's critique of capitalism is not simply 
founded on their concealed support of feudal Interests, "He 
reproached them much more with being totally incapable of grasping 
the 'course of modern history*, i.e., the necessity and the 
historical progreaaiveness of the bourgeois social order which they 
criticized, and for confining themselves to moralistic rejection 
of it."* (1977*422)
Contemporary radicals who contrast today's "one-dimensional" 
and "consumerist" worker with the proletarian of the Russian October 
or the modern Chinese peasant are well-advised to keep the 
strictures of Hegel and Marx against Romantic moraliam firmly in 
mind.
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4. The AgeB of Kan and Woman in Contemporary Society
The development of consciousness is a feature of the general 
progress of society, hut it is equally a function of the stages of 
maturity in individual human beings. Ilegel's account of these stages 
as they occur among people in modern society provides a most lucid 
demonstration of his dialectical approach to individual consciousness 
and its relation to society. Moreover, this account helps to resolve 
Borne of the thorniest problems in the interpretation of his thought.
The ages of man and woman are above all the stages of mental growth 
and development, steps toward freedom in the sphere of Individual 
consciousness. But they are not the clearly outlined counterpart of 
the actual social and intellectual flowering of individual human 
beings. The physiological and conscious aspects of individuals are 
subject to uneven development as is evidenced, for example, by the 
great intellectual accomplishment achieved by some children at a very 
early age. There is also a more fundamental difference between the 
stages of growth as Hegel outlines them and the development of any 
particular Individual. The stages of maturity are the natural and 
necessary "moments" of human development; they represent the arche­
typical progress of human consciousness. Accordingly, they may or may 
not occur in any one individual in exactly the sequence and form In 
which they appear in theory; in some individuals they may not occur 
at all.
An example of this conception of development is available in 
Hegel's view of insanity. Insanity for Hegel is a developmental 
stage passed through by consciousness in its ascent to maturity, but
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"this interpretation of insanity is naturally not to be understood 
as if we were asserting that every mind, every soul, must go through 
this stage of extreme development". The extreme of insanity does not 
appear "in every individual but only in the form of limitations, 
errors, follies,.." (1969»124-125) One form of insanity for instance 
is "mania or frenzy" which sometimes gives rise to a "mood which 
torments" the afflicted person "with whims and fancies, but also to a 
suspicious, false, jealous, mischievous and malicious disposition".
Such "fits of ill-will occur in everyone} but the ethical, or at 
least prudent person knows how to subdue them". (1969*135)
According to Hegel, life begins with an implicit unity between 
subject and object. Children are in basio harmony and peace with 
themselves and the outside world, "The child", writes Hegel, "lives 
in Innocence, without any lasting pain, in the love it has for its 
parents and in the feeling of being loved by them." (1969*57) Even 
at birth, however, human babies may be distinguished from the lower 
animals, not only by their "delicately organized, infinitely plastic 
body," but also their "unruly, stormy and peremptory" nature. Where 
the animal is silent or expresses its pain by whimpering, the human 
infant makes its wants known by imperious screams, "By this ideal 
activity", notes Hegel wryly, "the child shows that it is straightway 
imbued with the certainty that it has the right to demand from the 
outer world the satisfaction of its needs," (1969*56-57)
The development of children is marked by an increasing mastery 
over the outside world and themselves. They begin to be aware of the 
actuality of their environment and to become and feel like actual 
human beings. Soon the child wishes to unite theory with practice
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and ’’passes to the practical inclination to test himself in this 
actual world". Children are enabled to test themselves in this way 
by growing teeth and learning to stand, walk and talk. The child’s 
incipient self-dependence is at first expressed in learning to play 
with tangible things. "But the most rational thing that children can 
do with their toys is to break them." Play gives over to the serious­
ness of learning and curiosity, and children awake to the feeling 
"that as yet they are not what they ought to be", (1969*59) They 
succumb to the desire to be more like the grown-ups they see around 
them, and begin to mimic adult activities.
The need of children to grow up, to strive after knowledge is 
the driving factor in all education. But children perceive learning 
not as an end in itselfj rather they see it as a way to achieve an 
ideal they connect with a particular mature and authoritative 
individual. Consequently Hegel invokes discipline and obedience as 
key factors in the education of children (elements, incidentally, 
which reappear in his and Marx's theory of the development of 
consciousness in general). He criticizes "the pedagogy which bases 
itself on play, which proposes that children should be made acquainted 
with serious things in the form of play and demands that the educator 
should lower himself to the childish level of intelligence of the 
pupils instead of lifting them up to an appreciation of the serious­
ness of the matter in hand". There ia no doubt "that children must 
... be roused to think for themselvesj but the worth of the matter in 
hand should not be put at the mercy of their immature, vain under­
standing". (1969*60) School forms the transition from the family 
into the world of society. At school children learn to be accepted
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for what they do rather than simply for what they are. At home a 
child is loved regardless of his or her behaviour, "in school, on the 
other hand, the immediacy of the child no longer counts; here it is 
esteemed only according to its worth ..." In the classroom the child 
"is not merely loved but criticized and guided in accordance with 
universal principles, ... in general subjected to a universal order 
. . . "  ( 1969: 61)
Youth is the stage of opposition between subject and object.
The young person sees his or her ideals and fancies contradicted at 
every turn by the dull obstinacy of the outside world. The idols of 
childhood, the persons who once seemed worthy of respect and 
imitation are revealed as frauds and exchanged for substantive notions 
like the ideal of love and friendship or the universal world order 
of peace and understanding. These concrete ideals in turn are 
attributed by young people to themselves, while the world itself 
seems contingent and accidental by comparison. Hot only is youth 
opposed to the world, it also feels compelled and qualified to change 
it. But youth fails to perceive that the ideal it cherishes has 
already succeeded in actualizing and explicating itself. Hot the 
world, but the individual young person is the accident; the world 
will soldier on with or without a particular individual. And part 
of the world's substantial content is the ideal like love or friend­
ship which young people take to be theirs alone.
The apparent opposition between the ideals of youth and the 
nature of reality means that youth feels unrecognized and at war with 
the world. In this conflict young people seem to possess a more 
altruistic character than the adult who has found a place in the
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existing order. For Hegel, however, this is a superficial way of 
looking at things. In contrast with the youth who is still wrapped 
up in his or her particular impulses and subjective views, the adult 
has plunged into the life of society and has become active on its 
behalf. "The youth", Hegel dryly observes, "necessarily arrives at 
this goalj but his immediate aim is to train and discipline himself 
so that he will be able to realize his ideals. In the attempt to 
make these actual he becomes a man." (1969*62)
The entry from his or her ideal life into society "can appear 
to the youth as a painful transition into the life of the Philistine". 
The distress it causes and the impossibility of immediately realizing 
the ideals of youth can turn a person "into a hypochondriac". Hypo­
chondria or, in modern terms, anxiety is not easily eluded, and the 
later it occurs, the more devastating its consequences are likely to 
be. "In this diseased frame of mind the man will not give up his 
subjectivity, is unable to overcome his repugnance to the actual 
world, and by this very fact finds himself in a state of relative 
incapacity which easily becomes an actual incapacity."** (1969*62)
In Hegel's view, anxiety is synonymous with alienation since any 
disease indicates "the Isolation of a particular system of the 
organism from the general life, and in virtue of this alienation of
*Hegel here anticipates a theory recently developed by the U.S. 
psychoanalyst, Leslie H. Farber. According to this writer, anxiety 
has reached epidemic proportions in Western society where the promise 
and hunger for personal freedom is strongest, lie follows Karen 
Korney’s definition of anxiety which closely resembles Hegel’s notion 
of hypochondria, i.e,, "the feeling of being small, insi^iificant, 
helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world "that is out to abuse, 
cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy". (Farber, 1976*21) Farber 
maintains that "anxiety is that range of distress which attends 
willing what cannot be willed", and suggests that it can only dis­
appear under a state of things where "the predominant experience [is]
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the particular from the general life, the animal exhibits its own 
finitude, its impotence and dependence on an alien power”. (1969*
116) Alienation in this sense means that "I forfeit my freedom which 
is rooted in [my intellectual] consciousness, I lose my ability to 
protect myself from an alien power, in fact, become subjected to it,” 
(19698115-116) An alienated person is far from being a force for 
change in society? instead he or she is restricted and held fast by 
the surrounding environment.
Hegel's prescription for hypochondria or anxiety is deceptively 
simple. If tha individual does not wish to perish, he or she must 
recogpize the world as a self-dependent entity «which in its essential 
nature is already complete”, and "accept the conditions set for him 
by the world and wrest from it what he wants for himself”. To the 
individual his or her submission to the existing system seems 
arbitrary and irrational. But in fact this unity of the individual 
with the world stems from considerations which at their source are 
rational. "The rational, the divine", states Hegel, "possesses the 
absolute power to actualize itself and has right from the beginning, 
fulfilled itself, it is not so impotent that it would have to wait for 
the beginning of its actualization." Since the Idea will go ahead on 
its own, it makes sense for the individual merely to attend to his 
or her private affairs and forgot the illusions of youth, "The man 
behaves quite rationally in abandoning his plan for completely trans­
forming the world and in striving to realize his personal aims, 
passions and interests only within the framework of the world of which 
he is a part," (1969s62)
one of freedom, as opposed to the bondage of the isolated will".
(1976*27, 53)
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Hegel here puts his finger on some basic questions about his 
philosophy, and also reveals a clue to the relationship of his thought 
with that of Marx. The clue concerns the concept of alienation which 
will be dealt with in detail in the following chapters. It is only 
necessary to observe here that in the Manuscripts of 1844 Marx rejects 
Hegel's view of alienation as a process, as a necessary stage in the 
development of consciousness in the individual as well as in the 
progress of human consciousness in general. For Hegel an alienated 
consciousness is incapable of initiating conflict and change and must 
adapt itself to the existing structure of society or perish. The 
young Marx, however, conceives the abolition of alienation as the 
result rather than the precondition for social revolution. On this 
view the alienation and degradation of the workers makes them into a 
revolutionary force. The notion of alienation presented in the 
Grundrlsse more than a decade after the Manuscripts were written is 
much closer to Hegel's and reflects the culmination of a movement in 
Marx's thought which has its beginnings in the Theses on Feuerbach.
Hegel's idea that youth can avoid anxiety or alienation by 
throwing in its lot with the existing order lends weight to an accusa­
tion made by Sydney Hook (1976**19) and more recently Martin Hieolaus 
(1973i27) that Hegel is a conservative, a master at political 
accommodation who believes the Prussian State of the early nineteenth 
century to be the ultimate conclusion of all human progress. Marx 
originally rejected this view of Hegel and denied that his system 
could be explained by appeals to Hegel's "political accommodation", 
(Blumenberg, 19721415 Later in the Critique of Hegel'a "Philosophy of 
Right" (1970a) and the Holy Family (1975) when Feuerbach’s influence
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on Marx was at its height, Marx wholeheartedly took up the opinion 
of Hegel expressed by Hook and Nicolaus. (O’Malley, 1970:xx, xxxv)
It is doubtful that Marx maintained this hostile view of Hegel 
when he wrote the Theses on Feuerbach where Marx complained that 
Feuerbach had abandoned Hegel's "revolutionizing dialectics".
(Mehring, 1969:111) In the Poverty of Philosophy, however, in which 
as Mehring points out Marx "went beyond Feuerbach by going back to 
Hegel", (1962:127) there is no longer any question of Marx's opinion 
of Hegel. There Marx compares Hegel, "the simple professor of 
philosophy", with Ricardo, the "rich banker and distinguished 
economist". (PP:99) As is well known, Marx has the highest opinion 
of Ricardo and praises his "scientific impartiality and love of 
truth"; (1976*565) it is unlikely that Marx would put him in the 
same company as a political sycophant. In any case, the details of 
Hegel's life are in no way consistent with the accepted notion that 
"Hegel towards the end [was] a philosopher-pope bestowing benediction, 
as Pope's must, on the temporal emperor",*1 (Nicolaus, 1976:27)
Whatever Marx's final opinion of Hegel's politics may have been, 
there is little doubt he stood by the assertion, repeated by Lichtheim
gf
Hegel was a fervent supporter of the French Revolution as a youth 
and never lost his regard for its achievements. (Kauftaann, 1976:8, 321; 
Pelczynski:1971) As Avineri points out, Hegel was constantly hounded 
by the Prussian censors and protested strongly against the State perse­
cution of student radicals when it wa3 very dangerous to do so. (197?* 
3* 4* 67, 117* 130-131) It is usually forgotten first, that Hegel was 
passed over for a university chair until almost ten years after the 
publication of his epoch-making Phenomenology; and second, that the 
German universities of Hegel's time were the only remaining centres of 
free speech left in the country. After his death, Hegel's personally 
selected successor, Cans, attracted radicals from all over Germany, 
including Marx. (Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfer, 1976:31-32) After 
all, even a "Marxist in Philosophy" (Althusser, 1975*165) can find 
fame and honour in State institutions without relinquishing his 
principles.
43
(1967*xxx) and Plamenatz (1976*11* 129-268 ), among other commentators, 
that for Hegel history is merely the eternal manifestation of a 
logical process which goes on behind the backs of living men and 
women. (Marx, 1976:102) Much the same picture is painted by such 
diverse Western Marxist thinkers as Althusser (1972* 1976), Colletti 
(1969* 1970) and Marcuse (1973*258, 314)» although, as I will show 
in the next two chapters, Colletti and Marcuse also resort to the 
view that Hegel is a theologian. In any case, the notion that Hegel 
sees history as the manifestation of the Idea rather than the will 
of individual human beings appears to be supported by Hegel’s 
suggestion that youth can forget its ideals and let the Idea unfold 
on its own. There is another interpretation, however, which is Just 
as securely based on Hegelian texts as the previous ones, but which 
has the additional merit of being consistent with the overall 
trajectory of Hegel's thought.
As Hegel observes, if in society the mature individual is con­
fronted with a self-dependent and objective world, this world is 
itself nothing but the historical result of the action of individuals. 
At each stage in its development, the social structure manifests the 
Idea as it appears in the consciousness of all the persons within it. 
The Idea is not ’’something far away beyond this mortal sphere ”, but 
is found ’’however confused and degenerated in every consciousness”, 
(1971*276) "Actuality”, or society, In turn, "consists Just in mind's 
manifestation” and "belongs therefore to its Motion”, (1969*18) Of 
course, this is not to be taken to mean that the ideas of every 
single person or group are faithfully reflected in the objectivity 
of society. For example, the idea is now abroad that women should no
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longer be charged with the sole responsibility for the management 
of home and family, and that men should take an equal share in all 
aspects of family life. Clearly this idea extends the principle of 
personal freedom towards the condition of women, but it is far from 
being achieved in practice. Personal freedom, as expressed in the 
choice of a career independent of the home and its mind-stultifying 
chores, remains largely the prerogative of men, and is accepted as 
such in the consciousness of most people. Nevertheless, here and 
there the notion of personal freedom for women has a real presence in 
the form of day-care centres, women’s rights organizations, a more 
self-dependent character in many women and so on. As Hegel puts it,
"in finite mind" or the individual consciousness, "the Notion of 
mind does not ,,. reach its absolute actualization; but absolute 
mind Cor society] is the absolute unity of actuality and the Notion 
or possibility of mind", (1969*18) In a passage where he believes 
he is contradicting Hegel, Marx repeats this observation: "History 
is the thoughts which are in the minds of all,” (PP*105)
It is in this sense of society as the self-manifestation of the 
Idea, that Hegel calls the world into which the adult enters "complete". 
The freedom or liberation of mind "is not something never completed", 
it transcends the conditions of everyday life and establishes itself 
within these conditions. It iB  not an unrealizable goal "to be striven 
for endlessly; on the contrary mind wrests itself out of this progress 
to infinity, frees itself absolutely ... from its Other, and so 
attains absolute being-for-self". (1969*24) Accordingly, society 
leaves the individual "scope for an honourable, far-reaching and 
creative activity". Whereas society is "complete in its essential
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nature ... it i8 not a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life 
process, a world which perpetually creates itself anew, which while 
merely preserving itself, at the same time progresses”. (1969*62-63)
And it is precisely in this conservation and advancement of the world 
that the individual's work consists. A person not only re-creates 
in society something which is already there, but his or her activity 
also pushes society forward. Of course, the power of any one 
particular individual is severely limited, for "the world's progress 
occurs only on the large scale and only comes to view in a large 
aggregate of what has been produced". (1969*63) The tempo of advance 
is slow, but it is there all the same and its presence is visible for 
the individual even if only in retrospect. "If the man after a labour 
of fifty years looks back on his past he will readily recognize the 
progress made. This knowledge, as also the insight into the 
rationality of the world, liberates him from mourning over the 
destruction of his ideals." (1969*63)
In The German Ideology, and more than a decade later In the 
Grundrisse (l973*461), Karx provides a similar account of the visi­
bility of progress: "Communiem is not for us a stable state which is 
to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust 
itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the 
present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from 
the premises now in existence," (1968:48) No less than Marx, however, 
Hegel believes that progress is not only a gradual development; it 
is also manifested in "qualitative leaps" like that characterized by 
the Revolution of 1789« "»*» The spirit of the time", writes Hegel,
growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is
to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another
46
of the structure of its previous world. That it is 
tottering to its fall is indicated only by symptoms 
here and there. Frivolity and again ennui, which are 
spreading in the established order of things, the 
undefined foreboding of something unknown —  all these 
betoken that there is something else approaching.
This gradual crumbling to pieces, which did not alter 
the general look and aspect of the whole, is inter­
rupted by the sunrise, which, in a flash and at a 
single stroke, brings to view the form and structure 
of the new world. (1967*75)
The greatest barrier to progress is the obstinacy of the old 
ideas and ways of looking at things that people inherit from past 
generations. The structure and institutions of society are the work 
of centuries and before new ideas can be accepted a significant 
proportion of men and women must be educated up to their level. 
"Isolated individuals", for example, "may often feel the need and the 
longing for a new constitution, but it is quite another thing, and 
one that does not arise till later, for the mass of the people to be 
animated by such an idea." (Quoted in Pelczynskl, 1964*118) But 
prejudices and outmoded ideas are not solely the property of the great 
mass of people. They belong equally to the consciousness of the 
individual, however enlightened he or she may be. "We moderns too", 
notes Hegel, "by our whole upbringing, have been initiated into ideas 
which it is extremely difficult to overstep, on account of their far- 
reaching significance." (1975 * 51)
The ideas of men and women, no less than anything else, are a 
captive of reality. It is true, as Hegel observes, that the "’old 
mole1" of revolution (also a favourite metaphor of Rarx) which "is 
inwardly working ever forward ... until growing strong in itself 
bursts asunder the crust of the earth which divided it from the sun" 
sometimes gives ideas "seven league boots". But these ideas merely
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reflect a process which was long going on beneath the surface of 
appearance. The "work of the human spirit in the recesses of thought 
is parallel with all the stages of reality; and therefore no philo­
sophy oversteps its own time". (1896 * 547) Hegel's notion of
the role of ideas in history as well as his general conception of the 
place of the individual in the historical process, is paraphrased in 
a famous passage on the opening page of ftarx’s The Eighteenth Brumalre 
of Louis Napoleon:
Hen make their own history, but they do not make it Just 
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brain of the living. (1969» I*39Q)
According to Hegel, men and women newly emerged from the inner 
conflicts of youth into the reality of the outside world must ensure 
that what is worthwhile in their ideals is translated into their 
practical activity; "what the man must purge himself of is only what 
is untrue, the empty abstractions." (1969*63) What Hegel means by 
empty abstractions can only be fully explicated with reference to his 
debate with the Kantian philosophy, a debate which will be dealt with 
below. But a provisional indication of its meaning may be given 
here. For Hegel, empty abstractions are notions which, when put into 
practice, destroy themselves. They are the opposite of the mindless 
prejudices people inherit from past generations precisely because they 
are bereft of all continuity with the past. In the French Revolution, 
for example, freedom and equality were interpreted in an empty or 
abstract manner. As a result, no distinctions of class or rank were 
tolerated, and government itself was interpreted as despotic rule by 
a faction. Instead of achieving their aim, however, the proponents 
of abstract freedom and equality succeeded only in annihilating
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successive attempts at the government and order which the Revolution 
itself was meant to establish. (1967s603-607)
People with negative or abstract ideas about freedom view every 
possible manifestation or content of freedom in society as a 
restriction of freedom. This "freedom of the void" is the heart and 
soul of political or religious fanaticism; giving effect to it 
results in the destruction of the whole fabric of society, the loss 
of free thought as well "as the elimination of individuals who are 
objects of suspicion to any social order, and the annihilation of any 
organization which tries to rise anew from the ruins". (1976*22) 
"Negative freedom" is the underlying element in anarchism, a form of 
politics deplored as much by Hegel as it is by Marx who observes that 
communism itself must preserve and build upon the accomplishments of 
the old order. (1976*173)
Hegel observes that the world offers the individual a whole 
range of creative activities, but the most important element in these 
activities is "the interests of right, ethics, and religion". This 
offering may strike modern readers as extremely meagre, to say the 
least. But Hegel’s notion of these activities includes the entire 
realm of substantial and worthwhile endeavour, any activity in which 
the individual is "active on behalf of others". Men and women, he 
remarks, "can find satisfaction and honour in all spheres of their 
practical activity if they accomplish what is rightly required of them 
in the particular sphere to which they belong either by chance, outer 
necessity or free choice". (1969*63) Hegel's sanguine view of the 
possibility for the development and employment of an individual’s 
ideals in the existing order may seem overly optimistic especially
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when contrasted with the following hitter formulation from The German 
Ideology:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideast i.e,, the class, which is the ruling 
material force of society, is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the 
means of material production at its disposal, has 
control at the same time over the means of mental 
production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the 
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production 
are subject to it. (1968*61)
But if Hegel may be accused of optimism surely the opposite charge 
applies here to Marx and Engels. "The danger of this formulation", 
remarks Ralph Miliband, "... is that it may lead to a quite inadequate 
account being taken of the many-sided and permanent challenge directed 
at the ideological predominance of the ’ruling class’ and of the fact 
that this challenge ... produces a steady erosion of that predomi­
nance." (1977*53) As S. S. drawer observes, "the very existence of 
The German Ideology demonstrates [that] writers and thinkers can 
place themselves in opposition to dominant modes of thought". (1976* 
108)
The mistake, of course, is to forget that bourgeois or capitalist 
society is also "our" society; society is nothing but the productive 
activity of the people who make it up. This idea, which is never 
forgotten by Hegel and rarely by Marx, who hailed it as the "out­
standing achievement" and "final outcome" of Hegel’s Phenomenology 
(1964*177)» leads Hegel to suggest that the mature adult "beoomes 
such only through his own intelligent concern for his temporal 
interests; Just as nations only attain their majority when they have 
reached the stage where they are not excluded by a so-called paternal 
government from attending to their material and spiritual interests".
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(1969s63) Hegel's emphasis on the "temporal interests" of the indivi­
dual seems at first glance to once again substantiate his popular 
image as a cynical supporter of the status quo —  an image that is 
further strengthened by his observation that the mature individual "is 
for, not against, the existing order of things, is interested in 
promoting, not opposing it; he has risen above the one-sided subjec­
tivity of youth to the standpoint of an objective intelligence". 
(1969*57) But what Hegel calls "the standpoint of objective intelli­
gence" refers to the point of view an individual acquires by his or 
her membership In a social class. The temporal interests of the 
individual, therefore, are also the interests of his or her social 
class. "When we say that a man must be a 'somebody'." Hegel explains,
we mean that he should belong to some specific social 
class, since to be a somebody means to have substantive 
being, A man with no class is a mere private person 
and his universality is not actualized.
The young person rebels at the notion of Joining a social class and
believes "that by entering a class he is surrendering himself to an
indignity. This is the false idea that in attaining a determinacy
necessary to it, a thing is restricting and sundering itself". (1976*
271)
For Hegel as for Karx, the class structure of the existing order 
contains not only the legions of privilege and inequality but also 
those of freedom and progress, "Here is the rose," writes Hegel, 
referring to the present order of things, "dance thou here ... To 
recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby 
to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight that reconciles us 
to the actual ..." (1976:11-12) In the view of both Hegel and Karx,
the surface appearance of the prevailing system merely conceals the
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developing outlines of a more rational and freer society (Mthe rose
in the cross of the present") which may be perceived and fought for
by the individual in society. In a striking image Andre Glucksman
sums up the viewpoint of Marx in terms that apply just as well to
that of Hegel, "Marx was a revolutionary", writes Glucksman,
because he assigned to the capitalist system the sole 
basis of its mortality. He has been turned into a Statue 
of the Commander, before whom incense is burned in 
expectation of a sign of the final date of its decease, 
while all about the banquet of life continues in the joy 
of profanity ... Marx is no Enlightenment Aufklärer for 
whom history progresses by choosing the best in light of 
comparison ... Marx knew, with philosophical knowledge, 
that no absolute justifies and that every stage of reality 
is formed by defending itself against the movement that 
carries it away. (1977*514)
The adult individual cannot be satisfied with the solipsism of 
youth, but is subject to what Hegel calls "a real antithesis" and is 
forced to seek out and find "itself in another individual". This anti­
thesis —- which is the root of the temporal or social interests of men 
and women —  "is the sexual relation", a relation which has both a 
"subjective" and a "universal" aspect. (1969:64) Hegel maintains that 
it is the sexual instinct of men and women, their desire to find and 
realize themselves in others, which forma the foundation of society as 
well as the force behind the struggle for freedom and progress. "Love", 
as Hegel puts it, "is mind's feeling of its own "unity," This unity, 
however, is achieved only within a social group. Hence in society, as 
in the family, "one's frame of mind is to have self-consciousness of 
one's individuality within this unity as the absolute essence of 
oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an independent person 
but as a member". (1976:110)
On the subjective side, the sexual relation is expressed "in an
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instinctive and emotional harmony of moral life and love" which 
"acquires its ... moral and spiritual [social] significance and 
function in the family". Also on the subjective side of this anti­
thesis are "political, scientific and artistic" purposes of the 
individual where these are merely his or her private and undeveloped 
interests or talents. But the antithesis within each person also has 
an "active half" where these purposes are pushed to "an extreme 
universal phase". Here "the individual is the vehicle of a struggle 
of universal and objective [i.e. class] interests with the given 
conditions (both of his own existence and that of the external world), 
carrying out these universal principles into a unity with the world 
which is his own work". (1969*64)
It is worth noting that in Hegel’s time party politics had not 
developed very far (Pelczynski, 1964*8) and the political option 
advocated by Marx in the Communist Manifesto (1969* l) was, of course, 
unavailable. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between Hegel 
and Marx in this respect. An individual may indeed become the vehicle 
of universal principles within the framework of a political party.
The only stricture Hegel (and Marx) would impose is that the thinking 
of the individual should not prostrate itself and "remain stationary 
at the given, whether the given be upheld by the external positive 
authority of the state or the consensus hominum" or the political 
party. The individual should rely on his or her own free...thought, 
and "thought which is free starts out from itself and thereupon claims 
to know itself as united in its uttermost being with the truth", 
(1976*5)
Once entry into society is complete, the individual may well be
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unhappy and depressed with the state of the world, and may even 
abandon hope of ever improving it. Almost in spite of him/herself, 
however, the adult soon finds a place in the objective world of work 
and becomes accustomed to it. At first this world seems strange and 
new} there appears to be little pattern in what the individual does, 
and every event seems to have a uniqueness and peculiarity of its 
own. But the longer an individual works the more he or she comes to 
see that events follow certain general rules, are subject to parti­
cular laws. Accordingly, the individual becomes completely at home 
when at work and gradually grows accustomed to what was formerly an 
alien world. There are now no surprises for the individual} only 
odd events, with little connection to the general run of things, 
provide diversion and interest. Without the constant opposition 
between expectations and reality, the individual becomes trapped in 
the mechanism of habit which eventually hurtles a person into old age. 
•'The very fact", writes Hegel,
that his activity has become so conformed to his work, 
that his activity no longer meets with any resistance, 
this complete facility of execution, brings in its 
train the extinction of its vitality} for with the 
disappearance of the opposition between subject and 
object there also disappears the interest of the 
former with the latter. Thus the habit of mental life, 
equally with the dulling of the functions of his 
physical organism, changes the man into an old man.
(1969*64)
For the old person life has lost all its challenge and interest. 
Hope for the fulfilment of the ideals of youth has long since been 
abandoned, "and the future seems to hold no promise of anything new 
at all", The elderly individual imagines that he or she already 
knows the essence and general pattern of any event that may yet be 
encountered. Everything is explicable in terms of the maxims the old
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person has long since mastered and internalized. The mind of the 
elderly is focused entirely on these substantial rules of conduct 
and the events in the past to which it owes knowledge of them. By 
living in the past, the aged person forgets the details of the present 
"names, for example, in the same measure that conversely, he firmly 
retains in his mind the maxims of experience and feels obliged to 
preach to those younger than himself".' The wisdom of the old person, 
"this lifeless, complete coincidence of the subject’s activity with 
the world", carries the elderly individual back to the days of child­
hood where there was also no opposition between subject and object, 
just "in the same way that the reduction of his physical functions to 
a processless habit leads on to the abstract negation of the living 
individuality, to death", (1969*64)
5. On Nature and Contradiction
In his account of the sequence of ages in the human being, Hegel 
expresses the only dialectical "law" worth remembering, a law later 
emphasized by Marx with regard to historys "Ho antagonism, no 
progress. This is the law that history has followed up to our days". 
(PP:59) For both Hegel and Marx, contradiction, antithesis, or 
antagonism as they variously call it, is the origin Of all change and 
development. "... The Hegelian contradiction writes Marx, "is
the source of all dialectics." (1976*744) In Hegel’s words, ” ...
Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality, and it is only 
insofar as it contains contradiction that anything moves and has 
impulse and activity.11 (Quoted In Lenin, 1963*139) Without contra­
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diction the human being grows old and dies: the mind of the elderly 
lacks contradiction, or the condition within a living organism which 
forces it out of itself and compels it to change itself and/or its 
environment. By resolving the contradiction within itself the 
organism at once transcends its original condition, preserves itself 
—  and creates a new contradiction. In relation to the sequence of 
ages in men and women, for example, there is a contradiction between 
the desire of children to understand things and the limited nature of 
their knowledge, or between the ideals of youth and the character of 
society as youth sees it. Every type of contradiction or antithesis 
is not something external to the object in which it appears, but rather 
the contradiction is a distinguishing feature of the ob.lect itself.
In his seminal essay "Contradiction and Overdetermination" the 
French Marxist Louis Althusser observes that Hegelian contradiction 
concerns consciousness and for that reason, "it is simple". Conscious­
ness has "no true external determination. A circle of circles, 
consciousness has only one centre, which solely determines it ..." 
(1969*102) Althusser is right to stress that Hegel’s concept of 
contradiction involves consciousness, but the simplicity of the concept 
has not prevented its being misunderstood. As Hegel observes in a 
passage emphasized by Lenin in the Philosophical Notebooks. •In 
movement, impulse and the like, the simplicity of these determinations 
conceals the contradiction from imagination ..." (1963*141) I» the 
following discussion I will attempt to sort out the meaning and 
function of the concept with regard to Hegel's view of the role of the 
individual in the development of thought and society, as well as in 
nature.
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The comprehension of Hegel's concept of contradiction requires 
first of all a grasp of his notion of necessity, for as Lenin remarks, 
"the core of Hegelianism" is about "internally necessary movement",
(19631141) Hegel distinguishes what he calls "inner necessity" from 
"external necessity". External necessity "means determination from 
without only —  as in finite mechanics, where a body moves in the 
direction communicated to it by the impact". This meaning of necessity 
is implied "in the ordinary acceptation of the term in popular philo­
sophy". (1975:55-56) Accordingly, Kant assimilates the notion of 
necessity into the relation of cause and effect. "The concept of 
cause", notes Kant, "is one which involves the necessity of a connec­
tion between different existing things, insofar as they are different. 
Thus when A is granted, I recognize that B, something entirely 
different from it, must necessarily exist also." (1956*52) For Hegel, 
external necessity as represented by the relation of cause and effect 
"forms only one aspect in the process" of necessity, Moreover, it 
represents a relatively low level of necessity, a "finite" relation, 
Hegel notes that cause and effect are implicitly identical; " ... a 
cause is a cause only when it has an effect and vice versa. Both cause 
and effect are thus one and the same content ,,," But the relation of 
external necessity separates the cause from the effect "so that, though 
the cause is also an effect, and the effect also a cause, the cause is 
not an effect in the same connection as it is a cause, nor the effect 
a cause in the same connection as it is an effect". The consequence 
of utilizing the finite concept of cause and effect is that the 
investigation is led into "the infinite progress, in the shape of en 
endless series of causes, which shows itself as an endless series of
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effects", (1975*216-110 Necessity in Hegel's meaning of the term, 
however, refers to the "self-movement" or "activity" of a single 
organic whole. It Involves "the coincident alternation of inner and 
outer, the alternation of their opposite motions combined into a 
single motion". (1975*208)
Hegel argues that external necessity is "contingent" since it 
refers to something which "has the ground of its being not in itself 
but in somewhat [something] else". Something which is contingent,
"may or may not be ... may be in one way or in another, [its] being 
or not being ... depends not upon itself but on something else", 
(1975*205) For Hegel, the concept of external necessity can make 
sense of a mechanism like a watch or a steam engine, but it is power­
less to explain the interdependent functioning, development and 
reproduction of the parts within a living and growing organism such 
as an oak tree, human knowledge or society. Nor can it adequately 
comprehend the interdependent relations within a growing and changing 
unity or whole, such as the solar system, "What is necessary", says 
Hegel, is the "simple self-relation, in which all dependence on some­
thing else is removed". (1975*208) Within an organic whole or unity, 
the parts are defined entirely by their interdependent relation with 
one another and with the whole itself1 "... the different is not
confronted by any other, but by its other." (1975*173) On Hegel's 
definition, then, something which is necessary "has its end within 
itself, is unity with itself [and] does not pass into another, but, 
through [the] principle of activity, determines changes in conformity 
with its own content, and, in this way maintains itself therein". 
(1894*157) The "principle of activity" which "determines changes" In
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an organism or self-dependent system is,... contradiction.
Necessity, for Hegel, is a ’’process'* (1975*211) which ’’althou^i 
derivative ... must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived 
as a vanishing element in itself". (1975*208) The result of this 
process, therefore, should not be interpreted as the fulfilment of a 
purpose already overtly present or visible at the beginning. Neces­
sity, he remarks, is said to be blind if this means that in the 
process of necessity the end is not explicitly recognizable. The 
human baby, for example, does not appear first as a homunculus con­
tained in the spermatozoon or ovum as people once believed} and while 
capitalism developed out of earlier modes of production, the purpose 
of the latter was not to elaborate the former.
The process of necessity begins with the existence of 
scattered circumstances which have no interconnexion 
and no concern with one another. These circumstances 
are an immediate actuality which collapses, and out of 
this negation a new actuality proceeds ... From such 
circumstances and conditions there has, as we say, 
proceeded quite another thing, and it is for this 
reason that we call this process cf necessity blind,
(1975*209)
According to Hegel, the process of necessity expresses "the true 
profound Notion of life, which must be considered as an end in itself 
— a self-identity that independently impels itself on, and in its 
manifestation remains identical with its Notion* thus it is the self- 
effectuating Idea". (1894*159) Something like Hegel's concept of the 
"self-effectuating Idea" appears, for example, in modem molecular 
biology where "the structure of the assembled molecules itself" is said 
to constitute "the source of 'information' for the construction of the 
whole". In fact the description of the development of living organisms 
provided by the French biologist Nonod is identical to what Hegel
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describes as the process of necessity. In the development of a living 
organism, states Monod,
The complete structure was never preformed; but the 
architectural plan for it ["the Idea”] was present in 
its constituents themselves, so enabling it to come 
into being spontaneously and autonomously, without 
outside help and without the injection of additional 
information. The necessary information was present, 
but unexpressed, in its constituents. The epigenetic 
building of a structure is not a creation, it is a 
revelation. (1972 i 86-87)
The process of necessity, Hegel argues, concerns the "inner 
necessary connection" of the parts within a whole, as well as "the 
immanent origination of distinctions" within the parts which ultimately 
transform the whole, (1954*192) This process of interdependence, 
self-development and reproduction occurs at three different levels or 
stages. Matter or inorganic nature exhibits the first and lowest 
stage of necessity; living, or organic nature represents the second, 
while conscious human activity and its creation, society, constitutes 
the third stage.
At the level of inorganic nature the connection between things is 
"the merely internal, and for that reason also merely the external 
connection of mutually independent existences". This stage of neces­
sity refers to "matter, this universal basis of every existent form in 
Nature", which "not merely offers resistance to us, exists apart from 
our mind, but holds itself asunder against its own self, divides 
itself into concrete points, into material atoms of which it is com­
posed". The planets, for example, are attracted to the sun and to 
each other; nevertheless, they "appear to be mutually independent of 
it and one another, this contradiction being represented by the motion 
of the planets around the sun". ( 1969*9)
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In a process analogous to human history nature "advances through 
many stages, whose exposition constitutes the Philosophy of Nature".
In this process nature "overcomes its externality ... liberates the 
Notion concealed in Nature from the covering of externality and 
thereby overcomes external necessity". (1969*13) The human mind 
represents the ultimate triumph of nature over externality, although 
even human consciousness is at first shackled to the "illusory 
appearance" that its natural and social environment is something 
utterly alien and external to it. But this final externality of 
alienation is abolished by nature which "is driven onwards beyond 
itself to mind as such, that is, to mind which by thinking, is in the 
form of universality, of self-existent, actually free mind". (1969*14) 
Hegel has been criticized by many commentators, among them 
Lukács (1975*543) and Schmidt (1971*189)» because according to them 
he does not mention the historical development or evolution of things 
in nature but refers only to human history. This criticism is mis­
placed! but there are many statements in Hegel which provide grounds 
for this misinterpretation and which should be explained. In the 
Phenomenology, for example, Hegel observes that "organic nature has no 
history" (1967*326) and in the Lesser Logic he states that "the world 
of spirit [society] and the world of nature continue to have this 
distinction, that the latter moves only in a recurring cycle, while 
the former certainly also makes progress", (1975*291) 'What Hegel is 
here concerned to do is to separate the history of men and women, 
which is the result of their conscious activity, from the history of 
nature which is unconscious or external to the natural existences
within it
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The idea of evolution or natural history was a dominant motif of 
romantic thought, and the ideas of the thinkers within this tradition 
such as Schelling and Goethe were, as Lukács points out, "taken up and 
exaggerated and developed into a ... mystical cult of nature philo­
sophy which threatened to engulf all efforts to achieve a really 
concrete analysis of the historical development of society ..." (l975* 
545) The history of human beings, in other words, was treated as a 
mere branch of natural history as a whole. This tendency, although 
strongly resisted by Hegel, found expression in Engels’s determination 
to collapse the laws of society into the more general "dialectical 
laws of nature" and reached its apotheosis in the teachings of 
orthodox dialectical materialism where everything is reduced to the 
natural and dialectical laws of moving matter. (Jordan, 1967*394)
For Engels and the exponents of dialectical materialism, "the fact 
that human history is made by beings endowed with consciousness is 
nothing more than a factor which tends rather to complicate the 
matter", (Schmidt, 1971*191) Apart from the law of contradiction, 
Hegel never speaks of "dialectical laws" of any kind, whereas Engels 
found three» transformation of quantity into quality* inter­
penetration of opposites, and negation of the negation (1954*&3) and 
ilarx mentions the first of these in Capital. (1976*425)
Hegel argues that human consciousness and society are at once 
Part of and separate from nature* human consciousness developed out 
of nature, but it is no longer subject to natural laws in the same 
vay, for. example, as the solar system "where matter and movement 
have a manifestation all their own", (1969*7) Planetary life "is 
°nly a life of motion, in other words, is a life in which the deter-
62
mining factor is constituted by space and time (for space and time 
are the moments of m o t i o n ) E v e n  for the simplest organisms, how­
ever, the laws of motion are "a completely subordinate factor? the 
individual as such makes its own space and time? its alteration is 
determined by its own concrete nature"* (1969*38) As Konod puts it, 
writing from a tradition he believes to be opposed to Hegelian 
philosophy, "the organism effectively transcends physical laws", and 
"owes almost nothing to the action of outside forces". (1972*21, 81) 
The course of plant life is determined to a degree by the move­
ment of the planets (although this influence may be offset by the 
practical activity of human beings) but the internal development of 
plants is independent of the "abstract motion" that governs the solar 
system. The animal body is even more independent of natural forces 
than vegetable life* "the course of its development is quite 
independent of the motions of the planets and the period of its life 
is not measured by them? its health and the course run by its disease 
do not depend on the planets ... the determinant is not time as time, 
but the animal organism". For the human being "the abstract deter­
minations of space and time, the mechanics of free motion, have 
absolutely no significance and no power". The laws of cause and 
effect, "the abstract determinations of Juxtaposition and succession" 
which govern the "inner, necessary unity" of the solar system (1969* 
58, I63), are infinitely less substantial and less concrete than "the 
determinations of self-conscious mind", The concrete human 
individual, to be sure, "is indeed in a definite place and a definite 
time? but for all that is exalted over them". (1969*?8)
Karx shares Hegel’s view of.the independence of human conscious-
63
ness from the abstract laws of time and space "and often quoted the 
following remark of Hegel’s with approval: ’Even the criminal thought 
of a malefactor has more grandeur and nobility than the wonders of 
the heavens’". (Lukács, 1975:544) Lenin, however, who in many 
respects is undoubtedly Hegel's most perceptive student, suggests that 
by "referring time and space to something lower compared with thought", 
Hegel "allowed the ass's ears of idealism to show themselves ..." 
(1963:228) Whether or not he is an idealist in Lenin’s sense, Hegel 
is anxious to emphasize that "of course, the life of man is conditioned 
by a specific measure of difference, that of the Earth from the Sun? 
he could not live at a greater or less distance from the Sun? but the 
influence of the position of the Earth on mankind does not go beyond
that". (1969:38)
According to Hegel, the inmost truth, the essence of men and 
women is to create society by acting on nature? mind’s ’’manifestation 
is to set forth Nature as its world*. But in creating their own social 
world, men and women "at the same time presuppose the world as & 
nature independently existing". (1969*18) At the highest stage of 
human consciousness even this semblance of externality, the notion that 
nature is independent of human beings and their society, disappears 
end nature "appears only as a means whereby mind attains to absolute 
being*for-self, to the absolute unity of what it is in itself and what 
4t is for itself, of its Notion and its actuality*. (1969:19) What 
Hegel has in mind is precisely the union of nature and humanity which 
for Marx constitutes the goal of communism: a society where the 
division between people and nature will be torn away because men and 
women will have learned to relate to her with all their human
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faculties rather than through exploitation. "Need and enjoyment", 
writes the young Marx, "will have lost their egoistic nature and 
nature will have lost its mere utility in that its utility has become 
a human utility." (1971*151* also Grundrisse, 1973*542)
Hegel's observation that "Absolute mind ... is the creator of 
its other [society, and] of nature" (1969*19) has led many writers, 
starting with Feuerbach, to assume that for Hegel nature is merely 
some kind of fantastic production by Mind or the Idea. As Schmidt 
expresses it (using Hegelian terminology* a sure sign according to 
Marcuse that the writer is confused (1973*393)):"Mature [in Hegel's 
opinion] is not a being possessing its own self-determination but the 
moment of estrangement which the Idea in its abstract-general form 
must undergo in order to return to itself completely as Spirit". 
(1971*23) Schmidt postulates that since Hegel begins the Encyclo­
paedia with logic and only then goes on to the Philosophy of Mature 
that Hegel must have assumed the Idea comes first, followed In due 
time by Nature. "One of the strangest and most problematic 
transitions in the whole of Hegel’s philosophy, criticized equally 
t>y Feuerbach and by Marx [in the Manuscripts of 1844 (1964*109-190)] 
ts the transition from the.Logic whose conclusion is the pure Idea, 
t° the Philosophy of Nature, that is to say from thought to sensuous
b e i ..." (1971*23)
The full reason for this admittedly queer transition can only be 
given by considering both Hegel’s critique of Kantian philosophy as 
W®11 as Hegel's dialectic method which are the concern of the final 
chapters of this work. A preliminary response is simply that the 
essence of dialectical exposition is to start from the most abstract
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categories and to advance from there to the most concrete determina­
tions. "... We ... must start”, writes Hegel, ”from [the] most 
inappropriate reality.” (1969:21) Accordingly, the exposition of 
Hegel’s system in the Encyclopaedia begins with "being” — - a category 
that applies as well to ”a stone ... as [to] a thinking man”, (1975*132) 
—  proceeds through to nature, then to human consciousness and 
society, ending with philosophy and science.
No less than for its beginning, the Encyclopaedia (and the
Phenomenology with it (Lukács, 1975*546)) has been criticized for its
ending, which for the young Marx represents "the self-consciousness,
self-comprehending, philosophic or absolute (i.e., superhuman)
abstract mind ..." (1964:174) By ending with philosophy and science,
however, Hegel is simply trying to point out that history and society
cannot be understood until they are created: and, moreover, that
"the transformation of society must await its being understood in
theory. The same notion is expressed by Marx in the Grundrisse:
... individuals cannot gain mastery over their own 
social interconnections before they have created 
them ... This bond [money] is their product. It is 
a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase 
of their development. The alien and independent 
character in which it presently exists vi s-à-vis 
individuals proves only that the latter are still 
engaged in the creation of their social life, and 
that they have not yet begun, on the basis of these 
conditions, to live it. (Quoted in Rosdolsky,
1977*417)
It is a measure of the distance Marx travelled from the Manuscripts 
ibat he adopts Hegel's mode of exposition in his 1865-66 plan for 
Sä^ital. Here Marx advances from the commodity in Volume 1 —  the 
"being« of capitalist production — * through to the "Forma of the 
Process in its totality” (Volume 3) and finally to the "history of
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the theory'* of capital in Volume 4» (Handel, 1976528)
Hegel's notion that reason is prior to nature merely expresses 
Kant's idea that human consciousness approaches the outside world with 
certain a priori categories through which, as it were, the mind gives 
the law to nature. "The understanding", writes Kant, "draws its laws 
(a priori) not from nature, hut prescribes them to it." (l883i67*"68)
Neither Kant nor Hegel is trying to say that the laws of nature are 
there only because reason put them there. They are saying that as a 
product of nature, human consciousness shares its rational structure 
and has the capacity to go beneath the surface of things and compre­
hend their inner relations. "Laws", writes Hegel, "are determinations 
of the intellectual consciousness inherent in the world itselfj 
therefore, the intellectual consciousness finds them in its own nature 
and thus becomes objective to itself." (1969*163) If ihe Iaws 
inherent in nature are first expressed in human consciousness they 
also have a different form in reality than they do in the mind,
"What belongs to Nature as such lies at the back of mind} it is true 
that mind has within Itself the entire filling of Nature, but in mind 
the determinations of Nature exist in a radically different manner 
than their existence in Nature." (1969*15)
The epistemology of Kant and its extension in Hegel is rejected 
by Feuerbach, who goes back to the materialism of the Ehll^tenment 
according to which ideas proceed from sense perception. The basic 
Principle of Feuerbach's philosophy "is in the highest degree positive 
and real. It generates thought from the opposite of thought, from 
Hatter, from existence, from the senses} it has relation to its 
object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before defining it
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in thought.*' (Feuerbach, 1957:xxxv) This theory of knowledge 
influenced the young Marx's formulation in the Manuscripts of 1844,t 
"Science is only genuine science when it proceeds from sense percep­
tion and sensuous need, i.e., only when it proceeds from nature.'* 
(Quoted in Schmidt, 1971:29) But in the 1845 Theses on .Feuerbach 
Marx turns away from this account of the origin of knowledge. 
"Feuerbach ... appeals to sensuous contemplation; but he does not 
conceive sensuousness as practical, human sensuous activity.** (1969* 
1:14)
As lenin indicates in the Philosophical Notebooks (1963:212) —  
and as I will show in the following chapters —  the Theses on 
.Feuerbach are derived from Hegel's Logic or at least deeply affected 
by itj and clearly Marx is aware that a theory of knowledge which 
views thought as a product of sense perception is incompatible with 
the view that human practice does not merely reflect but also creates 
reality. Nevertheless there is no complete theory of knowledge in 
Karx, who even in his later writings sometimes wrote as though 
consciousness were a passive reflection of reality: "It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness.** (I970b:2l) Obviously 
this dictum is wildly incompatible.with the third thesis on 
Feuerbach: "The materialist doctrine that men are products of 
circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are 
Products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that 
it is men that change circumstances and that the educator himself 
needs educating." As Marx himself observes, the materialist doctrine 
baa ominous overtones since it "necessarily arrives at dividing
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society into two parts, of which one is superior to society ..."
(1969, 1*13)
The absence of a consistent theory of knowledge has had 
disastrous effects on Marxist theory. For Lenin, the presentation of 
an epistemology which "already denotes man’s ever deeper cognition 
of the objective connection of the world ... is ... the time meaning 
and significance of Hegel’s Logic". Lenin counsels a "return to 
Hegel for a step-by-step analysis of any current logic and theory of 
knowledge" in order to get beyond the "vulgar-materialistic stand­
point" of early twentieth-century Marxism. This programme was never 
fulfilled and much of contemporary Marxism continues in a vein which, 
as Lenin points out, is "more in the manner of Feuerbach ... than of 
Hegel", (1963*178-179) Even for "Begelianized" Western Marxism 
Hegel’s critique of Kantian epistemology remains largely a closed 
hook, Further, the dominant motifs of so-called Hegelian Marxism such 
as alienation, humanism, negative dialectic and so on, have their 
origin in Feuerbach and the young Marx, not Hegel. Lukács’s notion 
that the proletariat is the "identical subject-object of history" and 
that the individual, by contrast, has no access to truth (1971*39» 5 1) 
°wes nothing to Hegel but terminology’ and is a gift from the skies to 
authoritarian Marxism.
Hegel’s contention that there are three levels of necessity in 
Mature has profound but usually unnoticed implications for his concept 
°f contradiction and the role of the individual in nature and society, 
Contradiction In the sphere of inorganic nature is better referred to 
as a real opposition in Kant’s sense, according to which "matter (is] 
the unity of repulsion and attraction", (Hegel, 1975*1441 also
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Colletti, 1975s6-7) As Hegel puts it in the Larger Logic, «Contra­
diction which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed 
Nothing; and this is already obtained in Identity, and occurred in 
the expression that the law of identity states nothing." (Quoted in 
Lenin, 19635138-139) Hegel traces the law of identity to the Eleatic 
school of Greek philosophy which held that, "The nothing is like 
nothing and does not pass into Being or conversely; thus nothing can 
originate from like," The Eleatics were nothing if not consistent 
and advanced from this proposition to conclude that "as Being is pre­
supposed, change in itself is contradictory and Inconceivable",
(Hegel, 1892 i 245-246)
While recognizing its usefulness in the sphere of inorganic 
nature, Hegel is not impressed with the status of identity as a 
supreme law of thought for formal logic. "... The maxim of Identity 
reads: Everything is identical with itself, A*At and negatively, A 
cannot be at the same time A and not A, This maxim, instead of being 
a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract under­
standing. " Hegel mocks the notion that while the law of Identity 
cannot be proved, it nevertheless expresses the way people think.
*'... Ho mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with 
this law, and ... no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. 
Utterances after the fashion of this pretended law (A planet is a 
Planet; Magneticm is magnetism; Kind is mind) are, as they deserve 
to be, reputed silly." (1975*167) Identity and other laws of thought 
such as the law of the excluded middle are "not without ... value in 
such abstractions as number, direction, Ac.," but they are 
inappropriate when applied to human consciousness or even organic
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life. (1975:147) Mathematics, for example, is concerned with 
quantity, a category which "plays, so to say, a more prominent part 
in the inorganic world ... than in the organic. Even in organic 
nature, when we distinguish mechanical functions from what are called 
chemical, and in the narrower sense physical, there is the same 
difference". (1975*147)
For Hegel, external contradiction or a real opposition between 
non-living things results in equilibrium; contradiction within 
inorganic materials, on the other hand, completely destroys them.
"What belongs to external Nature is destroyed by contradiction; if, 
for example, gold were given a different specific gravity from what 
it has, it would cease to be gold ... The non-living ... is Incapable 
of enduring contradiction, but perishes when the Other of itself 
forces its way into it." (1969*15» 167) A contradiction within the 
atom, for example, gives off prodigious energy, but the thing of which 
it is a part ceases entirely to exist. According to Hegel, inorganic 
nature is potentially or "virtually the same as what life is 
actually".' The living being confronts inorganic nature and consumes 
it; "The result of assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a 
heutral product in which the independence of the two confronting 
sides is merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough 
to embrace it3 other which cannot withstand its power." The inorganic 
(or non-living) material is assimilated into the living body so that 
the conscious being "only coalesces with itself". Upon death the 
objective laws of nature feast on the organic being until finally only 
the abstract laws of motion have Jurisdiction over it. "... When the 
®oul has fled from the body, the elementary powers of objectivity
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begin their play. These powers are, as it were, continually on the 
spring, ready to begin their process in the organic body; and life 
is the constant battle against them," (1975*281)
Contradiction in organic nature is the source of life and self- 
preservation for the natural individual or being. Identity here for 
Hegel is precisely the positing of difference. That is, the living 
creature, the self-identical individual, is also an active, trans­
forming powert and its power lies in its ability to meet and overcome 
contradiction. Even the plant represents a certain self-development 
from within outwards and contains an "urge” to overcome contradiction. 
If something is in the way of the plant, it attempts to get around 
it? if it is shaded it strives to reach the sunlight. But the plant 
lacks the unity of animal life —  as Althusser would say it consists 
of "^centred circles" (1969*102) —  "because the plant’s process of 
articulating itself is a coming-forth-froro-self of the vegetable 
subject, each part is the whole plant, a repetition of it, and conse­
quently the organs are not held in complete subjection to the unity of 
the subject". (1969*10) In contrast with the plant, every element 
of. the higher animal’s body is in absolute subjection to a single 
centre* to its consciousness. "... This leading back of all the 
»embers to the negative, simple unity of life, is the ground of the 
origin of self-feeling in the animal ..." (1969*58)
The unitary consciousness, the single centre, the self-identical 
Helng both contains and withstands the thrust of contradiction. "The 
subjectivity of the animal”, writes Hegel, "contains a contradiction 
^ d  the urge to preserve itself by resolving this contradiction, this 
Self-preservation is the privilege of the living being and, in a still
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higher degree, of mind.” (1969*10) By feeling or becoming aware of 
the contradiction within it, the living being "removes its own defect, 
its diremption into a distinctionless I«I ... and gives its subjec­
tivity objectivity no less than it makes its object subjective". In 
this way even a cow overcomes the externality of the real world, 
transcends the sensuous contemplation so much talked of by materialist 
philosophy, falls upon its object and eats it up. (1969*169) At 
birth the animal leaves the "simple ... unity of feeling" which it 
enjoyed in the womb and "is forced out of its simple self-relation 
into opposition to External nature". The contradiction which 
compelled it to separate from its mother is replaced by a fresh 
contradiction it feels within itself» the desire for warmth and 
shelter, the pangs of hunger and thirst. The resolution of this 
contradiction "is effected by the animal consuming what is destined 
for it in external nature and preserving itself by what it consumes. 
Thus by annihilation of the Other confronting the animal, the original, 
simple self-relation and the contradiction contained within it is 
Posited afresh", (1969*10)
Hegel argues that the true resolution of contradiction within 
the animal can only be achieved when the Other which confronts the 
ahimal is similar to it. This resolution, therefore, is available 
only in the sexual relation, "... Here each sex feels in the other 
n°t an alien externality but its own self, or the genus common to 
hoth." (1969110) The sexual relation represents the pinnacle of 
amimat@ nature because in it external necessity is banished and the 
individual aohieves a concrete unity with its other. But this unity 
ia flawed» it is the unity only of one individual with another. The
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universal or social Interests promoted by the sexual relation in the 
self-conscious and purposeful human being are unavailable to the 
animal. "The animal soul is still not free? for it is always mani­
fest as a one ... as tied to one determinateness." True, the sexual 
relation in animals preserves and develops the species, but for the 
animal the result of its own activity is unknown. Moreover, the unity 
arrived at in the sexual relation results not in the general produc­
tion of the species in the sense of the development of economy and 
culture through the wilful activity of individuals in human society, 
but rather "what is produced in this process is again only the single 
individual". It is here that we arrive at Hegel’s meaning when he 
suggests that "nature has no history"* "Hature", he writes, "even at 
the highest point of its elevation over finitude, always falls back 
into it again and in this way exhibits a perpetual cycle." (1969* 
10- 11)
The Importance of Hegel's observations on animal life for an 
^der standing of his philosophy and social theory cannot be over­
stated. For in them lies the kernel of his view of the relationship 
between the individual and society. As I will show in the chapters 
vbich follow, the Hegelian dialectic always refers in the last analysis 
to the individual, not to an abstraction like class, nation or even 
the Idea. "The universal to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended 
as subjectivity [i.e., the practical activity of the living human 
being)f as a notion self-moving, active and fora imposing." (1975*290) 
Moreover, Hegel’s equation of society with the achievement of freedom 
~~ a dominant theme throughout his writings —  is stressed through 
kis notion that the animal, the quintessentially "natural" individual,
74
cannot attain freedom simply because it is trapped in its indivi­
duality, lost as it were in the genus or species.
Biologists refer to the development of human society as "exo- 
somatic evolution" where "exosomatic" refers to the tools and arte­
facts of the human species: in other words what Karx calls, the means 
of production. But the biologists are careful —  as Marxists often 
are not —  to point out that it is "the design of these instruments 
that undergoes the evolutionary change and not the instruments them­
selves, except in a quite unnecessarily figurative sense". There is 
now a trend among biologists to attribute the rapidity of exosomatic 
as opposed to ordinary organic evolution to "the subtlety, versatility 
and information-carrying capacity of language". (Kedawar, 1977*52-53) 
For Hegel, however, the great transformations in human society are 
the result of "ideality" —  the creative nature of conscious human 
activity. If we interpret ideology in its broadest sense as the sum 
total of the manifested ideas, techniques and knowledge of men and 
women: the inheritance human individuals receive from earlier 
generations and pass on transformed and deepened into the future$ 
then Althusser is right to observe that Hegel’s "principle of 
explanation" refers to "consciousness of self (ideology)". (19o9*111) 
The animal possesses the privilege of inheritance from past genera­
tions only in its genetic structural consequently its production is 
limited in the end only to the renewal of itself. The genetic code 
¿2. .the Ideology of the species.
According to Hegel, the natural individual dies because it is a 
contradiction between the individual and the species. Implicitly the 
animal is a universal: it represents in its bodily structure the
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truth as it were of the species. But it remains a single individual 
and produces only others like it. "Death shows the Kind to be the 
power that rules the immediate individual. For the animal the process 
of the Kind la the highest point of its vitality. But the animal 
never gets so far in its Kind as to have a being of its own: it 
succumbs to the power of the Kind." (1975*282) The human individual 
is no less a victim of this contradiction than the animal: the defeat 
of mortality remains an unrealized dream. But even this dream is 
already actualized by men and women in the production and reproduction 
of society.
The contradiction between the human individual and the genus or 
species is manifested as well as resolved in the sexual relation. The 
human individual achieves a being of its own, becomes a "concrete 
universal", by going out into society and manifesting its own ideals 
through work in the actuality of human culture, "In this manner", 
remarks Hegel, the individual "comes to itself, to its truth: it 
enters upon existence as a free Kind self—subsistent. The death of 
merely immediate and individual vitality is the »procession' of 
spirit." (1973:282) The animal species remains one-sided} it is a 
negative power only which subdues with death the individuals which 
compose it. Similarly, the animal itself is one-sided because it is 
tied to its own particularity, its own individuality. Hen and women 
overcome this one-Bidednese and duality by achieving a concrete unity 
uith the species in society. The procession of spirit "is not 
'according to the flesh’ but spiritual, is not to be understood as a 
natural procession but as the development of the Notion (human 
knowledge: ideology) ..." In other words, human consciousness imbued
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with the desire for and the force of freedom and liberty strives to 
actualize this notion in society, and the result is human progress, 
the record of history. The duality and one-sidedness of the species 
are abolished by the "... individuality which is in and for itself 
universal or, what is the same thing, in the universal which exists 
for itself in a universal mode [society], which universal is mind 
[i.e., the consciousness of the i n d i v i d u a l ] (1969*14) Society, 
therefore, is not for Hegel "the denial of eros", the repression of 
the sexual instinct, as it is for Freud (1949) and Marcuse (1962), but 
rather it represents the ultimate fulfilment and realization of the 
sexual relation* society is the playground of the human spirit.
According to Hegel, human consciousness is "self-differentiating” 
and '’self-mediating” and reduces difference or contradiction "to a 
moment”. (1969*153) In the realm of theory and ideas this mean3 that 
contradiction is a faot purely for the person who thinks about it and 
recognizes contradiction. (1967*68, 144) Awareness of a contra­
diction in turn leads to the thinker's attempt to resolve it by 
developing the idea further or abandoning it altogether. This meaning 
of contradiction is illustrated by Hegel in a note on the concept of 
irony in The Philosophy of R i ^ t » He observes that a colleague of 
his, Professor Solger, adopted the word "irony” fro® the Romantic 
theorist, Schlegel. But Solgar rejected the reactionary content of 
Schlegel's concept "and seized upon, emphasized, and retained only 
that part of Schlegel's view which was dialectic in the strict sense, 
d*«., dialectic as the pulsating drive of speculative Inquiry". (1976* 
1°1) Marx is wrong therefore when he alleges in the finrodrlsse that 
Ecgel sees contradiction as "a product of the concept which thinks and
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generates itself outside or above [human] conception". For Hegel as 
well as for Marx, "the concept as it appears in the head, as a 
totality of thoughts, is a product of the thinking head, which 
appropriates the world in the only way it can ..." (Marx, 1973*101)
As Hegel remarks, the theoretical concept of the concrete state and 
society, for example, "is only what the thinking mind comprehends 
there". (1976:101)
Marx's misrepresentation of Hegel is taken over directly from 
Feuerbach, who as Marx himself observes is partly responsible "for the 
neglect ... of the rational kernel of Hegel's method", (Hook, 197& 
273) Another part of the blame, however, must be borne by Marx and 
Engels, Thus Marx’s advice that Hegel should be "turned upside down" 
— • or right side up —  has led to the grossest misunderstanding of 
Hegel, To refer only to the Logic, we have, for example, Martin 
Nicolaus suggesting naively that certain chapters in this work are 
wonderfully "materialistic". (1975*40) The profound ignorance of/ • ■ - ■ -i
modern-day Marxists about what exactly German idealism is shines like 
ft beacon through Nicolaus's prose — * and that of numerous other 
Marxists. After all, the Logic is what it says it is: it is about 
logic, not sticks and stones and other things material. "In Logic", 
states Hegel, "there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as 
reason develops itself in this distinction-lacking medium," (1969* 
226) Moreover, when Hegel refers in the Logic to the self-development 
of concepts and categories, he means their appearance in the history 
of philosophy, i.e., among the individual thinkers who created that 
history. "I maintain that the sequence in the systems of Philosophy 
In History is similar to the sequence in the logical deduction of the
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Notion-determinations in the Idea.” (Hegel, 1892; JO} Kaufmann, 
1966:285)
The fact that the order of sequence in the Logic is not the same
as it is in the history of philosophy concerns the dialectical mode
of exposition which I shall explicate in the concluding chapter. In
any case, as Lenin suggests, the little-noticed similarity between the
sequence of the Logic and the sequence of ideas in the history of
philosophy ’’gives still a new aspect to the whole Logic”. (1963:114)
To mention only the first three categories in the Logic, "being” is a
category first discussed by the Eleatics, notably Parmenides (1975*
126)} nothing or "non-being" is mentioned by Zeno and Melissus and
developed by ^orgias 06921 380-382)j finally, "becoming”, of
course, was fully worked out by Heraclitus:
As the first concrete thought-terra, Becoming is the 
first adequate vehicle of truth. In the history of 
philosophy, this stage of the logical Idea finds its 
analogue in the system of Heraclitus, When Heraclitus 
says 'All is flowing' ... he enunciates Becoming as 
the fundamental feature of all existence, whereas the 
Eleatics ... saw the only truth in Being, rigid 
processless Being, Glancing at the principle of the 
Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes on to say: Being no 
more is than not-Being ... | a statement expressing 
the negativity of abstract Being, and its identity 
with not-Being, as made explicit in Becoming; both 
abstractions being alike untenable. This may be 
looked at as an instance of the real refutation of 
one system by another. To refute a philosophy is to 
exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, 
and thus reduce it to a constituent member of a 
higher concrete form of the Idea. (1975*132)
The Logic, then, concerns the development of thought through the 
cQntradiction or refutation of one system of philosophy by another.
this development is not carried through by a fantastic abstraction
called the Idea or the Concept, but by real living and thinking human
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beings. The Idea "is only the Notion of cognition thought b^ us", not 
the immanent development of the Idea itself. (1969*8) For Hegel, 
human thinking, the creation of ideas and concepts is nothing but 
"metaphysics", and metaphysics appears nowhere but in the individual 
human mind. "The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do 
not think? while man is a thinking being and a b o m  metaphysician." 
(1975:144) Thus when Popper remarks that the "fertility of contra­
dictions [in ideas or theories] is merely the result of our decision 
not to put up with them". (Quoted in Jordan, 1967*199) be is not —  
as Professor Jordan suggests —  contradicting Begel, but simply 
expressing the key to Hegel's notion. Human consciousness, writes 
Hegel, "endures contradiction because it knows that it contains no 
determination that it has not posited itself, and consequently that 
it cannot get rid of". (1969*16)
The development of mind or human consciousness, as well as 
society itself, is rooted in the contradiction between freedom, which 
is the essence of mind, and the various social structures which men 
and women create. History, therefore, "represents only mind's freeing 
itself from all its existential forms which do not accord with its 
Notion? a liberation which Is brought about by the transformation of 
■these forms into an actuality perfectly adequate to the Notion of 
mind". (1969?16) A similar idea is expressed by Marx* "the develop­
ment of the contradiction of a given historical form of production is 
the only historical way it can be resolved and then reconstructed on 
a new basis." (1976:619) But only "men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out". (1970*2 1)
At the dawn of human development the notion of freedom is
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unconscious or implicit: the society men and women create reflects 
their limited control over nature and the unconscious character of 
their relations with one another. "It is not mind itself that, at the 
outset, has already grasped its Notion: it is only we who contemplate 
it who know its Notion." (1969*21) The desire for independence and 
self-expression that Hegel assumes in his account of the stages of 
maturity of people in modern society is nowhere in evidence in earlier 
social forms. Where the freedom of the individual in contemporary 
society requires a strong awareness of the institutional structures 
within which he or she must operate, the ancient Creeks, for example, 
took these structures for granted, and made little distinction between 
Personal and community life. (1969*61) The notion of an individual 
conscience which recognizes a law higher than that embodied in 
society and the state was unknown to the Ancients. --(1976*302)
By the same token, in Homan law "there could be no definition of 
'»an*, since 'slave' could not be brought under it —  the very status 
of slave indeed is an outrage on the conception of man". (1976*15) 
Consciousness in its modern form is the product of a long struggle 
for liberation and freedom. Consequently, to grasp the nature of 
consciousness the human mind should be examined in terms of its role 
”a8 the creator of freedom". (1969*16) The dynamics of this creation 
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1. Plato, the Idea, and the Social Indlvidtml
In his Marxism and Hegel, Lucio Colletti argues that Hegel’s 
philosophy concerns "’the true infinite’, the Christian Logos”, and 
that Hegel's notion of contradiction "bears upon one precise topic: 
the problem of proving the existence of God", (1973:10, 25) Colletti’s 
argument is nôt nevj one of the first British Hegelians, J, H. 
Stirling, contended in his The Secret of Hegel, written in 1865» that 
God is "the secret origin and constitution of Hegel", (1865*144) The 
notion that Hegel is essentially a religious thinker is shared by 
Marxist and non-Marxist commentators alike, Marcuse, for example, 
observes that "Hegel’s philosophy was deeply rooted Cin] ... the 
Christian tradition •»." (1973*16?) Similarly, C, J, Friedrich states
that "Hegel was and wanted to be a Christian philosopher". (1956*3)
The conception of Hegel as a theologian is connected with the 
lotion that Hegel sees the development of society as the progress of 
what he calls the World Spirit toward freedom, "This march of freedom 
ts interpreted [by Hegel] as what the World Spirit wants, as it seeks 
to realize itself. And in the effort to realize itself it employs 
Peoples, world-historical peoples to do its work," (Friedrich, 1956*
2) According to this view there is a place for God, but certainly not 
f°r the human individual, in Hegel’s philosophy, Hegel’s "subject", 
says Marcuse, "does not designate any particular subjectivity (such as 
®an) but a general structure that might he best characterized by the
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concept »mind'. Subject denotes a universal that individualizes 
itself, and if we wish to think of a concrete example, we might point 
to the ’spirit' of a historic epoch”. (1973s155) The World Spirit 
embodies the Hegelian "Absolute Idea" which Karcuse and other writers 
identify with the thought of God. "God in [the Hegelian] formula 
means the totality of the pure forms of all being, or, the true 
essence of being ... [Thus] the absolute idea has to be conceived as 
the actual creator of the world [i.e., as God]." (ilarcuse, 1973*167)
Hegel’s use of religious terms in his philosophy, and his notions 
of the World Spirit and the Absolute Idea have led many commentators 
to compare him with Plato. Colletti, for instance, suggests that 
Hegel embraces the "Platonic-Chriatian tradition" of the "negative 
conception of the sensible world". (1973*19) In other words, Hegel, 
like Plato, views the universe as the manifestation of a divine Kind? 
the world has no true reality *— • it only reflects the thought of Odd.
Hegel is indeed in the Platonic tradition, but his interpretation 
of Plato's philosophy bears no resemblance to that of Colletti. For 
Hegel, Plato's philosophy concerns nature and society as they are 
conceived in theory, In the theoretical concepts of men and women. 
Plato's thought, writes Hegel, "embraces in an absolute unity reality 
as well as thinking, the Rotion [theory] and its reality in the move- 
®ent of science, as the Idea of a scientific whole". (1894*1) Hegel 
denies, for example, that Plato's Republic Is merely the ancient 
Philosopher's notion of what the world should look likej a dream 
toward which reality will be made to correspond. Plato's ideal state 
"is not beyond reality, in heaven, in another place, but is the real 
world", (1894»29) Of course, Plato's state is not that of the
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moderns, the one in which contemporary individuals find themselvesj 
rather it concerns the "Greek morality according to its substantial 
mode, for it is the Greek state-life which constitutes the true content 
of the Platonic Republic". (1894*96)
Hegel's criticism of what he sees as common misinterpretations 
of Plato may be used just as well to controvert received but mistaken 
opinions about Hegel. The notion, for example, that according to 
Platonic dogma, "God made the world, that higher beings of a spiritual 
kind exist, and, in the creation of the world, lent God a helping hand 
stands word for word in Plato, and yet it does not belong to his 
philosophy," (1894*21) Hegel argues that Plato uses such notions as 
"pictorial conceptions" to explicate his philosophy? nevertheless,
"all that is expressed in the manner of pictorial conception is taken 
the modems in sober earnest for philosophy," As if to anticipate 
current misconceptions of his own theories, Hegel goes on to say that 
"such a representation can be supported by Plato's own words? but one 
who knows what Philosophy is, cares little for such expressions, and 
recognizes what was Plato's true meaning", (1894*21)
According to Hegel, the greatest achievement of Plato's philo- 
sophy is its recognition of the intellectual and social world of men 
^ d  women, Plato goes beyond the ordinary world of sense perception 
and constructs theories about the "idea world", that is, the world of 
science and society. What is peculiar in the philosophy of Plato
Its application to the intellectual and eupersensuous world, and 
*■^ 8 elevation of consciousness into the world of spirit Csociety],
®hua the spiritual element which belongs to thought obtains in this 
form an importance for consciousness, and Is brought into conacious- 
uess." (1894*2)
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For Plato, as for Hegel, men and women Interact with each other 
on the basis of their shared beliefs of what the world is like, rather 
than in response to the blunt realities of ordinary sense perception.
On this view, human consciousness takes an active role in the deter­
mination of social relationships. For example, the commonly held 
ideas people have of marriage sets before them their privileges and 
taboos, prepares their moral pitfalls and stimulates their joys and 
anguish, all in a manner the natural sexual relationship, if it were 
a simple reflection in consciousness, would be incapable of doing. 
Similarly, human thought is also the active force behind the construc­
tion of science and the entire social world. "... The State", for 
instance, "really rests on thought, and its existence depends on the 
sentiments of men, for it is a spiritual and not a physical kingdom." 
(1892:439)
No less than the state, natural science depends for its existence 
on the thinking activity of men and women. The findings of science 
are not a simple record of objects and relationships given to thought 
by the observation of external nature. If science were only that, its 
historical development would be incomprehensible; we would have to 
say that Newton did not formulate Einstein's relativity equation 
because he did not observe nature closely enough. To grasp the laws of 
nature, human thought must penetrate the superficial appearance of 
things and construct theories capable of making sense of what appear 
be contradictory phenomena. Scientific theories are themselves a 
product of the general progress of human thought, and they hinge on 
the development of consciousness and society* Scientific theory, or 
*hat Hegel calls "the speculative", certainly deals with external
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reality, with actuality: "We are wrong in representing the speculative
to be something existent only in thought or inwardly, which is no one
knows where." But it is equally incorrect to suggest that human
thought and imagination take no independent role in the construction
of science. The speculative "is really present", writes Hegel,
but men of learning shut their eyes to it because of 
their limited point of view. If we listen to their 
account, they only observe and say what they see} but 
their observation is not true, for unconsciously they 
transform what is seen through their limited and stereo­
typed conception} the strife is not due to the 
opposition between observation and the absolute Notion, 
but between the one Notion and the other. (1892:291)
When Hegel writes of the "Idea" or the "Notion" in Plato, or when
he uses these terms in other contexts, he is not referring, as many
commentators believe, to a religious image or to a logical construct
somehow outside the thoughts and reality of living human beings. The
Idea —  even the Absolute Idea — ■ is neither a logical construct nor
the thought of God, but the scientific expression of society and
Mature as it has been developed by the thinking activity of individual
human beings, "Philosophy in its ultimate essence is one and the
same, every succeeding philosopher will and must take up as his own,
all the philosophies that went before, and what falls specially to him
is their further development," (1894*13) No less than that of any
other philosopher, Plato’s task was to take up, systematise and develop
the ideas 0f those who came before him. In the Idea of Plato, "we gee
ail manner of philosophic teaching from earlier times absorbed into a
deeper principle, and therein united. It is in this way that Plato’s
Philosophy shows itself to be a totality of ideas: therefore, as the
tesult, the principles of others are comprehended in itself". (1894*14)
Hegel observes that the thinkers of his time, especially those
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concerned with religion, were returning to Plato in order to under­
stand their own epoch. But this return was misguided. Both Plato’s 
philosophy and religion "have their due place and their own 
importance, but they are not the philosophy of our own time". (1894: 
10) The social reality of Hegel’s period, the new industrial society 
arising from the cataclysm of 1789» demanded a new philosophy and a 
new way of looking at the world. "We must stand above Plato," advises 
Hegel, "i.e, we must acquaint ourselves with the needs of thoughtful 
minds in our time, or rather we must ourselves experience these 
needs." (1894*10)
Hegel is impatient with efforts to discover in Plato ideas which
Have a direct bearing on the constitution of modern states, Karl
Popper, for example, identifies Plato as a precursor of the "enemies"
of what Popper calls the "open society", or modern democracy, (1977»
I) Por Hegel, however, this is to read into Plato "the crude notions"
of moderns who are "unable to conceive the spiritual spiritually",
(1B94:9) Anyway it "is foolish" and "a moral hypocrisy", notes
Hegel, "to pretend to be better than others who are then called
enemies", (1892:430) Hegel suggests that to understand Plato we
should attempt to consider M s  thought with respect to the needs and
reality of Plato’s time. "Plato", Hegel suggests,
is not the man to dabble in abstract theories and 
principles! his truth-loving mind has recognized and 
represented the truth, and this could not be anything 
else than the truth of the world he lived In, the 
truth of the one spirit which lived in him as well as 
in Greece. No man can overleap his time, the spirit 
of M s  time is his spirit also? but the point at issue 
is, to recognize that spirit by its content. (1894*96)
Plato lived during a period when the original Greek democracy 
Vas crumbling and only "preponderating individualities or masters in
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statesmanship" were able to hold it together. Hot only Plato but the 
Greek people themselves "were then altogether dissatisfied with their 
democratic constitution, and the conditions resulting from it »»." 
(1894:25) The disintegrating force was the development of private 
property and the demand for individual rights within the state. Plato 
denied both because he felt, rightly as it turned out, that these 
would end up destroying Greece, It is pointless, therefore, to 
attempt to consider modern democracy in terms of Plato’s ideal state,
"In modern states", writes Hegel, "we have freedom of conscience, 
according to which every individual may demand the right of following 
his own interests! but this is excluded from the Platonic idea,"
(1894:99)
The greatest shortcoming of Plato’s philosophy is neither its 
opposition to private property nor its condemnation of democracy, 
since these may be explained within the cohtext of Plato’s epoch. What 
tends to undermine Plato’s vision is his constant recourse to sensuous 
images and ordinary conceptions, like that of "God", to express what 
Regal calls, "the speculative Notion". The Notion refers to the 
cumulative product of the development of human thought, the power of 
the theorist to separate out sensuous images and conceptions, and work 
with theoretical constructs alone, The merit of Philosophy
consists ... in the fact that truth is expressed in the form of the 
Motion,” (1894:19) Plato lacks the ability to express ideas purely 
to theoretical terms and as a result-he'frequently falls back on myths
^  allegories to convey his ideas.
The Platonic myth is useful in that it helps elucidate his 
bought. Nevertheless, the value of Plato*# philosophy does not rest
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in its employment of mythology? myth is superfluous to speculative 
thinking and adds nothing to its progress. Yet in the study of 
Plato’s philosophy, "men often lay hold of nothing but these myths". 
(1892:88) Misconceptions about Plato led thinkers in Hegel’s time to 
ignore precisely the speculative aspects of his thought, and concen­
trate on what belongs to the merely "pictorial" side of his philosophy. 
Accordingly, Just as Colletti and other modern linkers claim to 
discover religion in Hegel's system, Hegel’s contemporaries evinced 
"an obstinate determination to lead back the Platonic Philosophy to 
the forms of our former metaphysic, e.g. to the proof of the 
existence of God". (1894*19)
Hegel argues that the most damaging misinterpretation of Plato 
concerns the meaning of the Platonic Ideas. In his account of the 
meaning of the Ideas, negel indirectly furnishes an explication of his 
own use of the term Idea. As pointed out above, most commentators 
interpret Hegel’s Idea as the product of the Cosmic Spirit, or God, 
which realizes itself through the unintended consequences of the 
activities of large masses of people or nation-states. One of the 
»oat recent examples of this approach appears in Charles Taylor’s 
jfogeli "... History", for Hegel, "is to be understood teleologically 
as directed in order to realize Gelst[Spirit]. Vhat happens in 
history has sense, Justification, indeed, the highest Justification.
*t is good, the plan of Cod." (1976*389) Although Marx —  as I will 
argue below —  Insists that Hegel’s philosophy should not be under­
stood as a theology, he nevertheless puts forward a view that corres- 
Pohde to that of Taylor and many others. "For Hegel", writes Marx, 
"the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent
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subject, under the name of ’the Idea', Is the creator of the real 
world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the 
Idea,” (1976:102) There is no doubt that Hegel often writes as 
though the Idea really is the thought of God, or of an independent 
logical construct. But as Hegel says regarding Plato’s philosophy, 
these notions do not belong to his philosophy but rather to its 
method of presentation, (1894*20)
Hegel suggests that the misapprehension of Plato’s thought takes 
two directions. First, the Ideas such as the "just” and the 
"beautiful” are taken as the sensuous image of something which exists 
outside of people’s minds, ”... The Ideas ,,, are made into 
transcendent existences which lie somewhere far from us in an under­
standing outside this world [i.e., in God's thought].” On this inter­
pretation the Ideas are "liberated from the actuality of the 
individual consciousness" and the subject of these Ideas "even ernes 
to be represented as something apart from consciousness". (1894* 
30-31) The second misconception is to see the Ideas as ideals in 
People’s minds "which produce nothing that has reality now or can ever 
attain to it", (1894*31) In other words, the Ideas are mere fancies, 
Very attractive in themselves, but impossible of attainment in the 
hard practical reality of society, "... They are defined as intel­
lectual perceptions which must present themselves immediately, and 
belong either to a happy genius or else to a condition of ecstasy or 
euthusiasm. In such a case they would be mere creations of the 
Pagination, but this is not Plato’s nor the true sense," (1894:31) 
^he received interpretation of Hegel’s Idea resembles the first way 
P  which Plato’s ideas are usually seen, l.e,, as something liberated
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from the Individual consciousness and existing apart from ordinary 
human beings.
Hegel’s "Idea" as well as the Ideas of Plato "are not immediately 
In consciousness, but they are in apprehending knovledgei and they 
are apprehending knowledge comprehended in its simplicity and in 
relation to the result; in other words the immediate perception is 
only the moment of their simplicity". (1894*31) What Hegel means is 
that the Idea, as he interprets it, is something which is manifested 
in concrete social reality through human conscious activity and 
struggle, and later given theoretical form by philosophy. "... The 
past [is] something which has taken shape. For the past is the 
preservation of the present as reality ... From out of ... formless­
ness the universal first comes into form in the present." (1892*454) 
Kegel identifies the Idea with the notion of freedom; this notion, as 
it is actualized in modern society, is the product of centuries of 
human striving and conflict, although it appears to contemporary men 
and women as "immediate perception", as the "moment of its simplicity". 
The philosopher, in .turn, gives the Idea theoretical form and then 
considers the history of human thought and society in terras of the 
development of this Idea. Hegel’s notion of the Idea as it relates to 
the progress of human consciousness, history and society will be dealt 
vith further in this and following chapters. There it will be argued 
that Hegel*s conception is much closer to that of Karx than ¿s 
Relieved even by Marx himself. But it is essential to put to rest at 
the outset some of the more popular views of Hegel, especially that he 
ia in any way a religious thinker. To consider only Hegel’s concep- 
tion of the development of the Idea in history the following 
r®flections are in order.
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The most accessible way to illustrate Hegel’s method of approach 
to history is to compare the Idea with, say, the automobile. To 
construct a history of the automobile, the first concern would be to 
consider its development in the late nineteenth century and then 
trace back all the elements in human history which eventually came 
together in this development. Inventions like the wheel and the 
discovery of the spark as a means to release energy and so on, would 
be treated as stages or moments in the development of the automobile. 
The approach to history, then, would be single-minded. The historian 
would not trouble to wonder whether the automobile should have been 
invented, or whether something else might have been invented instead. 
As Hegel puts it, ’’Philosophy indeed treats of nothing which is not 
&nd does not concern itself with what is so powerless as not even to 
have the energy to force itself into existence," (1895*79) Similar­
ly» the historian would not be concerned with ages and peoples which 
added little or nothing to the advance of the automobile, even though 
■they are no doubt worthy of study in other respects.
Prom the vantage point of the present the invention of the wheel 
“ay be seen as necessary to the invention of the motor car, but the 
historian would not suggest that the inventor of the wheel was seized 
hy the Idea of the automobile, and was its unwilling creator, although 
the unreflecting observer might suppose that this was the historian's 
Purpose, Certainly the invention of the wheel reflected its inven- 
tor's desire for freedom, for the ability to roam about the world 
more freely than he or she could without it, but the notion of freedom 
this respect probably did not lead the inventor to comprehend that 
some day whole continents would be traversed effortlessly by single
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individuals in their own automobile. Por the historian, the wheel*s 
invention would be seen in the context of the needs and desires of 
the people in whose society the inventor belonged. Because of these 
material aspects the inventor would put the wheel to other uses than 
those which might have assisted in the further development of the 
automobile. Nevertheless, his or her conscious activity was a 
necessary element behind the eventual emergence of the automobile.
For the religiously-minded, as many people were i» Hegel’s day, 
the development of the automobile might be seen as the wonderful 
work of an all-knowing God who puts His subjects to the divine task 
of creating modern transport. We moderns do not see the development 
of the automobile in quite this way? nor does Hegel imagine that 
this is the way the Idea is developed. The progress of the notion 
individual freedom in the consciousness of men and women and its 
actualization in history and society is no doubt a more worthy 
object of historical reflection than is the history of the automobile, 
®ut this is only because the history of the development of machinery 
¿¿ only one aspeot of the history of the development of human ; 
consciousness. That the material and social conditions of human 
®*istence are the product of the rational activity of men and women 
is the central message of Hegel’s philosophy. Ideology in its broad 
s®nse as human thinking activity is, in Hegel*s terminology, the 
divine creator of all human reality. It marks the alienation of 
consciousness in our day that the thought of men and women is con­
sidered by Marxists and their bourgeois opponents alike as merely the 
Reflection of things and structures which in fact are created by the 
^tional activity of people themselves.
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In his discussion of Plato's Ideas, Hegel says that the Idea of 
freedom is "the absolute power", as such it "has certainly to realize 
itself} in other words, God rules in the world". When Hegel uses 
the term God or when he refers to religious conceptions, he almost 
always qualifies this use with phrases like "in other words", "in 
religious language", and so on. But it is important to point out 
that God is not for Hegel a "pictorial conception" only: God formed 
a part of the consciousness of the societies and peoples with which 
Hegel deals. Accordingly, he often speaks as though God does exist, 
or did exist, in the thought and times he discusses. In that God was 
a present and real entity for people, their actions and desires are 
incomprehensible unless He is treated as such} to allow people 
their religion is at once to respect and understand their culture,
Hegel observes that "history is the Idea working itself out in a 
natural way", i.e,, through the action of ordinary human beings, "and 
not with the consciousness of the Idea". The outcome of this action 
Ha3 certainly been "what is right, moral and pleasing to God"; that 
ist it has contributed to the increased rationality and freedom in 
modern society, "but we must recognize that action represents at the 
8am® time the endeavours of the subject for particular ends". (1894s24) 
Ho less than Karx, Hegel recognizes that people must and do act 
*n accordance with the material reality in which they exist. While 
*n their activities people try to realize what for them appears to be
H
Hegel, notes Kaufmann, "... never implies acceptance of the 
nriatian faith in the supernatural ... he merely finds the Christian 
®yths more suggestive and appropriate anticipations of his philosophy 
Hsn the myths of other religions". (1978*272)
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the just and the moral, their activities are, nevertheless, mixed up 
with purely personal desires, expectations and goals, "Men”, observes 
Hegel, "must have brought forth from themselves the rational along 
with their interests and their passions, just as it [the rational] 
must enter into reality through the necessities, opportunities, and 
motives that impel them," (1894*115) The thought and ideas of human 
beings are not mere illusions, even when these ideas are of a religious 
nature, and even though they are conditioned by material existence.
The ideology of men and women, no matter at what stage of civilization, 
contains an inner ratlonalltyi it is this rationality which survives 
every epoch and takes root in the succeeding one. It is precisely the 
lack of recognition of this kernel of rationality in the ideology of 
a people or group in society which mars certain Marxist accounts of 
historical change and transformation. This blind spot is particularly 
apparent, as I will show later in this, and the following, chapter, 
in Marxist notions about the function of religion in society.
According to Hegel, the Idea wis only on the one side produced 
through thoughts, and on the other through circumstances, through 
human actions in their capacity as means". It will be argued below 
that Hegel's famous notion of "the cunning of reason", which most 
commentators associate with a divine agency which achieves its ends 
independently of the thought and will of men and women, has nothing to 
do with a power outside and above individual human consciousness, 
Reason is the most essential aspect of human consciousness and it is 
Realized both consciously and unconsciously by individuals in society. 
The ends pursued by individuals often seem opposed to the notion of 
freedom; and certainly the ruling powers of the world — * what Marx
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calls the ruling classes —  are most often in no way concerned with 
the realization of freedom. "... But that does not really matter; 
all those particular ends are really only means of bringing forth the 
Idea, because it is the absolute power. Hence the Idea comes to pass 
in the world, and no difficulty is caused, but it is not requisite 
that those who rule should have the Idea." (1894*24)
In his critique of Plato's notion of the ideal state, Hegel 
observes that the rulers of the world are saddled with human subjects. 
They use the minds and activity of people to produce the wealth on 
which their power rests. But human rationality is an explosive 
material which must be handled delicately if it is not to turn against 
those who make use of it. And regardless of the efforts of the ruling 
powers, the progress they foster through the exploitation of their 
objects will eventually lead to their own destruction, "lien", Hegel 
Points out, "do not remain at a standstill, they alter, as likewise 
do their constitutions". Every nation or society is founded upon what 
its members consider to be right and just; but as people develop 
their society, they also change their notions about how society should 
be governed. "If a nation can no longer accept as implicitly true 
what its constitution expresses to it as the truth, if its conscious- 
n®ss or Notion and its actuality are not at one, then the nation's 
®ind is t o m  asunder," When this occurs two things are possible, 
^irst, the nation may either change its laws "quietly and slowly", or 
may "by a supreme internal effort dash into fragments this law 
which still claims authority", (1694*97-90)
These alternatives are obvious: reform or revolution. The other 
Possibility is that the nation remains at a standstill or is absorbed
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by "another nation [which] has reached its higher constitution". If 
the time for revolution is ripe, the constitution may be changed 
without a shot being fired. "Hevolutions take place in a state without 
the slightest violence when the insight becomes universal} institu­
tions, somehow or other, crumble and disappear, each man agrees to 
give up his right." But for this to happen the government must recog­
nize that its time has come; if it does not, "that government will 
fall, along with its institutions, before the force of mind. The 
breaking up of a government breaks up the nation itself; a new 
government arises, —  or it may be that the government and the unessen­
tial retain the upper hand". (1894*97-98)
In his youth, Hegel was a fervent supporter of the revolutionary 
Principles of the Girondins; but he opposed the Terror on the belief 
that it jeopardised the achievements of the Revolution. (Harris, 
1972:63, 114) In the account of revolution and reform he provides in 
bis discussion of Plato, Hegel makes clear that he never lost his faith 
in the principles espoused by the revolutionaries in France; nor did 
b® transfer his allegiance to reaction —  the "unessential" —  his 
heart remains on the side of revolution. Later I will show that the 
Hegelian notion of social change is not so very different from that of 
Marx; the difference is more of emphasis than it is of substance. In 
fact, the Hegelian theory embraces rather than contradicts Pkrx’s 
historical materialism. But Hegel* s theory centres on the nature of 
¿HHjan consciousness, and to explicate this theory his attitude to 
^ i lgion is of extreme importance.
For Hegel, since the Ideas of Plato concern the social and Intel- 
actual world, they are "the True, that which is worthy to be known —
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indeed, the Eternal, the implicitly and explicitly divine”, (1894*50) 
Throughout hie writings, Hegel uses terms with religious connotations 
like ”divine”, "eternal”, "soul", "spirit”, and so forth, to refer to 
the products, not of an omniscient creator, but of conscious human 
activity or "ideality". By using religious expressions to illustrate 
his argument, Hegel relates these intellectual productions to a social 
reality which exists apart from any one person, and which predates 
and will survive the particular individual. Hegel's treatment of 
Plato's discussion of the nature of human knowledge provides an 
example of Hegel's own approach to the relationship between individual 
consciousness and society. But it also demonstrates how Plato himself 
fails to extricate his philosophy from the sensuous images he uses to 
express his thought. By criticizing this imagery, Hegel clearly 
shows his own opposition to the religious conceptions most commen­
tators take to be part and parcel of Hegel’s philosophy.
For Plato, as for Hegel, human consciousness is immanent and 
self-determining. Therefore, the development of thought appears to 
."be closer to the recollection of a content already in the mind than it 
is to the ordinary conception of learning for which mind is a mere 
fabula rasa on which external reality is imprinted, Hegel observes 
f^at in one sense Plato's "recollection ... is certainly an 
unfortunate expression, in the sense, namely, that an idea is repro­
duced which has already existed at another time”. But Ilegel contends 
fhat there is another sense of the ter® which brings out the actual 
hature of the development of individual consciousness, "namely that 
°f making oneself inward, going inward, and this is the profound 
Waning of the word in thought”. Vhat Hegel means is that in the
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process of learning the individual "becomes familiar with external 
nature as it is comprehended by human thought, and with society, 
which is itself the product of the rational activity of men and 
women, as well a3 the object of their theoretical or speculative 
efforts. Moreover, the individual makes these thoughts his or her 
possession and develops them further. "In this sense, it may 
undoubtedly be said that knowledge of the universal is nothing but a 
recollection, a going within self, and that we make that which at 
first shows itself in external form and determined as manifold, into 
an inward, a universal, because we go into ourselves and thus bring 
'»hat is inward into consciousness,** There is no doubt, however, that
i-.
Plato himself interpreted recollection in the first sense of the term. 
Nevertheless, he was attempting to express what is in essence the 
genuine quality of human consciousness 1 his error lay in employing 
myth and sensuous images to propound "the true Notion that conscious­
ness in itself is the content of knowledge ..." (189404)
Plato connects the notion of subjective or individual conscious­
ness as recollection with the religious conception or picture Image 
°f the eternal nature of the human soul* However, "immortality has 
not ,,, the interest to Plato which it has to us Cmoderns] from a 
religious point of view ..." (189407) The idea of immortality, of 
course, is an essential element in Christianity. As a result,
Colletti among others ascribes belief in immortality to Hegel*s 
Philosophy, "in precisely the same sense that for the Christian death 
is the beginning of the true life, which commences when one passes 
Prom the here and now over to the beyond". (Colletti, 1973*2?)
Neither Plato nor Hegel, however, entertain the belief in immortality.
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Plato confused the universal nature of human thought, its conceptual 
and active power, with the popular notion of recollection as mere 
memory, the dredging up of a previously given content. He then added 
to the confusion by suggesting that each individual soul is preformed, 
and belongs to an earlier period before the birth of the determinate 
individual. In modem times, something resembling Plato’s notion is 
retained in the theory of genetic inheritance. But genetic theory was 
unavailable to Plato, and so he illustrated the idea of preformation 
by comparing it to the doctrine of immortality. Historians of philo- 
S0Phy, observes Hegel, have seized upon Plato's allusion "to what 
really is an [early] Egyptian idea, and a sensuous conception merely, 
und say that Plato has laid down that such and such was the case",
But the notion of immortality was not put forward by Plato at all; 
ror does it have anything to do with his philosophy, "anymore than 
what afterwards is said about God". (1894*36)
For Hegel, the doctrine of immortality expresses "in the simple 
language of the religious mind" the real relationship between the 
Individual and society} a relationship which Hegel calls the "passage 
from subjectivity to objectivity" or "the genuine Infinity". (1975* 
209| 245, 159) The individual comes into a social world constructed 
Independently of his or her effort and will} but the development of 
^ e  individual and the actualization of the person’s thought and ideas 
In society through work prepares the ground for immortality? long 
^ter the individual has disappeared from the earth, his or her 
activity will be reflected in the development and continuity of social 
e*istence. As Hegel puts it, "work is Just this moment of activity 
°°ncentrating itself on the particular, which nevertheless goes back
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into the universal, and is for it". (1894*103) The social bond which 
holds society together is found nowhere else but in the consciousness 
and activity of each individual within it, and in the striving of the 
"social individual" to carve out a personal identity in the universal 
or society. "... The bond", says Hegel, "is the subjective and 
individual, the power which dominates the other, which makes itself 
identical with it." (1894*75)
Society can exist only so long as it satisfies the conscious needs 
and desires, the rationality, of the individuals who make it up. "... 
The universal is living spirit only in so far as the individual 
consciousness finds itself as such within it ..." Society is not a 
mere assembly of individuals externally held together like cogs in a 
wheel} a mob of mindless automatons bounced back and forth by alien 
causal laws. "... The universal is not constituted by the immediate 
life and being of the individual, the mere substance, but formed of 
conscious life." Just as society is constituted of rational or social 
Individuals with their own interests and goals, each individual is also 
dependent on society, and can find a place only within it. "... 
Individuality which separates itself from the universal is powerless 
&nd falls to the ground, the one-sided universal, the morality of 
individuality cannot stand firm." (1892*323-324) In . f t  paragraph in 
the leaser logic, which is almost universally interpreted by commen- 
i^tors as an expression of Hegel’s "Christian belief" in the immortali­
ty of the soul, Hegel sums up the relationship between the individual 
and society. "... Something [the individual) in its passage into the 
other [society] only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in 
th® passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity." (1975*139)
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Hegel denies that his own and Plato’s idealism has anything to
do with the "false idealism" according to which "the individual
produces from himself all his ideas, even the most immediate". But
the notion that "knowledge comes entirely from without" is ¿ust as
incorrect as the one which holds that all knowledge comes from within.
The conception that knowledge comes from education and learning only
ia "found in empirical philosophies of a quite abstract and ruda kind
••. Carried to an extreme, this is the doctrine of revelation" where
God reveals all to the virgin minds of believers. (1894*43# 44) What
both Plato and Hegel oppose, of course, is the same materialist
doctrine criticized by Marx in the third of his Theses on Feuerbach,
already quoted in Chapter 2t
The materialist doctrine that men are products of 
circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, 
changed men are products of other circumstances and 
changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that 
change circumstances and that the educator himself 
needs educating,
4^d, Piarx adds, in a passage which, as I will show, captures the inner
leaning of Hegel's philosophy?
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and 
of human activity can be conceived and rationally 
understood only as revolutionising practice. (1969,
1*14-15)
According to Hegel, Plato Is always careful to separate myth from 
Reality; Plato uses myth and religious imagery to explicate his philo- 
s°Phy and never descends to the grave speculations of modem 
theologians about such topics as the immortality of the soul and the 
of Kan and Woman. Since Hegel went to great lengths to extract 
tbe rational dimension of Plato's thought, he would doubtless be 
aPPalled at the hash made of his own philosophy by most commentators.
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In a passage on Plato available to anyone wishing to look, Hegel
exposes the dynamic element behind his and Marx’s notion of
"revolutionising practice
... What Plato expressed as the truth is that 
consciousness In the individual is in reason the 
divine reality and life; that man perceives and 
recognises in pure thought, and that this knowledge 
is itself the heavenly abode and movement. (1894*41)
Truth lies neither in Cosmic Kind nor, as contemporary Marxists
suggest it does, in the reified consciousness of a social class? It
can only be found in the consciousness of the social Individual.
2. Hegel’s Atheism
"There is no mode of intelligent being 
higher than life in which existence 
would be possible." (Hegel, 1976*252)
As John Plamenata observes, "it has been both asserted and denied 
that Hegel was an atheist." (1976*178) The question of atheism, of 
course, is important for the consideration of Hegel s work In a way it 
is not for that of most other writers. Hegel’s us® of religious 
Imagery has led, as I have suggested, to interpretations of his 
thought based entirely on the notion that he is a religious thinker, 
After his death in 1031, the Hegelian school'-itself split over the 
question of Hegel’s attitude to religion. Eight-wing Hegelians felt 
that "Hegel’s philosophy justified Christianity" (Brasill, 1970?47), 
whU e  the Young Hegelians of the left argued that Hegel opposed 
r®ligion. Even among the Young Hegelians themselves there was die- 
fusion about Hegel’s religious beliefs. In 1841, Karx and Bruno Bauer
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"began to write a book with the intriguing title The hast Trump over 
Hegel the Antichrist". (McLellan, 197“* :xiv) Marx'a contribution to 
the work never appeared, but in this and other publications Bauer 
tried "to prove that Hegel was an atheist and ... that his own 
atheism ... could be traced to Hegel". (Brazill, 1970:30)
Two works published by Feuerbach in 1843 established his "intel­
lectual leadership of the [Young Hegelians]" (McLellan, 1971:xxi) and 
"admitted validity to the claim of the Hegelians of the right that 
they could use Hegel's philosophy to Justify Christianity as the 
absolute religion". (Brazill, 1970*143) Deeply influenced by 
Feuerbach, Marx attacked Bauer and accepted Feuerbach's proclamation 
that "The Hegelian Philosophy is the last refuge, the last rational 
£jjPPort of theology". (Quoted in Hook, 1976:233) Marx, however, soon 
^turned to the view that Hegel's philosophy is atheistic and not 
Christian, He came to see Feuerbach's own attack on religion as a 
continuation of "certain points ... which Hegel had left in mystic 
eemi-obscurity". (?P:186) For the mature Karx, Hegel along with 
Leibnitz, "laboured to dethrone God" (1971&*64)» *^4 his philosophy 
"reduced ... all things" including "religion and law ... to a logical 
category", (PP-.103)
Sydney Hook remarks that the relationship between Hegel and Marx 
one of the most challenging problems in the history of 
bought". (1976:15) It is certainly a central problem for Western 
^rxism. But the evolution of Marx's attitude to the Hegelian philo- 
80*%, particularly with respect to its religious (or atheistic) 
character, has not been satisfactorily elucidated by most Marxists, 
^ter I844, Marx no longer refers to Hegel as a theologian: Just as
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Marx turns against Feuerbach’s epistemology in the Theses on Feuerbach
(1969, Xi13-15), he also rejects Feuerbach's reading of Hegel. In the
Manuscripts of 1844. Marx lends qualified support to Feuerbach’s
notion of Hegel as a theologian: "Hegel’s ... merely apparent
criticism" is based on "what Feuerbach calls the positing, negation
and re-establishment of religion or theology, but which has to be
considered in a more general way"« (1964:210; my emphasis).
The "more general way" of considering Hegel’s philosophy is worked
out by Marx and Bn gels in The Holy Family; this book —  which was
vxitten after the Manuscripts —  furnishes a secular interpretation of
Hegel, an interpretation to which Marx and Engels will adhere in all
their subsequent writings. Hegel, they observe,
thinks [he] has overcome the objective world, the 
sensuously perceptible real world, by transforming it 
into a "Thing of Thought", a mere determinateneas of 
self-consciousness instead of making self-consciousness 
the self-consciousness of man, of real man, i.e., of 
man living also in the real, objective world and deter­
mined by that world. He stands the world on Its head 
and can therefore in his head also dissolve all 
limitations, which nevertheless remain in existence for 
bad sensuous consciousness, for real man, (1975:192)
For Engels and the mature Marx, Hegel is not a theologian but simply
an idealist who believes that "eternal truth is nothing but the logical,
°r the historical process itself". (Engels, 1969# 111:340) Hegel
asserts "the primacy of spirit to nature" and assumes "world creation
i*1 some form or other", but Hegel’s notion of creation is not a
Ieligious one and "often becomes still more intricate and impossible
than in Christianity". (Engels, 1969, 111:346)
The nature of Hegel's absolute idealism will be dealt with in the
Allowing chapters, where I will argue that Marx and Engels are
incorrect in their assessment of it. But where Marx and Engels deny
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that Hegel is a Christian thinker, the approach of twentieth-century 
Marxists is either to contend —  as do Hook (1976), Marcuse (1973) and 
Colletti (1973) —  that Hegel is a theologian, or, alternatively, to 
ignore altogether —  as do Lenin (1963) and Althusser (1972) —  the 
religious aspects of his thought. Both these approaches tend to 
underestimate the impact of Hegel on Marx, and overlook the contribu­
tions Hegel's thought could make to the further development of 
contemporary Marxism, As I will demonstrate in this and later 
chapters, Hegel's Absolute Idealism, which culminates in the absolute 
Idea or freedom, is concerned precisely with the unity of theory and 
Practice urged by Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach? "The philosophers 
have only interpreted the world in various ways} the point, however,
*a to change it," (1969» 1:15) Far from being original to Marx, this 
statement simply paraphrases a similar aphorism in Hegel's Lesser 
logici "While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it 
*8» Will takes steps to make the world what it ought to be," (1975*291) 
Hegel's absolute idealism is the product of his critique both of 
Christianity and of Kant's "subjective idealism"; Marx's historical 
S^terlallsm is its direct descendant, Nevertheless, the meaning of 
Absolute Idealism is not an object of study for Western Marxism, Thus 
Arouse, on approaching what he considers to be Hegel's religiously-* 
winded notion of Absolute Idealism, throws up his hands end admits that 
w® cannot follow the Doctrine of the Notion beyond the point we have 
r®ached", since it "is overwhelmed by the ontological conceptions 
absolute idealism", (1973s161) Lenin's estimate of Hegel's philo- 
B°Phy ia close to the one I will outline below? in spite of this, 
however, Lenin confuses the speculative and revolutionary content of
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Hegel's thought with religion. "I cast aside, for the most part," 
Lenin explains, "God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc." (1963:104) 
The standpoint of Western Marxism with regard to Absolute Idealism 
oay be traced back to Marx and Engels themselves: "... The absolute 
idea", mocks Engels, "... is only absolute in so far as [Hegel] has 
absolutely nothing to say about it." (1969* 111:340)
The mistaken notions about Hegel fostered by Marx and Engels 
lead- Lenin, for example, to dismiss the "Introduction" to Hegel's 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (1892) The "Introduction", 
claims Lenin, is "extremely lengthy, empty and tedious on the relation 
°f philosophy to religion, in general, an introduction of almost 200 
pages — » impossible!" But the "Introduction" is crucial to an under­
standing of Hegel; moreover, had Lenin carefully followed It, he 
would have come across the following remark:
... Philosophy has placed itself in opposition to 
religion ... Of their relations ... we must not 
hesitate, as if such a discussion were too delicate, 
nor try to help ourselves by beating about the bush; 
nor must we seek to find evasions or shifts, so that 
in the end no one can tell what we mean. This is 
nothing else than to appear to wish to conceal the 
fact that Philosophy has directed its efforts against ■; 
Religion. " (1892:65; ' ay emphasis) ■
*** from considering himself a Christian philosopher, Hegel reckons
Christianity to be inferior to all secular philosophy, including, of
course, his own. While philosophy has a rich history of continual
development and progress, "The content of Christianity, which is the
^mth, remained unaltered as such and has therefore little history or
aa K°od as none," (1892:9) What Hegel regards as "the Truth" of
Christianity will be considered in detail in the next section? but
this truth, for Hegel, is lower than that attained by philosophy:
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It was in the Christian religion that the doctrine 
was advanced that all men are equal before God, because 
Christ has set them free with the freedom of 
Christianity. These principles make freedom independent 
of any such things as birth, standing or culture. The 
progress made through them is enormous, but they still 
come short of this, that to be free constitutes the 
very idea of man. (1892:49)
Hegel argues that through the centuries Christianity has been "an 
impelling power which has brought about the most tremendous revolu­
tions, but the conception and knowledge of the natural freedom of man 
is a knowledge of himself which is not old". (1892:49) For Hegel, 
the modem notion of freedom is derived not from Christianity, but 
irom the principles developed by Rousseau and later given theoretical 
form by Kant. (1896:402) The doctrine of Rousseau formed the basis 
ior the ideals of the great Revolution of 1789i ideals then 
incorporated into philosophy by German idealism: "In Germany this 
Principle [freedom] has burst forth as thought, Spirit, Notion? in 
France in the form of actuality. In Germany what there is of 
aQtuality comes to us as a force of external circumstances, and as 
reaction against the same," (1896:409) Philosophy reflects develop- 
°ents in the real world, rather than the autonomous development of a 
logical Idea, Heffel sees his own philosophy as a continuation in 
^^£222, £l the French Revolution: philosophy owes no debt to religion, 
Pact, Hegel’s formulation of the relationship of German philosophy 
with the French Revolution corresponds to that of Marx, who is also no 
^riatian, "In politics the Germans have thought what other nations 
done. Germany was their theoretical conscience," (Karx, 1970* 
^5?) Hook makes a grave error when he suggests in his influential 
£^22. Hegel to Marx that "Marx was. probably the first thinker to charac 
terise the philosophy of Kant as ’the German theory of the French
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revolution'". (1976*78) But Hook's error is symptomatic of current 
Marxist thinking which sees Hegel either as a religious mystic or as a 
hopeless idealist.
There is little question that a great deal of Hegel's philosophy
appears to substantiate the thesis that he is a theologian, just as
there are passages in Plato which may be interpreted in this manner.
One problem, as I have suggested above, is that Hegel often does not
separate religious thinking from philosophy. Human thought for Hegel
is a unity and should be treated that way; religion merely expresses
in picture-thought ideas which are brought to full rationality in
science and philosophy. But there is an additional problem which dogs
especially the writings he published in his lifetime, and —  though to
a lesser extent —  his lectures and the notes he prepared for them.
Anticipations of censorship by the Prussian authorities were never far
from Hegel's mind. (Avineri, 1972*117) Doubts about Hegel's
theological orthodoxy had already lost him a place in the Academy of
Sciences. An outright declaration of atheism would have placed his
career as a professor in considerable jeopardy; a similar avowal of
unorthodoxy had earlier cost Fichte his academic chair. (Hegel, 1896*
4Q0) The result of these pressures on Hegel is recalled by Heine, who
Was one of Hegel's students*
I stood behind the maestro as he composed it tthe music 
of atheism — G.L.] of course he did so in very obscure 
signs so that not everyone could decipher them —  I 
sometimes saw him anxiously looking over his shoulder, 
for fear that he had been understood •.* It was not 
until much later that I understood why he had argued in 
the Philosophy of History that Christianity was an 
advance if only because it taught of a God who had died, 
while Pagan gods were immortal. Vhat progress it would 
be, then, if we could say that God had never existed at 
alii (Quoted in Lukács, 1975*462)
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Lukács observes that the authenticity of Heine’s account ’’has
often been questioned by bourgeois scholarship", (1975*462) This
interpretation of Hegel, however, need not rest on Heine’s testimony
alone. The assumption that God and religion have no place in Hegel’s
philosophy is the only one consistent with Hegel's direct statements
on the matter. Further, if —  as I have shown above —  Hegel denies
the existence of religious conceptions in Plato, there is no reason at
all to suppose that he would then import these conceptions into his
own philosophy, Hegel’s depiction of Plato’s attitude toward God and
philosophy indirectly corroborates Heine's testimony about Hegel’s
Peelings toward religion. According to Hegel, Plato
expresses the most exalted ideas regarding Philosophy, as 
also the deepest and strongest sense of the inferiority 
of all else ... in a manner such as nowadays we should 
not venture to adopt. There is in him none of the modest 
attitude of this science towards other spheres of 
knowledge, nor of man towards God. Plato has a full 
consciousness of how near human reason is to God and 
indeed of its unity with Him, (my emphasis —  D.K.]
As though looking over his shoulder in Just the way Heine describes,
Hegel goes on:
Ken do not mind reading this in Plato, an ancient, because 
it is no longer a present thing, but were it coming from, 
a modern philosopher [i.e,, Hegel himself) it would be 
taken much amiss, Philosophy to Plato is man's highest 
possible possession and true reality; it alone [not 
God] has to be sought of man, (1894*22)
In his discussion of the philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle, 
Hegel alludes to the division between exoteric and esoteric philosophy 
vhich was traditionally supposed to apply to their writings. Exoteric 
Philosophy deals with non-controversial and conventional issues, but 
esoteric philosophy explores dangerous and subversive ideas and, 
therefore, the philosopher must be careful how much and to whom he or
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she reveals any esoteric thoughts. Hegel rejects this division and 
observes that thinkers are driven by the desire to communicate their 
ideas to others: "they cannot keep them in their pockets'*. (1894? 1 1) 
But in his discussion of the relationship between religion and philo­
sophy in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel falls back on the distinction 
between esoteric and exoteric philosophy. He cautions that this 
discussion, which attempts to refute the charges of pantheism and 
atheism levelled against his philosophy, is "exoteric", since 
"exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the 
external apprehension of notions as mere facts —  by which notions 
are perverted into their opposite", (1969*313) Hegel’s meaning is 
clear: the accusations of atheism and pantheism concern pictorial 
conceptions only} accordingly they are dealt with on the exoteric 
level to keep the Thillstines happy. But "the esoteric study of God 
and identity, as of cognitions, and notions, is philosophy itself" —  
and if this esoteric study, Hegel implies, indicates the non-existence 
of God, then so much the better. For Hegel, freedom of thought is 
the first condition of philosophy, and this freedom means that 
neither religious philosophy nor God are its proper object: "the 
Philosophy which we find within Religion does not concern us," and 
farther, "the simple existence which ... the Jews thought of as God 
(for au  Religion is thinking), is ... not a subject to be treated of 
by Philosophy ..." (1892:91,94)
According to Hegel, the exoteric notion of God is the simple 
Image that belongs to religious faith; but the esoteric notion, the 
Philosophical conception of God does not concern a Supreme Being, 
rather the real object of this esoteric conception is the human
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individual. The various definitions of God found in religion and 
philosophy represent the attempt by human thought to grasp its own 
naturei "Without the world", i.e», the natural and social world of 
men and women, "God is not God," (Hegel quoted in Hook, 1976*17)
The notion of freedom and the conception of the individual which 
Hegel finds in the doctrine of Christianity is the subject of the 
next section; before turning to Hegel's discussion of Christianity, 
however, it is necessary to touch on a final point concerning Hegel's 
personal religious belief or lack of it. "I am a Lutheran," Hegel 
declares in the "Introduction" to the History of Philosophy, "and 
will remain the same," (1892*73) Although this admission need not 
affect anyone's ability to construct a secular theory of history and 
society, it does throw considerable doubt on the conjecture that 
is an atheist. As I will show in the next chapter, however, 
Luther is not so much a religious figure for Hegel as he is the, 
admittedly limited, proponent of a new and revolutionary conception 
of the human individual; "It was with Luther first of all that free­
dom of spirit began to exist in embryo, and its form indicated", 
c°ntinues Hegel ironically, "that it would remain In embryo," 
<^ 892*148)
Hegel's estimate of Luther is taken up by the young Marx; ,
^rmany's revolutionary past is theoretical — ■ it is the Reformat!on.
In that period," continues Karx,
the revolution originated in the brain of a monk £Luther], 
today in the brain of a philosopher ... Luther, without 
question, overcame servitude throu^i devotion but only 
by substituting servitude through conviction ... He 
liberated the body from its chains because he fettered 
the heart with chains, (l964ai52-53)
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Hegel’s understanding of the ’’Lutheran faith without any accessories” 
reveals his own (atheistic) standpoint: "God is ... in spirit alone, 
He is not a beyond but the truest reality of the individual,” (1892: 
159) The subversive content of Hegel’s depiction of God is seized 
by Marx:
To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for 
man the root of man is himself. What proves beyond 
doubt the radicalism of German theory, and thus its 
practical energy, is that it begins from the resolute 
positive abolition of religion. The criticism of 
religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme 
being for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical 
imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which 
man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible 
being ... (I964a:52)
it is true, wrote this passage while still a disciple of 
Feuerbach, (Kamenka'f 1970:117) But both he and Feuerbach were then 
®ngaged in battering down a door already thrown open by Hegel, a 
Point later recognized by the mature Marx. ”Compared with Hegel,” 
admits Marx, "Feuerbach is extremely poor.” (1965*151)
3, The Idea of Christianity
Hegel’s attitude toward religion is complex and foreign to modern 
n°tions like that for which religion and theology deal largely with 
Mythology and therefore should be regarded as . quaint if beautiful 
expressions of fantaay. The contemporary view of religion is an 
inheritance from the Enlightenment which sought to banish religion 
entirely from its new-found realm of science and technology. For 
Feuerbach and the young Marx, as for the Enlightenment thinkers, 
religion is merely myth and fantasy, the alienated expression of the
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human desire to escape the realities of an imperfect world. On this 
view, religion is merely ideology or false consciousness: "It is the 
opium of the people." (Marx, 1964*43-44) In their approach to 
religion, both Feuerbach and the young Marx make use of Feuerbach's 
"'genetic-critical' method. This consists simply in tracing concep­
tions and beliefs back to their origin in the experience and attitudes 
of men". (Kamenka, 1970:94) The genetic-critical method reduces 
religion to the "natural experiential phenomenon or set of phenomena 
which it takes over and transports into what is allegedly another 
world", (Kamenka, 1970:62) This method, Kamenka observes, "has 
become one of the standard ways of dealing with 'ideologies' as 
opposed to theories —  we show how they arose and what needs they 
satisfy or what longings they appeal to". (1970*37)
The trick of treating human thought as ideology, where ideology 
is seen a3 false consciousness, and reducing it to its "material base" 
is easy to master} it is more difficult, however, to discover the 
Positive or rational elements in thought through study of the reality 
from which it originates. "We get to know the affirmative side 
later on both in life and in science," Hegel remarks, "thus we find 
it easier to refute than to justify." (1892:38) Th® genetic- 
ovitical approach to religion is careful to conceal —  even from 
itself ■—  the elements of human rationality in religion. It is not 
Uprising, therefore, that this approach finds little in religious 
Motions which appeal to modern men and women. This sort of history 
of ideas, notes Hegel, "occupies Itself with truths which were truths 
namely, for others, not with such as would come to be the 
Possession of those who are occupied with them". Practitioners of
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the reductionist method ’’know as little of God as a blind man sees of
a painting, even though he handles the frame ... Much is told of the
history of the painter of the picture, and of the fate of the picture
itself, what price it had at different times, into what hands it came,
but we are never permitted to see anything of the picture itself",
Hegel suggests that to understand religion, the investigator should
"enter ... into an inner relation" with it and attempt to absorb the
truths religion expresses. "For here it is with the value of his own
spirit that man is concerned, and he is not at liberty to remain
outside and to wander about at a distance," (1895*41-42) The point
in the investigation of religions is
to recognise the meaning, the truth, and the connection 
with truthf in short, to get to know what is rational 
in them. They are human beings who have hit upon such 
religions, therefore there must be reason in them, 
amidst all that is accidental in them a higher necessity, 
(1895*78)
Hegel argues that religions must be Justified by research! that
is, the rational elements in religions should be brought out even if
iHey represent a fairly elementary fora of truth.
We must do them this Justice, for what is human, rational 
in them, is our own too, although it exists in our higher 
consciousness as a moment only. To get a grasp of the 
history of religions in this sense, means to reconcile 
ourselves even with what is horrible, dreadful, or absurd 
in them, and to Justify it.
The Justification of religion, however, in no sense implies our 
acquiescence to it, "We are on no account", Hegel emphasizes, "to 
regard it as right or true, as it presents itself in its purely 
immediate form —  there is no question of doing this —  but we are at 
least to recognise its beginning, the source from which it has 
0riginated as being in human nature," (1895*78-79)
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In his treatment of religion, then, Hegel is not occupied, as 
are Feuerbach and the young Marx, with a search only for its negative 
aspects. In his Early Theological Writings (1948) which contain 
"what must be one of the harshest accusations ever to have been 
levelled against the Church", (Avineri, 1972:30; also, .Kaufmann, 
1966:59) Hegel had already dealt with this side of religion, Hor did 
he lose his awareness of the negative aspect of Christianity. In 
the History of Philosophy, for example, he writes: "All the passions 
[the Church] has within itself —  arrogance, avarice, violence, 
deceit, rapacity, murder, envy, hatred ■*— * all these sins of barbarism 
are present in it, and indeed belong to its scheme of government," 
(1896:50)
Moreover, Hegel is also aware of the function of religion as what
calls "the opium of the people*. Accordingly, Hegel observes in
the Philosophy of Right that "it may seem suspicious that religion is
Principally sought and recommended for times of public calamity,
disorder, and oppression, and that people are referred to it as a
solace in face of wrong or as a hope in compensation for loss", (1976:
1^5) Since religion Is often used to Justify tyranny, Hegel continues,
"... we ought not to speak of religion at all in 
general terms and ,,, we really need a power to 
protect us from it in some of its forma and to 
espouse against them the rights of reason and self- 
consciousness." (1976:165)
For Hegel, as for Marx, religion of any kind has absolutely no place 
*n *he constitution of a rational society. (1976:169-174» 203-265) 
Nevertheless , "it is of course open to it [religion] to remain corae- 
'thlng inward, to accommodate itself to government and law, and to
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acquiesce in these with sneers and idle longings, or with a sigh of 
resignation." (1976*167)
Hegel's approach to religion, as I will show, is precisely the
one recommended by the mature Marx in a passage where he rejects the
genetic-critical method applied earlier by Feuerbach and himself:
... A history of religion that is written in abstraction 
from ... ,the material basis of ... society ... is 
uncritical. It Is, In reality, much easier to discover 
by analysis the earthly kernel of the misty creations 
of religion than to do the opposite, i.e. to develop 
from the actual, given relations of life the forms in 
which these have been apotheosized, (1976*494)
This passage comes from Capital, but Marx had previously rejected
Feuerbach's method in his Theses on Feuerbach*
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious 
self-alienation, the duplication of the world into 
a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work 
consists in a dissolution of the religious world into 
its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after 
completing this work, the chief thing remains to be 
done, (1969* 1*14)
Farx's early critique of religion was written at precisely the point 
when he still'thought Hegel's emphasis on economics and civil society 
Vas misguided. "The 'one-sidedness' and 'limit' of Hegel consist ...
*n fact that his 'standpoint is that of modern political economy' 
(Marx, quoted in Colletti, 1973*222) Later Marx ruefully admits 
that his study of Hegel "led me to the conclusion that ... legal 
Nations ... political forms Cand even religion *—  D.M.] originate in 
material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel ... 
e®braces with the term 'civil society'j that the anatomy of this civil 
s°ciety, however, has to be sought in political economy", (1970*20)
The method Hegel applies to the study of religion is the same as 
on® he employs in the investigation of Plato's philosophy. As I
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have outlined above, Hegel separates the rational and ''eternal” 
aspects of Plato’s thought from its mythological expression. Further, 
he demonstrates that the elements in Plato which are alien to modern 
conceptions, such as Plato's attack on democracy, are rooted in the 
material and political realities of Plato's time, i.e,, the develop­
ment of private property and the "subversive" notion of individual 
rights. "It is thus", writes Hegel, "a substantial position on which 
Plato takes his stand, seeing that the substantial of his time forms 
his basis, but this standpoint is at the same time relative only, in 
so far as it is but a Greek standpoint, and the later principle [of 
individual freedom] is consciously banished." (1894*99) Similarly, 
in his examination of the Christian religion, Hegel shows that 
Christianity has its beginnings within a certain material framework, 
namely slave society, and that it incorporates the rational elements 
°f Greek philosophy. In fact, according to Hegel, Christianity is 
Precisely the existential ox social form which carried the thought of 
the ancient Greek philosophers into the realm of reality. "... The 
Creek philosophy he declares, "entered, in the Christian world,
tnto actuality." (1892*55)
For Hegel, modem philosophy and science arose in opposition to 
the teachings of Christianity. Thus Christianity is the central 
object of Hegel’s critique of religion. Hegel suggests that'Christ­
ianity i8 at once the most rational of all world religions, and also 
the chief opponent of reason and philosophy. The rational character 
of Christianity provides its own Justification and accounts for its 
survival in the modem age? but the limits of its rationality 
indicate the necessity of its eventual decline. Despite these limits,
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which will be discussed below, "philosophy indeed can recognize its 
own forms in the categories of the religious consciousness, and even 
its teachings in the doctrines of religion —  which therefore it does 
not disparage". Religion, however, fails to extend the same courtesy 
to science and philosophy? ignorance of its own nature lead3 it to 
oppose philosophy: "... the religious consciousness does not apply 
the criticism of thought to itself, does not comprehend itself, and it 
is therefore, as it Btands, exclusive." (1969*504) Since Hegel’s 
time, of course, Christianity has learned to adapt itself to science? 
the outburst in the 1920's against Darwinism and the current 
opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to the birth control pill may 
prove to be the last gasps of Christian opposition to science. But the 
compromising attitude of the modem Church stems not from the nature 
of Christianity, but from its loss of support in the consciousness of 
men and women. A9 Hegel’s student Heine puts it: "Religion, when 
it can no longer b u m  us alive, cooes to us begging." (1892*109)
For Hegel, a negative critique of religion, such as that of 
Feuerbach and the young Karx, can furnish no answer for the continued 
e*istence of religion. Nor can it penetrate beneath the illusions of 
ieHgion and grasp its rational core. "... Though philosophy must not 
itself be overawed by religion, or accept the position of (God’s} 
e*istence on sufferance, she cannot afford to neglect these popular 
inceptions. The tales and allegories of religion, which have enjoyed 
for thousands of years the veneration of nations, are not to be set 
asfde aa antiquated even now." (1975*42) The inner rationality of 
^ e  Christian religion is a product of its historical development. 
Christianity incorporates the discoveries of neo-Platonist philosophy
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and these in turn “are ... not only moments in the development of 
reason, hut also that of humanity} they are the forms in which the 
whole condition of the world expresses itself through thought“. 
(1894s376) The neo-Platonist thought which flourished in Rome 
reflected "the development of private rights relating to the property 
of individual persons". (1894s375) The evolution of merchant and 
trading fortunes, which threw into question the Greek polity and 
influenced the thou^rt of Socrates and Plato, continued apace in Rome 
and found expression in its philosophy.
Roman power crushed national life and showed "itself as the with­
drawal into the aim3 and interests of private life". (1894*376) Just 
as "abstract Christians only care for their own salvation", the people 
of Rome lost the feeling of unity with society which existed in 
Greece, and attended only to their own personal interests.
In this condition of disunion in the world, when man is 
driven within his Inmost self, he has to seek the unity 
and satisfaction, no longer to be found in the world, 
in an abstract way. The Roman world is thus the world 
of abstraction, where one cold rule was extended over 
all the civilized world. The living individualities of 
national spirit In the nations have been stifled and 
killed} a foreign power, as an abstract universal, has 
pressed hard upon individuals. In such a condition of 
dismemberment it was necessary to fly to this 
abstraction ... to this inward freedoa of the subject 
as such, (1894*235)
Along with the renewed, if abstract, interest in the individual, the 
industrial achievements of Rome brought with them "contempt for nature 
••• inasmuch as nature is no longer anything in itself, «seeing that 
powers are merely the servants of man, who, like a magician, can 
them yield obedience, and be subservient to his wishes". (1894* 
3?7) These aspects of Roman thought —  the supreme importance cf 
individual consciousness and the nullity of external nature —  were
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annexed by Christianity. But where neo-Platonist philosophy was 
unable to discover concrete truth in the consciousness of the indivi­
dual, i.e., the unity of the free individual with society, this hurdle 
vas overcome by Christianity.
... within Christianity the basis of Philosophy is that 
in man has sprung up the consciousness of the truth ... 
and then that man requires to participate in this 
truth. Kan must be qualified to have this truth present 
to him} he roust further be convinced of this possi­
bility. The first point of interest in the Christian 
religion thus is that the content of the Idea should be 
revealed to man; more particularly that the unity of 
the divine and human nature should come to the conscious­
ness of man ... (1896:2-3)
According to Hegel, the absolute unity between the individual and 
society or "the divine" is posited by Christianity in its notion of 
the relationship of the individual with God. Christianity teaches 
the oneness of men and women with God, "so that God ... ceases to be 
for them mere object, and, in that way, an object of fear and terror 
•••” The notion of Christ, "who revealed himself to men as a man 
^ong men and thereby redeemed them ... is only another way of saying 
that the antithesis of subjective and objective is Implicitly over- 
COffie (1975*260-261) But because Christianity finds the truth of
individual consciousness only in the existence of God and Jesus 
Christ, it fails to recognize the real, concrete human individual and 
^ts Christ in the place of man and woman, "... Christianity ... 
Revealed to man what absolute reality is; it is a man, but not yet 
self-consciousness in general." (1894*37?)
Moreover, by abstracting from the neo-Platonist doctrine of the 
nuUity of the external world, or rather by neglecting to notice that 
natur® is an objective reality which can be made to conform to the 
vH l  of men and women, Christianity fostered the "bad idealism" for
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which everything, including nature, is merely the creation of thought! 
"... Spirit, if complete in every aspect, must have also the natural 
aspect, which in this form of philosophy [Christianity] is lacking,11 
(1094*378) By seeing everything as the product of Cod’s thought, 
Christianity set the stage for its opposition to and supersession by 
science and philosophy:
In Christianity the root of truth ... was not only the 
truth against the heathen gods, but ... against 
Philosophy also, against nature, against the immediate 
consciousness of man, Nature is there no longer good, 
but merely a negative} self-consciousness, the-thought 
of man, his pure self, all this receives a negative 
position in Christianity, Nature has no validity and 
affords no interest; its universal laws, as the 
reality under which the individual existences of nature 
are collected, have likewise no authority; the 
heavens, the sun, the whole of nature is a corpse,
(1896:41)
Another aspect of the historical development of Christianity is 
°f supreme importance. The Christian religion was above all a cosmo­
politan religion; it united ’’the free universality of the East and 
the determinatenesa of Europe11, simply, because nlts origin happens to 
b© the country where East and West have met in conflict11, (t894*500) 
^rther, it reflected the imperial power of Rome over all other 
n©tions; nationality lost its importance for religion just as it had 
Rome, As Rome was a world power, Christianity became a world 
rQllgion, Rome enslaved the world and as the antagonist of Roman 
slavery, Christianity united all races and nations against its power. 
Sixty years after Hegel’s death, Engels notices the parallels between 
Christianity and socialism.
The history of early Christianity has notable points 
of resemblance with the modern working-class movement.
Like the latter, Christianity was originally a move­
ment of oppressed people: It first appeared as the 
religion of slaves and emancipated slaves, of poor
122
people deprived of all rights, of peoples subjected 
and dispersed by Rome. Both Christianity and the 
workers* socialism preach forthcoming salvation from 
bondage and misery? Christianity places this 
salvation in the life beyond, after death, in heaven? 
socialism places it in this world, in a transformation 
of society ... Three hundred years after its 
appearance Christianity was the recognized state 
religion in the Roman world empire, and in barely 
sixty years socialism has won itself a position which 
makes its victory absolutely certain, (1959*168-169)
The parallels between Christianity and socialism, however, go even
deeper than Engels imagines, Hegel suggests that Christianity forms
the basis of his own absolute idealism; and this philosophy, as I
Wi-H show, constitutes the foundation of Plarx's historical materialism.
^egel argues that through Christianity men and women "attain to the
consciousness of heaven upon earth, the elevation of man to God"?
absolute idealism, in turn, recognizes that the social and natural
world as comprehended by science and philosophy, "has its root in God,
W t  only the root". (1896*5) Before men and women can understand
"their own relation to nature and society, they must conceptualize this
r®lation in picture thought as the relation of God to the world? later
they will recognize that God is no one else but themselves?
The manner in which man represents to himself his relation 
to God is more particularly determined by the manner in 
which man represents to himself God. What is now often 
said, that man need not know God, and may yet have the 
knowledge of this relation, is false. Since God is the 
First, He determines the relation, and therefore in order 
to know what is the truth of the relation, man must know 
.Cod,'":
notion of God represents a necessary stage in the historical 
^®relopment of human consciousness: just as many children in modern 
8°ciety are at first attracted by the idea of a.Supreme Being, but then 
a^andon it when they achieve a mature consciousness of themselves, so 
to° earlier men and women form an image of God. "The idea which a
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man has of God", notes Hegel,
corresponds to that which he has of himself, of his 
freedom ... when a man knows truly about God, he knows 
truly about himself too: the two sides correspond 
with each other. At first God is something quite 
undetermined? but in the course of the development of 
the human mind, the consciousness of that which God 
is gradually forms and matures itself, losing more 
and more of its initial indefiniteness, and with this 
the development of true self-consciousness advances 
also. (1895*80)
Hegel argues that Christianity "brings about the whole revolution 
that has taken place in the world's history"; the truth of Christian­
ity is its recognition of the supremacy of individual human conscious- 
n®es and activity as expressed in the life of the mortal Christ. Ho 
than Christianity, of course, other religions have adopted an 
anthropomorphic concept of God. The Greeks, for example, imagined 
S°ds who were like men and women, but "they were not anthropomorphic 
enough". The Greek gods retained the trivial aspects of the human 
character as well as its divine or creative qualities, but for the 
Greeks, "man is not divine as man, but only as a far-away form and not 
as ’this», and subjective man". Christianity conceives of God as He 
has become in the flesh, in Christ; and Christ bears this resem­
blance to man and woman; He is mortal. Paraphrasing Hegel and without 
distorting his meaning, we can say, "that God Himself is dead ... con- 
sbitutea the great leading Idea of Christianity". (1896*4-5)
Another fundamental truth of Christianity is that men and women 
bheir true nature in society. The individual can prove him or 
herself to God only through action in society; "the animal is by 
nature vhat it ought to be", but not the human individual. The animal 
nev®r attains to real individual freedom because it lacks a social 
R e w o r k  within which to manifest its individuality; the
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individuality or divinity of men and women, however, is accomplished 
in society. Through worship and the repentance of sin, Christianity 
teaches the individual the absolute desirability of proving his or 
ber worth in society,
... The natural will is not the will as it ought to be, 
for it ought to be free, and the will of passion is not 
free. By nature Spirit is not as it ought to bej by 
means of freedom only does it become such. That the 
will is by nature evil is the form under which this 
truth is presented tin Christianity], But man is only 
guilty if he adheres to this his natural character.
Justice, morality, are not the natural will, for in 
it a man is selfish, his desire is only toward his 
individual life as such. It is by means of worship, 
accordingly, that this evil element is to be annulled. 
(1895:244)
S’or Hegel, then, the principle of Rousseau according to which "man was 
b o m  free, but is everywhere in chains” is incorrect, and had already 
been confuted by Christianity, In Christianity "the natural man is 
Represented as evil” (l895**244)i it is only in and through society 
that freedom and morality are attained. Thus Plarx's notion that 
human nature is "the ensemble of the social relations” (1969, 1 :14)» 
simply expresses a basic truth of Christianity,
Hegel denies that the truths of the Christian religion "were so 
1° speak ready made in the mind of God”: Christianity is nothing 
other than a stage in the autonomous development of human conscious- 
fcesa. But Christianity can be grasped in this way only from the stand­
point of modern times. In the same way as the inventor of the wheel 
c°uld not see his or her Invention as a moment in the development of 
^be motor car, the early Christian was unaware that the Christian Idea 
rePresent3 a step in the progress of individual human consciousness.
ft
History”, Hegel remarks, "is the process of mind itself, the 
revelation of itself from its first enshrouded consciousness, and the
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attainment of this standpoint of free self-consciousness ..." The 
notion that society is the platform on which human players fulfil and 
realize themselves belongs to Christianity, and informs the develop­
ment of the "natural individual" through the stages of maturity, no 
less than it does the progress of modern society. It is the basis of 
Marx»s and Hegel*s notion of revolutionizing practice: "... Mind", 
says Hegel, "is the living moment, proceeding from its immediate 
existence to beget revolutions in the world, as well as in individuals." 
(189617-8)
Hegel argues that Christianity "has made the intelligible world
of Philosophy the world of common consciousness". Through the
teachings of the Church the ordinary person arrives at a knowledge of
the nature of God (and therefore of the human individual) previously
taiown only by the greatest thinkers of antiquity. In the doctrine of
original sin, for example, "what is said of him as such, what every
member of the human race really is in himself, is represented in the
iora of the first man, Adam ..." The individual learns about good and
•vil, and comes to realize that evil is natural and can be eradicated
05%  through knowledge of God and self-development in society. This
concept of the benefit of education seems elementary to us modems,
^nt it vas not an idea easily arrived at by humankind as a whole.
The abrogation of mere naturalness is known to us simply 
as education, and arises of itself? through education 
subjection is brought about, and with that a capacity 
for becoming good is developed* How if this appears to 
come to pass very easily, we must recollect that it is 
of infinite importance that the reconciliation of the 
world with:itself, the making good, is brought about 
through the simple method of education. (1896:10)
According to Hegel, the very notion of sifa and repentance encourages
^dependent and rational thought in the popular mind. The individual
126
is from the beginning involved in a contradictions the believer is 
reputed sinful by nature, and can reach the divine only by proving 
him or herself worthy before God. "Yet I am at the same time 
referred into myself, for thought, knowledge, reason are in me, and 
in the feeling of sinfulness, and reflection upon this, my freedom 
[to overcome evil and sin] is plainly revealed to me ... Rational 
knowledge, therefore, is an essential element in the Christian 
religion itself ... [because] this subjectivity, this selfness (not 
B®lfishness) is just the principle of rational knowledge itself."
(1895:17)
Two principal consequences naturally follow the propagation of
Christianity. The first is the recognition of the infinite rights
^ d  worth of the ordinary individual. Each person, regardless of
hirth or class, is made in God's imagej every human soul is divine
and of equal importance for God. Thus to take up the principle of
Christianity is to deny forever the right of someone to take another
in-to slavery. Christianity teaches "that the human being is actually
free", and, writes Hegel in a remarkable passage,
When individuals and nations have once got in their 
heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there 
is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just 
because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its 
very actuality. Whole continents, Africa and the East, 
have never had this Idea, and are without it still.
The Greeks and Homans, even the Stoics, did not have 
it ... It was through Christianity that this Idea cam® 
into the world. According to Christianity, the 
individual as such has an infinite value as the object 
and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in 
absolute relationship with God himself, and have God’s 
mind dwelling in him: i.e, man is Implicitly destined 
to supreme freedom. •, (190! <59~?40;. my emphasis]
Sydney Hook, who suggests that both ttarx and Hegel assert "the 
$riority of the group over the individual", and deny "natural rights,
1 2?
or conscience", also criticizes as a "mere abstraction" (1976:47, 57) 
Hegel's notion that Christianity was instrumental in making freedom an 
essential and active principle in the formation of individual 
consciousness and society. But Christianity is itself a product of 
the material framework of ancient society, and once installed in the 
consciousness of men and women it had irrevocable consequences for the 
secular as well as the religious realm. "If, in religion as such," 
writes Hegel,
man is aware of this [free] relationship to the absolute 
mind as his true being, he has also, even when he steps 
into the sphere of secular existence, the divine mind 
present with him, as the substance of the state, of the 
family, etc. These institutions are due to the guidance 
of that spirit [of freedom], and are constituted after 
its measure{ whilst by their existence the moral temper 
comes to be indwelling in the individual, so that in 
this sphere of particular existence, of present 
sensation and volition, he is actually free. (1969:240)
Christianity is merely a stage or moment in the historical develop-
tt0nt of humanity, Christianity, and religion generally, is only neces-
Sa*y so long as people do not realize that both nature and society can
made subject to their conscious and rational will. Writes Hegel,
... Because thinking consciousness is not the outward 
universal fora for all mankind, the consciousness of the 
true, the spiritual and the rational, must have the fora 
of Religion, and this is the universal justification of 
this form. (1892:81)
®Xa°tly the same position is held by Karx, who observes in Capital that
The religious reflections of the real world can, in any 
case, vanish only when the practical relations of 
everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, 
generally present themselves to him in a transparent 
and rational fora. The veil is not removed from the 
countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process 
of material production, until it becomes production by 
freely associated men, and stands under their conscious 
and planned control. This, however, requires ... a long 
and tormented historical development. (1976:173)
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To recognize the limits of Christianity, however, is not to deny
its role in making the notion of freedom a kind of "second nature" for
®en and women* "Christianity in its adherents", writes Hegel,
has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and 
cannot he slaves| if they are made into slaves, if the 
decision as regards their property rests with an 
arbitrary will, not with laws or courts of justice, they 
would find the very substance of their life outraged.
This will to liberty is no longer an Impulse which 
demands its satisfaction, but the permanent character —  
the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulslve 
nature, (1969*240)
The second great result of the spread of Christianity concerns the
development of the independent and rational state. Christianity, it
da true, guarantees heaven in the beyond, and therefore relegates
freedom to another world instead of making it a principle of state and
government. But from the teachings of Christianity it occurred to men
and women that heaven should be constructed on earth, in a rational
state which would protect the rights of the individual.
On the appearance of Christianity it is first of all 
said* "My kingdom is not of this world;" but the 
realization has and ought to be in the present world.
In other words the laws, customs, constitutions, and all 
that belongs to the actuality of the spiritual conscious­
ness should be made rational.
According to Hegel, the development of the modern state during the 
i^-ddle Ages was neither the unintended consequence of mindless hitman 
ac^°n guided by "the cunning of reason", nor was it the result, as 
a°me Marxists would have it, of the endless shuffle of modes and 
delations of production across the stage of history. The modern state 
Cannot be in the beginning, but must come forth after being worked 
UPon *>y mind and thought", And it was "in Christianity Cthat] these 
absolutQ claims of the intellectual world and of spirit had become
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the universal consciousness”, (1896:21-22) Accordingly,
even under the feudal system ... justice, civil order, 
legal freedom gradually emerged. In Italy and Germany 
cities obtained their rights as citizen republics, 
and caused these to be recognized by the temporal and 
ecclesiastical power; wealth displayed itself in the 
Netherlands, Florence and the free cities on the 
Rhine. In this way meh gradually began to emerge from 
the feudal system ... (1896:105)
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CHAPTER 4
PROM THEOLOGY TO ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 
1, Theology. Enlightenment, and Absolute Idealism
According to Feuerbach, religious speculation or theology is 
®ere fantasy; it is worse than dreaming, for "where dreams can 
illuminate reality, once they are properly interpreted, theology 
obscures reality by resisting such Interpretation, by treating the 
fantasies that constitute religion as direct representations of 
(another) reality". (Kamenka, 1970:62) "All religious speculation is 
vanity and lying," claims Feuerbach, " —  a lie against reason and a 
lie against faith ..." (Quoted in Kamenka, 1970:60) Somewhat the 
same notion is put forward by Engels, although he extends it to 
include philosophy as a whole. "As to the realms of ideology which 
®°&r still higher in the air —  religion, philosophy, etc. — * " writes 
^gels in one of his letters on historical materialism, "these hare a 
Prehistoric stock ... of what we should today call bunk." (1959:405)
The cohjecture that theology, especially early Christian theo­
logy is, as Feuerbach puts it, a "swindle", (Quoted in Kamenka, 1970: 
has become part of received wisdom. For Hegel, however, this view 
is utterly mistaken. It is true that theology is merely exegesis —
It must work on a given form, i.e., the Bible —  nevertheless, each 
Person brings to the Bible his or her own notions and opinions. These, 
th turn, derive from, or concern, reality, "what Is given by the 
Benses". No one can merely expound a doctrine without slipping into 
It his or her personal conceptions. "We find what we look for, and
131
¡Just because I make it clear to myself, I make my conception, my 
thought, a factor in it; otherwise it is a dead and external thing, 
which is not present for me at all." To make something clear to our­
selves is simply to recognize ourselves in it* Just as different 
people in modem times can make diverse readings, say of Marx, earlier 
thinkers found a myriad of opposed ideas and notions in the Bible,
"Thus men have made of the Bible what may be called a nose of wax,” 
(1896:13-14) Hegel's problem, then, is to find in speculative 
theology the elements of sensuous reality which the theologians put 
into it. For, as Hegel suggests, "commentaries on the Bible do not so 
much make us acquainted with the content of the Scriptures, as rather 
with the manner in which these things were considered in the age in 
which they were written”. (1895*28) Hegel’s method of approach to 
theology, therefore, like his approach to religion generally, is 
Precisely the "materialist ... and scientific one" recommended by the 
nature Marx. (1576*494)
Arguments about the nature and existence of God are in reality 
arguments about the nature of the human individual and his or her 
relation to society: they represent the attempt by earlier genera­
tions to come to grips with the social reality in which they found 
themselves. (1895*2-3) Accordingly, the problems of theology are 
Precisely the problems of philosophy and modern social science# This 
is Hegel*8 meaning when he writes, "a reason derived knowledge of God 
the highest problem of philosophy", and "God", in turh, "is our
and essential self", <1975*57» 261) The theological arguments 
of the lathers of the Church, and those of the mediaeval schoolmen 
8Uch as Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, were alienated and external to
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their real content —  the life activity of the human Individual —
simply because of the undeveloped and alienated nature of their own
society. In the world of the schoolmen, for example,
life as a whole fell into two parts, two kingdoms.
Directly opposite the spiritual world kingdom there 
stands the independent worldly kingdom, emperor against 
pope, papacy and Church ... There the world beyond, 
here the world beside us ... The culture which now 
shows itself is confronted by this incomplete reality, 
as an actual world in opposition to the world of 
thought} and it does not recognize the one as present 
in the other. It possesses two establishments, two 
standards of measure and weight, and these it does not 
bring together but leaves mutually estranged. (1896*51)
The estranged and irrational character of feudal society found 
Political expression in the Crusades which exhibited all the "frenzy, 
foolishness and grossness" characteristic of the society which spawned 
them. The Crusaders, with "utter lack of judgement and forethought, 
and with the loss of thousands on the way", reached Jerusalem it is 
true; but why did they go there? The Christians clearly "did not 
^derstand themselves"; they went in search of holy spots which had 
absolutely, no relevance to their Immediate needs. "Barbarians all the 
time, they did not seek the universal, the world-controlling position 
of Syria and Fgypt, this central point of the earth, the free connec­
tion of commerce ..." "Bonaparte", Hegel wryly continues, "did this 
vh®n man became rational," The Crusaders were forced "by the Saracens 
^ d  by their own violence and repulsiveness" to admit that they had 
’’deceived themselves. This experience taught them that they must hold 
to the actual reality which they despised, and seek in this the 
reallzation of their intelligible world". (1896*104) Ho less than the 
Crusaders, the schoolmen themselves were reluctant to consider anything 
th the world of experience to be worthy of real interest. The arts and
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sciences alike were banished from the universities? and "law and 
right, the recognition of actual man, were not esteemed as pertaining 
to the social relationships of life, but to some other sphere". The 
rationality of ordinary existence yielded to the "utter barbarism of 
thought" which "keeps to another world, and does not have the notion 
of reason —  the Notion that the certainty of self is all truth". 
(1896:43)
The alienated form of theology, however, did not prevent it from 
expressing some fundamental truths —  truths which Hegel incorporates 
into the philosophy of absolute idealism. But before cohsidering 
these ideas, an alternative conception of Hegel's notions about 
religion and theology deserves a brief discussion. An example of this 
alternative conception is available in Charles Taylor’s Hegel. Taylor 
rejects arguments, such as the one X have made above, that Hegel is 
an atheist for whom "man as a natural being is at the spiritual 
summit of things", (1976:494) Instead, he sees Hegel as an (unortho­
dox) Lutheran Christian who is somehow unable to recognise his own 
heresy. (1976:486) Hegel’s "is a genuine third position" between 
orthodoxy and Enlightenment atheism, "which is why it is so easy to 
misinterpret". (1976:494) Tor Taylor, this "third position" means 
that «*,, God comes to knowledge of himself through man's knowledge of 
him", (1976:481) This is correct as far as it goes, except that 
iaylor does not draw what seems to be the obvious conclusion: if God 
ia only human self-knowledge, then God himself must be human. Par what 
kind of God is Be if He cannot even get to know Himself? As Hegel puts 
**» "... God's becoming man is an essential moment of religion ..." 
(1895»70)j and: "philosophy is knowledge, and it is through
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knowledge that man first realizes his original vocation, to be the 
image of God." (1975*44) Pressed to its conclusion, Taylor’s under­
standing of what he calls Hegel’s "bizarre" doctrine (1976*571) is 
bizarre indeed. "... This process of self-knowledge", writes Taylor,
is one which is slowly and painfully realized through 
history; for it is part of the self-realization of 
Geist Cor "cosmic spirit" (1976*387)]. And in the 
early stages, God’s self-consciousness will be very 
rudimentary and inadequate, very distorted one may 
sat. But even in this primitive form, it is recog­
nizably a consciousness of God ..." (1976*481)
It may be "recognizably a consciousness of God", but is it recog­
nizable to anyone as God’s consciousness?
Taylor's interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of religion has
®any adherents. Its Justification is usually considered to be found
In the following passage from the Encyclopaedia*
God is God only so far as he knows himself, his self- 
knowledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and 
man’s knowledge of God, which proceeds to man’s self- 
knowledge in God. (1969*298)
Andrew Seth, in a work published in 1892, comments on a similar 
Passage in Hegel, and arrives at an entirely different conclusion from 
that of Taylor —  one which, in fact, corresponds with Marx’s idea on 
the subject.
"God is not a Spirit"beyond the stars," says Hegel, "He 
is Spirit in all spirits." *—  a true thought finely 
expressed. But if the system leaves us without any 
self-conscious existence in the universe beyond that 
realized in the self-consciousness of individual 
philosophers, the saying means that God, in any 
ordinary acceptation of the word, is eliminated from 
our philosophy altogether." (Seth, 1892*196)
**or seth, as well as for Marx, .the conclusion is unavoidable: the
IIe€^lian system "sacrifices ... the best interests of humanity ... to
a Iogicai abstraction styled the Idea, in which both God and man
diBappear..t (1892*242)
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"God, in any ordinary acceptation of the word”, certainly does 
disappear from Hegel's philosophy, hut the human individual does not«
It is worth repeating that the individual is the central focus of 
Hegel's thought: the "very essence" of the absolute "is ... in the 
individual consciousness". (1894:401) For Hegel, "God" as the 
absolute essence is definitely an object of philosophy? but "the 
Absolute ... has not on that account the same signification as is 
implied in the term God." (1895*25) The pictorial notion of God, in 
other words, simply cohcems the nature of the human individual. The 
Enlightenment thinkers who argued that God is merely the creation of 
men and women and that religion should be viewed as "a means, and 
something practised with a definite end in view" were very close to 
Hegel's view, but they left out of consideration the actuality of 
religion, its role as a reflection of, and an active force in society 
and in the consciousness of the individual. "The true view" of God 
and religion, remarks Hegel, "and the false one [of the Enlightenment] 
are here very close together, and the obliquity or error in the latter 
appears to be only a slight displacement, so to speak, of the former." 
(1695*102)
Hegel opposes the Enlightenment notion that Christiahity in its 
modern form is merely a foreign mode of thought foisted on the people 
Hy a devious Church to protect its own interests and that of the ruling 
Powers. "Such ideas as that the priests have framed a people's 
Heligion in fraud and self-interest are completely absurd; to regard 
R®ligion as an arbitrary matter or a deception is as foolish as it is 
Perverted." (1892*62) To be sure, the Church itself is no stranger 
to corruption and greed; but religion as a form of thought is the
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reality as well as the reflection of the society from which it 
emerges. Religion is an alienated form of consciousness because it 
represents its object, i.e,, God, as something apart from the 
conscious life and social activity of the human individual. The 
alienated quality of the religious consciousness explains its 
reliance on pictorial images and expressions to convey ideas; unable 
to conceive the world as the product of the thinking activity of 
human beings, the believer creates a world in the beyond which is 
then furnished with characters and relationships found in the real, 
social world. Thus "the pictorial thought of the religious communion 
... brings into the realm of pure consciousness the natural relations 
of Father and Son," (1967:767) Because it appeals to external 
authority, religion becomes "wooden and unspiritual" (1892:80); its 
e*ternal character, its alienation from the life of the individual, 
exposes religion to "the will of the deceiving priesthood and the 
oppressive despot". (1967:562) Lacking the ability to find their 
real life.in their own consciousness and life activity, the faithful 
are subject to the manipulation of the existing powers.
According to Hegel, the terrific struggle between the Enlighten-
ment and the Church merely represented the split in society between
the rising middle class and its aristocratic and religious opponents.
Hegel describes this battle in the Phenomenology:
The sphere of spirit {^consciousness and society] at this 
stage breaks up into two regions. The one is the actual 
world, that of self-estrangement, the other is that 
which spirit constructs for itself in the ether of pure 
consciousness, raising itself above the first, This 
second world, being constructed in opposition and contrast 
to that of estrangement, is Just on that account not free 
from it; on the contrary, It is only the other form of 
that very estrangement, which consists precisely in 
having a conscious existence in two sorts of worlds, and 
embraces both. (1967:513)
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Marx captures the essence of Hegel's position in his Theses on 
Feuerbach: "... the fact that the secular foundation detaches itself 
from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent 
realm is really only to be explained by the self-cleavage and self­
contradictoriness of this secular basis.w (1969» 1:14) In later 
chapters I will deal more closely with Hegel's notion of alienation 
and its relation to the work of the young and the mature Marx, For 
now it is only necessary to point out that the religious critique of 
Feuerbach and the young Marx owes everything to Hegel and contributes 
little of its own. The following passage from the writings of the 
young Marx simply repeats Hegel's critique in the Phenomenology:
Man is the human world, the state, society. This state, 
this society, produce religion which is an inverted 
world consciousness., because they are an inverted world. 
Religion ... is"the fantastic realisation of the human 
being inasmuch as the human being possesses no true 
reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, 
indirectly a struggle against that world whose spiritual 
aroma is religion, (1964^:43)
^hat both Feuerbach and the young Marx fail to grasp is the positive*
°r constructive aspect of religion and alienation! moreover, they 
overlook the fact that, no less than its religious opposition, the 
^Hghtenment consciousness es also alienated. Marx will later gain 
access to these Hegelian positions In The German Ideology (1968)| 
tixey form the foundation of his mature work.
Although Taylor is incorrect in his depiction of Hegel’s philo- 
s°Phy of religion, he is right in saying that Hegel takes up a genuine 
third position between Enlightenment atheism (and Deism) and religious 
°rthodoxy. In what follows, I shall sketch out the main elements in 
th*s Position and show their connection to what Hegel calls the truths 
of religious speculation or theology. Hegel defines consciousness as
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"the relation of knowledge to its object". (1895*205) Because the
religious consciousness arises from the "severance or division of
consciousness", it is by definition an alienated consciousness. For
Kegel, religion, even in its earliest forms, is symptomatic of the
divided or alienated consciousness, because religion always separates
the everyday life activities of men and women from the higher realm of
divine existence and thought. "In their simple relation", religion
and everyday life, observes Hegel,
already constitute two kinds of pursuits, two different 
regions of consciousness, and we pass to and fro from 
one to the other alternately only. Thus man has in his 
actual worldly life a number of working days during 
which he occupies himself with his own special interests, 
with worldly aims in general, and with the satisfaction 
of his needs? and then he has a Sunday, when he lays all 
this aside, collects his thoughts, and, released from 
absorption in finite occupations, lives to himself and 
to the higher nature which is in him, to his true 
essential being, (1095*7)
According to Hegel, when men and women think about God and 
religion they are actually thinking about spirit, about social life, 
^Ken people raise their thoughts to God they are really reflecting on 
^he infinite relations of the intellectual and social world.
In religion man places himself in relation to this centre, 
in which all relations concentrate themselves, and in 
doing so he rises up to the highest level of consciousness 
and to the region which is free from relation to what la 
other than itself, to something which is absolutely self- 
sufficient, the unconditioned which is free, and is its 
own object and end, (1895*2)
T?
r Kegel, thought about the intellectual and social realm is free 
bought; for it is thought which has itself for an object. The intel- 
^eotual and social world is the creation of men and women} to conceive 
^ia world in all its infinite relations is to engage in absolutely 
endeavour.
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... Thinking means that, in the other, one meets with 
one's self. It means a liberation, which is not the 
flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is 
actual having itself not as something else, but as its 
own being and creation, in the actuality with which 
it is bound up by the force of necessity. (1975*222)
The Enlightenment consciousness denies the existence of this 
higher (social) realm posited by religion. As suggested above, 
Rousseau, for example, sees reality in terms of "the arbitrary choice 
of the individual" (1894*115)» he has no notion of the unity of the 
individual with the higher realm of society, what Hegel calls the 
unity of the finite and the infinite. Similarly, Kant's philosophy 
has no social basis; the morality of the individual is conceived in 
terms of an abstract moral law, the postulate of practical reason. 
(Hegel, 1895*228) Religion at least retains this concept even if in 
^  alienated form:
A present and actual church is an actuality of the kingdom 
of God upon earth, in such a way that this last is present 
for every man —  every individual lives and must live in 
the kingdom of God. In this disposition we have the 
reconciliation of every individual; thereby each becomes 
a citizen of this kingdom, and participates in the 
enjoyment of this certainty. (1896:53-54)
Hegel's philosophy of absolute idéalisa is aimed precisely at 
uniting the social dimensions of religion with the abstract indivi­
dualism of the Enlightenment:
Philosophy demands the unity and intermingling of these 
two points of view; it unites the Sunday of life when 
man in humility renounces himself, and the working-day 
when he stands up Independently, is master of himself 
and considers his own interests. (1892:92)
vas Luther who first expressed the absolute unity of the indivi­
dual's life activity with worship of the divine; Hegel's philosophy 
kud then only to conceive this unity in rational (non-religious) 
*eiTIJs» And it is this unity, as I will argue below, that is carried
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forth into the world by Marx and his followers.
What Hegel calls "the highest concrete content of absolute
idealism" is precisely the unity of the individual with society.
It is the power which unites in itself what appears to 
consciousness infinitely removed from one another —  the 
mortal and the absolute. This absolute is itself ’this1 
first of all concrete, not as abstraction, but as the 
■unity of the universal and the individual; this 
concrete consciousness [of absolute idealism] is for 
the first time truth. (1896*42)
the unity of the individual with society is above all a creative 
relationship; in their concrete social relations men and women 
create a social and intellectual world, no less than they create a 
*orld of the mind, a world of art, literature and science, Sydney 
Hook is wrong, therefore, when he expresses an opinion shared by many 
contemporary Marxists* "Hegel and Marx are agreed that consciousness 
Plays an active role In knowing. They differ as to the nature of 
consciousness and the degree of its activity. Por Marx all thought is 
Human, not absolute; it transforms but it does not create," (1976;
52) Hegel, of course, agrees with Marx that there is a world which 
exists independently of the mind. For both thinkers, the question is 
n°t whether the world is there, but rather how it-'can.be-changed.
Philosophy has to recognize that mind is only for 
Itself by opposing to Itself material being, and by 
leading back what is thus differentiated into unity with 
itself, a unity mediated by the opposition of material 
being and the overcoming of it. (Hegel, 1969!145)
With a striking image Hegel elucidates the creative relationship
He tween the individual and society. "The reality of my mind", he writes,
is thus in my Mind itself and not outside of it; It is 
my real Being, my own substance, without which I am 
without existence. This reality is, so to speak, the 
combustible material which may be kindled and lit up by 
the universal reality as such as objective [i.e,,
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society]; and only so far as this phosphorus is in 
meni is comprehension, the kindling and lighting up, 
possible. (1892*75)
The problem with both the consciousness of the Enlightenment and that 
of theology is that they cannot comprehend the creative nature of 
the relationship of the individual with society. In these two types 
of thought the consciousness of the individual is essentially passive 
in relation to the external world. Theology, for example, separates 
the consciousness of the believer from its object, from God. wThe 
Spirit which bears witness is further distinguished from me as an 
individual; my testifying spirit is another, and there only remains 
to me the empty shell of passivity,w (1895*42) Hence when Anselm 
declared he had proved the existence of God by showing that He must 
he something greater than what can merely be thought, Anselm over­
looked the fact that thought itself is the property of the individual 
human being. Thus the unity of thought and being is found not in 
God, but in the human being and his or her relation with society.
Though I see the truth of I Anselm’s] proposition, I 
have not attained to the final point, the object of my 
desire; for there is lacking the I, the inner bond, 
as awareness of thought. This lies only in the Notion, 
in the unity of the particular and the universal, of 
Being and thought. (Hegel, 1896*93)
Before going on to consider further the relationship between 
absolute idealism and the opposing thought forms of Enlightenment and 
theologyf a point should be made to which 1 will return in further 
chapters. If Hegel believes that the freedom of the individual can 
°hly be realized in society, he does not suggest that bourgeois or 
capitalist society can offer the total freedom urged by absolute
Bourgeois society is an advance over earlier social forms 
^ut it is not the final answer for humanity; it offers only the
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possibility not the reality of freedom. In fact, the abstract prin­
ciple of the Enlightenment, "the idea of abstract man outside of any 
relation to others”, is simply an expression of the nature of 
bourgeois society. (1894*209-210) The same connection is made by 
Marx in a passage in the Grundrisae where he refers to Hegel's notions 
of the "natural individual", and "oivil society".
In this society of free competition, the individual 
appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in 
earlier historical periods make him the accessory of 
a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and 
Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of 
the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations 
this eighteenth-century individual —  the product on 
the one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of 
society, on the other side of the new forces of 
production developed since the sixteenth century —  
appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into 
the past. Hot as a historic product but as history's 
point of departure. As the Natural Individual 
appropriate to their notion of human nature, not 
arising historically, but posited by nature ... Only 
in the eighteenth century, do the various forms of 
social connectedness confront the individual as a mere 
means towards his private purposes, as external 
necessity. But the epoch which produces this stand­
point, that of the isolated individual, is also 
precisely that of the hitherto most developed social 
... relations. (1973*83-84)
Hegel compares the "abstract right" of the isolated individual in
®odern society "which allows of his acting as such, and yet, as an
individual spirit, holds all parts together", with the operation of a
factory, which is also an analogy favoured by Marx. For no one in
bo^geois society, writes Hegel,
is there properly speaking the consciousness of, or 
the activity for the whole? hut because the Individual 
is really held to be a person, and all his concern is 
the protection of his individuality, he works for the 
whole without knowing how. It is a divided activity, 
in which each has only his part, just as in a factory no 
one makes a whole, but only a part, and does not possess 
skill in other departments, because only a few are 
employed in fitting the parts together.
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Hegel is in no danger of confusing bourgeois society with a completely 
free state where the development of each leads to the development of 
all, such as in the communist society recommended by Marx. "It is 
free nations alone", observes Hegel, "that have the consciousness of 
and activity for the whole; in modern times the individual is only 
free for himself as such, and enjoys citizen freedoms alone —  in the 
sense of that of a bourgeois and not a citoyen." (1896:209) Capital­
ism is a necessary stage in the development of human cuitare; it 
constitutes an advance over earlier societies and prepares the way 
for a "communist society", which in Hegel1s own words, will give "to 
each according to his need or in equal portions ..." (1967:447) In a 
Passage worth quoting in full, Hegel outlines an argument that will 
later be given more concrete expression by Karx.
The freedom of citizens in this signification [bourgeois] 
is the dispensing of universality, the principle of 
isolation; but it is a necessary moment unknown to 
ancient states. It is the perfect independence of the 
points, and therefore the greater independence of the 
whole, which constitutes the higher organic life. After 
the state received this principle into itself, the 
higher freedom could come forth. These [earlier] states 
are sports and products of nature which depend upon 
chance and the caprice of the individual, but now, for 
the first time, the inward substance and indestructible 
universality, which is real and consolidated in its 
parts, is rendered possible. (1894*210)
True freedom cannot exist wherever there is exploitation and
Inequality as there is in modern day bourgeois society. "The true
^minion of spirit", Hegel remarks,
cannot ... be a dominion in the sense that its opposite 
is in subjection to it; spirit in and for itself cannot 
have the subjeotive spirit to which it relates 
confronting it as an externally obedient slave, for this 
last is itself also spirit. The dominion which exists 
must take up this position, that spirit is in subjective 
spirit in harmony with itself," (1896*47-48)
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Nor can freedom exist if one’s occupation and class are the result of
external circumstances rather than of free and rational choice.
Everyone may make the experiment for himself; he must be 
allowed to decide regarding his own affairs as subject 
in a subjective matter, by his own free will, as well as 
in the consideration of external circumstances; and 
nothing must therefore be put in his way if he says, for 
instances ’I should like to apply myself to study,*
(1894*110)
The distance between real individual freedom and its inadequate 
expression in bourgeois society is suggested by Hegel in the Philosophy 
of Right. ”... the concrete concept of freedom”, urged by absolute 
idealism, writes Hegel,
we already possess in the form of feeling — » in friendship 
and love, for instance. Here we are not inherently one­
sided, we restrict ourselves gladly in relating ourselves 
to another, but in this restriction we know ourselves as 
ourselves. In this determinacy a man should not feel 
himself determined; on the contrary, since he treats the 
other as other, it is there that he first arrives at the 
feeling of his own self-hood. Thus freedom lies neither 
in indeterminacy nor in determinacy; it is both of these 
at once. The will which restricts itself simply to a 
this is the will of the capricious man who supposes that 
he is not free unless he has this will ... Freedom is to 
will something determinate, yet in this detersinaey to 
be by oneself and to revert once more to the universal,
{19?6t 228-229)
concept of freedom in absolute idealism is also the one incor­
porated into Marx’s historical materialism. "Only in comunity (with 
othera]% writes Marx in the O m a n  Ideology«
. has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts 
in all directions; only in the community, therefore, 
is personal freedom possible. In the previous 
substitutes for the community., in the State, etc#, 
personal freedom has existed only for the individuals 
:'who developed within the relationships of .the ruling 
class, and only in so far as they were individuals of 
this class. The illusory eomounlty, in which indivi­
duals have up till now combined, always took on an 
independent existence in relation-to them, and was at • 
the same time, since it was the combination of one
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class over against another, not only a completely 
illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In the 
real community the individuals obtain their freedom 
in and through their association. (1971i295-296)
According to Hegel, Enlightenment thought, which he also refers
to as "finite thought" or the "understanding consciousness", develops
out of and in relation to religious consciousness and theology.
Although the religious consciousness is alienated or divided within
itself, there is at first no realization of this division in the mind
of the believer. The religious person in the Kiddle Ages, for
example, accepts religion along with the personal conditions of life
"as a lot or destiny which he does not understand. It. is so". The
individual simply subordinates his or her life to the higher region of
God and heaven. Hut with the development of society and the social
delations of the individual, the individual becomes ever more acutely
aware of a social and intellectual world of his or her own creation.
■ Although he sets out from what is.* fro® what he finds, 
yet he is no longer merely one who knows, who has these 
rights*, but what he makes out of that which is given 
in knowledge and in will is his affair, his work, and. he 
• has the consciousness that he has produced it, Therefore 
these productions constitute his glory and his pride, 
and provide for him an iEssense, an infinite wealth vMm . 
that world of his intelligence, of his knowledge, of his 
external possession, of hla rights and deeds, (1895*6)
Without being conscious of the process, the individual Is building
a real® which begins to eat into the world of religion and God, The
A v e r s e  takes on a more and more divided aspects on one side the
Individual is free and selfHJetensiningi on the other, ha or she. must.
^ i t  to what, seems now to be an alien power* Gradually the indivi-
comes to distinguish between the human world of knowledge and ■
°cietyf and -the other, alien, realm of God, "Its religion is
&Co°rdingi.y distinguished from what we have in that region of todtpen-
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dence [society] by this, that it restricts knowledge, science, to the 
worldly side, and leaves for the sphere of religion, feeling and 
faith." (1895:10)
Despite the illusion of independence, however, the relations of 
the individual in the developing bourgeois society are subject to 
chance and arbitrariness? furthermore, the individual is acutely 
aware that he or she is conditioned and determined by society. This 
feeling of being conditioned is reflected in science and knowledge 
generally.
Wan demands his right? whether or not he actually gets 
it, Is something independent of his efforts, and he is 
referred in the matter to an Other. In the act of 
knowledge he sets out from organisation and order of 
nature, and this is something given. The content of his 
sciences is a matter outside of him,
feeling of outward determination, of an order external to the will 
the individual, led the thinkers of early bourgeois society, like 
Descartes, Kalebranche and Spinosa (Hegel, 1969:33)» to suggest that 
ev©rything is the creation of Cod, hoping thereby to get on with the 
Pursuit of science and knowledge. "♦»* The matter", writes Hegel,
. Mis settled with the one admission, that Cod has made everything, and 
thls religious side is thereby satisfied once for all, and then in the 
Progress of knowledge and the pursuit of aims nothing further is 
th°ught Of the matter." (1895*10)
At this point there is simply no adequate theory.about.the 
N a t i o n  of religion and God to the social and natural universe! "the 
re*ation-of Cod to the other side of consciousness is undetermined'and 
.®®n®ralw and ia expressed simply as "God has created all things"* But 
8 attitude is "cold and lifeless") it does not do justice to the . 
a°V that everything which constitutes the interest« of the .individual
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are only the objects and products of his or her self-conscious 
activity. Moreover, if everything is created by God for certain 
divine ends, how is it that there is so much evil and conflict in the 
world? ’’The idea of God and of His manner of operation as universal 
and necessary is contradicted by this inconsistency, which is even 
destructive of that universal character," (1895*13) This contra­
diction leads to the abandonment of God altogether* nothing is 
recognized except that which can be demonstrated to the consciousness 
of the individual. Everything is looked at in terms of the categories 
of cause and effect, and these categories are applied to the universe 
of individual things and their relations with one another,
... It is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the 
cause of lightning, or of the downfall of the Republican 
system of government in Rome, or of the French 
Revolution; here it is perceived that this cause is 
only an entirely general one, and does not yield the 
desired explanation. What ve wish to know is ... 
not the reason which applies to all things, but only and 
exclusively to thle definite thing *.* Therefore this 
knowledge does not go above or beyond the sphere of the 
finite, nor does it desire to do so, since it is able to 
apprehend all in its finite sphere, is conversant with 
everything, and knows its course of action. In this *
manner science forma a universe of knowledge, to which 
God is not necessaryt■which lies outside of religion, 
and has absolutely nothing to do with it Of the 
Infinite and eternal, nothing whatever is left, (1895*15)
For this type of thought —  the origins of which Marx suggests are to
found in "the men and women of the court of Charles II, Bolingbroke,
the Walpoles, Hume, Gibbon, and Charles Fox" (1963*240) —  the world
lost its absolute connection in the mind of the individual. Cod
and Religion have shrivelled up into m  empty kingdom of the-'Eternal.
^rything is seen, to be connected one to another, but a unified theory
0f th® universe has died along with God, The opposition between
: ^ ghteraent and theology la complete.
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If the Enlightenment is a tremendous advance over the religious 
consciousness, it achieved its position at a terrible cost to the 
unity of human thought. The Enlightenment consciousness is alienated 
and divided because it sees the objects of thought as something 
independent of and given to individual consciousness. The central aim 
of Hegel’s absolute idealism is to recover the unity sacrificed by the 
understanding consciousness; the truth of reality has to be seen as 
the product and the result of the conscious activity of individual 
human beings. Further, the progress and realization of the infinite 
Qualities of the individual have to be apprehended as the chief end 
snd goal of all social development. "While the finite required an 
Other for it3 determinateness, the True has its determinateness, the 
Itfflit, its end in itself; it is not limited through an Other, but the 
Other is found in itself," (1895*22) The central aim of absolute 
Realism is also that of Marx’s historical materialism, "Communism", 
declares Marx,
... consciously treats all natural premises as the 
creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their 
natural character and subjugates them to the power of 
the united individuals, . Its organization is, therefore, 
essentially economic, the material production of the 
conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions 
into conditions of unity. The reality, which communism 
is creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering 
It Impossible that anything should exist Independently £  
Individuals, in so far as reality is only a product of 
the preceding intercourse of individuals, themselves ... 
By the overthrow of the existing state of society by the 
communist revolution ,,, and the abolition of private 
Property which is identical with it, this CalienJ power 
*111 be dissolved; and ... then the liberation of each 
single individual will be accomplished ... Only then 
*111 the separate individuals be liberated from the
%  emphasis
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various national and local barriers, be brought into 
practical connexion with the material and intellectual 
production of the whole world and be put in a position 
to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided 
production of the whole earth (the creations of man),
All-round dependence ... will be transformed by this 
communist revolution into the control and mastery of 
these powers, which, bora of the action of men on one 
another, have till now overawed and governed men as 
powers completely alien to them. (1971*294-295)
Hegel argues that religion at least retains the unity of the 
individual with the universe in the notion of God, who is conceived as 
the image of the individual, "It is this speculative element which 
comes to consciousness in religion." (1895:22) Where the Enlighten­
ment thinkers retain a religious consciousness it is only to conceive 
God as a Supreme Being in the Beyond, "as the Infinite, with regard to 
which all predicates are inadequate, and are unwarranted anthropo­
morphisms, In reality, however, it has, in conceiving God as the 
Eupreme Being, made him hollow, empty, and poor". (1895*30) Even 
modern theology has followed the lead of the Enlightenment and has 
Pushed the knowledge of God to the background. "It no longer gives 
°nr age any concern that it knows nothing of God; on the contrary, it 
i® regarded as the mark of highest intelligence to hold that such 
P l e d g e  is not even possible." <1695*36) For Hegel, ignorance of 
^he nature of God "must ... be considered as the last stage in the 
d*eradation of man". (1895*56) TThe degeneration has reached the 
Point where anyone who tries to investigate the nature of religion and 
004 «ill be either opposed or ignored, let Hegel sees it m  the duty 
absolute idealism to rescue the dogmas of the Church from the 
avkvard hands of the theologians and oppose these dogmas to the finite 
;Consei©ueness of the Enlightenment* ■
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But why is a study of the nature of God so important? The 
reason Is simples the nature of God is the nature of men and woment 
to apprehend the qualities of God is to grasp the infinite qualities 
of the human individual.
... There cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of 
Spirit? there cannot be a Divine reason and a human, 
there cannot be a Divine Spirit and a human, which are 
absolutely different. Human reason —  the consciousness 
of one's being —  is indeed reason? it is the divine in 
man, and Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of God, is 
not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world ... God 
is a living God, who is acting and working. (1895*55)
^be "acting and working ... living God", of course, is no one other
than the real, concrete human individual.
For Kegel, there are three fundamental truths in Christian theo- 
lo«y*. the notions of redemption and resurrection, and the concept of 
the Holy Trinity. The first two were treated in detail in the last 
chapter. The doctrine of redemption for sin is discussed in the 
Action on the Idea of Christianity where it was shown that the 
doctrine simply expresses the unity of the individual with society and 
tbe absolute importance of education and self-development. The 
Petrine of resurrection and irsnortality is dealt with in the section 
0n Klato; the idea of everlasting life concerns the eternal nature of 
social activity.
Kegel calls the notion of the Trinity, which is derived from
^atonic and neo-Platonic philosophy, "absolute reality" <1894*363)* 
it »constitutes the essential nature of Cod" (1894*76)« The theological
c°ftception of the Trinity is simply "picture thinking”, but "in a
ïati°nal conclusion, however, the main point of its speculative eon- 
t®ht î18 the identity of the extremes which are joined to on© another? 
ip thi B
** Hegel continu«©, "It is involved that the subject presented
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in the mean is a content which does not Join itself with another, but
only through the other and in the other with itself", (1894:76) What
the notion of the Trinity expresses, then, "in the bare form of
ordinary conception" (1894*379) is the essentially creative character
of the relation of the individual with society. For Hegel, the human
individual • like the Christian God — ■ is
not ,,, something quiescent, something abiding in 
empty identicalness but [is] something which neces­
sarily enters into the process of distinguishing 
itself from itself, of positing its Other [through 
work in society], and which comes to itself only 
through this Other, and by positively overcoming it 
—  not by abandoning it, (1969*12)
In other words, the individual in society is the absolute "identity
which posits difference".
In the following passage Hegel outlines the conception of the
Trinity, but to grasp Hegel’s meaning it is important to keep in mind
that when he speaks of God creating nature, he is referring only to
Kant's notion that the human being comes to nature with certain a
priori categories through which the individual is able to comprehend
®nd elucidate its structure*
Theology, as we know, expresses this process [the 
relationship of the individual with external world] 
in picture-thinking by saying that God the Father (this 
simple universal or being-within-self) [i.e,, the 
individual], putting aside his solitariness creates 
Nature (the being that is external to itself, outside 
of itself), begets a Son (his other ’I') but in the 
power of his love beholds in the Other himself, recog­
nizes his likeness therein and returns to unity with 
himself; but this unity is no longer abstract and 
immediate, but a concrete unity mediated by the moment 
of difference [i.e,, the unity is that of the individual 
with nature and society through his or her conscious 
activity]| it is Holy Spirit which proceeds from the 
Father and the Son, [the individual in his or her 
relations with others] reaching its perfect actuality and
152
truth in the community of Christians [society]j and 
it is as this that God must be known if He is to be 
grasped in his absolute truth, and the actual Idea in 
and for itself [as conscious individual human 
activity], and not merely in the form of the pure 
Uotion, of abstract being~within-self [the "bad 
idealism"] or in the equally untrue form of a detached 
actuality not corresponding to the universality of 
His Motion [the isolated individual of Enlightenment 
thinking], but in the full agreement of his Notion and 
his actuality [the unity of individual consciousness 
and social being], (1969*12-15)
The rational form expressed by the Christian notion of the Trinity
is outlined in the Lesser Logic, where Hegel discusses the relation
between the individual and civil or bourgeois society. It is important
to note, however, that for Hegel this relation is only what he calls
the "Absolute Mechanism". Bourgeois society has yet to achieve the
organic relation between the individual and society which will be
achieved only in the rational, or as Marx calls it, the communist
state. "... The state", says Hegel,
is a system of three syllogisms. (1) The individual or 
person, through his particularity or physical or mental 
needs (which when carried out to their full development 
give civil society), is coupled with the universal,
i.e. with society, law, right, government. (2) The will 
or action of the individuals is the intermediating 
force which procures for these needs satisfaction in 
society, in law, etc., and gives to society, law, etc. 
their fulfilment and actualization, (3) But the 
universal, that is to say, the state, government, and 
law, is the permanent underlying mean in which the 
individuals and their satisfaction have and receive 
their fulfilled reality, intermediation, and persistence.
Each of the functions of the notion, as It is brought 
by intermediation to coalesce with the other extreme, is 
brought into union with itself and produces itself* 
which production is self-preservation* (1975*264-265)
Hegel puts the relationship between his philosophy of absolute
■^dealisnj and theology as follows*
Absolute idealism ... though it is far in advance of 
vulgar realism, is by no means merely restricted to 
philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion} for
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religion too believes the actual world we see, the 
sum total of existence, to be created and governed 
by God.
But the God Hegel speaks of is the human individual. Hegel contrasts 
absolute idealism with Kant's "subjective idealism" for which "the 
things we know about are to us appearances only, and we can never 
know their essential nature, which belongs to another world we cannot 
approach". As Hegel points out, "plain minds have not unreasonably 
taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its reduction of the 
facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created by our­
selves alone". (1975*73) Hegel, as I have observed above, accepts 
Kant's notion that the human mind comes to the outside world with 
certain a priori categories! "it is a mistake", writes Hegel, "to 
imagine that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas 
come first and that our subjective agency then supervenes and frames 
notions of them." (1975*73) But Hegel carries Kant’s argument a step 
further and suggests that not only do human beings confront nature and 
reality with a rational consciousness which is self-determinihg and 
independent of the action of external objects, men and women also 
transform nature and create a reality all their own in society. 
"Hature", writes Hegel, is for man "only the starting point which he 
has to transform". (1975*44) Kant fails to grasp the social nature 
°f individual human consciousness and therefore constructs an episte­
mology, as well as a moral theory, based entirely on the Enlightenment 
n°tion of the isolated individual. This aspect of Kant’s philosophy ia 
Criticized by Marx no less than It is by Hegel. Notes Marx,
The characteristic form which French liberalism,
based upon real class interests, took in Germany, we 
find in Kant. Neither he nor the German bourgeoisie 
whose ideological apologist ... He was, observed that
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at the root of these theoretical ideas of the 
bourgeoisie lay material interests and a class will 
conditioned and determined by the material relations 
of production. Kant consequently separates the 
theoretical expression of these interests from the 
interests themselves. He transforms the materially 
motivated will of the French bourgeoisie into a 
pure self-determination of the free will, of the 
will in-and-for itself, of the human will. In this 
way he converts it into a purely ideological deter­
mination and moral postulate, (Quoted in Hook,
1976*310)
According to Hegel, the history of religion is the story of the 
struggle of men and women to overcome external authority and aliena­
tion; with the victory over external power won by Christianity, which 
teaches that "man and God — are one" (1892*105), theology cleared 
the way for science and philosophy. The stages of religion reflect 
the stages of society, and the notion of God reflects the position of 
the individual in society. "In the East only one individual is free, 
the despot; in Greece the few are free; in the Teutonic world ... 
all are free, that is, man is free as man." (Hegel, 1892*100) In 
Eastern society the subjection of the individual is almost complete*
"In the brightness of the East the individual disappears," (1892*99) 
Consequently, the Oriental God is only an abstract spirit in the beyond 
who inspires the individual with fear in the same way as society 
itself is based on fear, "The man who lives in fear, and he who rules 
°ver men through fear, both stand upon the same platform; the 
difference between them is only in the greater power of will which can 
So forth to sacrifice all that is finite for some particular end." 
(1892:97) The relation between the social subjugation of men and women 
in Oriental society and Eastern religion is also noted by Marx.
Oriental despotism ... restrained the human mind within 
the smallest possible compass» making it the unresisting 
tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional
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rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical 
energies ... These little communities [which made 
up Indian society] were contaminated by distinctions 
of caste, and by slavery, ... they subjugated man 
to external circumstances instead of elevating man 
into the sovereign of circumstances ... they trans­
formed a self-developing social state into never 
changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a 
brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its 
degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of 
nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of 
Hanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow. (1959*480)
By contrast, the Greeks grasped as human consciousness «what they
opposed to themselves as the Divine”. But, enmeshed in the relations
of slave society, the ancients were unable to recognize the absolute
creativity and worth of the individual, and urged the subordination of
the individual to the state and society. (Hegel, 1969*2) The Greek
gods are not apprehended in thought, they are given content through
sensuous images and axe subject to the limits of this medium Itself.
The gods are jealous, war among themselves and are prey to the natural
forces that influence men and women: «... The medium of sense”,
Hegel observes, «can only exhibit the totality of mind ... as a circle
of independent, mental or spiritual shapes{ the unity embracing all
the shapes remains, therefore, a wholly indeterminate, alien power
over against the gods.« (1969:20) In a famous passage, which is
undoubtedly much influenced by Hegel, Karx connects Greek mythological
art to the undeveloped character of ancient society.
Is the view of nature and social relations on which the 
Greek imagination and hence Greek taythologyl is base<V, 
possible with self-acting mule spindles and_railways and 
locomotives and electrical telegraphs? What^chance ha®
?ulcan against Roberts à  Co., ^plter 
lightning rod and Hermes against Credit .Mobilier. . -All 
mythology overcomes and dominates and.shapes the forces 
of nature in the imagination and by the imagination! 
it therefore vanishes with the advent of real mastery- 
over them. {1973 s 11
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Unlike the deities of the Orientals and the Greeks, "the Christian 
God”, says Hegel, "is God not known merely, hut also self-knowing; he 
is a personality not merely figured in our minds, hut rather 
absolutely actual." (1975*211) Por Hegel, theological arguments 
about the existence of this "actual" God turn precisely on the nature 
of the human individual. Accordingly, when theologians began to 
consider the character of God they found that certain categories like 
"substance", "necessary essence", "cause which regulates and directs 
according to design" and so on, were appropriate enough for things 
in the material world like stones, wheelbarrows and watches, but 
"inadequate to express what is or ought to be understood by God".
These concepts refer to "a subordinate level of facts", i.e., inor­
ganic nature and its "merely contingent" qualities. Even the proper­
ties of organic nature —  "the organic structures, and the evidence 
they afford of mutual adaptation ..." —  even these properties are
’‘incapable of supplying the material for a truthful expression to the 
idea [of] God." (1975*83-84) Thus religious thinkers were forced to
go beyond these categories and adopt ones which approximate the
ooncepts which Hegel applies to the nature of the human mind.
The highest definition of the Absolute is that it is not 
merely mind in general but that it is mind which is 
absolutely manifest to itself, self-conscious, infinitely 
creative mind ... Just as in philosophy we progress 
from the imperfect forms of mind's manifestation ... to 
the highest forms of its manifestation, so, too, world 
history exhibits a series of conceptions of the Eternal, 
the last of which shows forth the notion of absolute 
mind. (1969*19-20)
The Christian notion of the Triune God, "the highest definition
the Absolute", captures the essence of what Hegel calls, "the 
distinetive determinateness of the notion of mind, ideality".
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(1969:9) Ideality, in turn, is the fundamental category of absolute 
idealism, for what it expresses is that "Kind ... should not merely 
be pure thought, but that it should be thought which makes itself 
objective, and therein maintains itself and is at home with itself.” 
(1894:382) Ideality concerns the active and creative nature of human 
thought, what Marx will later call, "revolutionising practice”: "the 
fundamental idea”, remarks Hegel, is "Thought which is its own 
object, and which is therefore identical with its object, with what 
is thought; so that," as in the Trinity formula, "we have the one and 
the other, and the unity of both". (1894*582-383) It is through 
ideality, through the practical activity of men and women in society, 
that "liberty and happiness are attained for the subject". (1894*385) 
The concept of ideality expresses the absolute identity of the indivi­
dual with society; but this identity is creative and transforming —
it "is absolute negativity ..." (1989*8)
In Christian theology "Cod is conceived as making himself an 
object to Himself, and further, the object remains in this distinction 
in identity with God? in it God loves Himself," (1895*30) The
abatractt differentiating consciousness of the Enli^tenment abandons 
entirely this theological notion of an "identity which posits 
difference" and settles for pure, lifeless identity, 1=1. Absolute 
idealism, on the other hand, "which is no longer abstract, but which 
eets out from the faith of »an in the di£nit£ of his spirit [my 
aphasia], and is actuated by the courage of truth and freedom, grasps 
the truth as something concrete, as fullness of content, as Ideality, 
in which determinateness -  the finite —  is contained as a moment", 
(1s95:30) Transforming, creative human practice remains a mystery for
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the Enlightenment consciousness, or to what Hegel also calls, the
"understanding", or "materialized conception".
To materialized conception existence stands in the 
character of something solely positive, and quietly 
abiding within its own limits: though we also know 
... that everything finite (such as existence) is 
subject to change. (Hegel, 19755157)
The very nature of human individuals —  their consciousness and the
contradictions contained within it —  forces them out of themselves
and spurs them on to change and improve their environment. "Such
changeableness", Hegel declares,
is to the superficial eye a mere possibility, the 
realization of which is not a consequence of their own 
nature. But the fact is mutability lies in the notion 
of existence, and change is only the manifestation of 
what implicitly is. The living die, simply because they 
bear within themselves the germ of death, (1975*157)
According to Hegel, the supreme defect of the understanding 
consciousness, a term he applies to modern philosophy from Descartes 
to Kant, is its "obstinacy ... which views the finite as self­
identical, not inherently self-contradictory". (1975*165) later I 
wU l  show that what Hegel calls the "understanding», is precisely what . 
M&Sc calls "bourgeois thought", and "bourgeois consciousness". It is 
a state of mind unable to comprehend that reality is in a state of flux 
and doomed to be washed away by the future: by the self-conscious 
activity of individual human beings, by "revolutionising practice".
^ia is what Farx means in Capital when he writes that the Hegelian
dialectic,
in its rational form ... is a scandal and an abomination 
to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, 
because it includes in its positive understanding of 
what exists a simultaneous recogmition of its negation, 
its inevitable destruction; because it regards every 
historically developed form as being in a fluid state, 
in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspects S3
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well; and because it does not let itself be impressed 
by anything, being in its very essence critical and 
revolutionary. (197^1103)
2. Ideality and Absolute Idealism
Hegel1s notion of ideality has been entirely overlooked by Western
Marxism, no less than by non-Marxist commentators. The concept of
ideality appears in the Phenomenology variously as alienation,
estrangement or extemalizatlon; but it is precisely the same concept
Hegel uses in his later works, ’’The world”, writes Hegel in the
Phenomenology, ”is objectively existent spirit, which is individual
self, that has consciousness and distinguishes itself as other, as
world, from itself”. (1967*770) Similarly the concept of human work
or extemalization developed in the Phenomenology is simply an aspect of
■the wider concept of ideality. The poverty of current Western Marxist
commentary on Hegel is illustrated by the work of Colletti. According
*0 this writer, absolute idealism means nothing but the union of God
human beings and the world. For Colletti,
The meaning of [Hegel’s] argument could not be clearer;
God becomes real in the world ... the civil and political 
institutions of modern bourgeois society ... which to us 
seem to be historical institutions ... to Hegel appear ... 
as the presence itself of God in the world —  not profane 
realities but ‘mystical objects*, not historical 
institutions but sacraments. (1973*269)
kike Marx, Colletti is indebted to Feuerbach for the basic assump-
■tiona'-'of his critique of Hegel. "Pantheism”, remarks Feuerbach, "makes
G°d into a present, real and material being ..." and therefore, Kegel's
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philosophy "is pantheistic idealism". (1966:24» 5®) Feuerbach’s 
reading of Hegel is indeed, as Marx suggests, "extremely poor" (1965* 
15l)| and Marx's own failure to question many of the aspects of 
Feuerbach's critique of Hegel which he absorbed as a young man has 
left an unfortunate legacy in the writings of Western Marxism. Never­
theless, as I have argued above, Marx —  unlike Colletti and others —  
came to reject Feuerbach's assumption that Hegel is in any way a 
religious thinker. Marx's reason for doing so, especially regarding 
Hegel's "pantheism", is a good one; while Hegel never responded 
directly to the accusation of atheism, except to observe that what is 
regarded as atheism and what is not Is culturally relative (1975*106), 
he rejects in the strongest terms that his philosophy is a form of 
Pantheism. "To impute Pantheism", Hegel declares,
... is part of the modem habit of mind —  of the new 
piety and new theology. For them philosophy has too 
much of Gods —  so much so that, if we believe them, 
it asserts that God is everything and everything is God.
(1969:304)
According to Hegel, pantheism —  this "all-one doctrine ... this 
stale gossip of oneness or identity" (1969*313) —  is much more
nvidious than the charge of atheism.
The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea 
of a full and real God, and arises because the popular 
idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the 
peculiar form to which it is attached [i.e,, the creative 
consciousness of the human individual}. (1969:304)
the naive critic of absolute idealism, writes Hegel, "each and 
Very secular thing is God. It is only his own stupidity and the 
alsification due to such misconception, which generates the imagina- 
ion and allegation of pantheism". (1969:305) Charles Taylor observes 
'kat Hegei»s system "breaks asunder"-and yields "an impossible
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conclusion" because Hegel cannot decide between "romantic pantheism"
and "orthodox theism". (1976:349) In contrast with Colleiti, Taylor
at least recognizes the existence of this contradiction, if indeed
God, on the ordinary meaning of the term, is present at all in Hegel’s
philosophy. But the contradiction lies in Taylor's interpretation of
Hegel, not in Hegel's philosophy. Notes Hegel,
If any difficulty emerge in comprehending God's relation 
to the world, [the critics of absolute idealism] at once 
and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation 
contains for them an Inexplicable contradiction? and 
that hence, they must stop at the vague conception of 
such relation, perhaps under the familiar names of e.g. 
omnipresence, providence, etc. Faith in their use of 
the term means no more than a refusal to define the 
conception, or to enter into a closer discussion of the 
problem. That men and classes of untrained intellect 
are satisfied with such indefiniteness, is what ohe 
expects? but when a trained intellect and interest for 
reflective study is satisfied, in matters admitted to 
be of supreme interest, with indefinite ideas, it is 
hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest 
with the subject. (1969*312)
Collett! observes that the problem of Hegel's philosophy is to get
Past the abstract notions of finite and infinite which impair the
ordinary conception of the relation of God with the world. For this
conception, God is at once an object, a finite thing, and also a spirit
vho resides in the beyond, an infinite being. "The terms of the
Problem to be solved by Idealism", says Colletti,
are all here ... In order to comprehend the infinite in 
a coherent fashion, the finite must be destroyed, the 
world annihilated ... [But] once the finite is expunged 
... the infinite can pas3 over from the beyond to the 
here and now, that is, become flesh and take on earthly 
attire, f?973!l2)
^Hia is how Colletti arrives at the conclusion that absolute idealism 
actually pantheism.
The 'principle* of idealism has been actualized. In 
place of the world now annihilated, one has substituted
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the ’true* reality. It is not, however, the Revolution 
that has taken place but the I'ransubstantlation.
(Colletti, 1973*19)
The problem of absolute idealism — - once it is recognized that for 
Hegel God is the human individual is here correctly posed: to 
posit the unity between God and the world left open both by the 
Enlightenment thinkers and by a theology which makes God at once 
finite and infinite —  a unity, as Hegel observes, "to be called 
incomprehensible by the agnostic"• (1969*311) Absolute idealism, he
writes, "certainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however 
with abstract unity, mere identity, and the empty absolute, but with
concrete unity (the notion) ...” In other words, Hegel's philosophy 
is concerned with unity as contradiction, as "the unity which posits 
difference": «... Each step in [the] advance [of philosophy] is a
Particular term or phase of this concrete unity, and ... the deepest 
and last expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself."
(Hegel, 1969*311)
The unity of absolute mind or reason is precisely the unity of 
theory and practice 'urged by Karx in his Theses on Feuerbach : "Theo-
betlcal and practical mind", states Hegel,
reciprocally integrate themselves ... Both modes of 
mind are forms of Reason, for both in theoretical and 
practical mind what is produced, •—  though in different 
ways —  is that which constitutes Reason, a unity of 
subjectivity and objectivity. (1969*185*'1R6)
Ideality— the key term in Hegel’s absolute idealism and the basis of
vhat he calls the unity of theory and practice —  makes its first
aPPearance in the "Doctrine of Being" in the lesser logic where Hegel
indirectly explains why he calls his philosophy absolute idealism. 
Hegel claims that there is no distinction between the finite and the
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infinite, or at least the distinction between them as comprehended by
the Understanding is incorrect* "... The truth of the finite is
rather its ideality This ideality of the finite is the chief
maxim of philosophy! and for that reason every genuine philosophy is
idealism,” (1975*140) For Hegel,
... the assumption of a rigid opposition between finite 
and infinite is false ..»in point of fact the infinite 
eternally proceeds out of itself, and yet does not 
proceed out of itself ... the finite itself is the first 
negative, the non-finite is the negative of that negation, 
the negation which is identical with itself and thus at 
the same time the true affirmation. (1975*158]
Translated into prose, this means that the individual in society is at
once determined by and creates through his or her work —  or negativity
—  the actuality of society. «... The concrete [the individual in
society] is the universal which makes itself particular, and in this
making of itself particular and finite yet remains eternally at home
with itself.« (Hegel, 1894*581)
Earlier in the lesser loglo» Hegel declares that
the tendency of all man's endeavours Is to understand 
the world, to appropriate and. subdue it 1m à
to this end the positive reality of the world must 
as it were crushed and pounded, in other words, idealised. 
(1975*69? wy emphasis)
Here is the true meaning for «idéalité« and «ideality« which 
Colletti mistakes for the notion that «the world has disappeared. That 
vHich seemed finite, in reality is infinite. An independent material 
*oria no longer exists". (Colletti, 1975*19) According to Hegel,
"vhen reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it la at 
°nce seen to be ideality"! in other words, jderüitv is the B l i &  S i  
theory and practice achieved b£ concrete human sensuous activity.
*Hence”t observes Hegel,
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ideality has not received its proper estimation, when 
you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an 
ideality must be recognized outside it. Such an 
ideality [i.e., Cod] external to it or it may be even 
beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name, 
(1975*141)
For Hegel, ideality —  active human consciousness and practice —  
exists not outside the world but in it5 its presence is felt every­
where in nature as well as society. But ideality without human 
sensuous activity, as expressed in the "bad idealism" which sees 
everything in terms of non-materialized thought, is abstract and void 
— - a nullity. "Ideality", Hegel declares, "only has a meaning when it 
is the ideality of something? but this something is not a mere 
indefinite this or that, but existence characterized as reality, which 
if retained in isolation, possesses no truth." (1975*141)
As the fundamental category of mind or human consciousness, 
ideality is what separates human beings from the rest of nature, "The 
distinction between Nature and Kind is not improperly conceived, when 
the former is traced back to reality, and the latter to Ideality as 
the fundamental category." Ideality is the expression of human self- 
consciousness or being-for-self* "Being-for-self may be described as 
ideality, Just as Being there-and-then was described as reality." The 
' v  of the human being is, according to Hegel, "the reference to self 
wM c h  is infinite and at the same time negative"} in other words, the 
stands for a particular person and also his or her active relation- 
sbip with other individuals, nature and society. "Kan", says Hegel,
is distinguished from the animal world, and in that way 
from nature altogether, by knowing himself as *1 ’} which 
amounts to saying that’natural beings never attain a 
free Being-for-self, but as limited to Being-there-and- 
then, are always and only a Being-for-another. (1975*
141)
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Hegel's notion of Being-for-self and ideality is related to "Being 
Determinate" which he calls, "the truth of ... Alteration", (1975s
145) Alteration, in turn, refers to work, to the transforming power of
human practice. "Alteration ... exhibits the inherent contradiction 
which originally attaches to determinate being, and which forces it 
out of its bounds." (1975*137)
Ideality is the truth of identity, a truth, as we have seen, first 
arrived at by theology which sees God not only as the One God (the 
individual), but also as the infinitely creative and transforming 
power. "Identity In its truth, as an ideality of what immediately is, 
is a high category for our religious modes of mind as well as all other 
forms of thought and mental activity." The notion of God as ideality 
"is to see that all the power and the glory of the world sinks into
nothing In God's presence, and subsists only as a reflection of his 
power and glory". (Hegel, 197511«) To view God as Ideality; Is 
precisely to grasp the trus natug» of h g S  ."«TOlntlffll^ jS HSSjto«:- 
"In the same way Identity, as self-consciousness, is what distinguishes 
nan from nature, particularly from the brutes which never reach the 
Point of comprehending themselves as 'I', that is, pure self-contained
unity." (Hegel, 1975*168) The revolutionizing potential of human
ssif-coneeioue activity ie captured in the phrase of the Church, "sic 
i&nslt gloria rcundl". no less than it is by Shelley!
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said* Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert ...
And on the:pedestal these words appear»
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings*, 
took on my works, ye Mighty, and despair]"
Nothing beside remains. ■ Round the decay ■
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bar©
The lone and level sands stretch far away,
(P. B. Shelley* "Ozymandias")
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For Hegel, the activity of the 'I*, the activity of the self­
identical human being is what stands in the way of absolute authority, 
as well as the abstract identity of the Enlightenment or the Under­
standing. Identity and the other so-called laws of thought, such as 
that of the »excluded middle", are important and indeed vital for the 
finite, non—human, sciences and other branches of knowledge. But 
they are unable to account for the creative movement, the inner 
dialectic, of human thought and activity. In formal logic, notes 
Hegel,
... the identity of the understanding which allows 
nothing to contradict itself is fundamental. However 
little this logic of the finite may be speculative in 
nature, yet we must make ourselves acquainted with it, 
for it is everywhere discovered in finite relationships.
There are many sciences, subjects of knowledge 4c«, 
that know and apply no other forms of thought than these 
forms of finite thought, which constitutes in fact the 
general method of dealing with the finite sciences. 
(1975*222-223)
A recent writer is wrong, therefore, when he suggests that Hegel 
lacks "a clear understanding of the nature of logic and theories, and 
between logics and the interrelated causal patterns of the world". 
(Wussachla, 1977*273) It is not that Hegel misunderstands formal 
logic, it is simply that he believes it can play no valid role in 
the comprehension of human consciousness and society. Consequently, 
Hegel*a; Logic is aimed precisely at constructing a rcetftodplofX, 
a theory of human social activity. Benin makes this point in his 
commentary on Hegel: "When Hegel endeavours- sometimes.even huffs 
an(i puffs", remarks Lenin,
—  to trine Ban', purpo.lv. activity under the categories 
of logic, saying that this aotlvlty is the "syllogism”
.;. t L t  the subject (man) plays ^ the role or a "member” 
in the logical "figure” of that "syllogism”, and so on,
167
—  THEN THAT IS NOT MERELY STRETCHING A POINT, A MERE 
GAME. THIS HAS A VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MATERIALISTIC 
CONTENT, (I963i1905 Lenin's capitals)
Failure to grasp the "materialist" content of Hegel's philosophy, 
or rather, the inability to see that absolute idealism and ideality 
are concerned precisely with human theory and practice, has led to 
much confusion in Marxist and non-Marxist accounts of Hegel, One 
aspect of this confusion is that when certain writers actually manage 
to comprehend the meaning of particular passages in Hegel, they see 
these passages as somehow discontinuous with the thread of his 
argument. Thus Kussachia, the writer quoted above, interprets Hegel’s 
"absolute idea" as "the Universal of universals, a pure conscious- 
conceptual essence which is the source of all and which reunites with 
itself in the historical development of man’s religio-philosophlcal 
thought", (1977j273) This interpretation of Hegel leads Mussachia to
note that
In reading Hegel it is fascinating to see how his 
rationality brings systematization to his irrationality 
by stretching and twisting the meanings of practically 
every one of his philosophical concepts. In other 
words, it appears that the struggle between an implicit 
rationality and an overt irrationality was an underlying, 
cognitive cause of much of the obscurity and ambiguity 
of Hegel’s philosophy. (1977*273-274)
There is no denying the difficulty of Hegel’s thought, and especially
his peculiar manner of expressing it, Yet it is hard to resist the
observation that many interpreters
Intellectual achievement to dismiss his ^ p * o j * 2 L  SS.
iFratinnait than to attempt to discover its SlSSSiHZ ££&
£2h®£ence.
Aristotle developed the ordinary-logic of the Understanding, but 
IIeg®l attributes to him also the discovery of the significance of
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ideality. In his discussion of what he sees as Aristotle's develop­
ment of the notion of ideality, Hegel emphasizes the element of human 
labour-power; a concept later to be made the foundation of tfarx’a 
Capital. For Aristotle, »the energy of thinking and the object of 
thought are the same"; but this identity "is ... no dry identity of 
the understanding". (Hegel, 1894.’ 148-149) According to Aristotle, 
thought alone is the "unmoved mover"; thought is the ultimate source 
of activity. But thought also constitutes the unity between the 
activity itself and the content and object of activity. Aristotle 
lived in the bustling trade and manufacturing city-state of Athens.
His problem in searching for an unmoved mover, as he called it, was to 
explain the nature and characteristics of human activity in connection 
with the simple tools and machinery employed in the products of Greek 
artistry and design.
Aristotle argues that activity is imperfect if it does not con­
tain its end in itself. That is, activity as true or perfect activity 
is the action of self-identical human beings guided by their own 
national consciousness. Ken and women use tools to change and trans­
form their external environment —  tools are employed to serve the ■ 
Particular ends of those who invent and use them. But tools them­
selves lack in their inner nature what makes them tools; they cannot 
act of themselves, but require a human master and designer. Hegel 
quotes Aristotle as follows;
... "Suppose that an instrument, such as an axe, werrthe natural body, this form, this^axehood,^would be its
substance, and this its form would be its soul, for if 
this were to be taken away from it,^it vcmld no longer 
be an axe, the name only would remain. But soul is not 
the substantial form and notion of such a body as an axe,
■ but of a body £the human individual D.H.i,which has .
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within itself the principle of movement and rest.”
(Hegel, 1894!183)
What is true of the tool or instrument of production is equally true 
of the raw material on which it is employed. ,MBrass’”, notes 
Aristotle,
’is in capacity a statue} yet the motion to become a 
statue is not a motion of the brass so far as it is 
brass, but a motion of itself, as the capacity to 
become a statue. Hence this activity is an imperfect 
one ...’ i.e. it has not its end within itself, ’for 
mere capacity whose activity is movement is imperfect’.
(Quoted in Hegel, 1894• 163)
Human thought and purposive activity ideality *— ■ constitutes
the energy which links the subject and object of labour into the unity
of the product. Hegel observes that for Aristotle
Thought, as being the unmoved which causes motion, has 
an object, which, however, becomes transformed into 
activity, because its content is itself something 
thought, i.e. a product of thought, and thus altogether 
identical with the activity of thinking. The object of 
thought is first produced in the activity of thinking, 
which in this way separates the thought as an object,
(1894*147)
What this means is simply that thought as the design or purpose of the 
human subject is brought into reality as a product of labour through 
the machine- or tool-assisted activity of the person on the object of 
that activity, Hegel makes this concept of hHEHL thinking ¿£tivitjr the
Rpogranroattn basis of his whole philosophy;! Act”, writes Hegel, ■
thus is really one, and it is just this unity of 
difference which is the concrete. hoV only is the
act concrete, but also the implicit(the inner plan
or design], which stands to action^in the relation —  
of the subject which begins, and finally the product 
is just as concrete as the action or as the subject 
which begins. (1892:24)
^  absolute Idea, the notion of freedom, is ’’concrete” precicely 
^eeause it is this "unity of difference”: it is the ideal men and
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women carry around in their heads, and also the reality they construct
and strive to realize in society through their concrete, sensuous
activity, their ideality. "Thus the Idea", notes Hegel,"is in its
content concrete within itself, and this in two ways: first it is
concrete potentially, and then it is its interest that what is in
itself should be there for it," (1892;26)/
The echoes of Hegel's notion of ideality and his discussion of
Aristotle reverberate throughout the whole of Capital. Consider, for
example, the following passage in Chapter VII of Volume I, "The Labour
Process and the Valorisation Process":
In the labour process, man’s activity via the instruments 
of labour effects an alteration in the object of labour 
which was intended from the outset. The process is 
extinguished in the product. The product of the process 
is a use value, a piece of natural material adapted to 
human needs by means of a change in form. Labour has 
become bound up in its object: labour has been 
objectified, the object has been worked on. What on the 
side of the worker appeared as unrest ... now appears, 
on the side of the product, in the form of being . as 
a fixed immobile characteristic. The worker has spun, 
and the product is a spinning, (1976:287)
Aristotle taught that machinery and tools, no less than the raw
Materials as they are transposed into the finished product of labour,
are nothing but the result of human practice or ideality. Ken and
Homen, then, have the power and ability to create through thought the
tools and machinery which then operate directly on the object of
3s£our. Per Hegel, the modem factory, with its complex machinery
which operates directly on the raw material of production under the
guidance 0f the human operator, is the historical culmination of
Aristotle's ruminations on the unmoved mover, Marx shares Hegel's
view, but he also points out the less desirable features of the employ
^snt of machinery under capitalism. Writes Karx,
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"If", dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of 
antiquity, "if every tool, when summoned, or even hy 
intelligent anticipation, could do the work that 
befits it, just a3 the creations of Daedalus moved 
of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestus went of 
their own accord to their sacred work, if the weavers* 
shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there 
would be no need either of apprentices for the master 
craftsmen, or of slaves for the lords," And Antipater, 
a Greek poet of the time of Cicero, hailed the water­
wheel for grinding corn, that most basic form of all 
productive machinery, as the liberator of female 
slaves and the restorer of the golden age. Oh those 
heathens! They understood nothing of political 
economy and Christianity ... They did not, for 
example, comprehend that machinery is the surest 
means of lengthening the working day. They may 
perhaps have excused the slavery of one person as a 
means to the full human development of another. But 
they lacked the specifically Christian qualities 
which would have enabled them to preach the slavery 
of the masses in order that a few crude and half- 
educated parvenus might become "eminent spinners",
"extensive sausage-makers" and "influential shoe-black 
dealers". (1976:533)
According to Hegel, the modem factory which developed under the
impetus of the British industrial revolution is an expression of "the
caning of reason". As he puts it in the teaser logic,
... Purposive action, with its Keans (of production], 
is still directed outwards, because the End [the plan 
for the finished product of labour] is also not 
identical with the object, and must consequently 
first be mediated with it. The Keans in its capacity 
as object stands, in this second premise, in direct 
relation to the other extreme of the syllogism, 
namely, the material or objectivity which is 
presupposed [i.e., the raw material]. This relation 
is the sphere of chemicn and mechanism Ci.e., the 
chemical and mechanical processes now understood and 
brought into practical use by modem science], which 
have now become the servants of the Final Cause [the 
human individual], where lies their truth and free ■ 
notion. Thus the Subjective Ehd £ the.-purpose.; or 
plan of the individual], which is the power ruling 
over these processes [of production],"in which the 
objective things'wear themselves out; on-■one another, 
contrives to keep Itself free from them, and to 
preserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the 
Cunning of reason. (1975*272)
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It is an expression of the state of Hegelian scholarship, and
especially that of Western Marxism, that Marx's use in Capital of the
following quotation from Hegel on the "cunning of reason" to refer to
the labour process has gone unexplained*
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be 
said to lie in the intermediate action which, while it 
permits the objects to follow their own bent and act 
upon one another till they waste away, and does not 
itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless 
working out its own aims. (Quoted in Marx, 1976:285)
Marx uses the quotation as a reference for a passage directly
influenced by Hegel's account of the labour process in the Lesser
Logic. "An instrument of labour", observes Marx,
is a thing, or a complex of things, which the worker 
interposes between himself and the object of his 
labour and which serves as a conductor, directing his 
activity onto that object. He makes use of the 
mechanical, physical and chemical properties of some 
substances in order to set them to work on father 
substances as instruments of his power, and in 
accordance with his purposes. (1976:285)
Although this reference to Hegel by Marx is of utmost importance,
Marcuse (1973) and'. Collett! (1973) do not even refer to it, and Hook
In ffrom Hegel to Marx only observes that it Is "in an interesting
connection" (1976:37) — * which connection, however, Hook neglects to
discuss. Charles Taylor fails to notice that the passage from Hegel
hag to do with the labour process and provides a nonsensical inter—
Pretation of its meaning. Hegel, says Taylor,
invokes here ... his famous image of the "cunning of 
reason" by which the higher purpose makes use of the
lower level principles in encompassing^itn end.
Rather than working directly on its object, the
higher purpose slips another object-between itself
and what it wants to transform. If it were to enter 
directly into the interaction of things, it would 
be a particular thing itself and would gc under like 
all such things.- But it cunningly saves itself from
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this fate by having its work done for it by the 
mechanical interaction of things in the world.
(1976:326)
In his reference to Hegel’s "cunning of reason", Marx omits the
last few sentences of the passage which refer to the meaning commonly
associated with Hegel’s use of the term:
With this explanation, Divine Providence may be said 
to stand to the world and its processes in the 
capacity of absolute cunning. God lets men do as 
they please with their particular passions and 
interests} but the result is the accomplishment 
of —  not their plans, but his, and these differ 
directly from the ends primarily sought by those 
whom he employs. (Hegel, 1975*273)
But Hegel is no more suggesting that God is the reason behind history, 
than that God is the moving force behind the labour process, is I 
will show in the concluding chapter, the cunning of reason, in this 
leaning of the term, simply refers to the historical process through 
which the ideality of men and women eventually creates the possibility 
®nd actuality of freedom in modern society. Again, it is useful to 
Recall the analogy of the Idea of the automobile used in Chapter 3.
The automobile was in no way the actuating force behind the invention 
the wheel? but seen from tbe standpoint of the present, the wheel 
Wa® a necessary element in the "divine plan" of the automobile.
For Hegel, the means of production and tne raw material on which 
tiley are employed are only "ideal" ■—  that is, the result and object 
of human Ideality, or human labour-power. Through the development of 
industry men and women exercise their dominion over chemical and 
Kechanical processes: science is employed rationally in the produc- 
Processes under capitalism. Further, the tremendous productive 
i®rces developed under the bourgeois mode of production, including 
ita employment of science and technology, make possible for the first
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time in human history the final subjugation of nature to human design.
"Through this process," states Hegel,
... there is made explicitly manifest what was the 
notion of designs viz. the implicit unity of 
subjective and objective is now realized. And this,
Hegel continues, "is the Idea." (19755274) like Hegel, Marx also
recognizes the historical impact of the development of the bourgeois
mode of production. "The bourgeoisie", writes Marx in the Communist
Manifesto.
during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has 
created more massive and more colossal productive 
forces than have all preceding generations together.
Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, 
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, 
steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, 
clearing of whole continents for cultivation, 
canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured 
out of the ground —  what earlier century had even a 
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered 
in the lap of social labour? (1959*12)
In following chapters I will discuss more fully what Hegel means
V  the Idea or truth, but his notion of truth means more than the
»ere correspondence between a thing and our image of it. On Hegel's
definition, truth means the unity of thought and being as obtained
through human practice or ideality, "... Truth", as Hegel says, "can
°oly be where it makes itself its own result," (1975*274) Thus, the
ldea is precisely the union of theory and practice obtained through
ideality.. . ■ ■ ' ■
The definition which declares the Absolute to be the 
Idea, is itself absolute. All former definitions 
come back to this, The Idea is ; the Truth * for Truth 
is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion — * 
not, of -course, the correspondence of-■■external -things ■ ' 
with my conceptions, for these are only.correot .
conceptions held by me, the individual person, (19^5*275) 
Idea of absolute idealism is dialectical, that is, it is the
175
dynamic self-creation of human self-conscious activity! "... it is 
the free notion giving character to itself, and that character, 
reality." (1975*. 275)
Ho less than the categories of human thought, the stages of
human development and the modes of production belonging to them are
the creations of human ideality. This is why Hegel in the Lesser
Logic connects the emergence of the absolute Idea with the development
of the bourgeois mode of production. But as creations of ideality,
the forms of society are subject to unrest and progressive change in
the same manner as the human consciousness which gives rise to them.
"The stages ... are not, when so distinguished, something permanent,
resting upon themselves. They have proved to be dialectical} and
their only truth is that they are dynamic elements of the idea."
(1975:276) The Idea is the formative element of society, but only
because it is also the possession of each living individual within it.
As Hegel puts it, "When we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not
imagine something fsir away beyond this mortal sphere. The idea is
rather what is completely present« and it is found, however confused
and degenerated in every consciousness." (1975:276) Somewhat the
same notion is expressed by Ear* in the''German IdeoiofiE, although
^arx is here unaware of its similarity with that of Hegel.
The ideas and thoughts of people were, of course, 
ideas and thoughts about themselves and their 
relationships, their consciousness of themselves and
o f people in  ^  for U  H h f ° USneSSnot merely o f T H H i l e  individual
individual in hie interconnection with the whole of 
society and about the whole of the society in which 
they lived. (19^8«198)
Tor Hegel, and —  as I will argue —  for Marx as well, the social 
iMivldu-tl is the Identical subject-object of history; he or she is.
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froth determined by and the creator of society and its objective forms, 
"Only the notion itself", writes Hegel, referring to the human 
individual,
is free and the genuine universal: in the Idea, 
therefore, the specific character of the notion is 
only the notion itself —  an objectivity [i.e,, 
society] into which it, being the universal, 
continues itself, and in which it has only its own 
character, the total character. The Idea is the 
infinite judgement, of which the terras are 
severally the independent totality? and in which, 
as each grows to the fullness of its own nature, 
it has thereby at the same time passed into the 
other [i.e,, into society], (1975*278)
3. Protestantism. Absolute Idealism and "Revolutionising Practice”
According to Hegel, knowledge of the human mind is "the highest, 
hardest, just because it is the most ’concrete’ of sciences",
The goal of this science explains its difficulty: "the aim of all 
genuine science is just this, that mind shall recognise itself in 
everything in heaven and earth. An out-and-out Other simply does not 
exist for mind," (1969:1) The forras of religion are also the forms 
°i‘ human ideality? they are the creations of men and women in their 
endeavour to comprehend the absolute. The aim of religion, like all 
forms of human knowledge, "is to divest the objective world that 
elands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase is, to 
find ourselves at home in it: which means no more than to trace the 
°frjective world back to the notion —  to our innermost self", (1975: 
2S1) Por Hegel, the Protestant religion is the highest form of the 
religious consciousness? through it, philosophy as veil as industry
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and commerce were given freedom and added impetus in the modern world.
With the defeat of the Roman Catholic Church by Protestantism in
northern Europe and the advent of secular government, writes Hegel,
in a passage which anticipates Weber's argument in the Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958; originally published
1904-5) by almost a century,
With this commerce and the arts are associated. It 
is implied in the arts that man brings what is divine 
out of himself; as artists were at one time so pious 
that as individuals they had self-abnegation as their 
principle, it was they from whose subjective abilities 
these representations Cof the nascent bourgeoisie] 
were produced. With this is connected the circum­
stance that the secular knew that it had in itself the 
right to such determinations as are founded on 
subjective freedom. In his handicraft the individual 
is taken in reference to his work, and is himself the 
producer. Thus men came to the point of knowing that 
they were free, and insisting on the recognition of 
that freedom, and having the power of exercising their 
activity for their own objects and interests ... The 
man who was moved to seek what was moral and right ••• 
looked round about him ... The place which was pointed 
out to him is himself, his inner life, and external 
nature. (1896*106)
The Christian doctrine in its original form, with its emphasis 
°h the individual's unity with Christ, "first gave to human conscioue- 
n®sa a perfectly free relationship to the infinite and thereby made 
Possible the comprehensive knowledge of mind in its absolute inf ini*» 
iude”. (1969:2) But in the Roman Catholic Church as It was 
constituted in the Middle Ages, this "perfectly free relationship" 
impossible; Christian doctrines were interpreted for the indivi- 
dkal by the priests in the name of, the Church. The Bible, written in 
and available only to the initiated, was unknown to the common 
People except from on high. The revolution effected by Protestantism 
c°ncerned precisely the presentation of religion to the ordinary
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individual» The principle of Protestantism "is simply this, that it 
led man hack to himself, and removed what was alien to him, in his 
language especially”» (18945114)
Protestantism everywhere cleared away the barriers which 
separate the individual from God; the Saints and the priesthood were 
alike overthrown j the Virgin was pushed from Her place as the 
mediator between the believer and God. But the greatest revolution 
was to make available the teachings of Christianity in the language 
of the faithful. For Luther "to have translated the book on which 
their faith is grounded, is one of the greatest revolutions that 
could have happened”. (1896:114) It is interesting to observe that 
Marxism itself, the most Influential and revolutionary doctrine in 
human history, itself owes a great debt to Luther’s translation of 
the Bible, since —  as Prawer informs us —  "the vocabulary,
Phrasing, rhythm, and characters of Luther’s Bible are recalled again 
and again in Marx’s own prose”. (1976*316)
Nor was this revolutionary transformation —  reflected and 
encouraged as it was by Luther’s Bible -  limited to religion alone, 
"Italy", writes Hegel, "in the same way obtained grand poetic works 
when the vernacular came to be employed by such writers as Dante, 
Boccaccio and Petrarch.” But, Hegel adds significantly,."Petrarch’s 
Political works were ... written in Latin.” (1894*114) The abolition 
of.the believer’s estrangement from God meant also that servitude in 
^ligion disappeared. Men and women no longer prostrated themselves 
Before God, or fell upon their knees. Mumbling unknown prayers in a 
foreign tongue no longer characterized religious worship in the same 
Way as man and women ceased -to study the sciences in such”, (1896:150)
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Consciousness of their oneness with God led people to question the 
authority of rulers who claimed that they were responsible to God 
alone. The overthrow of the priests led to the overthrow of kings.
As Hegel observes with regard to the seventeenth-century English 
Revolution,
the distinction between priests and laymen does not 
exist among Protestants, and priests are not 
privileged to be the sole possessors of divine 
revelation, and still leas does there exist any such 
privilege which can belong exclusively to a layman.
To the principle of the divine authorisation of the 
ruler there is accordingly opposed the principle of 
this same authorisation which is held to be inherent 
in the laity in general. Thus there arose a 
Protestant sect in England, the members of which 
asserted that it had been imparted to them by 
revelation how the people ought to be governed, and 
in accordance with the directions thus received 
from the Lord, they raised the standard of revolt, 
and beheaded their king. (1895*249)
The birth of Protestantism, which in turn reflects the develop­
ment of Individual consciousness, finds its basis for Hegel in the 
development of private property along with the social relations of the 
individual in the Kiddle Ages, "Possession, personal property, is ... 
a Part of what pertains to man? it is by his own will"? as such, it 
is connected with the evolution of "Freedom, conscience [which] 
belong also to man". (Hegel, 1895*245) dialectical relationship 
of the development of the notion of freedom with the emergence of 
capitalism and free enterprise is emphasised, of course, by Karx*
... Greek society was founded on the labour of slaves,
: hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men 
and of their labour powers. The secret of the - : 
expression of value,.namely.the-equality and equi- 
valence of all kinds of labour because and in so far ' 
as they are human labour in general, could not. be 
deciphered until the concept of human equality had ■ 
already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular 
opinion. This however becomes possible only in a 
society where the commodity-form is the universal
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form of the product of labour, hence the dominant 
social relation is the relation between men as 
possessors of commodities. (Marx, 1976*152)
Hegel argues, as we hare seen, that the revolution in language was 
one of the major achievements of the Reformation. Language is the 
vehicle of consciousness, the means for its manifestation. 'Vani Testa­
tion", Hegel explains, "is Being for Other ... What is for an »Other', 
exists for this reason in a sensuous form ... thought is only capable 
of being communicated by the one to the other through the sensuous 
medium of sign or speech, in fact, by bodily means." (1895*81) By 
liberating the Bible for all men and women, Protestantism liberated 
the whole world of literature, politics, science and philosophy for the 
individual. "In speech", notes Hegel,
man is productive} it is the first externality that he 
gives himself, the simplest form of existence that he 
reaches in consciousness. What man represents to himself 
he inwardly places before himself as spoken. This first 
form is broken up and rendered foreign if man is in an 
alien tongue to express or conceive to himself what 
concerns his highest interest. This breach with the 
first entrance of consciousness is accordingly removed} 
to have one's own right to speak and think in one’s 
language really belongs to liberty. This is of infinite 
importance, and without this form of bein^at-home-with- 
self subjective freedom could not have existed. (1896:150)
Hegel’s observations on the importance of language are taken up 
by Marx in The German Ideology. "Language", says Marx,
is as old as consciousness, language is practicalconsciousness that exists also for other men, md^for
that reason alone it really exists for me personally 
as well} language, like consciousness, only arises 
from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with 
other men. (1968:42)
After this passage, Marx crosses out the following words, probably to 
avoid any truck with "idealism": "My relationship to my surroundings 
is my consciousness." (1968:42) But Hegel's influence crops up again 
fu*ther on; "neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm
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of their own ... they are only manifestations of actual life," 
( 1968: 504)
The social and revolutionary significance Hegel finds in the
Reformation has become an object of modem historical science* Engels,
in his classic Peasant War in Germany was among the first after Hegel
to grasp this significance, although he presents Protestantism and
Christianity as external forms which almost by coincidence can be used
to express real concepts like liberty and freedom. According to
Engels, for example, Thomas Kunzer preached his radical doctrines
"mostly in a covert fashion under the cloak of Christian phraseology'*.
(1967:46) Engels’s interpretation of the relationship between
r®ligion and reality is embraced by Christopher Hill, who contrasts
the "materialist” with the «theological" aspects of Vinstanley’s
Citings, and describes Winstanley’s "astonishing", because radical,
interpretation of Biblical sources as "a remarkable feat". (1975*139»
142, 14Q) Hegel, however, rejects this account of th© relationship
between religion and reality. Christianity, like other forms of
Popular conception, is not a "cloak", but an integral aspect of the
believing consciousness: to see it as such requires insight as well:
as imagination. Creek mythology, for instance,
is not a mere cloak *** it is not merely that the thoughts 
were there and concealed. This may. happen in our 
reflecting timesf. ' hut'the first-poetry does not start 
from a separation of prose and poetry• If philosophers 
used myths, it was usually-the case that they had the 
thoughts and then sought the images appropriate to them,
(Hegel, 1892:87)
^  SSS. end women use religious lmap«» to f t r r m  thou^ts, it i n  only; 
their consciousness has not developed to the P O M  at which 
£an express-themselves purely in the form of theoretical concepts.
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In his discussion of Christianity and Protestantism, Hegel is 
simply pushing the materialist thesis that people's consciousness is 
determined by their environment to its logical conclusions if the 
relationship is valid, then even the Bible —  this most mystical of 
mental productions —  must have reference to reality, and must speak 
even now to the real concerns of concrete, living human beings. 
Hegel's interpretation of religion has the advantage over more ortho­
dox views in that it better explains the tenacity with which religion 
has gripped, and continues to exert influence over, the human mind. 
Recently S. S. Prawer has noted the connection between ¡Marxism and 
religion:
... As philosophers of religion have increasingly come 
to recognize, Marx is himself working out a system 
that draws a good deal of its strength, its grandeur, 
and its pathos, from a recollection of the eschatological 
pattern that underlies the great religions of Europe 
and Asia ... It is not difficult to discern in Marx's 
later work —  with its demand for righteousness, its 
stern judgement of existing society, the vision of the 
battle between Good and Evil, its hope of an absolute 
end to historical processes as we know them ~~ a return 
to the tradition of the Hebrew prophets. (197&*287)
Marxism, however, is in no way a "return" to the "deeper and truer
spirit of Judaism". ' (Prawer, 1976*528) ^Marxism s j ^ . ^ r e s a e a  the
Rational core of the myths and images through which earli_er men, and
Hegel's contention that Protestantism represents the highest 
^°int reached by the religious consciousness in expressing the freedom 
infinite rights of the individual has drawn criticism of his
HSSSS. manifested their thoughts
Plamenatz writes that "In England, and more particularly in 
P*ford, we are not trained to make the best of such a thinker as Hegel, 
are easily put off by his arrogance and obscurity, and we are
is simply referring to the world-historical role of Protestantism, not
its current form. Marx, who has never been accused of a bias toward
Protestantism, echoes Hegel's analysis in a passage where he compares
the Protestant critique of Catholicism with the struggle of the
bourgeoisie with the forces of feudalism.
In so far as the bourgeois economy did not mytho­
logically identify itself altogether with the past, its 
critique of the previous economies, notably of feudalism, 
with which it was still engaged in direct struggle, 
resembled the critique which Christianity levelled 
against paganism, and also that of Protestantism against 
Catholicism. (1973*106)
5hr from glorifying the Protestant Church, Hegel sees the develop­
ment of Protestantism ’'partly, no doubt, as a separation from the 
Catholic Church, but partly as a reformation from within. There is a 
®iataken idea that the Reformation only effected a separation from the 
Catholic Church| Luther just as truly reformed the Catholic Church”, 
(1096:158) Moreover, for Hegel, Protestant theology is much Inferior 
to that of Catholicism precisely because Protestantism has been shorn 
of the rich Roman Catholic heritage of Greek philosophy and its 
Principle of subjective freedom.
disgusted by the poverty or (as it seems to us) the dishonesty of his 
^rguments. His faults strike us first and blind ua to his virtues," 
^976:202) It must come as a surprise to those familiar with the 
institution of Oxford and its products that ’’arrogance and obscurity” 
foreign to its temperament. But Plamenatz is probably right about 
iys blindness, and over-sensitivity to the faults of writers with
it disagrees, Plamenatz, who has written one of the few books in 
in® English language which manages to make some sense out of Hegel, . 
“rings to mind something Marx once wrote about John Stuart Mill* "On a 
level plain, simple mounds look like hills* and the insipid flatness 
of our present bourgeoisie is'to be measured by the altitude of its 
®reat intellects'.” (Marx, 1976*654)
184
Even to the present day we shall find in the Catholic 
Church and in her dogmas the echoes, and so to speak 
the heritage of the philosophy of the Alexandrian 
school*, in it there is much more that is philosophic 
and speculative than in the dogmatism of Protestantism 
... (Hegel, 1896s^52)
In this connection, Hegel counsels against a merely «critical, 
philological and historical exegesis» of the writings of the Hew Testa­
ment. Such treatment is »perfectly barren» and assumes the content of 
the Bible "were really retained only in the form of history«. New 
Testament contains a speculative or theoretical treatment of the nature 
of the human mind and its relation to society: to approach it as 
simply an historical account, therefore, "is a wrong beginning of a 
wooden and unyielding exegesis«. (1896:152-195) Hegel observes that 
there are two ways to treat the life of Jesus? the first is to see 
him as a supernatural spirit present in everyone. The second is to 
view him as an historical personage only: ».*. Here this present, 
indwelling Christ retreats two thousand years to a small corner of 
Palestine, and is an individual historically manifested far away at 
Nazareth or Jerusalem." The second point of view, according to Hegel, 
is undoubtedly closest to the truth? but it misses in the notion of
the actual spirituality and divinity of reason in the individual 
human being that his image was meant to express.
The man who speaks of the S2S 2 H
-reason, and of the limits to mere reason, lies against . 
the Spirit [the actual social quality ^ d  power or human
consciousness and its knowledge], for 0 ‘j'P romorehenda 
infinite and universal, as self-~cp®prehension, cOTprehends
itself not in a "merely" 1! compre-
as such. It has nothing to do witJ S i nitude‘P
hands'-Itself within itself alone, in its infinitude,
(Hegel, 1892:74)
Christ as a mere godhead, "is not the true relation; it will dis- 
aPpeaxM. (Hegel, 1892:73) Tut as the living image of the social and
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rational character of the actual human being he is eternal.
Hegel's approach to religion has been contrasted with that of
Marx, and there is no doubt, as I have argued in this and the preceding
chapter, that a wide gulf separates the writings of the young Marx on
religion from those of Hegel. The case is different with the mature
Marx. In Capital, for example, Marx observes that there is a strong
relationship between the form of a society and the nature of its
religion. This relationship is easily discerned in bourgeois society
where the abstract character of human labour as it is embodied in the
commodity is matched by the Christian concept of the individual. "For
a society of commodity producers", writes Marx,
whose general social relations of production consist 
in the fact that they treat their products as 
commodities, hence as values, and in their material ... 
form bring their individual, private labours into 
relation with each other as homogeneous human labour, 
Christianity with its religious cult of man in the 
abstract, more particularly in its bourgeois develop­
ment, i.e. in Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most 
fitting form of religion. (1976«172)
For Ilegel, the Christian religion advanced hand-in-hand with private
Property and both phenomena are associated with the development of
individual human consciousness. The suitability of Christianity for
caPitallst society with its basis in private property is therefore to
expected.
Marx is certainly aware of the parallels between his account of 
religion and that of Hegel, for the above-quoted passage from Capital 
si*ply reproduces a similar argument in the Phonomonolog. Here Hegel 
discusses the concept of the individual in the bourgeois theory of 
utility according to which the individual's "characteristic function" 
i® to be "of use to the common good, and serviceable to all". Writes 
Hegel,' : ■ ■ ■ . ■
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Different things are serviceable to one another in 
different ways. All things, however, have this 
reciprocity of utility by their very nature, by being 
related to the Absolute in the two-fold manner, the 
one positive, whereby they have a being all their own, 
the other negative, and thereby exist for others. The 
relation to Absolute Being, or Religion, is therefore 
of all forms of profitableness the most supremely 
profitable» for it is profiting pure and simple» it 
is that by which all things stand —  by which they 
have a being all their own —  and that by which all 
things fall —  have an existence for something else, 
(1967:579-580)
According to Hegel, the triumph of Protestantism in northern 
Europe and the separation of philosophy from theology meant at first 
the rejection of the speculative or theoretical content of religion.
"... As for the enrichment of Christian conceptions through the trea­
sures of the philosophy of the ancient world," he observes, "and through 
the profound ideas of all earlier oriental religions, and the like —  
all this is set aside." (1896:154) While the theology of the 
mediaeval schoolmen shut itself up "in the centre point of the indivi­
dual", i.e., God (1896:157), "®an became conscious of his will and his 
achievements, took pleasure in the earth and its soil, and also his 
occupations". The invention of gunpowder made the individual heroism 
of the feudal period more dangerous than sublime, and men and women of 
adventure turned their thoughts to "the exploration of the earth, or 
the discovery of the passage to the East Indies. America was dis­
covered, its treasures and people -  nature, man himself, navigation", 
Hegel continues, "was the higher romance of commerce". (1896:158-159)
■^•he same juncture is isolated by l*arx: ■ ,
The circulation of commoaitle. la the ■
of capital. The production of commodities and their 
circulation In Its developed fora, namely trace, fora
World trade end the world »arret date from the eliteenth
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century, and from then on the modern history of capital 
starts to unfold. (Karx, 1976:247)
Hegel argues that religion reflected this new direction toward 
the external world, and as a result, "the Reformation of Luther had 
inevitably to come ..." The Lutheran faith focused attention on the 
present, on experience, and goaded men and women "to understand laws 
and forces, i.e. to transform the individual of perceptions into the 
form of universality". The "works" of the individual were now the 
object of faith and God was conceived "in spirit alone, He is not a 
beyond but the truest reality of the individual". (1896*159) Luther­
anism encouraged the individual to be "satisfied in his activity, to 
have joy in his work and to consider his work as something permis­
sible and justifiable ... Art and industry receive through this 
principle new activity, since now their activity is justified * The 
search for profit and the inclination of men and women to improve them­
selves through work and labour "receive ... highest confirmation, and 
that is sanctification through religion". (Hegel, 1896:148-149)
The new philosophy, stimulated by its release from theology 
through the Reformation, turned its attention to the self-consciousness 
°f the individual and the understanding of what was taken to be "the 
pre-snpposed object". (Hegel, 1896*160) The separation: of theology 
philosophy spelt the death of theology as a theory of the indivi- 
<^1, nature and society: theology*s "home and private metaphysics, 
thus [now] frequently quite uncultured, uncritical thought —  the 
bought of the street". True, Christianity retains it3 "particular 
Objective conviction" —  its historical truth —  "but these thoughts 
which constitute the criterion are merely the reflections and opinions 
vhich float about the surface of the time"» (Hegel, 1896tl6d-l6l)
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Thus, the Reformation brought about the utter dissolution of theology: 
"... When thought comes forth on its own account," declares Hegel, 
referring to modern philosophy, "we thereby separate ourselves from 
theology." (1896:161)
The unity of thought and being constitutes the chief problem of 
the new philosophy, and in the eighteenth century philosophy itself 
broke into two opposed sides: realism or materialism, and idealism. 
Materialism supposes thought to be caused by the action of external 
objects on the mind, while idealism sees the categories of thought as 
independent of the external world. Materialism is concerned with 
experience or reality as it appears in nature and society as well as 
in the activity of the human being. Its paramount concern is with 
wbat exists —  the present. As the young Marx puts it, with regard to 
bbe French enlightenment,
the downfall of seventeenth-century metaphysics can be 
explained by the materialistic theory of the eighteenth 
century only as far that theoretical movement itself is 
explained by the practical nature■of French life at the 
time. That life was turned to the immediate present, 
worldly enjoyment and worldly interests, the earthly 
world. Its anti-theological, anti-metaphysical, and 
materialistic practice demanded correspondingly anti- 
theoretical, anti-metaphysical and materialistic theories.
(1971*77)
The method of materialism is that of "finite", or natural science} 
th® method of observation and deduction, the formation of universal 
lawai and so on. According to Hegel, the empirical sciences are 
"finite, because their mode of thought, as a merely formal act, derives 
ita content from without. . Their content therefore is not known as 
a°nlded from within through the thoughts which lie at the ground of it, 
^  form and content do not thoroughly interpenetrate each other". 
^575:190) f 0T ifeg«l# materialism marked a great advance over
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scholastic or mediaeval philosophy which set aside the human power of 
observation and approached arguments respecting nature from the 
vantage point of abstruse and abstract hypotheses. Moreover, the 
development of all science and philosophy depends on the findings of 
empirical science, "for mind is essentially a working on something 
different”. (Hegel, 1896*177) The young Marx shares Hegel’s positive 
evaluation of materialism, but he is as yet unaware of what Hegel sees 
as the negative or finite aspects of materialist philosophy. Materia­
lism ”, says the young Marx,
is the son of Great Britain by birth ... tAndJ the 
real founder of English materialism and all modern 
experimental science was Bacon. For him natural 
science was true science and physics based on percep­
tion was the most excellent part of natural science ... 
According to his teaching the senses are infallible 
and are the source of all knowledge« Science is experi­
mental and consists in applying a rational method to 
to data provided by the senses* Induction, analysis, 
comparison, observation and experiment are the 
principal requisites of rational method. The first and 
most important of the inherent qualities of matter is 
motion, not only mechanical and mathematleal movement, 
but still more impulse, vital life spirit, tension ••«
The primary forms of matter are the living, 
individualizing forces of being inherent in it and 
producing the distinctions between the species»..
In Eicon, its first creator, materialism contained 
latent and still In a naive way the germs of all-round 
development. Matter smiled at man with poetical 
sensuous brightness.'.' (1971 *78-79) ■
1*o less than to the world of nature, materialism applies itself 
the study of nations and the relationships between individuals in 
®ociety, Where the .rule of law was based in feudal .times on the maxima 
°f the Old Testament, and guilt or innocence in criminal proceedings 
Wa* decided by divine intervention a3 expressed in trial by torture,
. »ti right*,■says Hegel, "was sought for in man himself, and in 
history ^  ^thod of observation was utilized to determine "the
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desires which could be satisfied in the state and the manner in which 
satisfaction could be given them, in order thus from man himself, from 
man of the past as well as the present, to learn what is right'".
(Hegel, 1896:163) Hegel's observations on this aspect of materialism 
are taken up by the young Marx, who connects materialist philosophy to 
the development of communism:
There is no need of any great penetration to see from
the teaching of materialism on the original goodness 
and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence 
of experience, habit and education, and the influence of 
environment on man, the great significance of industry, 
the justification of enjoyment, etc,, how necessarily 
materialism is connected with communism and socialism.
If man draws all his knowledge, sensation, etc., from 
the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, 
the empirical world must be arranged so that in it man 
experiences and gets used to what is really human and 
that he becomes aware of himself as man ... If man is 
shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be 
made human. If man is social by nature, he will develop 
his true nature only in society, and the power of his 
nature must be measured not by the power of separate 
individuals but by the power of society, (1971*82)
Because materialism places all truth in sensation and matter, even
^ d  came to be questioned because His existence could not be verified
in the sensuous present, "Since only what is material", says the young
Marx, "ig perceptible, teowable, nothing is known of the-existence of
I am sure only of my own existence," (1977 s©0) "The result", as
He&el points out, "has ... been atheism. Cod would thus be an
historical product of weakness, of fear, of joy, or of interested hopes,
CuPidity, and lust of power." (1895*51)
For Hegel, realism or materialism fails to account for the fact
that the categories of thought are not the mere result of the action of
eternal objects on the mind, but rather, as Kant explains, the cate«
^°I’Ies are independent of experience or a priori: "•*« the highest
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legislation of Nature oust lie in ourselves» namely in our under“* 
standing, and ... we must seek its universal laws, not in nature, by 
means of experience? but conversely must seek Nature, as to its 
universal regularity, solely in the conditions of the possibility of 
experience lying in our sensibility and understanding. (Kant, 
1883:6?) Science, it is true, deals with "a variety of sensuous 
properties and matters? ... [however,] these matters (elements) also 
stand in relation to one another ... [and] the Question is, Of what 
kind is this relation?" (Hegel, 1969*311) Discovering the relation­
ship between things requires more than passive observation, it needs 
thought and theory to penetrate the veil of sensuous experience. The 
verification (or falsification) of theory depends on observation? but 
theory itself is a product of the active power of the human mind. 
Materialism, with its reliance on the method of the natural sciences, 
fails to appreciate the Independent role of theory, of the activity of 
the mind. The physicists, for example, says Hegel,
devote their attention to what they call experience, 
for they think that here they come acrossjenuine 
truth, unspoiled by thought, fresh^from the handa^of
nature? it is in their hands wd^befow ^eir faces.
They can certainly dispense with the Notionttheory], 
but through a kind of tacit agreement they allow 
certain conceptions, such as forces, subsistencain^ 
parts, &c. to be valid, and make use of these without 
in  thi least knowing whether they have ■ truth^wd how 
they have truth. But in regard to the content they 
express no better the truth of things, but only th 
sensuous manifestation, (1894*155)
Hegel’s notion that the external appearance of things, their 
Sensuon3 manifestation, must be penetrated by the mind, by human 
theory or ideality, appealed greatly to the mature Marx. "The older 
he grew,” suggests S. S. Braver, "the more he came to agree with 
»•«*1 and the German idealists that truth lay below the level of
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immediate empirical perception. It had to be dug for by well-informed 
men with a gift for theorizing and philosophic reflection ..." (1976s
315) Por Hegel, as for Marx, materialism (and natural science with it) 
deludes itself when it imagines that its categories deal only with 
things as they are directly perceivable by the senses. Much of what 
materialism takes to be concrete facts are actually only theoretical
constructs which, as Hegel suggests, "cannot be verified by observa-
tion”. Even "matter itself", he notes,
—  furthermore form which is separated from matter —  
whether that be the thing as consisting of matters, or 
the view that the thing itself subsists and only has 
proper ties, is all a product of the reflective under­
standing which, while It observes and professes to 
record only what it observes, is rather creating a 
metaphysic, bristling with contradictions of which it 
is unconscious, (1975*186)
Hegel’s critique of materialism is taken up by Marx in Capital.
vHere he applies it to theories about the nature of the laws of
competition under the bourgeois mode of production. "It is not our
intention here", notes Marx,
to consider the way in which the laws, immanent in 
capitalist production, manifest themselves-aa coercive 
laws of competition, and are brought home to the mind 
and consciousness of the individual capitalist as the 
directing motives of his operations. But this much is 
clears a scientific analysis of compétition is not 
possible, before we have a conception of the inner 
nature of capital, Just as the apparent motions of. the '■ 
heavenly bodies are not intelligible to any but him, 
who Is acquainted with their real motions, motions 
which are not directly perceptible by the senses,
(1976*433)
hl®an theory or ideality is necessary to penetrate the mysteries of
he 7 „ ,>.a gore indiepensaue In eoBPWh.nâ-natural relia, H  1» ouoh V
. vi, ««the eupra-eeoaible or fi0C*a*^  what Marx, following Hegel* calls
: m * (1976:165)
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According to Hegel, the human mind —  like all natural organisms 
—  Is a product of self-development, and is not dependent on sources 
external to it. Thus the external or finite methodology of materialism 
and natural science is incapable of grasping the immanent or "neces­
sary" character of human consciousness. Before Hegel, Kant had 
already elucidated the principle of living organisms, a principle 
Materialism fails to comprehends "an organised natural product is one 
in which every part is reciprocally both end and means." (Kant, 1973* 
24) For Kant, as for Hegel, freedom is both the end and means of 
human development, and "the concept of freedom", Kant declares "is the 
stumbling block of all empiricists ...” (1956jQ) While under the 
influence of Feuerbach, the young Marx is unable to see this weak 
Point in materialism —  its inability to understand organic processes 
as well as the active and transforming nature of individual human 
consciousness. As the young Marx points out, for materialism the 
human individual is something like a machine, and is subject to the 
f°nces of nature} "Every human passion is a mechanical motion ending 
or beginning. The objects.of impulses are what ia called good, Kan 
is subject to the same laws as nature} might and freedom are iden­
tical.** .(i97tS80) Kant, however, emphasises the contrast between 
natural organisms and mere machinery}',”In a watch", notes Kant,
on© part is the instrument by which the movement of 
the others is effected, but one wheel is not the 
efficient cause of the production of the.'other. One 
Part Is certainly present, for. the .sake of. another, . 
but it doe* not owe its presence to the.agency of. 
that other. For this reason, also, the producing 
cause:of.the watch .and its. fora is not contained in 
the nature of this material, but-lies outside the 
watch in a being that:can act according to ideas of 
a whole which its causality makes possible.■ Hence 
one wheel in the watch does not produce the other, and,
194
still less, does one watch produce other watches, 
by utilizing, or organizing, foreign material? 
hence it does not of itself replace pants of which 
it has been deprived, nor, if these are absent in 
the original construction, does it make good the 
deficiency by the subvention of the rest? nor does 
it, so to speak, repair its own causal disorders.
But these are all things which we are justified in 
expecting from organized nature, —  An organized 
being is, therefore, not a mere machine. For a 
machine has solely motive power, whereas an 
organized being possesses inherent formative 
power, and such, moreover, as it can impart to 
material devoid of it — material which it organizes.
This, therefore, is a self-propagating formative 
power, which cannot be explained by the capacity of 
movement alone, that is to say, by mechanism.
(1973:22)
According to Hegel and the mature Marx, human consciousness is the 
ihfinitely creative, transforming power and manifests itself through 
human practice in the external, social world. "... rfork", notes 
Hegel,
is the result of the disunion [between human beings 
and nature], it is also the victory over it. The 
beasts have nothing more to do but to pick up the 
material required to satisfy their wants! man on 
the contrary can only satisfy his wants by himself 
producing and transforming the necessary means. Thus 
even in these outside things man is dealing with 
himself. (1975:44) ■
llaterialism, on the other hand, holds that mind is ^ termined by the
°^tside vorW: that is, by.the world of nature and society that human
Reality itself transforms andcreates*" As-Marx puts it in his
CriUque 0f Feuerbach*3 materialism in the German Ideolo£Xi
Feuerbach ... does not see how the sensuous world 
around his, Is not a thing.given direct from ail 
eternity, remaining ever the same,, but the product 
of industry and of the state of society? and» 
indeed, in. the -sense that it is a historical 
product, the r e su lt-of the activity of-a whole 
succession of generations,, each-standing-on the 
shoulders of the preceding one» developing % 8 
industry and its intercourse, modifying its social
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system, according to the changed needs. Even the 
objects of the simplest "sensuous certainty" are 
only given him through social development, 
industry and commercial intercourse.
Even the "certainties" of Feuerbach’s beloved natural science, Karx 
continues,
Even this "pure" natural science is provided with 
an aim, as with its material, only through trade 
and industry, through the sensuous activity of men ... 
Feuerbach ... only conceives Cman] as an "object of 
the senses", not as "sensuous activity", because he 
still remains in the realm of theory and conceives 
men not in their given social conditions, not under 
their existing conditions of life, which have made 
them what they are ... "Thus he never manages to 
conceive the sensuous world as the total living 
sensuous activity of the individuals composing it ... 
(1968*58-59)
fn other words, what both materialism and Feuerbach himself forget is 
"revolutionising practice" or human ideality.
Despite its defects, however, materialism makes a genuine attempt 
^  overcome the separation of thought and being, to provide a solution 
f°r what is, after all, the supreme problem of philosophy, "rfe must 
^cognize in materialism", suggests Hegel# "the enthusiastic effort to 
transform the dualism which postulates two different worlds as
dually substantia l and true, to nullify this tearing asunder of what 
ia originally One," (1969*34) *hl« accomplishment of materialism is 
als° Recognized by the young Karx: "If", for materialism, 
man’s senses are the source of^all hia
then conception, thott^it, ittaginationt^*i
nothing bui phantoms of the material world
less divested of its sensuous forts ..♦* ■
substance it just as such nonsense aa an . ■ ■
tody. Body, being, substance, onJ .** ' 1** ,
real idea. One cannot separate the thought fr
Ratter which thinks. Matter ia t,,e subject of .
change *. ( i ^ i  % 80) .
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Idealism —  what Hegel calls, the second approach to the problem 
of the unity of thought and being —  proceeds from thought and makes 
everything the product of mind. "What Realism draws from experience 
is now derived from thought a priori." Nevertheless, Hegel argues, 
the two sides overlap one another? materialism must give experience 
the form of thought as laws and theories, while the abstract univer­
sality of idealism is in need of a determinate content derived from 
sensuous reality. "The philosophic systems are therefore no more than 
modes of this absolute unity, and only the concrete unity of these 
opposites is the truth.” (Hegel, 1896:165) The same unity is urged, 
of course, by Karx. "The chief defect of all hitherto existing 
materialism ... is that the thing,... reality, sensuousness, is con­
ceived only in the form of the object ... or of contemplation, .,. 
but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence 
it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, 
was developed by idealism —  but only abstractly, since ... idealism 
does not know real, sensuous activity as such." (1969# Is 13) ^or 
Hegel and for Karx, philosophy is now posed with the question which 
they both believe can only be answered by a philosophy which 
constitutes the unity of .materialism and idealism: "How is and how 
can thought be identical with the objective?" (Hegel# 1896:166)
The answer provided by Hegel’s absolute idealism, and which I will
cctline in more detail, in the following chapters, is the one which
excited Marx in 1845 and prompted him to set down the V b m m  m  
Sgcgrbach!
The question whether objective ...truth can be ^
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roust prove the truth, that is the reality and 
power, the this-sidedness of his thinking. The 
dispute over the reality or non-reality of 
thinking which is isolated from practice is a 
purely scholastic question, (1969» 1*13)
The saroe excitement which infuses Karx's Theses also races 
through Lenin's 1914 commentary on Hegel's Logic» "Remarkable," Lenin 
exclaims,
Remarkable} Hegel ceases to the 'Idea' as the 
coincidence of the Notion and the object, as truth, 
through the practical purposive activity of roan ,,,
Undoubtedly, in Hegel practice serves as a link in 
the analysis of the theory of cognition, and 
indeed as the transition to objective ("absolute", 
according to Hegel) truth, (1963*191)
"Marx," Lenin continues, "consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in
introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge,
see the Theses on Feuerbach," The conclusion to be derived from Hegel,
is obvious: "Han's consciousness", says Lenin, "not only reflects the
objective world, but creates it." Lenin's study of Hegel led him to
a further conclusion. For Hegel, writes Lenin, "Practice is hifher
t e l  theoretical to owl edge, for it has not. only the dignity of
universality, but also of immediate actuality." (1963*212-»215)
A little ler-s than three after £ 0^  discovery of , .
^ t e lntionisinm Practice" in Hegel, ^ar* wrote the 
<1%9, 1*98-137)i after a siroilar 22^2. — . .
The new relationship of men and women to philosophy and science 
**e»Plified by the "revolutionising tactic#" of. Ear* wad lenin is .■
anti=ipated by Hegel»': .The philosophers of. the ancient world, he . 
^iteSf were' "eelf-suffining individualities ... they kept the ■ ■ 
nte^ l  c o m e c U c n  with the world all th* further removed from.then- ■;
because they did not. greatly approve .of much, therein present| V;
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or at least it ever proceeds on its way, according to its own parti­
cular laws, on which the individual is dependent*'. In the Middle Ages 
philosophers were chiefly clergy, theologians and "in the transition 
period” from mediaeval to modem times "the philosophers showed them­
selves to he in an inward warfare with themselves and in an external 
warfare with their surroundings, and their lives were spent in a wild, 
unsettled fashion”. (1896:167) Thus the Italians Bruno and Vanlni 
were burnt at stake by the Inquisition? the Frenchman Cardanus was 
imprisoned and tortured? his compatriot Ramus was murdered.
The case is different with modem thinkers. They no longer con­
stitute a class or group by themselves: "we find them generally in 
connection with the world, participating with others in some common
*ork or calling ... They are involved in present conditions, in the 
*orld and its work and progress.” The new relationship of philosophy 
and science with the world results from the rationality and universal 
connection of individuals with one another which sets bourgeois 
society apart froa past epochs. «This connection is of such power, 
that
«i&e
every individuality is under its domination and yet at the same 
can construct for itself an inward world.” (Hegel, 1896*167—168)
In modem society the external life of the individual »ay be set 
Pa*t from his or her inward existence, while in past ages a person*» 
a^rd life was entirely detemined;by his or her, outward' occupation: 
Priest was a priest, a peasant, a peasant, Hotes Hegel*
K'ow, on the contrary, with the higher degree of 
.strength'attained by the inward side of the . 
individual, he may hand over: the external to 
chance? Just as he leave# clothing to the contin­
gencies of fashion,.not considering it worthwhile 
to exert Ms understanding upon it. The external , 
fce leaves to be determined by the order which'is ■■
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present in the particular sphere in which he is 
cast. The circumstances of life are, in the true 
sense, private affairs, determined by outward 
conditions, and do not contain anything worthy of 
our notice. {1896s168)
Accordingly, Marx —  a man whose outward personality and prejudices 
conformed in most ways to the respectable middle-class standards of 
his time —  went about hia business in London, trudging daily to his 
' seat in the British Museum, spinning the web of revolution. But Marx 
like all other individuals in capitalist society also found that he 
had to "seek to act in connection with others"; he found in those 
dark days in London that
The calling of philosophy is not, like that of the 
monks, an organized condition. Members of academies 
of learning are no doubt organized in part, but even 
a special calling like their sinks into the ordinary 
commonplace of state or class relationships ^ because 
admission thereinto is outwardly determined. The 
real matter is to remain faithful to one*_s aims, 
liege1, 18967T69; my emphasis)
*
„ Like Marx, Hegel had reason to believe that admission to 
^acadeaie3 of learning" is "outwardly determined". Both men were 




1. Feuerbach« Western Marxism and Alienation
"In the social production of their existence,* writes Marx in the
"Preface” to his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.
"men invariably enter into definite relations, which are independent of
their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage
in development of their material forces of production«” (1970:20)
Marx means here is elucidated by an already quoted passage from
j-ifhteenth Brumal re of Louis Kanoleon where he writes,
' ■ Ken make their own history, but they do not make 
it just as they please? they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum­
stances directly encountered, given and transmitted 
from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living, 
(1969,1:398)
Nevertheless, Marx’s observation in the «Preface* is enthusiastically
b^raced by Louis Althusser and bis followers, who deny that for
‘'*trx» and women are «'free* and ’constitutive** actors in the human
dra®a. Individuals, Althusser declares, «work in and through the
deierminationa of the forms of historical existence of the social
laUons of production and reproduction", (1976:95).
^cr Althusser, history is a «process without a Subject or Goal*,
n wbich men and women can act only as agents determined by their
°cial relations, {1976*94) Social relations, in turn, are a product 
of twJ® clasa struggle —  what Althusser calls, the "motor* of history.
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(1976:99) Althusser imites his interpretation of Marx with a corres­
ponding vision of Hegel. Both thinkers, he argues, deny the «philo­
sophical ideology of the Subject”? that is, they do not see the human 
individual as the subject of history, nor do they posit the liberation 
and freedom of men and women as history’s goal. (1976.179» 97) 
Althusser claims that Kegel substitutes the Idea for the human indivi­
dual and Marx substitutes the class struggle for the Hegelian Idea.
According to Althusser, history in Marx’s view, "is a terribly 
Positive and active structured reality, just as cold, hunger and the 
night are for his poor worker”. (1969*115) * * b î o  assumptions of 
Althusser’s structuralist Marxism are summed up by tlicos Poulantzass 
”1. The distinction between real processes and processes of thought, 
between being and knowledge. 2. The primacy of being over thought? 
the primacy of the real over the knowledge of the real.” PoulanUaa
(and Althusser) believe that «in the strong sense of the term, only 
Seal, concrete, singular objects exist", and therefore, "the final aim 
of. the process of thought is knowledge of these objects”. (1973*12-13)-
Bc>th Poulantzas and Althusser forget, however, that a corpse la also 
a "terribly positive and active structured reality”, even if the 
acUvlty of its "de-centred" structure (Althusser, 1969:115» 1°'~) is 
or‘ly decomposition. A corpse most certainly has existence "in the 
«wne. sense -of the. ter,” -  it in a "real, c<^rete, n i n ^  object”? 
a corp5e, in .fact, is .the; ultimate realication of the primacy of being 
°Ve* thought. (Hegel, 1976:232) Because individual human conscious- 
will cannoV.be' seen, heard, smelled or prodded with one’s
foot, it lacks reality "in.the strong sense" for. the Althusserians.
case i n jM f o w f .  To t  Kegel and I-arx.
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According to »Sir*, the object of social science "is always what 
Is given, in the head as well as in reality", economic categories, 
for example, "express the forms of being, the characteristics of 
existence". (1975:106) Hegel also emphasises that philosophy and 
science are concerned with "the apprehension of the present and the 
actual", and tint truth in science "means that concept and reality
•correspond". (1976:10 , 250 F°* * * »  thlnters' the preSent* ir‘
Marx's words, "points beyond itself ... towards a past lying behind
, . i (1973?460-461) "... The greatit” and towards the future as well. *
»n-n-ehend in the show of the temporal and thing”, Hegel writes, "is to app.c-ena an
, . v i a  tm w m ent and the eternal which is the transient the substance which is immanent an
v x 4- tv as something with a past
Present.” <1976*10) This view of soci Y
a. . a notion that society wia a
as well as a future is predicated on t
« M  of independent organism" (Karx, 1975:464). a living unity which 
rinds its life in the breath, pulse and consciousness of the men end
u ««a fia-x, the concept of a living
w°m.en who make it up. For U:& :1 . *
. ths dialectic in history, the 
organic expresses the essence of . ■
« U v t t y  of living, conscious individuals In the process of the pro­
motion, reproduction and transforaation of society-
' , mtcose*' of h w a n  history is
i^iot of both thinkers, th« M^ sl® ilml
* »  full "elaboration and d e v e l o p  of 0 »  ^rsonaUty and it,
^edom«. (liosdolshy, 1977.415) Mater, Is not AUhusser's-Ufeless 
"wooes. Without a Subject or Goal". taVthe record and reaUty o 
« » v i n g  of individual ash ar.i the multi-facsted
oppression of their character ar.d personality, toward freeu
on, of Althusser's primary aims is to ,*W  the humanistic
6l^ :ent in Karrisi which, he believ«»*. «tema frm the young •
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assimilation of Feuerbach’s materialist inversion of Hegelian philo­
sophy. It is paradoxical, therefore, that Althusser's conception of 
Hegel's Idea as a process without a subject or goal is derived from 
the writings of the young Marx and Feuerbach. "Hegelian philosophy", 
writes Feuerbach, "made thought, —  namely the subjective being con­
ceived, however, without subject, that is, conceived as being distinct 
from the subject —  into a divine and absolute being." (1966:36) For 
Hegel, adds the young Marx, "the divine procesa of man ... must have 
a bearer, a subject. But the subject first emerges as a result. This 
result ... is therefore God —  absolute Spirit 5®lf-l212ííj££ 
self-manifesting Idea. Real man and real nature become mere predi­
cates —  symbols of this esoteric, unreal man and of this unreal 
^ture," Thus Hegel's philosophy concerns "the g^gciute subject aa a 
■Brocees ... a pure, restles3 revolving within self". (1964:168) 
According to Feuerbach and the young Marx, the truth of the historical 
Process lies not In the Hegelian Idea but in man and woman as anecien 
¿glngf as the generic essence of husarilnd. The new philosophy",
Eays Feuerbach,
makes man —  with the inclusion of nature as the 
foundation of man —  the unique, universal and big t 
object of philosophy ... Truth does not exist in 
thought for itself or in knowledge for iJsjJJv 
is only the totality of human life and of the human 
essence ... The essence of man is conta nrk «« \
the community and unity of man with man ... (1966:70» 11J
Hegel, however, had already criticized the notion of suelee heln^ 
0i as a hopeless abstraction. ”... A person", he writ,., "!• » 
'H^ific existence! not nan in general (a ten. to which no real 
e*Utence corresponde) but a particular Honan being." (19;6:24) ,ho 
^ W c u l a r  huraan being, in turn, anet be seen within the context of
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his or her sensuous activity in society.
The first glance at History convinces us that the 
actions of men proceed from their needs, their 
passions, their characters and talents} and 
impresses us with the belief that such needs, 
passions and interests are the sole springs of 
action —  the efficient agents in this scene of 
activity. (Hegel, 1956:20)
1-t is not the Idea that creates history, but the concrete action of• ■ - i-
individual men and women guided by their interests, passions and
desires. "Only by this activity'* is the "Idea as well as abstract 
characteristics generally ... realized, actualized} for of themselves 
they are powerless. The motive power that puts them in operation and
Sives them their determinate existence, is the need, instinct, 
inclination, and passion of man,** (Hegel, 1956:22)
"... The absolute right of personal existence”, Hegel remarks, is
in find itself satisfied in Its activity and labour ... Nothing ,»< 
nppens, nothing is accomplished unless the individuals concerned seek 
heir satisfaction in the issue,” (1956:23) Hegel's view of history, 
hen, has nothing to do with the abstractions of Althusser, Feuerbach
nd the young Marx, Writes Hegel,
Two elements ... enter Into the objeot of our 
investigation} the first the Idea, the second the 
complex of human passions ... We have spoken of 
Freedom a3 the nature of Spirit, and the absolute 
goal of history ... I mean here nothing more than 
the human activity as resulting from private  ^
interests ... with this qualification, that the 
whole energy of will and character is devoted to 
their attainment ... The object [freedom] is so 
bound up with the man's will, that it entirely and 
alone determines the "hue of resolution , and Is 
inseparable from it. It has become the essence of 
his volition, (1956:23*24)
At first attracted by Feuerbach's concept of species being. Marx 
*ter rejects it and turns to Hegel's view that the human individual
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is above all a social being:
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into 
the human essence. But the human essence is no 
abstraction inherent in each single Individual. In 
its reality it is the ensemble of social relations 
... The human essence can with [Feuerbach] be 
comprehended only as "genus", as an internal, dumb 
generality which merely naturally unites the many 
individuals, (1969» 1:14)*""
Along with Hegel's notion of the human individual as a social being,
also comes to accept his conception of the role of men and women
in the making of history. "When", writes Marx in his critique of
Proudhon's "quasi-Hegelian phrases" in the Poverty of Philosophy.
When we ask ourselves why a particular principle was 
manifested in the eleventh or in the eighteenth century 
rather than in any other, we are necessarily forced to 
examine minutely what men were like in the eleventh 
century, what they were like in the eighteenth century, 
what were their respective needs, their productive 
forces, their mode of production, the raw materials of 
production —  in short what were the relations between 
man and man which resulted from all these conditions of 
existence. To get to the bottom of all these questions 
— what is this but to draw up the real, profane history 
of men in every century and to present these men as 
both the authors and the actors of their own drama.
(PP: 110—1111 my emphasis')
Althusser claims that "the Thesis that 'men' (the concrete 
individuals) are the subjects ... of history ... has nothing to do with 
^xism, but actually constitutes a quite dubious theoretical position 
which it is practically impossible to conceive and to defend". (1976s 
5Q) It is certainly easier to conceive the process of history in 
te*’ms of abstractions than as the result of the activity of concrete 
human beings. It is also true that the "individual" is a category that 
fcakes only very rare appearances in the writings of Western Marxism, 
‘’Class" and "class struggle", which perform the same role in Marxist 
theory as Feuerbach's "human essence", are more often the operative
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terms. A good example is Luldcs’ History and Class Consciousness, 
which charges "bourgeois thought" with the error of regarding "social 
Phenomena ... from the standpoint of the individual , and which 
demands that things should be looked at "from the point of view of 
the proletariat ... together with its organised form, the Communist 
Party ...» (1971,28, 20, 75)
The Western Marxist glorification of the proletariat, of course, 
siinply echoes Feuerbach. "Not I, you, S S L else is tho measure 
truth, but man, the species." (Quoted in Hook, 1976*261—262) 
Peuerbach no doubt expresses here a great belief. But to surrender 
iije "bourgeois” right to decide what is objective or not to the snecign 
£XL even to the proletariat is to surrender the rlfdvfc of decision 
Ultimately to the individual or individuals who claim _to speak ¿n the 
Hame of the species or the proletariat. The result of this surrender 
is well known; it is called silence. "X am not talking , says 
Althusser in his critique of Stalinism, "about the silence or half"** 
silence of the moment, hut about a silence that has lasted twenty 
years. It is clear that the Soviet leaders have refused and.'are still 
I ' e f u s i to undertake a Marxist analysis of this gigantic error, 
hurled, like its millions of victims, in official silence... Hie Ui,>oR 
lives on in symptomatic silence about its own history, 0  977*H) 
••• V/e must never overlook the distance", declares Lukács, that 
separates the consciousness of even the most revolutionary worker from 
the authentic class consciousness of the proletariat." (197 ^ * BO)
^alin and his successors, to their everlasting credit, never mads this 
Mistake. The debate about Lukács* movement from a "revolutionary 
Realism" characterized by History and Class Consciousness to the "non-
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revolutionary Realpolitik of Stalin" (Lowy, 1977 *.64) could be settled 
by recognizing that Lukács*s early work formed the philosophical 
H ide rp innings of Stalinism. The Western Marxist abstractions of «the 
Proletariat« and "class struggle« are merely the continuations in 
^1S 22L Stalinism.
Despite Althusser's claim to the contrary » the "individual« 
appears at least as often in the writings of the mature Karx as do the 
categories of "class" and "class struggle«» Moreover, Marx*s emphasis 
°n the individual and his use of the individual as a category in his 
theory of society and history is a direct inheritance from the philo- 
SoPhy of Hegel and German Idealism. "••• Personal conviction*, Hegel 
remarks, "is the ultimate and absolute essential which reason and its 
Philosophy ... demand from knowledge." (1Q92»14)
Althusser’s contention that Hegel's view of history concerns a 
"process without a Subject or Goal" is not the only, nor the most 
important, of Feuerbach's and the young Marx's contributions to conte®«* 
Porary Marxism. The materialist assumptions of the Althusserians, 
which are shared by roost Marxists, also have their roots in the 
Writings of Feuerbach and the young Marx. As Vogel points out, 
"Feuerbach's philosophy is based on sense perception ..." (l966tix)
"The real in its reality or taken as real", Feuerbach explains, "is 
the real a3 an object of the senses} it is the sensuous. Truth, 
reality, and sensation are identical. Only a sensuous being is a true 
and real being. Only through the senses and not through thought for 
itself, is an object given in the true sense." (1966*51) The young 
^rx, who contrasts the "sober Philosophy" of Feuerbach with the 
"drunken speculation" of Hegel (1971'75)» suggests that "sense
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experience (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Science 
ia only genuine science when it proceeds from sense experience, in the
two forms of sense perception and sensuous need; i,e. only when it
Proceeds from nature". (1971*72)
_„„ with its obvious distinctionThe emphasis on sense perception witn ivs
from and dependence on external objects, leads to the conclusion that
the object, sensuous being, has priority over thought and the mind. "...
Ve make the real, that is, the sensuous," Peuerbach points out, "Into
Its own subject end give it an absolutely independent, divine, and
Primary meaning which is not first derived from the idea', lee., from
thought, (1966*51) In his essay on Feuerbach, Engels approvingly
summarizes Feuerbach’s materialist positions
The material, sensuously perceptible world to which 
we ourselves belong is the only reality; and ... oux 
consciousness and thinking, however supersensuous 
they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily 
organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind,
but mind i t s e l f  is the highest product of matter. This
is, of course, pure materialism, , (1969» 111*348)
In Feuerbach's philosophy» the human mind and thought are ©3sen—
tlally passive in relation to the independent, external object;
Only that thought which is determined and rectified 
by sensuous perception is real and objective thought —  
the thought of objective truth ... Perception takes 
matters in the broad sense, whereas thought takes them 
in their narrow sense* Perception leaves matters in 
their unlimited freedom, whereas thought gives them 
laws, which, however, are only too despotic. Perception 
enlightens the mind, but determines and decides nothing
... (1966; 64-65)
Feuerbach's conception of the passive nature of the mind is 
s’ummed up in the phrase, "Things must not be thought of otherwise than 
as they appear in reality ... The laws of reality are also the laws of 
thought." (1966:62-63) The young Marx was never comfortable with this
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aspect of Feuerbach’s materialism, although it is accepted by some 
contemporary Marxists* Timpanaro, for example, claims that "we cannot 
••• deny or evade the element of passivity in experience* the external 
situation which we do not create but which imposes itself on us". 
(1974:7) Even in 1843-44, however, when Feuerbach’s influence on him 
was at its height, Marx is aware of a tremendous discrepancy between 
Reality and thought which, he feels, should be balanced in favour of 
ihe latter, "Will the enormous gulf", he asks, "between the demands 
°f German thought and the replies of German actuality match the same 
gulf that exists between civil society and the state, and within civil 
society itself? Will theoretical needs immediately become practical 
°nes? Xjt is not enough that thought should tend inwarda reality, 
Sgality must also tend towards thought." (1971M:124) Marx, of course, 
utterly rejects the passive content of Feuerbach’s materialism in hie 
eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach which, as I suggested in Chapter 3» 
is taken almost word for word from Hegel: "The philosophers have only 
Interprets the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
S^ange it." (1969, 1:15)
According to Feuerbach, objectivity or truth is obtained only
when the conception of an object is identical with the object itself,
as corroborated by the testimony of an independent observer.
The distinction between the object in itself and the 
object for us —  namely between the object in reality 
and the object in our thought and imagination— * is 
... necessarily grounded .... You think only because 
your ideas can themselves be thought, and they are 
true only when they pass the test of objectivity, 
that is, when they are acknowledged by another person 
apart from you for whom they are an object. (1966:
10 , 68)
Feuerbach's criterion of truth or objectivity is accepted by most
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Modern Marxists. Lukács, for example, claims that true knowledge is
"a reflection of reality” (1975*533) and Benton, a British theorist,
observes that "adequacy to the object of knowledge is the ultimate
standard by which the cognitive status of thought is to be assessed”,
0977:171) Marx, as I have already pointed out, rejects this
"ultimate" standard of truth in favour of the criterion of practice«
The question whether objective ,.* truth can be 
attributed to human thinking is not a question of 
theory but is a practical question* In practice 
man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and 
power, the this-sidedness ... of his thinking.
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of 
thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely 
scholastic question. (1%9 i 1:^3)
Sydney Hook observes that "Marx did not live to develop the 
¿indications Of his scientific theory of truth". (1976:285) But as I 
WU 1  argue, it is precisely the scientific theory of truth which is 
ultimate concern of Hegel’s philosophy. Significantly, Western 
Marxism has made no attempt to develop Marx’s theory of objectivity? 
n°r has it explored Hegel’s elaboration of this theory. The 
A3-thusserian Decourt is therefore correct when he writes, "one 
hundred years after the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach”, (tduch is 
Quoted above) Marxism "remains in a state of theoretical non-olabora- 
tion such that the question of its (theoretical) existence can still 
be asked." (1977:104)
Feuerbach’s materialist epistemology lendsutself easily to an 
^critical regard for the methods and achievements of natural science, 
"The most perfect, and hence divine, sensuous knowledge", notes
Feuerbach,
is indeed nothing other than the most sensuous 
knowledge that knows the most minute objects and 
the least noticeable details, that knows the hair
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on a man’s head not by grasping it indiscriminately 
in one lock but by counting them, thus knowing 
them all, hair by hair. This divine knowledge ... 
becomes real knowledge in the knowledge of natural 
science gained through the telescope and micro­
scope ... it alone demonstrated anatomically in 
the grub of the butterfly 288 muscles in the head,
1,647 in the body, and 2,186 in the stomach and 
intestines. What more could one ask? (1966!16-17)
■he seeds of what Hook calls Feuerbach’s "’degenerate’ sensationalism*'
~~ which consisted among other things in Feuerbach’s contention in
lQ50 that "roan is what he eats" (Quoted in Hook, 1966j267) may already
be seen in this 1843 passage. But the young Marx at first fully
accepts Feuerbach’s worshipful attitude to the natural sciences and
echoes Feuerbach’s dictum that "Philosophy must once more tie itself
Natural science and natural science to philosophy," (Feuerbach,
quoted in Kamenka, 1970;78) "The first object for man —  man himself
n writes the young Marx, "is nature, sense experience} and the
Particular sensuous human faculties, which can only find objective
realizatlon in natural objects, can only attain self-knowledge in the
science of natural being ... Natural science will one day Incorporate
^ e  science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate
natural sciencej there will be a single science." (1971 *73)
As he did with most other aspects of Feuerbach’s philosophy —
w*th the notorious exception of Feuerbach's materialist inversion of
Hegel —  Marx, as I have noted in Chapter 4 , also came to reject
Auerbach’s unquestioning enthusiasm for natural science1
Feuerbach speaks in particular of the perception of 
natural science} he mentions secrets that are 
disclosed only to the eye of the physicist or chemist} 
but where would natural science be without industry 
and commerce? Even this ’pure’ natural science is 
provided with an aim, as with its material, only 
through trade and industry, through the sensuous
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activity of men. So much is this activity, this 
unceasing' sensuous labour and creation, this produc­
tion, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it 
now exists, that, were it interrupted only for a 
year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous 
change in the natural world, but would very soon 
find that the whole world of men and his perceptive 
faculty, nay his whole existence were lacking.
(1971:84)
Feuerbach's respect for natural science is one of his moat
®nduring legacies to modern Marxism. Accordingly, the Stalinist
intention that there are two forms of natural sciences "proletarian
science" and "bourgeois science" has been utterly rejected by Western
Marxism, The Lysenko affair, which strangled biological science in
the U.S.S.R., was enough to indicate that the "theory of two sciences"
ia untenable and has disastrous consequences for progress in the
natural sciences. (Lecourt, 1977) But Western Marxism clings to the
notion that there are two forms of social science, the bourgeois,
incorrect one, and the true Marxist social science. The fact that, on
"this basis, sociology has also been crushed in the Soviet Chi on eludes
the attention of most Marxists. Feuerbach's contention that the
sturai sciences are divine while philosophy (and its modern-day off-
shoot, social science) is simply a collection of errors and fantasies
("no philosophy", declares Feuerbach, "is my philosophy." (quoted in
Ks^enka, 1970:80)), has appealed to generations of Marxists,
Colletti provides an instructive summary of the Western Marxist
attitude to science. For Colletti, science, understood as a system of
knowledge based on the methods of natural science, is "the sole form of
ie*l knowledge ... Bourgeois thought and civilization", he continues,
succeeded in founding the sciences of nature; whereas 
bourgeois culture has been incapable of generating 
scientific knowledge of society and morality. Of
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course, the natural sciences have been conditioned 
by the bourgeois historical context in which they 
have developed —  a process which raises many 
intricate problems of its own. But unless we are 
to accept dialectical materialism and its fantasies 
of a "proletarian'’ biology or physics, we must 
nevertheless acknowledge the validity of the 
sciences of nature produced by bourgeois civilization 
since the Renaissance. But bourgeois discourses 
in the social sciences command no such validity? 
we obviously reject them, (1977*3?5~326)
The "true (bourgeois) natural science" and the "false bourgeois social
science" distinction made by Western Marxism is one of the roost
glaring aspects of what I shall define as the Marxist variant of false
¿oftaolousneBs or Ideology. For what Hegel calls the "understanding"
or Enlightenment consciousness is as much a part of contemporary
Marxism as it is of bourgeois thought. Marxism developed out of and
¿long with bourgeois philosophy and science} together they compose an
g£gtnlc. if contradictory and antagonistic, unity,
Feuerbach's and the young'Marx's vision of a unified natural
science of man and woman has suggested to many Marxists that the study
°f human beings and society should be assimilated under the categories
and methodology of pure or natural science. Accordingly, Feuerbach's
admiration for the scientific probing of the anatomy of the butterfly
S^ab has its analogue in Regis Debray's admiration of the "exact
analytical tools" provided by thermo-dynamics (1977*28), and Benton's
fascination with the theory of ideal gases. The lack in the "corpus
°f Marxist literature" of any "logical conditions, rules and con-
straints involved in the employment of [its] concepts in concrete
analysis", says Benton,
may be compared with the precise and quantified 
knowledge which exists, for example, in the 
application of the kinetic theory of gases to
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particular cases, concerning: the degree of 
difference between the theoretically established 
behaviour of the ’ideal gas’ and the behaviour 
of particular gases in particular temperature- 
ranges, etc. (1977*155)
Benton criticizes Engels because he has the temerity to apply 
"Hegelian categories" to the study of natural science in Dialectics of 
Nature (19 5 4), "It does not seem to bother Engels", writes Benton, 
that these "discoveries" of Engels’s dialectical materialism "were the 
result of the method of speculative philosophy, and are only externally 
applied by him to the results of the natural sciences." (1977*58)
The "ideal gas", of course, has neither consciousness nor will, but 
'it does not seem to bother" Benton, and many other farxists (as well 
as bourgeois positivists), that the categories of natural science 
should be "externally applied ... to the results’ of historical and 
s°cial science. Long ago Ilegel noted Kant’s "customary tenderness for 
things" as exemplified in Kant's concern "that they shall not contra­
dict one another". (Quoted in Lenin, 1963*135) Remarking on this 
Passage, Lenin exclaims, "This irony is exquisite! ’Tenderness for 
Mature and history (among the Philistines) —  the endeavour to cleanse 
■tbem from contradiction and struggle ..." (1963*136) Kant’s and
Feuerbach's tenderness for things and the methodology of natural 
Science lives on in Western Marxism, but the irony of this position 
ascapes its exponents. "The unity of the sciences', declares Benton,
... justifies the practice of looking to the natural 
sciences for analogues of the conceptions of 
causality and of explanation which are required in 
the social sciences, and also of demanding that they 
are consistent with the basac laws and propdsitions 
of the physical sciences, (1977*199)
In the Lesser Logic, of course, Hegel subjects the category of 
Ground or causality to a searching critique, and condemns its
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uncritical -use in the realm of human consciousness and society,
... It happens that a ground can he found and adduced 
for everything: and a good ground (for example, a 
good motive for action) may effect something or may 
not, it may have a consequence or it may not. It 
becomes a motive (strictly so called) and effects 
something, e.g, through its reception into a will,* 
there and there only it becomes active and is made a 
cause, (Hegel, 1975*179)
Feuerbach's materialism leads him to glorify the human senses at
exPfinse of what Hegel calls ideality —  the theoretical and
Practical activity of men and women. According to Feuerbach, human
superiority over other animals lies neither in consciousness and will,
n°r in reason, but rather in the development of the senses of feeling,
faring, seeing, and so on,
Man does not have the sense of smell of a hunting dog 
or of a raven, but only because his sense of smell is 
a sense embracing all kinds of smell; hence it is a 
freer sense which, however, is indifferent to parti­
cular smells. But wherever a sense is elevated above 
the limits of particularity and its bondage to needs, 
it is elevated to an independent and theoretical 
significance and dignity ... Even the lowest senses, 
smell and taste, elevate themselves in man to intel­
lectual and scientific acts. The smell and taste of 
things are objects of natural science. Indeed even 
the stomach of man, which we view so contemptuously, 
is not animal but human because it is a universal 
being that is not limited to certain kinds:of food 
He who concludes his view of man with the stomach, 
placing it in the class of animals, also consigns man, 
as far as eating i3 concerned, to bestiality,
(1966:69-70)
Auerbach's observations on the senses are actually derived from 
^ugel's Philosophy of Hind (1969)? but where Hegel relegates sensation 
the lowest level of thought, Feuerbach never attains to a critical 
e3ca®lnation of the higher levels of consciousness which Hegel, follow- 
A g  Kant, calls understanding and reason.
The young Marx is not so certain that mere sensation is above
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intelligence and will, but the 1844 Manuscripts contain many passages 
reminiscent of Feuerbach's "sensationalism". "... Man", writes the 
young Marx,
is affirmed in the objective world not only in the 
act of thinking, but with all his senses ... The 
forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire 
history of the world down to the present ... Thus, 
the objectification of the human essence, both in 
its theoretical and practical aspects, is required 
to make man's sense human, as well as to create the 
human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of 
human and natural substance. (19641141)
Tbis emphasis on the human sensations drops out of the work of the
mature Marx and finds no place in Hegel's writings, but the Feuer-
bachian influence has affected the so-called "Hegelian Marxists".
^ong them is Herbert Marcuse for whom "'The revolution will throw up
new men with new needs even at the biological and instinctual level'",
(Quoted in Walton and Gamble, 1971*91)
For contemporary Western Marxism, the chief difference between
classical German Idealism, as exemplified by Kant and Hegel, and
Materialism, lies in the "acknowledgement" by materialism "of the 
Reality and independence of the external world ... This", as Colletti 
°bserves, "is, of course, a fundamental thesis", (19/7*527) Marxism 
ia divided over many questions of theory but not over this one. Thus 
both Colletti and his Althusserlan opponents accept "the priority of 
being or matter over thought and therefore the dependence of the latter 
the former". (Colletti, 1973*201) gut there is a differenaa 
between acknowledgement of the Independent reaHJx of the external 
and the affirmation of the priority Ofmaster anj being oyer 
thought. Neither Kant nor Hegel for a moment denied the independent 
teality of the external world: the essential distinction between being
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and thought. However, in the view of Western Marxism this is the
foundation of their philosophies and the root of all their errors.
In an otherwise intelligent account, Martin Jay, for example, assures
his readers that "She itankfurt School never reverted to the idealist
notion of the world as the creation of consciousness." (1974*268)
Even the briefest and most superficial acquaintance with Kant' e
Critique of ¡hire Reason (1895) confirms that Kant is acutely aware
that there is a world which exists independently of the thinking mind.
mK p v¡arrr>-i trjjothins”* he writes, "can be more£he same is true of Hegel. îioumi5 »
. +MnV or conceive is not on thatobvious than that anything we only thinK o
account actual, the mental representation, end even the notional
(theoretical] comprehension, always falls short of being ... Those who
Perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference between
Being and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not
wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be eny preposition more trite
than this?" (1975:84-85) But this "trite" proposition has been taken
v i, .. H q  intellectual superiority over theby Western Marxism as a mark of it
., „, d, YiiVacs. for instance, who approves ofidealism of Kant and Hegel. Lukács,
„ ■ _  nf ïïpvel’s position by Feuerbach", claims’the materialist criticism of üege-i ^
,, . , ¿-finite idealistic significance: ...■that Hegel’s philosophy has * a de
the total supersession of the objective world". (1975,528, 515)
The received Western Marxist view of German Idealism is especially
» , a , y, nf nodem-day Marxism, Stalin. "Contrarydear to the current bête noir of modem » * . .
idealism," writes Stalin,
, nriiv our mind really exists, andwhich asserts thatjmly . natur6| exl8ts only
that the ^teria gen’atlons, ideas and perceptions,
in our mind, in philosophy holds that matter,
nature^being^ is an objective reality existing outside
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our mind; that m a t t e r is primary, since it is 
the source of sensations, ideas, mind and that 
mind is secondary, derivative, since it is a 
reflection of matter, a reflection of being-, that 
thought is a product of matter which in its 
development has reached a high degree of perfection, 
namely of the brain, and that the brain is the 
organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot 
separate thought from matter without committing a 
grave error, (1940:15-16)
Stalin perceptively observes that "it is easy to understand how
important is the application ... of the philosophical principles
of Philosophical materialism ... to the practical activities of the
Party of the proletariat," (1940:19) Althusser describes the
t’Ssuits of this application:
the decay of philosophy into a practical ideology, 
sustaining the political ideology of the party by 
providing it with the guarantee of the »laws’ of the 
dialectic, encourages the party to close in on 
itself, to cut itself off from the outside world.
It deprives it of the political benefit which a 
real Marxist philosophy, a ’critical and revolu­
tionary’ philosophy, could contribute both to its 
theory and to its historical practice, in ©very 
domain. (1977*15)
2SL asserting the priority of being over thought, Marxism
denies the very essence of Marx’s "revolution!sin^ prao- 
•Milg," or what Hegel calls, ideality. For what these terms mean, above 
a^ »  is the transformation, creation, and formation of external 
Reality by conscious human activity: the dependence, as it were, of 
Matter on mind. The result of the materialist (and metaphysical) 
Position that mind is dependent on matter has been precisely what Marx 
Piedicted in 1845: "this doctrine necessarily ax-rives at dividing 
society into two parts, of which one is superior to society ..."
1:12) In Kussia itself materialism "became an alienating 
Geology expressing and serving the interests of the new dominant class
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produced in the course of Stalinist industrialization*». (Claudin,
■>975s604) Since matter is primary and mind secondary, there is little 
need for the "broad masses" to think overmuch about what will happen 
anyway through the "inexorable laws'* of history. This doctrine, 
understandable enough in a rapidly developing but backward country, 
has absolutely no place in an advanced country where self-dependence 
and self-directed industriousness is the rule rather than the excep­
tion. But it remains a linchpin in the ideology of modem Western 
Marxism.
The reason for the survival of this materialist doctrine among 
Marxists in the advanced Western'countries lies in the alienated 
character of bourgeois society itself» a character which will be 
detailed below. But this survival has historical roots as well. 
Marxism, as it is practised today, retains its connection with the 
radical generation of the 1950's and 1940's. "The distinctive feature" 
of this generation, writes Claudin, was its "total lack of any critical 
spirit towards anything which carried the Soviet label, a disregard 
for theory —  since all important problems were solved 'from above* *—  
and what was known in the party jargon as * practician)'.« Theory was 
ignored by these new recruits to Communism, except that spoon-fed to 
them by Stalin. "ITo one came to Lenin except through Stalin, Narx 
came a long way behind, in third place. It was this generation which 
provided the middle-rank organizers and many of the leaders in the 
Period of the resistance, the liberation, 'national unity', the 'cold 
*ar\ the People’s Democracies, etc." (1975:642) The radical genera­
r o n  which grew up in the Western democracies of the 19¿0«s found 
itself unable to express its opposition to the existing order except
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with the categories bequeathed to it by the "old Left". These cate­
gories did not explain very much; certainly they did not explain the 
struggle and initiative of thousands of working» and miMi^ -class 
Individual a who /independently) decided to change the world in their 
££2, image.
No more than Kant and Hegel» Narx does not deny the independent 
Reality of the external world, of nature, of reality as given by the 
sensations. But he does deny that this affirmation of external reality 
Spiles anything other than that. The world, nature, external reality, 
is certainly there, "the point, however» is to chants it1, (1969» It 
*5) Hegel puts the same idea another ways "•«» Neither we nor the 
objects" of the external world "would have anything to gain by the mere 
fact that they possessed being. The main point is not, that they are, 
but what they are, and whether or not their content is true. It does 
»° good to the things to say merely that they have being. What has 
being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it." 0 975*70) As 
far as the external reality of nature is concerned, says Hegel, "Nature, 
the totality immediately before us, unfolds itself into the two 
extremes of the logical Idea [theory] and Kind [human practical 
activity]. But Kind is only Kind when it is mediated through Nature." 
And again. "Nature'is for man only the starting point which he has to 
transform..." (1975*251, 44)
In his critique of Feuerbach's materialism, Marx observes that
"revolutionising practice" —  "this unceasing sensuous labour and
creation, this production" of men and women in society *r*“ leaves
the priority of external nature ... unassailed, and 
all this has no application to the original men 
produced by generatio aequivoca (spontaneouo
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generation); "but this differentiation has meaning 
only in so far as man is considered to be distinct 
from nature. For that matter, nature, the nature 
that preceded human history, is not by any means 
the nature in which Feuerbach lives, not the nature 
which today no longer exists anywhere ... and which, 
therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach, (1971:
84-85)
The reality given to Feuerbach's five senses, as well as to those of
contemporary Western Marxists, is the mediated reality of human sensuous
Activity, The important question", notes Marx,
of the relation of man to nature ... out of which 
all the 'unfathomably lofty works' on 'substance' 
and 'self-consciousness* were bom, crumbles of 
itself when we understand that the celebrated 
'unity of man with nature' has always existed in 
industry and has existed in varying forms in every 
epoch according to the lesser or greater develop­
ment of industry, just like the 'struggle* of man 
with nature, right up to the development of his 
productive powers on a corresponding basis,
(1971:84)
Feuerbach's belief, which he inherited from Kant, that nature is a 
sort of "thing-in-itself" available only to the senses and ultimately 
s^yond the grasp of human reason and sensuous activity, has influenced 
eveh those thinkers who are outside the main-stream of Marxist thought, 
Accordingly, Giddens in his New Roles of Sociological Method, suggests
The difference between society and nature is that 
nature is not man-made, is not produced b£ man,
Human beings, of course, transform nature *#• But 
nature is not a human production, society is ,,,
Theories men develop may, through their technological 
applications affect nature, but they cannot come 
to constitute features of the natural world as they 
do in the case of the social world, (1976*15, 160) ,
Du* what exactly is what Giddens calls, ''the natural world''? As Marx
Points out, the natural world, as we know it, is not anything like the
Qriginal nature which confronted the earliest human being, Even the
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„ . , to confute Hegel’s Absolute Idea bycherry tree —- which Feuerbach uses
, ^ . + orl ethereal idea but something whichdemonstrating that it is not an etnereai
Ti , v, a r\n «-— even this cherry tree ’like all fruitieuerbach can bump his head on
x ' . w nnlv a few centuries ago transplanted bytrees, was, as is well known, only a
, xv^-ro-fore only by this action of a definite commerce into our zone, and therefor — -
* x h„3 become ’sensuous certainty' for society in a definite age it ha3 oeca
revolution, for example,
Feuerbach”. (1971s84) If ihe industr
. it also created an entirely new form of created modem British society,
x »That is. it not only transformed
’’nature” in the British country
- world of sheep and cattle breeds, nature, but created a new one.» a
, utterly unknown before. Further,varieties of vegetation and so on, ut y
modem biology stands on the threshold =f an ora where life itself will
no longer be "God's" or "nature's" prerogative, bat one of the
creations of human theory and practical activity.
,, flv+ornal to and outside of humanThere is no "nature" standing exte
consciousness and ideality. Men 5£l 122SI i£SDl££H! —  SSSiiS. EaSHS
ar. taking advantage of natgri j a g  » . & *  ■ ~  ^  ~
x, : x - y»nte society by develo|^ andjhe^ same way as they transform _—  —■ -■ ~~
^ + ^r»a1itv. The individual, says Karx, their own natural huMS 2iiiSSSiiSi'
t '„„nv nresent as practical power over nature) wust recognize "nature (equally P
„ /1Q7v^o) As Hegel puts it, "For these
as his own real body • (1973*54*-/
* «M+pnt has directed the work: and that thousands of years the same Architect has
' , ■ ,mi —  the ideality of the human indivi-
Architect is the one living mini,
, ,ik t0 bring to self-consciousness whatdual— «whose nature i s  to thins,
, , „ i p nature and society, "thus set asit is, and with its being", i-e**
i x. * same time raised above it, and so toobject before it, to be at the same
veins'" (1975:18) The same idea is reach a higher stage of its own being . V J f ?
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expressed, though in less abstract terras, by Marx in the Grundrisse;
... Just as production founded on capital creates 
universal industriousness on one side —  i.e. 
surplus labour, value-creating labour —  so does it 
create on the other side a system of general 
exploitation of the natural and human qualities Oy 
emphasis —  D.M.], a system of general utility, 
utilizing science Itself just as much as all the 
physical and mental qualities, while there appears 
nothing higher in itself, nothing legitimate for 
itself, outside this circle of production and exchange. Thus capital creates bourgeois society, 
and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the social bond itself by the members of
society. Hence the great civilizing influence of 
capital; its production of a stage of society in 
comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere 
local developments of humanity and as nature- 
idolatry. For the first time, nature becomes 
purely an object for humanity, purely a matter of 
utility; ceases to be recognized as a power lor itself; and the theoretical discovery of its 
autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse [of 
reason —  D.H.] so as to subjugate it under human 
needs, whether as an object of consumption or as 
a means of production. (1973*409—410)
For Hegel, alienation— what in modem times has also been called 
"false consciousness'* —  is precisely that t ^ e  of human conaciougness, 
ifoich persists in seeing things as external to, somehow outside of 
■§£>4. above. human theory and sensuous practice. Consciousness is the 
£g.lation of knowledge to its object ; and knowledge in turn, "means 
Such an acquaintance with its object as apprehends its distinct and 
sPecial subject matter". (Hegel, 1975*74) False consciousness or 
alienation, on this definition, is the view that certain aspects of 
reality —  whether they are social or natural —  are beyond the reach 
of knowledge, of human rationality and practical activity. Recognition 
of the essential unity of mind, society and nature as it is achieved 
in the science and industry of modem men and women is the ultimate 
Waning, states Hegel, of the phrase "Know thyself";
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... the summons to the Greeks of the Delphic Apollo,
Know thyself, does not have the meaning of a law 
externally imposed on the human mind by an alien 
power; on the contrary» the god who impels to self- 
knowledge is none other than the absolute law of 
mind itself. Hind is, therefore, in its every act 
only apprehending itself, and the aim of all genuine 
science is just this, that mind shall recognize 
itself in everything in heaven and earth. An out- 
and-out Other simply does not exist for Hind,
(1969:1)
?he abolition of alienation, otherness, false consciousness, is 
jruth of ideality, human sensuous activity, revolutionizing 
£S S t i c e j
This triumph over externality which belongs to the 
Notion of mind, is what we have called the ideality 
of mind. Every activity of mind is nothing but a 
distinct mode of reducing what is external to the 
inwardness which mind itself is, and It is only by 
this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, 
of what is external that it becomes and is mind,
(Hegel, 1969:11)
Hegel argues that "finite mind” —  what he also calls the "under­
standing", ''reflection", the Enlightenment consciousness and so on 
(and which Marx calls, bourgeois thought) —  considers the outside 
Wo*ld, nature, to be an external reality which is only passively 
transformed-by human ideality; that is, nature and society is 
believed to remain outside of, or alienated from, ideality or human 
theory and practice. There is no doubt of the "distinctive doter- 
®inateness of external Nature and Mind [society] as such", but this 
distinction is overcome by revolutionizing practice.
We have said that mind negates the externality of 
Nature, assimilates Nature to itself and thereby 
idealizes it. In finite Hind which places Nature 
outside of it, this idealization has a one-sided 
shape: here the activity of our willing, as of 
our thinking, is confronted by an external material 
which is indifferent to the alteration which we 
impose on it and suffers quite passively the idealiza­
tion which thus falls to its lot, (1969:13)
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According to Hegel, "absolute mind" —  which Marx would call, com­
munist consciousness —  recognises the essential unity of mind with 
society and nature as it is achieved through ideality or revolu­
tionizing practice:
Only in ... absolute mind ... does the Idea apprehend 
itself in a form which is neither the one-sided form of Notion or subjectivity [theory], nor merely 
the equally one-sided form of objectivity or 
actuality, but is the perfect unity of these its 
distinct moments, that is, in its absolute truth,
(1969:12)
Hegel refers to alienation or false-consciousness as "illusory 
appearance", a term he borrowed from Kant. Illusory appearance, then 
is the notion that mind ox human consciousness is somehow dependent 
on external reality, rather than its supreme arbiter, Illusory 
5£l?earanooT as I have suggested, is particularly endemic to Western 
i3£gxi.8in which sees mind or human knowledge and practice as dependent 
ii£22. and passive in relation to external social reality and nature, 
^is illusion can only be removed by practice, by individual human
ideality.
The illusory appearance which makes mind seem to 
be mediated by an Other is removed by mind itself, since this has so to speak the sovereign ingrati­
tude of ridding itself, of mediatizing, that by 
which it appears to be mediated, of reducing it to 
something dependent solely on mind and in this way 
making itself completely self-subaistent,
(Hegel, 1969:14)
Feuerbach's materialism, its reliance and dependence on sensation 
^ d  external reality corresponds to what Hegel calls the first stage 
of human consciousness —  that of "finding a world presupposed before 
UsM. The second stage, that of "generating a world of cur own 
Nation" (1969:22) is reached by Kant's philosophy which will be 
considered in the next chapter. Both these ways of considering the
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world belong to "finite find" -  to bourgeois (and contemporary Marxist)
consciousness. Much of bourgeois social theory has an advantage over
certain aspects of Western Marxist theory in that it incorporates the
heritage of Kant's philosophy. This advantage is shown above all in
bourgeois ideality -  the production, reproduction, maintenance and
extension of capitalist relations of production, which have survived
Marx by almost 100 years and which are likely to do so for a few more
years at least. M  X2S ««iSSL ia a  «12224'iSSS. ¡S3.
Marxist theory has been unable to beggi & g  ~  S£ S S .  Z S m i Z
understand him -  preciselx tecgaS. »  >33 S2l the
revolutionary aspects of Hegel's absolute Idealism.
For Hegel, finite mind or false consciousness "means the dlspro-
■ . a -p-iitv”. But this finitude is itself theportion between concept and reality
. .X__.*„»•—  i t is a false consciousnessresult of the activity of consciousness ii i- - —  ■— — -— -
,, , TT . it »it is a shadow cast by thethat creates itself. As Hegel puts it. it i
, vision which the mind implicitlywind's own light— a show or illusion
... order, by its removal, actually toimposes aa a barrier to itself, in order, °y *
i frnodom'as its very being. i»e. to berealize and become conscious of freedom «.s i—  *
fully manifested”. (1969*22)
v rissare is brilliantly explicated by MarxWhat Hegel means by this passage
in the famous section of Capital called, "The Fetishism of Commodities 
and its Secret". Marx observes that the commodity embodies nothing
m ond the value of a commodity is anmore than human labour*power, and tne v w
1 v 0v.,v,ndied in it. Commodities are equi- expression of the human labour embodied
■ .. . ia +.Hfxv mav be exchanged for one another,valent to one another, that is, they may w. b
+ fhpv embody human labour-power considered Precisely on the basis that tney
.• ,, . i  v-irrin labour or value. Honey, a3 theln the abstract as universal human
2 2 ?
■universal equivalent, is the social mediator between commodities as
values, and facilitates their exchange. All this, however, is beyond
the ken of the economist who insists on seeing value, not as abstract
human labour manifested in the object, but rather as an aspect of the
external object Itself. Writes Marx,
The mysterious character of the commodity—form 
consists therefore simply in the fact that the 
commodity reflects the social characteristics of 
the products of labour themselves, as the socio- 
natural properties of these things. Hence it 
also reflects the social relation of the producers 
to the sum total of labour as a social relation 
between objects, a relation which exists apart 
from and outside the producers, (1976s164— 165)
In bourgeois society, production takes place as "the labour of 
Private individuals who work independently of each other". The social 
character of their labour is lost on people in capitalist society 
since everyone appears to be pursuing his or her private ends, inde­
pendently of anyone else. The only conscious productive social 
relation between people is simply that of the exchange of their 
Private labours.
In other words, the labour of the private individuals 
manifests itself as an element of the total labour 
of society only through the relations which the act 
of exchange establishes between the products, and, 
through their mediation, between the producers. To 
the producers, therefore, the social relations - 
between their private labours appears as what they 
are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social 
relations between persons in their work, but rather 
as material ... relations between persons and social 
relations between things. (1976:165-166)
When people exchange the products of their labour with on© 
another, what they are actually doing is equating "their different 
kinds of labour as human labour. The:/ do th1 s withont being aware of 
il". (1976:166-167? my emphasis) In other words, "it is a shadow
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oast by the mind's own light" —  an illusory appearance in conscious­
ness brought about by bourgeois ideality Itself. Marx observes that 
the classical economists, such as Smith, James Kill and Ricardo, had 
advanced as far as what Hegel calls, the second stage of conscious­
ness: "generating a world as our own creation". They recognised that
the wealth of bourgeois society is the creation of human labour, but 
they could not go beyond this point because they took the commodity 
relation as an eternal and objectively valid aspect of ail societies, 
not Just of bourgeois society itself. In a word, the classical 
econ enlists thought they had discovered a » U t lonshlj. equivalent to 
one in the natural sciences. They applied the external methodology 
of finite science, which has no knowledge of human consciousness and 
“ill, to a province in which individual ideality is the ultimate 
category, "The belated scientific discovery , writes Marx,
that the products of labour, in so far as they are 
values, are merely the material expressions of the 
human labour expended on them, marks an epoch in 
the history of mankind's aevelf  e3„ed
means banishes the semblance of
*  r i v T a U d  S rihrsr^ t  =u?S-fo» cf prfduction.
i L ° S d u S i o n fS  c l c L t f e s .
t h £ 1 q« n ? y T s t S »  labour, and. in th. product,tneir eqvaxijy the existence of value, appears
assumes the °f.;h®h®^elatlona 0f commodityto those caught up in the reiaxxoiis u v ^
production (and this is twe_ ^ov ) t0 be j U3t
the If Se SetLt the scientific
dissectio^of the^air^nto its component parts ieft
the atmosphere itself unaltered in its physical 
configuration. (197 o * 167/
The formulae of the classical economists, writes Marx, "which 
bear th. unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which 
« *  process of production has mastery over man, instead of the
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opposite, appear to the political economists* bourgeois consciousness
to be as much self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive
labour itself". The bourgeois economists could not foresee, nor could
they comprehend, the transformation of capitalist society into a
social form in which the rationality of freely associated individuals,
rather than the abstract forces of the market for commodities, will
rule and determine social relations. (1976*173“175) But the_
alienation or false consciousness characteristic of the bourg eois
epoch is a necessary phase or moment in the t^nsfo.rmation, to what
Hegel calls, the third stage of human consciousness, "galnirtg freedom
from" the natural and social world " g i  ill !*"• (1969.22) flan out-
lines these three stages in the Crrndrlsse.:
Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous 
at the outset) are the first social forme, in which 
human productive capacity develops only to a alight 
extent and at isolated points. PerB^.ii^^jnce 
founded on objective ... dependence Ei.e., <capitalism] 
ia the second great form, in which a system of :general social metabolism, of universal relations,
o T a U ^ Z d  needs and universal capacities is formed 
for the first time. Free individuality, based on 
the universal development of individuals and on their 
suhordination of their erarmunal, ■ ®°c^ 4 ! ° dThe1VUy
as their social wealth ie the • for^the third second stage creates the condition, for the third.
(1973*158)
. ' „ . a^ri-i+aUsm is a barrier to-consciousness*;For Karx as for Hegel, capitalism
the alienation it imposes, the subordination of individuals to the rule 
of capital, is only the pre-condition for the development of a freer 
end richer individuality among its members. Jo it stands, bourgeois 
society is "a mass of antithetical forms of the social unity, vhose 
antithetical character can never he abolished through ,ui.t metamor­
phosis". Nevertheless, "if we did not find concealed in society as it :.C 
1. the material conditions of production and the corresponding relations
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of exchange prerequisite for a classless society, then, all attempts 
to explode it would be quixotic.” (1973:159)
2. Alienation and Natural Science
"Feuerbach”, writes Vogel, "is one of those thinkers who in the 
course of their careers radically changed their views,” Although he 
was for fifteen years a loyal disciple of Hegel, "Feuerbach's distinct 
contribution is made as an empiricist, not as an idealist ..." (1966:
lx) As shown in the previous section, Feuerbach's empiricism linked 
him not only to materialism but also to natural science, Natural 
science lends itself most easily to quantification and the abstract 
relations of mathematics, and, remarks Hegel, "this mere mathematical 
view ... viz. quantity, is no other than the principle ofMaterial­
ism." (1975:147) Quantity or number is the thought-form closest to 
sensuous perception, to Feuerbach's sensationalism . Huiaber, wri te a 
Hegel, is "a thought, but thought in its complete seif-externaliza- 
tion, Because it is a thought, it does not belong to perception: but 
it is a thought which is characterized by the externality of
Perception". (1975:153)
«amber la a category of thoucht since it is not really a part of 
the external world, numbers are thoughts people independently 
attach to objects and are not aspects of the objects themselves. 
Nevertheless, number expresses an essential aspect of objects, namely 
"what is many, and in reciprocal exclusion". (Hegel, 1975,154) The 
category of number is an essential aspect of Feuerbach's ultimate
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standard of objectivity: the intersubjectively valid correspondence
between thought and its object. We know a thing is singular, a "one",
for example, because we can see it and touch it? other thought-forms
tend to elude this certitude. Writes Hegel,
The ordinary definition of truth, according to 
which it is "the harmony of the conception with the 
object" is certainly not borne out by the concep­
tion} for when X represent to myself a house, a 
beam, and so on, I am by no means this content, but 
something entirely different, and therefore very 
far from being in harmony with the object of my 
conception. (1894:150)
The "exact sciences", such as physics, are so-called precisely 
because of their reliance on number as an absolute category, ’utrictly 
speaking", notes Karl Mannheim, "from this point of view, only what 
is measurable should be regarded as scientific ... the ideal science 
has been mathematically and geometrically demonstrable knowledge ... 
Modern positivism (which has always retained its affinity for the 
bourgeois-liberal outlook and which has developed in its spirit) has 
always adhered to this ideal of science and truth." (1966:147) Just 
as' the early bourgeois philosophers attempted to put their ideas in 
«mathematical form and "regarded with an envious eye the systematic 
structure of mathematics", .(Hegel, 1954*190) many Western Marxists 
admire and try to imitate the method of natural science. For these 7 
Marxists and their bourgeois opponents alike, "science is a neutral 
Structure containing positive knowledge that is independent of 
.culture, ideology, prejudice". (Feyerabend, 1978:302) Accordingly, 
a recent critic of Luk.ics demands that Marxism should become "a real 
«ad responsible science". Castigating IukiCcs for his failure to 
ta*el before the altar of natural science, this writer las,eats that 
"far from social-historical knowledge■straining to attain a degree of
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certainty comparable to natural science, the methodology and findings 
of natural science are demoted [by Lukács] to the status of being a 
particular form of expression of the world vision of the bourgeoisie * 
(Jones, 197704, 37)
An aspect of the alienated consciousness of Western Marxism is its 
adherence to the «either-or« syndrome: science is either bourgeois, 
or neutral and objective: it cannot be both. In fact, however, 
science can be both bour^ois and demonstrates
by criticizing the categories of bourgeois political economy with ... 
the categories of bourgeois political economy. «... The forms of pro­
duction" .of capitalism, says Marx, «... are theoretically or ideally 
expressed by the categories of political economy«. (1973*409) Natural 
science is bourgeois, i.e., it arose with bourgeois society and has 
attained a high degree of development under capitalism. But it is 
also (to a degree) neutral and objective. Similarly, both atheism and 
materialism are also bourgeois, for the same reasons: they are not 
the exclusive property of Marxists. B u t b e s i d e s  .- 
being neutral and objective is also an alj^mted and £22£2£l£ IjMted / .
of thought: for - it treats its object as n m e M m  2 ^  &  
and independent of, human ideality.
The limitation of natural science is also the limitation of 
W e e d s  thought itself, where bourgeois thought mean, what Hegel 
alls "reflection", the "understanding” and so on —  and means also, as 
I have argued, the consciousness of Western Karris*. This limitation
la rooted in the bourgeois mode of production, in the production of
eommodities, of things produced for profitable sale in the market. It u 
Oonsista precisely in the view of reality as being constituted by '
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things external to, and independent of, human consciousness and will. 
It is a form of thought which sees the objects constituted by human 
endeavour as things alienated or apart from consciousness. It is 
useful to recall that the term alienation, which classical German 
philosophy took over from the English, has as one of its primary 
meanings "The action of transferring the ownership of anything to
another." (OED. 1971*55)
One aspect of alienation under capitalism is that the independent 
Individual worker sees the product of his or her conscious activity 
as a thing belonging to the capitalist. "Capitalist production", 
writes Marx, "is the first to develop the conditions of the labour 
process ... on a large scale — -it tears them from the independent 
worker, but develops them as powers that control the individual worker 
and are alien to him. In this way capital becomes a highly mysterious 
thing." (1976*10565 The labour process under capitalism, Karx con-
conditions of production confronted the worker as capital only in the
/-.iTvS+al itself are considered to be Not only the commodity and capital
-t , -hut also science, culture, and so onindependent, autonomous thing.»» but
+ * ™ A ,^1f.+ ivitv of labour into attributes oftransposition of the social, productivity
so firmly entrenched in people’s minds
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that the advantages of machinery, the use of science, invention, etc.
are necessarily conceived in this alienated form, so that all these
things are deemed to be attributes of capital.11 (l976:1058) Enmeshed
in the understanding mode of thought, Western Marxism is reduced to
defining culture, science, etc., as an other, as an aspect of capital
—  as "bourgeois culture", "bourgeois social science", and so on.
Western Marxism fails to recognize that while these things are
certainly aspects of the bourgeois mode of production, they are also
the productions of the Independent individuals within it. "The basis
for this" illusion, states Marx,
is (1 ) the form in which these objects appear in 
the framework of capitalist production and hence in 
the minds of those caught up in that mode of 
production, (2) the historical fact that this 
development first occurs in capitalism, in contrast 
to earlier modes of production, and so its contra- 
dictory character appears to be an integral aspect 
of it. (1976*1058)
The most far-reaching aspect of this alienation of human conscious­
ness and ideality from Itself is the mystified view, propounded by all 
shades of the political spectrum, that the great progress achieved in 
Production, consumption, education and so on represents the achievement 
^  the bourgeoisie, and not of all ¡ii&iZl
££de pf production. In his critique of "late capitalism" t-nndel 
Provides an instructive example of the headstands forced on Marxist 
theoreticians by the movement of capitalist society. On one page, for 
eSample, Mandé! laments the take-over of the socialist press,
^operative publishers'and so on by the "bourgeois" media. This, he 
Suavely informs us, represents "a far-ranging of the
recreational sphere of the working class". Mandel spares his readers . 
examination of the Stalinist character "of the spheres of collective
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action and {solidarity of the proletariat»* represented by much of the 
working-class media so heartlessly usurped by the capitalists. But on 
another page he speaks of "the growing interest of a wide public for 
Marxist literature" which is obligingly served by bourgeois publishers. 
Of course, this is explained by the mindlessness of the capitalists 
who are too stupid to perceive the results of their own actions, i.e., 
"the mass formation (or heightening) of anti-capitalist consciousness*'. 
0978:393, 507-508) There may, however, be another explanation. For 
example, it may be that capitalist society is not the bourgeois mono­
lith that Western Marxism thinks it is.
The growth of profit and the availability of consumer goods 
through increased production and reduced prices under capitalism, 
writes Marx,
appear to be the direct act and acUevement « E .
capitalist, who functions here as the personification 
of the social character of labour, of the^workshop 
as a whole.“ In the same way, science, which is in 
fact thTieneral intellectual product^of the social
process, also appears to be the direct offshoot of
capital (since i t s  application to the mterial _ _
process of production takes place in Isolation from 
the knowledge and abilities of the Indlw 
And since society is marked by the exploitation of 
labour by capital, its development appears to be the 
p S Z t i i e  force I t  capital as
It therefore appears to be the ~ ~ — for'Ths'Treatcapital and all the more so since, for the great
s f s f i ;  U  a product With which he dnawins
off of labour-power keeps pace. (197 J * )
fa aspect of this alienation from their own eooletjr, is the tendency 
of Western Marxists to deny the progress achieved under contemporary 
capitalism, or, if they do recognise it, to attribute it almost 
entirely to the plunder and exploitation of the Third World. The
achievements of nineteenth-century capitalism are acknowledged
(because they were applauded by Kan) but not those of the present day.
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To paraphrase Marx, '»there has been history, but there is no longer 
any", (1966:175) "It is only because of the phenomenon of imperial­
ism," states Handel,
or more precisely the beginning of the capitalist 
mode of production’s decline, that Marx’s old 
dictum that the most advanced countries mirror 
the future of the least advanced is no longer 
generally applicable in the twentieth century.
(1978a:29)
Accordingly, all the hard-won advances achieved by individuals 
within the Western democracies, such as universal suffrage, the 
creation of a mass consumer economy, the growing recognition of female 
equality, the ever-widening field of individual freedoms, and so on, 
are attributed to "imperialism" and held to be irrelevant to the Third 
World. For this abstract frame of mind the socialist republics appear 
to represent a glowing standard of progress. "... Any Marxist",
suggests Handel,
... is compelled to recognize the Progressive^character of the CSoviet] bureaucracy relative to
thí boSíeoisie, must credit it with the
k i - -«¿i cultural achievements ofenormous economic ana cuj^ ux»* ~
this tt <í T? lust as the achievements of t 
the bourgeoisie. (1978a*30)
Claudin, the historian of the Communist movement, declares, however, 
that "the new forms of human alienation, oppression and exploitation" 
Practised In the U.S.S.D. represent "in some respects ... a recession 
from the forms familiar under 'advanced' capitalism". (1975:601) The 
view put forward by Handel, which is representative of Western Marxist
thinking on this Issue, has led to the abSSEa S i  i  »HZÍÍÍ  ^ S a g H S a l
--- . - . . 1.UW. -„„H+V nf the advanced capitalistgyatero capable of (grasping xng. --------.
íorld.
„ , . „ +vP labour process as it occurs under the ,For Hegel, as for Marx, tne *
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bourgeois mode of production is a process of «outward necessity«.
The production of commodities by the worker is accomplished according 
to a force and direction contrary to his or her inclination. In 
Marx’s words, «labour capacity relates to its labour as to an alien, 
and if capital were willing to pay for it wlttwut making it labour it 
would enter the bargain with pleasure". 0  973:462) Hegel's analysis 
or the labour process as it occurs speoifl.c.anz capitalism
appears in the "Second Subdivision of Logic” in the Lesser Logic.
This subdivision entitled, "The Doctrine of Essence” is concerned with 
the categories of the understanding or bourgeois consciousness. Here 
Hegel discusses the production of "the fact" or commodity, a process 
which, as Hegel suggests, is completely externa! or alien to the 
Individual worker. Everything in this process is pre-supposed or 
independent of the individual: the conations of labour are "prior, 
and so independent ... contingent and external ..." The design and 
Plan for the commodity to be produced "is also . .. something pre­
supposed or antedated ... an independent content by itself". The 
individual worker is free and independent, but his or her activity or
1 , , , i.u0 r *>•*+, srnal] conditions are and thelabour "is possible only where tht- {.externa
fact«, (1975:211-212)
"„■■■■ capitalism is accomplished by- Because the labour process under
•, , . . in the shape of independent®leraents which «stand to each other
„ united content for its fact. For theexistences”, this process "has a lieu tea -u
^r> „irurleneos, Uut since in its form fact is this whole, in phase of singleness.
+. . _ , it is self-externalized even in  itsthis whole is external to itself, it is *
own calf and in ita content, and this externality, attaching to the 
fact, la a limit of ita content". Hegel's analysis is extremely
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abstract, but its meaning is clear:
Whatever ia necessary is through an other, which 
is broken up into the mediating ground (the Pact 
and the Activity) and an immediate actuality or 
accidental circumstance which is at the same time 
a Condition. The necessary, being through an 
other, is not in and for itself: hypothetical it 
is the mere result of assumption. (1975*212)
Hegel's abstract analysis is put in concrete terms by Marx, All
things under capitalism, he writes,
confront the individual workers as something alien, 
objective, ready-made. existing without their 
intervention and frequently hostile to them ...
As objects they are independent of the workers whom 
they dominate. Though the workshop is to a degree 
the product of the workers' combination, its 
entire intelligence and will seem to be incorporated 
in the capitalist or his under-strappers CMarx's 
word], and the workers find themselves confronted 
by the functions of the capital that lives in the 
capitalist. The social forms of their own labour 
... the forms of their own social labour, are 
utterly independent of the individual workers.
(1976:1054)
^t if the worker is alienated, so is the capitalist. Like the 
Worker, the capitalist has no interest in the commodity: its produc­
tion and sale is regulated and determined by market forces independent 
°f the capitalist. Rot the commodity, but profit, is the aim of the 
entrepreneur". The labour process itself is for the capitalist a 
hecessary evil" required for the amassing of profit, This "highly 
impoverished and abstract content •.• makes it plain that the 
capitalist is just as enslaved by the relations of capitalism as is 
his opposite pole, the worker, albeit in a quite different manner", 
(Karx, 1976:990)
Given the alienated character of bourgeois consciousness and 
society, it is not difficult to understand why the development of 
n*tural science constitutes one of its most outstanding achievements.
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As Korsch suggests, '»Bourgeois consciousness necessarily sees itself 
as apart from the world and independent of it, as pure critical 
philosophy and impartial science ..." (1970*97) o^r ^  sur­
prising that both natural science and its object are felt to be 
independent of the social activity of individual human beings. But 
the object of science, after all, is not just the thing being 
investigated but also and most important the thin£ as it is placed 
and understood within a theoretical .system. And this system is, 
above evexy thing else, a product of the development of individual 
human consciousness, "the accumulated knowledge of society". (Karr, 
1973*712) If under the bourgeois mode of production, "capital comes 
to be thought of as a thing" (Marx, 1976:982), this same "transforma­
tion may be observed in the forces of nature and science, the 
Products of the general development of history in its abstract 
quintessence. They too confront the workers as the powers of capital.» 
(Marx, 1976*1055)
The alienated conception of capital, natural science and nature 
as independent and autonomous powers existing apart from the 
consciousness and ideality of the individual is paralleled, of course, 
by the materialist belief in matter as the ultimate and inviolable 
component of reality. "The dominant basic trend in contemporary 
bourgeois philosophy, natural sciences and humanities ...", writes 
Korsch, "is inspired not by an idealist outlook but by a rnaterUaiBt 
outlook that is coloured by the £¿£2^*" (1 7^0i129) And
for the natural sciences, of course, matter is the fundamental 
category. "In the■field of physical science", notes Hegel, ^  C  
Universal, which is the final result of analysis, is only the
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indeterminate aggregate —— of the external finite in one word, 
Matter ..." (1975*96)
The materialist belief is articulated by Feuerbach’s philosophy 
which "takes matter as a real and independent being and therefore 
bases itself on sensation as the primary means of the authentic 
cognition of reality". (Vogel, 1966:lxxiii) ”... Being, apart from 
thought," writes Feuerbach, "is matter —  the substratum of reality." 
(1966*45) The young Marx shares Feuerbach’s notion of matter and 
observes that "the first and most important of the inherent qualities
of matter is motion ..." (1971*79) The idea that moving matter is, 
as Engels and Lenin suggest, "the only reality" the "objective 
reality given to us in sensation" and so forth, is the foundation of 
-dialectical materialism" as well as most other variants of Marxism. 
Nevertheless, the basic idea of materialism and natural science —  the
assertion of the independent, autonomous, alien, character of moving
®atter ——• is a myth. Writes Hegel,
Materialism ... looks upon matter, gua matter, as 
the genuine objective world. But with matter we 
are at once introduced to an abstraction, which as 
such cannot be perceived, and it may be maintained 
that there is no matter, because as it exists, it 
is always something definite and concrete* Yet 
the abstraction we terra matter is supposed to lie 
at the whole world of sense, and expresses; the 
sense-world in its simplest terms as out-and-out 
individualization, and hence as a congeries of 
points in mutual exclusion. (1975*65-64)
u „+<n_ standpoint, Karl Popper echoes Hegel’sV/riting from a neo-Kantian cpoo-u ,
N o v a t i o n .  on materialism and the” t0 " "  theoret1« 1
Practice of modern science. The research proera^o of science, says
+hat matter "was ultimate} essen- Copper, started from the assumption rnai, «
substance neither capable of further ^alj substantial* an essence or suD^az
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explanation nor in need of it, and thus a principle in terms of which 
everything else had to be, or could be explained". But "Modem 
physics contains explanatory theories of matter and of the properties 
of matter ... In thus explaining matter, and its properties modem 
physics transcended the original programme of materialism ... Matter", 
Popper continues,
is not "substance", since it is not conserved} 
it can be destroyed and it can be created ... Matter 
turns out to be highly packed energy, transformable 
into other forms of energy; and therefore something 
of the nature of a process,- since it can be 
converted into other processes such as light, and 
of course, motion and heat.
Thus one may say that the results of modem 
physics suggest that we should give up the idea of a 
substance or essence. They suggest that there is no
s e lf -id e n t ic a l entity persisting through all changes
in time ...j that there is no essence which^is the 
persisting carrier or possessor of the properties or 
qualities of a thing. The universe n o w ^ a r s t o  
be not a collection of things, but an interacting 
set of events or processes. (1977*&-U
or course, what this means is that the world la not a collection of 
Independent things' available as such to IVuertach's sensuous concep­
tion, but rather the external world, as it is in reality, can only be 
understood and grasped through theory, through inggn U S & i S .• «atore 
is not something Independent of human endeavour, but something which
n+iHved throurh thought andcan only be grasped, understood and utilize „---- L------ 1—
Efactleal activity.
For the understanding consciousness in both its bourgeois mid 
Marxist form, the denial that the methodology of natural science con­
stitutes what Peyerabend ironically calls, "a lonely peak of human 
development", (1978:302) appears to be a foul slander against all that 
is good in the world. 0. Stedman Jones, for example, declares "there 
“i n  never be a millennium In which the formal analytic procedures of
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natural science will cease to be applied to those objects for which 
they are the adequate instruments of appropriation.» To deny the 
eternal character of the methodology of natural science (the objects 
of which include living organisms) is to turn aside from »the 
liberating effects of industrialization and scientific discovery”. 
0977*58, 54) Jones* polemic is delivered against the errors of 
LukAcs* History and Class Consciousness. For all Lukács» faults, 
however, he never once questions the validity of natural science in 
its own realm. "When the ideal of scientific knowledge is applied to 
nature,” he writes, "it simply furthers the progress of science.
When it is applied to society it turns out to be an ideological weapon 
of the bourgeoisie." (1971*10) Hegel also has no wish to deny "the 
brilliant successes of the physical or ’exact* sciences in ascertain- 
ing natural forces and laws", nevertheless, "it is certainly not on 
the finite ground occupied by these sciences that we can expect to 
®eet the indwelling presence of the infinite [i.e., Individual 
consciousness and society)«” (1975*96)
Another aspect of the respect for natural science current in 
Western Marxism is Althusser’s notion that philosophy 50^  aTter and 
bui^ Hjon the results of natural science. For Althusser, "only 
science produces new knowledge| philosophy then works to transform 
and articulate this knowledge". (Althusser, 1969*14) To a degree, of
„ . Kant explains, "... we have completecourse, Althusser is correct, as ivan
Insist only Into what v. can cake aoconplish «cording to our 
conceptions," (1973.J4) According, early materialist philosophy
a 4-v,« «Mionre of mechanics and its certainly had its origins in the science oi
_  ,, , writes Hegel» "the empiricalPractical applications. Moreover, &
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sciences are "the real authors of growth and advance in philosophy". 
(1975:18) But Althusser's contention is based on the separation (or 
alienation), characteristic of our epoch, between science and philo­
sophy —  a separation unthinkable, in Britain at least, even up to the 
nineteenth century. "Newton", writes Hegel, "continues to be cele­
brated as the greatest of philosophers; and the name goes down as far 
as the price lists of instrument-makers. All instruments, such as 
the thermometer and barometer ... are styled philosophical instru­
ments." (19 7 5 5 11)
But Althusser-s conception of the relation between science and 
Philosophy suffers from a deeper error. The m i n  categories such as 
"matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, etc." were 
among the earliest creations of Lhll°s°g3; and were the primary cate­
gories employed by the mediaeval metaphysicians in their attempt to 
determine the existence and nature of Cod. (Hegel, 1975:«) They 
were taken over quite uncritically in the sixteenth century by the
an, +1« nature. "And all the while," observes sciences and applied directly to nature,
,, , «„-lovn is unaware that it contains meta-Hegel, "... scientific empiricism ... is una a
, ... «nvas use of these categories ar.dPhysics —  In wielding which, it makes ub« ,
their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical."
(1575.62) Similarly, the sensuous conceptions of time and space,
A v W r e c k  of human thought, were mindlesslyPostulated by Kant to be the bearo
xu- e-riv twentieth century when they utilized by science right into the eariy
' ' x_ir. Their demise would undoubtedlywere suddenly exploded by Einstein, iheir
hav© come earlier had scientists fcc-,n 
these "absolute" categories. (Hegel, 
that the basic categories of natural
aware of Hegel's critique of
1096:433-436) Hegel points out 
science —  quantity, qxiality and
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measure —  "just because they are the first, are also the poorest, 
i.e. the most abstract. Immediate (sensible) consciousness, in so far 
a3 it simultaneously includes an intellectual element, is especially 
restricted to the absolute categories of quality and quantity. The 
sensuous consciousness is in ordinary estimation the most concrete and 
also the richest} but that is only true as regards materials, whereas 
in reference to the thought it contains, it is really the poorest and
the most abstract”. (1975s124)
Feuerbach's philosophy and its Western Marxist equivalent (as
veil as bourgeois empirical science) is the philosophy of sensuous
perception. It thrives on the belief that “reflection ie the means of
ascertaining the truth, and of bringing the objects before the mind
as they really are. And in this belief it advances straight upon its
objects, takes the materials furnished by the senses and perception,
„ „ _ ueeif aej facts of thought} and thenand reproduces them from itself as
v ,, ' , . . . +Vlo truth. the method is content,” (1975»believing the method to be the truxn, ww
47) This "reflection theory of thought" is, of course, the mainstay
of dialectical materialism as it has been developed from Engels 
., ,. / TnWHn 19 6 7V and survives outside thethrough to Lenin and Stalin, (Jorda , lyQf; i
Soviet Union in much of the writings of Western Marxism. Writing in
1930, Korsch observes that this ».philosophical- outlook was ...
,. , uV,.1e 0f the Western Communist world,dispensed from Moscow to the whole 01
Indeed it formed the basis of the new orthodox theory, so-called
'Marxism-Leninism'". < m o . 1 2 M » V  “  £lr8t qUesUOrad
v . .v as an "idealist” —  not because Kantby Kant —  whom most Marxists see as an ^
v , ,x_ .„ud ftVer matter but because he took verybelieved in the priority of mind over mat
, . . „ , 1  +he ability of thought adequately toseriously Hume’s scepticism about the aoixj. jr
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reflect reality, (Kant, 1683*6)
Both Kant and Hegel would agree with Feuerbach that sensuous 
perception is the only way an object can be received into the mind: 
consciousness is dependent for its content on the external world,
"Everything11, Hegel affirms,
1, to sensation (feeling). if you will, everythin® 
that emerges- in conscious intelligence and in 
reason has its source and origin in sensation} for 
source and origin just means the first immediate
manner ih which a thing appears, (1^69573)
Similarly Kanfs Critique of Pore Reason is full of passages acknow­
ledging the priority of the senses in the act of knowledge. "Without 
the sensuous faculty," writes K ant, "no object would he given to us, 
and without the understanding no object would be thought." (1895.46) 
Furthermore both thinkers would accept Feuerbach's definition of
objectivity, the intersubjeotively valid correspondence between an
Object and the representation of it. bor is Hegel opposed
. , « hift"! our consciousness is,empiricist notion of the "objective lact •
. . ~.1v I« the fact and its characteristicsIn the matter of its contents, only in tne ia
u * nvA-nnrtion as it sinks itself into facta ... thougilt is only true in proportion as *
r i-van-v universal action in which it is iden-[and] restricts itself to that universal
.. ., . H ^1078*36) But Feuerbach’s definitiontical with all individuals, { ' J O ' ? 0 )
. - vltvi there are other andrefers only to the lowest form of objectivity,------------------ ■
. n f these forms is constructed byhigher forms of truth. The second of tnese
v .... .. 3 , ,.a charter,* the third, that of the unionKant and is discussed in the next cnaj-t ,
Of theory and practice is developed by Hegel and Karr.
v^.f.Tba-h’B definition of objectivity is As suggested above, Feuerba^i s u
r , r „ «^«"clousness as essentially passive inW d  on a doctrine which views con-ciou-n
„ i a " ' T h i r m " ,  notes Feuerbach in an relation to the external world. »
246
already quoted passage, "must not be thought of otherwise than they 
appear in reality ... The laws of reality are the laws of thought."
(1966:63) In this notion of empiricism, Hegel writes, "we have a 
doctrine of bondage: for we become free, when we are confronted by 
no alien world, but depend upon a fact we ourselves are." According 
to empiricism, "we must take what is given just as it is, and we have 
no right to ask to what extent it is rational in its own nature." 
(1975:64) The parallel with.Karx is obvious: for what Marx struggles 
to overcome is precisely the situation in which the "material 
conditions" of capital "confront labour as alien, .autonor^ 
as value —  objectified labour —  which treats living labour as mere 
means whereby to increase and maintain itself . (1976.1006) Marx,
therefore, is concerned to discover whether capital "is rational in 
its own nature". His answer, of course, is that capitalism is far 
from rational ~  it is instead a minefield of contradictions: "... 
Within bourgeois society, the society  that rests on excheng  yolue,
as well as of production, whichthere arises relations of circulation, as wt
, . 4+ .1 (1973:159) Truth, then, involvesare so many mines to explode it. , 7l
, validity: in recent times,something more than Feuerbach's notion ox vaxi a y
. * Q iustify thought, with reference says Hegel, "it became urgent ... to
. , , » filerei means the French Revolu­to the results it had produced ...
.. . . .. nr,p 0f the main problems of philosophy".’tien), and this ’’constituted o-*
(1975:26-29)
, 4 -I „Mence and the materialist philosophers,Along with empirical scien a
T, . c .srY are convinced of the reality of theRant, Hegel and, of course *arx, axe
. . world is the truth if it could but knowexternal world. "The external world is ^
' +nth is actual and must exist." Theit," remarks Hegel, "for the trutn u  «
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central problem, however, is to grasp the character of this external 
reality in theory and change it in practice, ’’The infinite 
principle, the self-centred truth ... is in the world for reason to 
discover; though it exists in an individual and sensible shape, and 
not in its truth." (1975:62) But materialism and empiricism, because 
of their dependence on sensuous perception and feeling, are the least 
able to confront and overcome objective reality. In fact, are
the root of all ideology, where, ideoloQC. is M i STli as false 
consciousness. "... It is from confirming to finite categories in 
thought and action", Hegel observes, "that all deception originates."
;•> 975:41)
natural or empirical science is everywhere distinguished by its 
reluctance tc consider the categories it applies to reality. The 
essential anti-intellectuallsm of science Bust be obvious to anyone 
<bo has ever considered the political and theoretical backwardness 
evinced by many scientists whenever they wander outside their own 
realmj not to mention the absolutely overwhelming attention paid by
natural science in the modern world to novel methods and means of
bringing about death and destruction to humanity and nature. The
' , , „„„x.,. Af natural science is noted by Marx:essentially alienated character oi naxux«**
"The weaknesses of the abstract materialism of natural science, a 
materialism which excludes the historical process, are immediately
1 ' ■ ' , . . */feelordeal conceptions expressed byevident from the abstract and ideology.«.
it, spokesmen whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own
specialty." (1976:494) It i i  SSSiSSM . ZSSIBBS. ££ ~  S jb SSS . SB.
. ni'-rrontion. and its failure to
external objects, as riven b£ ------------------
_ ‘ „ ____ that natural science is theSHestlon the nature of its own .££Ss62£±^V — - — —  —
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most ideologically conditioned and dogmatic - of sciences. Of course, 
natural science has prepared its ovn ideological defences, and con­
stantly preaches the difficult and esoteric nature of its endeavours. 
But as Feyerabend points out,
Modem science ... is not at all as difficult and 
as perfect as scientific propaganda wants us to 
believe. A subject such as medicine, or physics, 
or biology appears difficult only because it is 
taught badly, because the standard instructions 
are full of redundant material, and because they 
start too late in life. (1970*307)
The dogmatic or alienated character of natural science has been 
noted by modem philosophers of science. Popper, for example, refers 
to the Instrumentalist dogma1 of current science ... which is 
accepted by our leading theorists of physics ...” and which "has 
Become part of the current teachings of physics", (1976:100) Accord­
ing to this dogma, "The world is Just what it apneam. to be. 0nl£ the 
scientific. theories are not what the£ appear to Be, A scientific 
theory neither explains nor describes the world; it is nothing but 
«a instrument." (Popper, 1976*102) Similarly, "Kuhn's formulation of 
’normal science* suggests that the development of science, outside of 
obtain 'revolutionary phases' of change, depends upon the suspension 
of critical reason ..." Unlike Popper who urges the further progress 
<* natural science through "the tanent «permanent revolution' of  ^
critical reason," Kuhn suggests that "the suspension ofcritical 
*ea80n- ... is a necessary condition for the success of natural science 
(Giddens, 1976:137) Kuhn may be correct in stating that 
natural science as it is presently £ ^ 1 1 ^  depends upon mindless- 
ne®s and alienation. Hegel, however, would side with Popper in 
criticizing the instrumentalist view of science: the thought-forms of
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science are not simply instruments, they also reflect the character of
the universe.
The view that theories are instruments, while the real is only
what is given to us in sensation is, of course, a hang-over from the 
ideas of Feuerbach and other materialists. Thus Feuerbach contrasts
the ’’despotic" laws of thought compared to the "unlimited freedom" of
perception. (1966:65) For Hegel, this is nonsense: "Pure science
includes thought —  —  ~
as it is thought, or the thing in itself so far as ft fs Jusjb as much
pure thought £2 It U  th. ¿ M 2 C  iS . ilSSl£■" (1954=165) But the view
that the categories of silence reflect the nature of reality, alee 
implies that these categories should he constantly criticized and
subjected to the unrelenting tyranny of critical reason, to Popper-s 
"permanent revolution". An example of the necessity of this permanent
revolution is provided by atomic theory. Hegel observes that early 
atomic theory, which was based on Kant's notion of the reciprocal
assumed that there is a void orattraction and repulsion of atoms, wtu .
space between the atoms.
The Void, which is assumed as the complementary 
principle to the atoms, i3 repulsion and nothing 
else, presented under the image of nothing 
existing between the atoms. Modem Atomism «—  
and physics is still in principle atomistic —  
has surrendered the atoms so far as to pin its 
faith on molecules or particles. In doing so, 
science has come closer to sensuous conception, at 
the cost of precision of thought. To put an 
attractive by the side of a repulsive force, as 
the modems have done, certainly gives complete­
ness to the contrast: and the discovery of this 
natural force, as it is called, has been the 
source of much pride. But the mutual implication 
of the two, which makes what is true and concrete 
in them, would have to be wrestled from the 
obscurity and confusion in which they were left
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even in Kant’s Metaphysical Rudiments of the 
Natural Science. (1975* 143)
Following Kant, Hegel observes that the atom can only be under- 
stood as a dynamic process, and to comprehend this process the void or 
field between the atoms must be investigated theoretically, (1975i144)
This investigation was not seriously pursued until Einstein took it up 
more than 100 years after Hegel first suggested it. "Einstein’s
approach to the problem'*, writes Coleman,
was to consider the field itself in an effort to 
understand the basic underlying properties of 
fields in general. Then gravitational, electrio 
and magnetic fields would follow as special cases 
and the General Theory of relativity (since it is 
a theory of gravitation) would be derivable from 
the unified-field theory, (1972:133)
Einstein’s theory has yet to be proven, but his work suggests that
natural science is at last abandoning its uncritical reliance on the 
abstract and alienated categories of early metaphysics. Notes 
Coleman,
Up to now, scientists have been concerned mainly 
with directly measurable quantities, such as 
temperature /force, etc, and have evolved theories 
in terms of them so that they can V_ . ■things experimentally in an almost mechanical afte.- 
mathC TiS emphasis has not been on the^ mderstanding 
of a phenomenon but on the physical^ proof 0f tf or 
as Einstein called it, the osenexperience". Admittedly, physical proofi- 
desirable, but it should be emphasized^ taut it is 
not necessarily the most important element.
Coleman goes on to discuss the advantages of adopting a different 
methodology in the physical sciences -  one more dependent on theoreti­
cal practice than the current one -  but observes that "our civilisa­
tion" has not encouraged such a novel methodology. Einstein’s ideal
field theory, for example, could
erahle us to Predict ard create fields which are 
completely different from the ones we know, tuch
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scientific progress is rare in our civilization, 
but a brilliant example occurred when Maxwell in 
1864 predicted the existence of radio waves from 
the elementary knowledge of electricity and 
magnetism. The fact that these could not be 
produced experimentally for another twenty-odd 
years makes his achievement all the more notable. 
We may be on the verge of a similar development 
today through the unlfied-field theory, (1972:
154-135)
Enphasis on theory in science, in place of its current and crude
reliance on sensuous perception, experiment and so on, would be simply
to recognize Hegel's dictum that
Everything which is human, however it may appear, 
is so only because the thought in it works and has 
worked ... Thought is the essential, substantial 
and effectual ... We must, however, consider it 
best when Thought does not pursue anything else, 
but is occupied only with itself —  with what is 
noblest —  when it has sought and found itself,
(1892:4-5)
The fact that science has been used predominantly in bourgeois
,, capital and to create weapons ofsociety to bolster up the rule or capias w
, U «  »«fflq to the understanding consciousness ofdestruction and repression seems xo ^  w
v, ,„ nnv-» be a mere aberration, the mis-Earxists and their opponents alike to oe
. iVv.a^+<ve technology* For Hegel, however, application of an otherwise Iterative tecrmoxugy. b ,
.. . „ _ h m  in science itself. Science,the root of the alienation of science ires _ _  _ _ _
t, , vh* thought, point of view, and prin-Hegel observes, simply assumes the tnougnv,, v
, V  +rt +he condition and culture of the time andciplea "which are common to tne c o n a x ^ xv
j ____ the particular intellect’jfilPeople —  the general ideas and aims •«« J--— ^
„ . «nd life. Our consciousness", Hegelpowers dominating i-nnficiousness. ana xx— .
a them to be considered ultimatecontinues, "has theca ideas and allows tnem xo
. ■ . , them as guiding and connecting links,determinations? it makes use ci xnem 6
v J even make them the objects of itsfcut does not know them and does not even
consideration". (1692*571 ^  emphasis)
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Benton, Colletti and others have railed against Hegel’s »denigra­
tion of science and common sense in favour of metaphysical speculation». 
(Benton, 1977:141) For these Marxist defenders of conventional wisdom 
against Hegelian »metaphysics», »nothing remains ...» as Marx suggests 
regarding Proudhon’s critics among the »vulgar economists», »but to 
recoil from a sophistry they cannot entangle and to launch an appeal to 
'common sense» relying on the notion that things will take their 
course. A great consolation for the would-be ’theorist»”. (1976:974) 
But for Hegel, science and common sense are metaphysics; metaphysics, 
that is, of the lowest order. Speaking of another writer who admires 
common sense and its cultured companion, science, Ilegel remarks that,
Tiedemann could say of every philosopher that he 
went further than healthy human understanding, for 
what men call healthy human understanding ianot 
Philosophy, and is often far from healthy. Healthy 
human understanding posses s e s ^  modes of thought, 
maxims, and ¡judgments of its t^me». 
determinations of which dominate it without its being conscious thereof ... Before Copernicus it 
would have been contrary to all humanTOderstanding 
if anyone had said that the earth vent round the 
sun, or before the discovery of America, if it were 
said that there was a continent there. In India or 
China a republic would n j n  w ;  J  contrary to all 
healthy understanding. (1892.^/9/
Hegel, however, does not reject common sense, and even less its 
scientific counterpart. The categories of science are perfectly 
adequate to what he calls, "the household needs of knowledge". (1975. 
176) Categories like cause or force have a definite relation to 
reality, even if it is only the reality of sensuous perception. Every­
one has felt or applied a "force", and "causation" is immediately 
available to the least cultured mind: we see ourselves as the cause 
Of certain things and recognise that a tall, for erample, flies because 
we threw it. (Hegel, 1975.61) Eeeal putB U >  cause OT "er0'm 4  18 I
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the contradiction which is expulsion of [contradiction] from itself»*, 
(1975î1?6) The knowledge and ideas of science and common sense "are 
permeated and governed by a [practical] metaphysic ... it is the net in 
which all the concrete matter which occupies mankind in action and in 
impulse is grasped. But this web and its knots in our ordinary 
consciousness are sunk into a manifold material, for it contains the 
objects and interests which we know and have before us". (1892157) 
Much has been written recently about what separates science from
mythology, and the curtain of bogus respectability which science has
drawn around Itself accounts for a lot of this speculation. Giddens,
for example, asks, "In what sense ... if any, is Western science able
to lay claim to an understanding of the world that is more grounded in
'truth' than that of the Assnde, who perhaps simply operate with a
different over all cosmology ... to that of science?- After consider-
ing various aspects of scientific method, Giddens concludes, "There is
no ¡¡ajr 0f justifying a commitment to scientific rationality rather
., , ' „7V,r+ from premises and values whichthan, say, to Zande sorcery, apart irora *
science itself presupposes, and indeed has drawn from historically in
U s  evolution within Western culture." O t f i . W  M») Kogel and
„ , this hand-wringing relativism offerx, however, would have no part
■ . Science is, as f!arx points out, onethe understanding consciousness.
, „  ¿»wlonment ..." As such, "science»*1 °f "the general products of human developmenx
. , , N nj »»becomes manifest to tno workers inis "realized in the machine" and \
, . In turn, is a tremendousihe form of capital". (1976=1055) Capital, in , ----------
, , „ The tendency of the capitalist mode of produc-¿horresaive force: '*... dne xt* j
„ rrMuctivlty of labour ..." Capital Wo n  Is steadily to increase the produce
. , „ i- nrices and cheapening of commoditieswings about "the reduction in price»
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an increase in the Quantity of poods, in the number of articles that 
must be sold. That is to say, a constant expansion of the market 
becomes a necessity for capitalist production”. (1976:959» 966, 967) 
These achievements are possible because capital is linked to science? 
they would be impossible without science and would gain'nothing from 
"say ... Zande sorcery". Belief in science does not require what 
Giddens despairingly calls, "a Kierkegaardian »leap into faith*".
(1976:140)
For Hegel, natural science represents "the onward movement of a 
peaceful addition of new treasures already acquired", (1892:10) Its 
achievements are recognizable everywhere in the advanced industrial 
societies, and its impact (both positive and negative) is beginning to 
be felt in the impoverished countries of the Third World, neverthe­
less, the principles, methodology and technique of natural science 
represent the work of an alienated and disjointed consciousness! it 
i» ideology Incarnate-and the worshipful attitude toward it of the 
ideologues of -„'eater» Marxism simply represents their own theoretical 
bankruptcy. In the concluding chapter, where the dialectic method 
Will be discussed, the extent of this bankruptcy is delineated. First, 
however, it was necessary to confront the alienated character of 
natural science. Hegel sunaaritM the weaknesses of its methodology 
as follows:
Sven if the sciences are systematic and containuniversal principles and^laws^frora * - £ m U
r o b j e i t s ^ r u l i i m a t e  principles »
tv»'•.o-.w+'i +bem*»elve3t'■ that is, the o reward are the object - f tbe heart, natural or
experience or the V !  b  constitute the
educated sense rf « B ' - ^ ^ a .  logic and the
source from wh c. *¡rciples of thought in generaldeterminations and principi
are in'their methods assumed. ( i ^ - ^
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In other words, natural science takes its objects, method, and
logic as given, and then proceeds on this basis guided by «natural or
educated sense of duty". Its principle is the principle of alienation,
of bondage, of acceptance of the external world as it appears and is
grasped by the categories of early metaphysics and common sense. Its
greatest error lies in its uncritical reception of objects selected at
random and as they are given by the senses. Its error is the funda^
mental error of materialism. This is the error that Karx combats on
every page of Capital, For, according to Marx, reliance on materialist
methodology, on Feuerbach’s sensuous perception, is the foundation of
all falsa consciousness, all of what Karx calls, following Kant (1835!
209) and Hegel, "illusory reflection" or appearanoe. (1976*1065)
Prom the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, writes t o ,
We can see ... how an article regarded as the 
product of capital is to he distinguished from an
individual article treated as an independent 
k t ^ d - t h i r d l s t l n o t l o n  w i n  increasingly make 
i Th© folly of identifying &
2 «  social reUiiiSS!liE S *  
the t h i n , i i S r . T r i S m ^  of certain articles 
simoly because it represents itself ih terms of
reduced to their basic form, turn .jut ..to toe. land, 
capital and labour. One Bight :
iKSTthey were ^ i f ^ ^ h r m m ’and 
spindles, c o t t o n , ^ g r a i n , ^ ^ ^ ^  c S T W H H ^ d ,
- 2£SH. SJL , - xue labour process combined ,we name the elements of the ^ peouliar t0
them in a given forffl3 m  integral -part
proofs independently of any particular 
of tne iaoou£ Xi— rr"M rt of the eternal commerce of . .
social formation, as Par that this illusion
man and^natxire e,^ j^0^the nature of capitalist 
is one that Sf-rin^ i8 evident even now that




KAET AST) T1IE BOURGEOIS WORLD OP ABSTRACTION
I. Realit2_^JTd-Abstraction_in_^he_j>enerated_Vorl^_of_the-Cate£orie£
Lukács suggests In History aqd Class Consciousness that Kant's 
Philosophy, unlike that of Feuerbach, "refuses to accept the world as 
something that has arisen ... independently of the knowing subject, and 
prefers to conceive of it as it. own product". (197H11.1) But, as 
Lukács recognizes, Kant is far from vulgar idealism, according to which 
the external world is merely the creation of consciousness. In fact, 
Kant is concerned to show precisely the limits of reason in relation to 
reality, beyond these limits, Kant argue., reason becomes "transcen^
dent" and dissolves into "illusory appearance". (1895,210-211) Never-
,, , , V  iv,a nature of consciousness in itstheless, Kant emphasizes the active
. , , „ay.™ rnd shows that human experiencerepresentation of the external world, cna »
Of reality is predicated on categories, like cause and effect, which
the mind develops a xriorl or Independently of experience. "Kant",
+v,-,+ the world as we know it is otsr says Karl Popper, "... assumed ... that tne ---------- - ---
, „ the lirht of theories thatinterpretation of the observable, facts ..— —  -  — . ,;-
. „ &s Hegel observes, "according toPnrselves invent.n . (197« •' .
„ ; , consists in thinking ourKant all knowledge, even experienc ,
4 +reforming into intellectual cate-iapressions —  in other words, in transit
r, r . n ,r ho longing to sensation." (1975*75)goriea the attributes primarily beii.n& o
.. +h*n is to make the earns affirma- What Kant does in philosophy, then, is a
,, . v,nlitical economists like Smithi*ion about the world as the classical polltica
■ . . .... T segel’s words, they are engaged in'^d Ricardo do in economics, m i l e
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"generating & world as our own creation". (1969:22) If Kant sees 
experience itself as dependent on human consciousness, the political 
economists regard values and wealth as ’the material expressions of 
the human labour expended on them". (Marx, 1976:16?) Both discoveries 
were the theoretical equivalents to the subjection _of nature and the 
unleashing of human productivity made possible b£ the bourggois. mode of
production.
Kant's philosophy, Popper argues, "makes it possible to look upon 
science, whether theoretical or experimental, as a human creation, and 
to look upon its history as part of the history of ideas, on a level
with the history of art or of literature". 0376:181) Kant Digit have 
been expected to influence erectly the methodology of natural science, 
for one of the questions he attempts to answer is, "How ia pure natural 
science possible?" (1883:26) Yet in the same way as classical 
Political economy did not banish "the semblance of objectivity possessed 
by the social characteristics of labour" (Marx, 1976:167), Kant's 
epistemology of science left the external and finite methodology of 
natural science unaffected. Both political economy and natural science 
went on as before, convinced they were dealing only with thin£S. and not 
social relations or the categories of human thought. The reason for 
this failure is the same in both instances. Kant accepts the categories 
he employs in the grlticue of Pur. Reason Just as they were developed 
by formal logic: instead of criticising these categories he takes thorn 
to be the natural and eternal expressions of thought. As a result, "the 
facts and modes of observation" given currency by Kant, "continue quite 
the same as in" empirical science. (Hegel, 1975.93) Similarly, 
classical political economy
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never succeeded ... in discovering the form of value 
which in fact turns value into exchange-value. Even 
its best representatives, Adam Smith and Ricardo, 
treat the form of value as something of indifference, 
something external to the nature of the commodity 
itself. The explanation for this is not simply that 
their attention is entirely absorbed by the analysis 
of the magnitude of value. It lies deeper. The 
value form of the product of labour is the most 
abstract, but also the most universal form of the 
bourgeois mode of production; by that fact it 
stamps the bourgeois mode of production as a parti­
cular kind of social production of a historical and 
transitory character. If then we make the mistake of 
treating it as the eternal natural form of social 
production, we necessarily overlook the specificity 
of the value-form and consequently of the commodity 
form together with its further developments, the 
money form, the capital form, etc. (I976t174* my  
emphasis)
like Kant, classical political economy remains imprisoned in the 
categories of the understanding consciousness. In fact, for Hegel as
for Marx, political economy represents the ultimate excretion of the
understanding or bourgeois consciousness in the realm g£ gElrlcal
science. Political economy studies the syBtem of social needs and
Production, but only from the point of view of the abstract Individual
who pursue, his or her selfish Interests, This pursuit, in turn, is
shown by political economy to produce the mutual interdependence of
People on one another in civil or bourgeois society. But the bourgeois
mi j onhiiof'tin* the economic sphere itself to®ind sees no necessity for subjecting. w**
, ,„U£1j in the state, "In the course of theike control of individuals united i- ..........
actual attainment of selfish ends", writes Hegel,
there is formed a system of complete interdependence,
wherein the livelihood, happiness anddegal status of 
one man Is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, 
and rights of all. On this system, individual 
happiness, etc, depend, and only In this connected 
system are they actualized and secured. This system 
nay be prlma facie regarded as the external state, the 
state based on need, the state as the Inderstanding 
envisages it, C^9761125)
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The state recognized by the understanding, however, is severely 
flaweds "... The whole sphere of civil society is the territory of 
mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every 
talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where waves of every 
passion gush forth, regulated only by reason glinting through them. 
Particularity, restricted by universality, is the only standard where­
by each particular member promotes his interest.*' (Hegel, 1976:267)
As Marx observes, the call for a rational organization of society 
based on universal principles is absolute anathema for the understand­
ing or bourgeois consciousness. "The same bourgeois consciousness",
Marx points out,
which celebrates the division of labour in the workshop, 
the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial 
operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as 
arTorganization of labour that increases its productive 
powerfdenounccs with equal vi(tour every conscious
i i f r S t s  « S t y freed«, and th^elf-det.rminin*
SSSt&X1» ? - a
i t ' S S f t S f S S i t x  l » f  . factory. (1976.477)
Hoi... than B m . W  is aware of the «Teat achievements of 
what Kara calls, »classical political economy” (1976.174). "To dis­
cover this necessary element", i.e., the laws i.d.erent in the working 
of the capitalist system, "is the object of political economy, a 
science which is a credit to thought because it finds !aws for a mass
of accidents”. (He^el, 1976.260) nevertheless, the methol S L
, -nr on in civ boenune it taken itsBglitlcal economy la severely. lIHHil ------ ---------------
a .  ^V^^rvpriqie itself. The- development ofstand 2H the name soil as, the b o ------
Political economy, writes Hegel,
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affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say, 
and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass 
of details which confront it at the outset and 
extracting therefrom the simple principles of the 
thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and 
directing it. It is to find reconciliation here to 
discover in the sphere of needs thi3 show of 
rationality lying in the thing and effective there? 
but if we look at it from the opposite view, this is 
the field in which the Understanding with its 
subjective aims and moral fancies vents its dis— 
content and moral frustration, (1976;126-127? ray 
emphasis)
Hegel has frequently been represented as a bitter opponent of the
Kantian philosophy; and recent Marxist commentators, like Colletti
(1973) and Benton (1977), attribute to Hegel the absolute denial of
Kant's thought, or at least his epistemology, «/rites Colletti,
One could say, indeed, that there are two main traditions 
in Western philosophy in this respect [i.e,, epistemology]? 
one that descends from Spinoza and Hegel, and the other 
from Hume and Kant. These two lines of development are 
profoundly divergent. For anyone that takes science as 
the sole form of real knowledge that is, falsifiable, 
as Popper would say —  there can be no question that the 
tradition of Hume-Kant must be given preference over that 
of Spinoza-Hegel. (1977?325)
But Hegel's position with regard to Kant is the same a3 that of both 
him and H a m  to classical political economy, torx and (as I will show) 
Hegel accept and go beyond the categories of political economy! in 
Hegel's phrase, they dialectically transcend the analyses of thinkers 
like Smith and Ricardo. Hegel explains this process with reference to 
"khe history of philosophy?
mho reiation ... of the earlier to the later systems of 
xhe relat 0 . h reiation of the correspondingphilosophy^ much like tae r w r J  th. earlier
nES  later; but subordinated and
T h i s is the true meaning of a much mieunder- 
, . *V * „ n in the history of philosophy the
stood phenomena * * another... The refutation 
refutation o r  one system x y that ita barriers are
of a philosophy *’’_ x ay'principle reduced to a factor crossed, and its special prinuj-yx
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in the completer principle that follows. Thus the 
history of philosophy in its true meaning, deals not 
with a past, but with an eternal and veritable 
present} and in its results, resembles not a museum 
of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a 
Pantheon of god-like figures. These figures of gods 
are the various stages of the Idea, as they come 
forward one after another in dialectical development.
(1975:126)
Par from rejecting Pant, Hegel describes his thought as "the basis 
and beginning of modem Carman philosophy". (1956,200) The distinction 
made by Kant between "thought and thing ... is the hinge on which 
modem philosophy turns". (197505) Kant rejects the notion, such as 
is later put forward by Feuerbach, that thought passively reflects the 
true nature of reality. Instead, Kant holds that thought merely grasps 
Phenomena as they are given to our sensatione, we can never really 
know the thing-ln-itself, but ohly its appearance as it is registered 
in our sensations. (16S3128-29) If the categories of thought "give 
the law to nature", as Kant suggests, this is simply because the nature 
we Know is Just cur subjective conception of it. For Kant, objectivity 
does not lie in the correspondence between an external object and the 
Way it appears in sensation, as Feuerbach (and common sense) suggest.
Kant argues that categories or concepts like cause and effect,
existence, contingency and so on, are not derived from sensation, but 
originate with thought. Accordingly, he applies the term objective 
only to things as they are grasped by the categories, things as they 
appear in sensation are merely subjective, 11*6*1 observes that this 
classification, though confusing, is Justify since "‘ ¡>0 perception.
, . and secondary feature, while theof sense are the properly dependent anu  ^u
sr .A urinary. Our sensations are sub- thoughts are really independent und pramaxy.
, , stability in their own. nature, and are nojective, for sensations lack
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less fleeting and evanescent than thought is permanent and self- 
subsisting.” (1975*67)
The immediate sensible object, which is the only form of being or 
objectivity for Feuerbach*s materialism, is the essence of non—being 
or appearance for Kant and Hegel. "... If we look at the thought it 
holds," writes Hegel, "nothing can be more insignificant than being 
that which at first sight is perhaps supposed to be, an external and 
sensible existence, like that of the paper lying before me. However, 
in this matter, nobody proposes to speak of the sensible existence of 
a limited and perishable thing." (1975*85) What were immediate 
sensible objects for the early Greek philosophers have long since 
deteriorated and passed away*, but Greek thought and ideas, as 
expressed in Western culture and civilization, is as lively and present
now as ever.
Kant's distinction between ths subjectivityof sensation and the 
objectivity of thought Is now universally accepted In the sciences and 
humanities. Thus scientists try to resist the interference of merely 
subjective feelings in their scientific work! and the criticism of 
art is not based, as Hegel points out, on -the particular and acciden­
tal feelings of the moment", but rather "on those eoneral points of
M e w  which the laws of art establish". (1975*67)
. . .  wnwled'7-e of the objects of theAccording to Kant, we have knovieac.e
, ." „ „-„o able to unite the manifold contentexternal world only because we are ac.it,
... +-hriwh the categories of thought. Given to us by sensation with and t.f*rougu t,
>. . ,. f ik, giro or "I" that Kant calls, "the^  is this unifying action of the ego or
+ „ , - .„r-er.iousnpss". (1893*62) Nevertheless,transcendental unity of self-coiiSdoatne- v
•tu , without any real content; in Kant’sthe categories themselves are wxtro .
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phrase, the categories furnish "the conditions for the possibility of 
experience’», but they add nothing to experience. (1893:90-91) How­
ever, the notion that the unity of the external world belongs to the 
effort of thought rather than to the way things are immediately 
presented to sensation, seems to threaten belief in the reality of 
that world. Kant’s solution to this problem is to postulate the 
existence of an unknowable universe of things-in-themselves or 
"noumena" along side the phenomenal world of human consciousness. "... 
I can only say of a thing in itself", writes Kant, "that it exists 
without relation to the senses and experience ... To this transcen­
dental object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our 
Possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself 
Prior to all experience. But the phenomena, corresponding to it, are 
not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone." (1895. 
308-509) Thus, despite his emphasis on the objectivity of thought as 
opposed to sensation, t o t  re-imposes the «tf"mlltZ or alienation of 
thought from its object vhioh is ohsEoteristic of the understaniinE
£r bourgeois consciousness.*
4-Vsinfl-s-in-themselves ia aimed pre- Kant’s notion of noumena or things
■ , of natural science. He is con­cisely at staking out the subject area
, belief that abstract theorizingcemed once and for all to destroy the beixex
w turpi joints out, the mystified beliefHas a place in science. he gel p
one of the moat acute philo- «iticlwd by t o t  misled even "Ielbnlts, one oi
,flrn times", to construct "a baseless Bophers of either ancient or modem
... wMoh professes to determine itsAstern of intellectual cognition, vhic. P
, .. n cf the senses". (1975*201) For Kant,Ejects without the intervention oi
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the field of science is objective knowledge5 and such knowledge can 
only be obtained by a synthesis of the categories of thought with the 
data of the senses. The function of the Kantian thing-in-itself is
elaborated by Colletti;
When Kant declares that the thing-in-itself is 
unknowable, one (if not the only) sense of his argument 
is that the thing-in-itself is not a true object of 
cognition at all, but a fictitious object, that is 
nothing more than a aubstantification or hypostasization 
of logical functions, transformed into real essences.
In other words, the thing-in-itself is unknowable 
because it represents the false knowledge of the old 
metaphysics. This is not the only meaning of the 
concept in Kant's work, but it is one of its principal 
senses, and it is precisely this that has never been 
noticed by the utterly absurd reading of Kant that 
has prevailed among Marxists, who have always reduced 
the notion of the thing-in-itself to a mere 
agnosticism, (1977*326)
Colletti, however, argues that Hegel takes a step backwards from 
Kant; » ... When Hegel announces that the thing-ln-itself can be known,
vhnt he is in fact doine is to restore the old p r e - W i e n  metaphysics."
0?77:327) But Hegel 1» actually In sympathy with Kant'a programme for
natural science in so far as it outlines the meanins and conditions
for objectivity in the second sense of the term, i.e., knowledce
obtained through the concrete union of the eateries of thoueht with
the data of sensation. Kestrioted to the first sense of objectivity,
■n V amnrt/r the early empiricist philosophersFeuerbach and his predecessors among tnc * * * .. f
, , „ jda-HnruiGh theoretically between thelike tavid Hume, are unable to distinguisn
, . i. - fleecing or imaginative state asdata given by sons© impressions in a ^  o
„„vi-fT -+ate. "An impression" for Ilune, opposed to the conscious or waking state. f
, iiiftinruished from" a merely imaginative'•'rites R, G. Collingwood, "is <usxingu.^
„ uvelirosos but this force may be of twoidea only by its force ox liveiJ.no»».
,. v of crude sensation, as yetkinds. It may be the brute violence oa v
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undominated by thought. Or it may be the solid strength of a sensura 
firmly placed in its context by the interpretive work of thought, Hume 
did not recognize the difference ,,.n (1975*214)
Recognition of this distinction is precisely the strength of Kant'a 
notion of objectivity: "With judgements of experience" based on the 
categories of thought, notes Kant, "what experience teaches roe under 
certain circumstances, it must teach roe at all times, and every other 
person as well; its validity is not limited to the subject or the state 
of the latter at a particular time," (1885*46) Hegel outlines Kant's 
position as follows*
• •• in the waking state man behaves essentially as 
concrete ego, an intelligence* and because of this
intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as
a concrete totality of features in which each aerober 
each point, takes up its place as at the came time /  . 
determined through and with all the rest. Thus the 
facts embodied in his sensation are authenticated, 
not by his mere subjective representation and 
distinction of the facts as external from the person, 
but by virtue of the concrete inter-connection in 
which each part stands with all parts of this complex 
In order to see the difference between dreaming 
and waking we need keep in view the Kantian distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity of mental 
representation (the latter depending upon determina­
tion through the categories). (1969*66)
Colletti suggests that Marx also subscribes to the Kantian notion of
°6jectivity as showh in Karx’s discussion of the method of political
economy in the Crundrlsse. (Colletti, 1975*121) Colletti is correct,
°f course, but only in so far as Hegel also accepts Kant's definition
validity. For Marx's discussion of method, as I will show, is based
eijtirely on Hegel,
Hegel urges that the facts shown to be objective in the Kantian
Rcnse should themselves be subjected to the scrutiny of thoutfrt. »...
Ve are chiefly interested in knowing what a thins is: l,e. its content,
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which is no more subjective than it is objective.” (1975*71) The 
construction of the atomic bomb, for example, as well as its employment 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 certainly conformed to all the 
requirements of Kantian objectivity: but it also raised certain 
questions for which objectivity in the Kantian sense is irrelevant.
"If mere existence be enough to make objectivity," Hegel remarks, "even 
a crime is objective: but it is an existence which is nullity at the 
core, as is definitely made apparent when the day of punishment comes." 
(1975*71) Similarly, Marx never questions the objectivity of the 
capitalist mode of production as it is revealed by the categories of 
political economy. Nevertheless, he argues that capitalism is based on 
a system of exploitation of human labour which necessarily dooms 
capitalism to "a historical and transitory existence". (1976*174)
Both Hegel and Karx point to a third and higher form of objec­
tivity: a form of truth that recognizes the essential unity of human
theory and sensuous practice. ^ ^
critical evaluation of oM.ctl.lte, involves the ^ l o g e n t
or universal vain., and principles bv the jnvcctlS tor. Hegel and Harr, 
therefore, reject the alienated dlvlelon w i .  by the understanding or 
bourgeois consciousness between facts and values. Itaan rationality, 
as It appears in the objectivity of society, represents the concrete 
Manifestation of active human thought and will, or ideality, which is 
itself an analgOT of emotions, desires and so forth. To exanir.e 
society as though it were an external thing, an object like that treated
by natural science, is to overlook the tost important aspect of this
* a., rvn.et model is wrong when he reject©:theformation. Consequently, Ernest JAnue*
i3 essentially an instrument for the theory that Marx's. Capital is
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revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat . •." and that 
therefore, "it is impossible to separate the 'scientific* content of 
Capital from its 'revolutionary' intention ..." (Kandel, 1976:16) For 
Mandel, "Marx strove ... to analyse capitalism in an objective and 
strictly scientific way?" he tried to build a "rock-like foundation of 
scientific truth"; and "sought to discover objective laws of motion". 
(1976:16-17) But Mandel limits objectivity to its Kantian form, and 
forgets that for Marx, capitalism is "historical and transitory" 
precisely because it fails to conform to the most elementary demands of 
human reason, demands which are themselves mate possible &  the ^ogress 
fostered by capitalism.
The object of Capital Is precisely to convince men and women that 
bourgeois society Is irrational and inefficient bjr the standards of 
political economy Itself, and therefore should be replaced by a society 
based on rational and human principles. In the concluding chapters. I 
Will show that the type of Marxism dominated by the desire to be scien­
tific, in the Kantian sense of the term, is often reduced to a platitu­
dinous search for indications of capitalism's »death agony», and 
delights in forecasting the imminent end of the system in the same way 
as the early Christians looted forward to the end of the world. 'Ibis
millenarianism of Marxism has closed its eyes to the fact that
. vpfnre. and has refuted every lastcapitalism is flourishing as never before, ana
Prediction of the date of its final hour. More Importantly, it ha* 
obscured for Marxists the very e l S g H  Hi & £  SCSiSi jlroUx the
forms of the new society developing witl_i—  — *
- is under the impression that KegelLike Colletti, however, larx is unae* * c
- , __the reality of the external world.retreats from the Kantian notion oi w  j,
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. Hegel”, says Marx, ’’fell into the illusion of conceiving the real 
as a product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, 
and unfolding itself out of itself ..." (1973:101) Karx derives this
interpretation of Hegel from Feuerbach1s materialist critique and 
inversion of Hegelian speculative philosophy,. But, as I have argued 
above and as X hope to demonstrate conclusively in this study, Marx is 
fundamentally wrong in his estimation of Hegel’s thought. In any case, 
Marx's formulation of what he calls, «the concrete" or objective in the 
Grundrisse merely repeats Hegel’s remarks on the subject. "By concrete­
ness of contents", writes Hegel, "it is meant that we must know the 
objects of consciousness as intrinsically determinate and as a unity of 
distinct characteristics." (1975:60) And further, "The concrete is 
the unity of diverse determinations and principles: these in order to 
be perfected, in order to come definitely before consciousness, must 
first of all be presented separately." (ie94:13) Compare these 
passages from Heel with the following one from the Guarisse,
The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration 
of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It 
appears in the process of thinking,, therefore, as a 
process of concentration, as a result, not as a point 
of departure, even though it is the point of departure 
in reSlty and hence also the point of departure for
observation and conception. (1976.101)
According to Hegel, while Kant made a great contribution to know­
ledge by demonstrating that thought, rather than sense perception, 
produces a unified and meaningful vision of the world, Kant neverthe­
less failed to realize the implications of his own argument. For as 
Hegel observes, it is not merely the action of our personal self-
consciousness that introduces un 
tion; this unity is a property
ity into the variety of sense. percep- 
of the real world which human
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consciousness discovers through the effort of thought. "... Though 
the categories, such as unity, cause and effect, are strictly the 
property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours 
merely and not the property of the objects. Kant, however, confines 
them to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled subjective 
idealisms for he holds that both the form and matter of knowledge are 
supplied by the Ego —  or knowing subject —  the form by our intel­
lectual, the matter by our sentient ego," (1975*76)
The rationality or law-governed character of the external world as 
revealed by the action of thought, "is itself absolute. The absolute 
is as it were, so kind as to leave individual things to their own 
enjoyment, and it again drives them back to this absolute unity". 
(1975*69-70) Par from being an abstract product of our personal self- 
consciousness, then, the laws of nature'are objective and real} their 
reality is confirmed by human sensuous practice which takes advantage 
of these laws in the productions of science and industry. As Engels
observes,
Tf we are able to prove the correctness of our conception 
of a natural process by .»aklms «  « ,  talneinsr
It Into being out of its conditio)"a and making it a.ervs 
our own purposes in to  th. bargain, then there Is an end 
to the Kantian thing-in-ltself. U 9 W ,  III.347)
Lukács rightly alludes to the limitations of Engels's critique of 
Kant's thing-in-itsslfi industry and science under capitalism «main 
external and alienated activities which by no means overcome the 
division between thought and its object postulated by Kant. (1971. 
01-13J) nevertheless, In practice this alienation is in part trans­
cended by the bourgeois mode of production; it only remains for this 
alienation to be superseded in as well as in junotioe by -  as
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Marx argues the communist revolution. Hegel puts this (dialecti­
cal) idea very succinctly: The "reason world" of society and culture 
is perceived by the individual in bourgeois society as a complex of 
"unconditioned and likewise universal powers, to which he must subject 
his individual will ... Now, to turn these rational (of course 
positively rational)" -  i.e., Hawed —  "realities into speculative
principles, the only thing needed is that they be thought ... By 
this", Hegel explains, "we mean only two things: first, that what is 
immediately at hand", i.e. bourgeois society, "has to be passed and 
left behind" —  in theory —  "and secondly, that the subject matter of 
such speculations, though in the first place only subjective, must not 
remain so, but be realised or translated into objectivity" —  through 
ideality or revolutionizing practice. (1975*120)
In his commentary on Hegel's Louie, Lenin describes the third, or
Hegelian, form of objectivity:
mup unity of the theoretical idea (of knowledge) 
and of practice —  this KB —  and this unity H gcisejx 
in the theory of knowledge, for the resulting sum is
,:g 9f 3eMlveVahre" [the objectively true]). (1963.219)
Hegel’s third form of objectivity, the unity of theory end practice,
Is present in what he calls "free mind" or concrete willi Karx would 
call it "communist consciousness". There are three phases of free 
mind: the first phase is theoretical. Theory seises the external 
object so that "the seeminely alien object receives, instead of the 
shape of something given, isolated and continent, the form of some­
thing inwardized, subjective, universal, necessary, and rational".
The externality -  objectivity of the object, of course, is unaffected 
by this activity of theory, but at the same time, in knowledBe the
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object has become something subjective. "Of the content of this 
knowledge I know that it is, that it has objectivity and at the same 
time that it is in me and therefore subjective." (1969:185)
Hegel argues that it is a mistake to see theory as passive in 
relation to its object, for this activity of mind is engaged in 
seeking the rational quality, the law-like form of the object. "... 
Intelligence strips the object of the form of contingency, grasps its 
rational nature and posits it as subjective: and conversely, it at 
the same time develops the subjectivity into the form of objective 
rationality." But free theoretical mind does not stop at mere objec­
tivity in the abstract Kantian sense —  it aims at determining to what 
degree the object is rational in itself: in other words, theory is 
critical. "... Free mind does not content itself with a simple 
Knowing; it wants to cognise ... it wants to know not merely that an 
object i n ,  and what it is in ^ neraI and with respect to ^ c o n t i n ­
gent, external determinations, but it wants to know in what the . 
object's Specific, substantial nature consists." (1969.191)
Through the action of theoretical mind the ertemallty of the 
object is annulled! the object becomes a part of the thinker, an 
aspect of his or her thinkine activity. »Consequently ... thinking 
has no other content than itself, than Its own determinations which 
constitute the immanent content of the for.! In the object It seeks 
and finds only itself." (1969.227) In this way. then, "Thoufibt is 
Being.» (1969.224) But the materialists need not rejoice at the
discovery of this so "Idealist" notion, since no one is questioning
it , .,. r thp object itself. "... fh® object isthe external reality of tue oujte
.a- „„iv w  having the form of being, ofdistinguished from thought only by navnk.
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subsisting on its own account.'* Nevertheless, "thinking stands here 
in a completely free relation to the object." (1969:227) In its 
theoretical activity, mind takes possession of the object; the object 
has become the property of consciousness. This forms the transition 
from mere theory to a thinking will. "But when intelligence is aware 
that it is determinative of the content, which is its mode no less 
than the mode of being, it is Will." (1969*227)
Will, or practical mind, is the second stage of the Hegelian form 
of objectivity; it is only through the action of will that mind 
becomes objective to itself, that it distinguishes its theoretical 
activity from itself as objective reality. For Hegel, as Lenin 
observes, "Practice is higher than (theoretical) toowledge, for it has 
not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality." 
(1963:213) The sphere of will or practice is the universal reality, 
i.e,, society, and the content of the will is freedom. "Trueliberty, 
in the shape of moral" (social) "life, consists in the will finding 
its purpose in the universal content, not in subjective or selfish
interests." (1969*228)
In the first stage of Hegelian objectivity, theory seeks the 
universal or rational aspects of its object; that is, it looks for
those qualitii ¡t connected with concrete freedom. Thus
for exanple, rar* studies capitalist society in order to Isolate
theory. the Idea of freedom that the will should* m • It belongs to
make its Notion, which is freedom itself, its content and aim. When it 
does this it becomes objective mind, constructs for itself a world of 
its freedom, ana thus gives to its true content a eelf-subsistent 
existence." (1969;229) Free will, or objective mind, is the third 
stage of objectivity, i.e., "the unity of theoretical and practical 
mind”. (1969:238) Objective mind, which in its full development Is 
really only Herel«s term for what Marx calls,, communist society, is 
the result of ideality or revolutionising practice. It is the result 
of the social activity of Individual. -  for the single will Is "the 
peculiar and immediate medium In Wjich" freedg. “Is actoallsed".
(1969!240; ray emphasis)
According to Hegel, the speculative and dialectical content of 
absolute Idealism rises above the abstract contrast between subjec­
tivity and objectivity postulated by the understanding consciousness. 
This contrast Is characteristic not onl£ of Kanti, subjective Idealism 
but also of the consciousness and ldecdog Si 2 2 2 M. &
Whole. In place of the division between subjectivity and objectivity, 
dialectical thought "evinces its own concrete and all-embracing 
nature", nevertheless,'.» must not be forgotten that "subjective and 
objective are not merely identical but also distinct". W a t  Hegel 
means is that human ideality is at once subjective, It Is a property 
of the individual -  as well as objective: it creates through its 
activity the concrete forms of the external world, like economy and 
culture. Kant, along with bourgeois (and Harriet) thinkers generally,
* u  <n difference", and therefore for them, "thecannot grasp this "unity in dinere..-« ,
, , . r— s,+ical — not however because thought reason world may be styled ... irv sticax
, it. but merely because it lies beyondcannot both reach and comprehend it» .0Ufc.
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the compass of the understanding’". (1975*^20—121)
By leaving the categories of thought empty of any real content 
except that given hy sense experience, Kant overlooked the faGt that 
nature, as it is transformed hy human endeavour, and society, as it 
is theorized, produced, reproduced ana changed hy human conscious 
activity, are not only objective facts, but also the products of 
revolutionizing practice, of ideality. Sense experience, then, is 
given by the categories of thought in so far as the categories are 
also actualized in the outside world by human practice. Par from
being empty, as Kant supposes, the categories of thought constitute 
the forms of the real world. "To thinkVnotes Hegel,
is an expression which attributes especially to 
consciousness the determination which it contains. 
But in so far as it is allowed that understanding, 
and reason, are of the world of objects, that spirit 
[society] and nature have general laws in 
accordance with which their life and mutations are 
governed, in so far is it admitted that the deter­
minations of thought also have objective validity 
and existence. (1954s1©7)
According to Hegel, economy, cultore, religion and ao on, are »concrete
formations of consciousness"! as such, their development is inseparable
from the development of individual human con.oiou.neo» itself. The
progressive advance of human society results from, intern and «fleets
the concrete development of individual human consciousness or ideality.
But this "process must, so to speak, go on behind consciousness, since
those" social "facts are the essential nucleus which is raised into
_____ ..-N „-»it„ .for the individuali-? within theconsciousness". (I975i4&] As a .re“ * --------- - --------------------\
v . , u.- 4-w*. vptv creations of individual humanbourgeois mode ef production, tne v -------- -- «— — —
S^nsçiousness and ideality appear as external and alien facts which
exist amrt from and dominate individuals.
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Marx’s work in the Grundrisse represents above all his struggle 
to theorize Hegel’s dialectical conception of the relation between 
individual consciousness and social forms. Thus for Marx, capital 
itself represents, "the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the 
general product!ve forces of the social brain ..." (1973•&94! my
emphasis) The objective, external nature which forms the basis of the
Kantian thing-in-itself —  this nature, says Marx,
builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric 
telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are 
products of human industry? natural material trans­
formed into organs of the human will over nature, or 
of human participation in nature. They are organs . 
of the human brain, created b£ the human hand? the 
power of knowledge objectified. The development of 
fixed capital indicates to what degree general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production, and 
to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process 
of social life itself have come under the control of 
the general intellect and have been transformed in 
accordance with it. To what degree the powers of 
social production have been produced, not only in the 
form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of 
social practice, of the real life process. (1973s706)
For Marx, the "forces of production and social relations" are
themselves merely «two different sides of the social individual ...
It is, in a word, the d e v a i e n t  of the social Individual which
appears as the great foundation-stone of production and wealth. The
theft of alien labour tire..on jjhjçh the absent wealth is based.
* V-, in face of this new one" of autoroa-appears as a miserable founuation an
■tion and mass production "created ty large scale industry itself. In 
fact, however," the wealth produced by the social individual creates 
"the material conditions to blow this foundation sky high". (1973. 
705-706) Before Kara, Hegel already anticipates the result cade
. *. »>-,inhere facilitated by the bourgeois modePossible through the great abunuance . V
■ .„ » _r«m»l in hi3 Lectures on Aesthetics,of production: Kan", notes negei xi ------r - ------— --- ’
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must work out his necessary satisfaction by his own 
activity; he must take possession of things in 
nature, arrange them, form them, strip off every 
hindrance by his own self-won skilfulness, and in 
such a way that the external world is changed into 
a means whereby he can realize himself in accordance 
with all his aims ... In so far as possession and 
affluence afford a situation in which poverty and 
labour vanish, not merely momentarily but entirely, 
they are therefore not only not unaesthetic, but 
they rather coincide with the Ideal «•* lor the 
genuine Ideal consists not only in man*s being in 
general lifted above the grim seriousness of 
dependence on • #. external circumstances, but in 
his standing in the midst of superfluity which 
permits him to play freely and cheerfully with the 
means put at his disposal by nature» (1975* 1 *257)
Hegel argues that Kant's subjective idealism simply reflects the 
distrust of reason and thought characteristic of the bourgeois mind.
"It marks the diseased state of our age", Hegel writes, "when we see 
it adopting the despairing creed that our knowledge is only subjective, 
and beyond this subjective we cannot.go.* (197505) By asserting the 
essential unknowability of the thlng-ln-iteelf, Kant divided thought 
from its object "by an impaseible gulf”. Koreover, the authority on 
which Kant makes this distinction represents the most extreme form of 
alienation! "Kant ... holds that what we think is false, because it 
is ve who think it." (1975*94)
In a passage already quoted, Colletti sueeests that for Hegel the
"thing-ln-Itself can be known” and that, therefore, Hegel restores "the
old pre-kantian metaphysics". (1977.327) Hegel observes, however,
that the thlng-in-itself is simply <j8TOld o i  all qualities which
consciousness finds in Its object, "all its emotional aspects, and all
specific thought, of it". Consequently, there is no great difficulty
! * ftbotraction, 1)010.1 emptinossi •.# thein seeing "what is left —  utter aojua. »
^  ruling and definite thought". Moreover, ItV negat.ive of every image* leering»-***
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does not "require much penetration to see that this caput mortuum is 
still only a product of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried 
on to abstraction unalloyed? that is, the work of the empty ’Ego', 
which makes an object out of this empty self—identity of its own".
Hegel*s dismissal of Kant's thing-in-itself must be among the most 
abrupt in the history of philosophy? "... One can only read with 
surprise", he writes, "the perpetual remark that we cannot know the 
Thihg-in-itself. On the contrary, there is nothing we can know so 
easily." (1975*72) Par from restoring the "old pre-kantian meta­
physics", Hegel seeks only to reinstate "the natural belief of men ... 
that thought coincides with thing". (1975:35) Hote3 Hegel,
everything we know both of outward and inward 
nature, in one world, the objective world, is in its 
own self the same as it is in thought, and to think 
is to bring out the truth of our object, be it what 
it may. The business of philosophy is only to bring 
into explicit consciousness what the world in all 
ages has Relieved about thought. Philosophy therefore
advance, rothlhg n .«l our-Present d l w u s s l ^ a .
led U3 to a conclusion which agrees with the natural
belief of mankind. (1975*35)
Although he rejects Kant's thing-ln-itself, the whole construction 
Of Hegel's boric —  as I have argued in Chapter 2 —  is based on accep­
tance of tot's notion that the categories of thought are the actual 
building blocks of huran experience of the world. The categories of 
logic are the constituents of Hegel's logical Idea, and the Idea is 
simply the a priori basis through which individual consciousness is
"necessarily" led "onwards to the real departments of Nature and Kind". 
0975:71) But the Idea itself, as Kant emphasises, is constructed cut
' . ,0,*+ vant fails to acknowledge, however,of the facts of experience. What Kant xaixs , ,
. ■ , ,■ . i n  Kant the activity of consciousnessis the active power of thought, in m j h -
_  . , i. *+ is eerarated altogether from human^mains formal and abstract: -------------------- - -----
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practice and ideality. Kant’s "great error", declares Kegel,
is to restrict our notions of the nature of thought 
to its form in the understanding alone. To think 
the phenomenal world means to recast its form, and 
transmute it into a universal. And thus the action 
of thought has also a negative effect upon its 
basis: and the matter of sensation, when it 
receives the stamp of universality, at once loses 
its first and phenomenal shape. By the removal and 
negation of the shell, the kernel within the sense- 
percept is brought to light ... (1975*61)
Because the logical Idea is based on "the material world per­
ceived by the senses" {1975* 1*116) it does not "come into possession 
of a content originally foreign to it: but by its native action is 
specialized and developed to Nature and Hind . (19?5!?1) 1° the case
of nature, for example, the Idea begins as "Perception or Intuition, 
and the percipient Idea is Nature": in other words, external nature
Is first given to consciousness by sense perception. Consciousness 
then works up this concrete content into categories and laws ; but 
these laws and categories are not external to nature, as Kant suggests,
but rather they express its essence and reality. This is Hegel’s 
meaning when he writes on the last page of the lesser l££ic, that
Briovin-... an absolute liberty, the Idea does not
merely*pass over into life Cas passive sense^ perception], 
or as [Kantian] finite cognition allow life to ^ how init * in its absolute truth -it re solves to let the
W n f  of its particularity» orof the flr.t charac-terization and other-being* the irmediate^ idea, as its^
reflected image, go forth freely as hatuie. (1975^ 96)
. \ «At and held in thoughts"} -theFor Hegel, logic studies 222. -—  —  —  —— M— -
_a4, . ' . f,^+w are “accredited able to express the canon-categories of logic, further, are *****
.. , ■■,- This, of course, is also Marx’stial reality of things". {iVfJO-V *
r +v,a «^nr-nric categories, Karx writes in an Position. The subject of tne economic oa  ^ ^ ...
a1vnvs what is given, in the head as well already quoted passage, "is *
„ . , /*-. + or^ rie3 therefore express the for.no ofaa in reality, and ... these cat-c^ ri^ ^
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being, the characteristics of existence ...” (1973:106) Hegel’s
logic, moreover, is not the formal logic of the understanding —  it is 
not "the science of the mere form of thought" — * rather, the -theme of 
Logic is in general the supersensible", i«e*, the social and intel­
lectual world. Like Marx's work in the Grundrisse and Capital. Hegel's 
logic studies "thought in its actions and productions". (1975:28) 
Whereas Kant's categories are simply taken over from formal logic, the 
categories in Hegel's logic reflect the dialectical development of 
the history of philosophy Itself. "... The History of Philosophy gives 
us the same process from a historical and external point of view." 
(1975:18) Similarly, Karx's Capital, as Korsch points out, "is indeed 
precisely a theoretical comprehension of history". (1970:59)
Hegel argues that the history of philosophy constitutes the
development of the categories of thought which men and women use to
apprehend, utilize and transform the relations of the natural and 
social world. Consequently, the Lo^ic is merely the exposition of that 
history in dialectical (l.e., logical and developmental) t o m .  But
it is also something else: it "recognises and accepts ... the 
empirical facts in the several sciences ... it appreciates and applies 
to its own structure, the universal element in these sciences, their 
laws and classifications ... it preserves the same forms of thought, 
the same laws and objects -  while at the same time remodelling end 
expanding them with wider categories”. 0975:13) Accordingly, just as 
Marx employs the categories and facts of political economy in his
■ ■ . „ p a t «  new ones, like surplus-value andconcrete analyses and also creates new -- .»
. t, i „tui.ps the categories of formal logic -he social individual, Hegel utilise* toe
, ,.r-r i n the "Speculative or Absoluteuid constructs his own, amo.^g whic
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Idea" (i,e., the rational, or communist, society). (1975:292) Read 
along with his other works, especially the History of Phnogojgha;
(1892: »94{’96) and the Philosophy of (1976), Hegel's Lo^ic is
what would now be called, an exposition in the sociology of knowledge. 
But with this difference: it is a sociology of knowledge concerned 
not with ideology as false consciousness, but with human thought as 
the expression of the truest reality of the world. Seen in this way, 
Hegel's "system" is infinitely more powerful and more advanced than^ 
anything ever attempted in the field.
2. Contradiction end Freedom in BourgeoisSociety
Kant's epistemology, which guarantees only the illusory unity of 
consciousness with its object, and leavea the thing-in-itself outside 
of cognition, represents what Hegel calls, "abstract Ideality". (1969. 
165) This is the form of ideality commonly thought to apply to 
Hegel'S philosophy as well: that is, an abstract essence or Idea, 
which leaves reality outside of consciousness, or, rather, refuses to
, . , * 11+» at all. except in an abstract manner,recognize external reality at axa,
Marxists and their opponents are unified in this vision of Hegel. 
Accordingly. Karl Topper observes that "Hegel's philosophy ... permit­
ted" him "to construct a theory of the world out of pure reasoning ... 
(1976:323) tad even the -Hegelian Marxist" Karl Korsch suggests that
- +-,«v nf the Concept in its 'thinking '’For Hegel, the practical tas< oi tne wu. w i
' , , r.Mlnecohv) does not lie in the domain ofactivity» (in other words, phiioscpnyy
■ „ (Karx), It is rather 'toordinary 'practical and sensuous
tosp what is, for that which is, is Season'." (1970:94) ¡but for
Hegel, of course, ideality is precisely the relation between h™an
2G1
sensuous practice and its object, which he refers to as "an identity
in itself with its difference". (1969*164)
*•
Kant recognizes one side of ideality: the translation of the
external world, as it is given in sensation, into the categories of
mind. But he fails to emphasize the active side of consciousness:
the theoretical and practical activity which transforms and creates
the natural and social world. Nevertheless, Kant does admit the unity
of theory and practice through what he calls, pure practical reason.
Practical reason concerns the faculty of will "which is a faculty
either of bringing forth objects corresponding to conceptions or of
determining itself, i.e., is causality to effect such objects". (Kant,
1956:15) The precepts of will, says Kant, "themselves produce the
reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the will) —  an
achievement which is in no way the business of theoretical concepts".
(1956:68) Kant's notion of the freedom of the will has radical
implications: "For, in fact, the moral law ideally transfers us into
a nature in which reason would bring forth the highest good were it
accompanied by sufficient physical capacities., and it determines our
will to impart to the sensuous world the form of a system of rational
beings." (1956*45) In Kant, however, even the notion of the unity of
theory and practice remains purely abstract. The will is determined
, ,, nf these laws remains indeterminate inby moral laws, but the content o n ¿
, w  what Kant holds to be the "Fundamental the extreme, as evidenced by iiam;
Law of Pure Practical Rea.on”. "So act that the « 4 »  of ;j«ur will 
could always hold at the s a »  tice as a principle eetabUahlns univer- 
sal law." (1956*50)
In Kant's philosophy, the fundaaontal determinant of the will Is
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simply "abstract identity ... there mu3t be no contradiction in the 
act of self-determination". (Heg^L, 1975*87) In other words, for 
Kant the will is determined by moral laws which it is bound to obey; 
it cannot contradict these laws without contravening morality itself. 
These laws, which are given to the individual by his or her reasoning 
faculty, are absolute; acting according to them constitutes what 
Kant calls, duty. "The relation of ... will to" moral "law is one of 
dependence under the name of 'obligation». This term implies a 
constraint to an action, though this constraint is only that of reason 
and its objective law. Such an action is called dut£ ..." (1956*32)
In Kant's view, obligation or duty simply constitutes the freedom of 
the Individual to conform to moral laws which themselves are the 
product of the thinking reason of the individual. "... The moral law
expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason, 
i.e,, freedom." (1956:23“34)
Hegel is impressed with Kant's notion of "Practical BeasonV 
This notion, Hegel observes, «does not confine the universal principle 
of the Good to its own inward regulation; it first becomes 
in the true cense of the word, when It insists on the Good being mani­
fested in the world with an outward objectivity, and requires that the 
thought should be objective throughout, and not merely subjective".
But Kant's notion of the free will is governed entirely by the abstract 
., , ■ . ■ rnnformitv of the will to moral law,identity of the understanding: coniorraiv
- , ...vj in themselves no social content.Further, the lavs of the will nave in
„ „+ _„vp the Good the content of his will"... To say that a man must maice m e
, . rtnntent is, and what are the means ofraises the question, what that conxun, ,
„ , . VnT does one get over the difficulty byascertaining what good is. I*or aoes w e ,
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the principle that the will must be consistent with itself, or by the 
precept to do duty for the sake of,duty." Kant simply empties the 
concept of freedom of any content it had in metaphysics and fails to 
originate "any special forms, whether cognitive principles or moral 
laws". Nevertheless, by recognizing the absolute autonomy of human 
thought in social or moral practice, Kant "refused to accept or 
indulge anything possessing the character of an externality. Hence­
forth the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute 
self-subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy, as well 
as a foregone conclusion of the time". (1975**87-88, 93)
Hegel argues that "The principle of free mind is to make the 
merely given element in consciousness", i.e., the external world as 
perceived by the senses, «... into something mental", -  the catego­
ries of thought —  «... and conversely to make what is mental into an 
objectivity ..." through revolutionizing practice or ideality. In 
Kant•» epistemology, says Hegel, the identity of subject and object 
"is still abstract, the formal identity of subjectivity and objec­
tivity. Only when this identity has developed into an actual 
difference and has made itself into the identity of itself and its 
difference, therefore, only when mind or spirit steps forth as an 
immanently developed totality, not till then has that certainty 
established itself as truth". <1969:101) wtlinea
argument as follows»
tf eapiclSe of
external actuality, o r l ^ e r "  q i a l i t i e ^ o f i t ) ! " ^
(«alters some s the features of Semblance,
thus removes from ^  ^ e g  it as being in andexternality and null! y# an  ^result of
for itself («objectively true; ...
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activity is the test of subjective cognition 
and the criterion of OBJECTIVITY WHICH TRULY IS. 
(1963:218-219)
For Kant, reality as perceived by the Ego —  the singular or
simple "identity of my Self" (Kant, 1893î242) —  is characterized by
the absence of contradiction; consequently, non-contradiction must be
the foremost principle of thought. As Karl Popper observes,
... it can easily be shown that if one were to accept 
contradictions then one would have to give up any 
kind of scientific activity: it would mean a 
complete breakdown of science. This can be shown by 
proving that if two contradictory statements are 
admitted, any statement whatever must be admitted; 
for from a couple of contradictory statements any 
statement whatever can be validly inferred. (1976*317)
Kant argues that if hunan reason operates without regard for the non- 
oontradictory world of experience, it is bound to involve itself in
arguments, which, although they contradict one another, can equally be 
shown as logically valid. Kant explains that this "natural and 
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason" (1093*212) is one of the essen­
tial weaknesses of thought, against which it must constantly guard 
itself. Contradiction can only be avoided by constant reference to 
the non-contradictory facts given to us in external reality. In 
Kant's view, the human mind is subject to a mass of internal contra­
dictions, reality, however, is signally without contradiction. Kant's 
"only motive", Hegel writes, "was an excess of tenderness for the 
things of the world. The blemish of contradiction, it seems, could
hot Be allowed to mar the essence of the world} 
Ejection to attaching it to thinking reason, to
but there could be no 
the essence of mind”.
5:77)
Most commentators believe that Hegel utterly rejects Kant’s prin- 
e of non-contradiction; and this rejection, suggests Earl Popper,
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"makes” Hegel's "system secure against any sort of criticism or attack 
and thus it is dogmatic in a peculiar sense, so that I should call it 
a 'reinforced dogmatism«". (1976*32?) Hegel, however, is much 
influenced by Kant's discussion of contradiction and states that it is 
even "more valuable" than Kant's theory of the nature and use of the 
categories. (1975*74) Hegel agrees with Kant that non-contradiction 
is an essential element of formal logic and empirical science, where 
science deals with inorganic matter and sensuous conceptions like 
number and force. But the principle of non-contradiction has no 
application whatever to the world of living things, and especially to 
the intellectual and social universe of men and women. (See above, 
Chapter 2) "... If in the end", writes Hegel, "Reason be reduced to
mere identity without diversity ... it will in the end also win a 
happy release from contradiction at the alight sacrifice of all its 
facets and contents." (1975*77)
According to Hegel, if Kant shows, that reason becomes "transcen­
dent", or prey to illusion and contradiction, when it tries to compre­
hend the infinite, what Kant is actually doing is proving the 
inadequacy of the categories of the understanding or bourgeois mind 
to grasp the social and intellectual world of men and women. This
, ,, <„ inlv available to experience, butsphere of social relations is certain.^
„ , to what immediately can be per-Kant's view of experience is limitea xo wua
■ «merience and observation of the worldceived by the senses* "*»* e3CP .
„ * - candle stick standing here, and amean nothing else for Kant than a canax
.. ipo6:444-445) In Kant's estima-enuff-box standing there." (Hegel,
3 „ o-tmnlv an "ought to be", something to betlon, for example, freedom is simpl/ an « c
■ i n the world of experience* it is anstriven for but never realized in tn<- w
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ideal conception which can only he approximated by political consti­
tutions which are "always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible 
perfection". (Kant, 1893*223) But Hegel argues that freedom can be 
studied with reference to the empirical world} it takes a concrete 
form at each stage of development of society, a form which can be 
elucidated by science and connected with the various aspects of 
society —  its laws, religion, class structure, mode of production, 
and so on. In this (theoretical) reconstruction of society, however, 
something more than sense perception is involved. "... Ho one wishes", 
writes Hegel, "to demand a sensuous proof or verification of the 
infinite; spirit is for spirit alone." (1896*448)
Marx accepts Hegel’s view and applies it to "vulgar political 
economy" —  the science which "actually does no more than interpret, 
systematize and defend in doctrinaire fashion the conceptions of the
agents of bourgeois production who are entrapped in bourgeois produc­
tion relations", the limitation of this science is precisely its 
abstract and uncritical faith in the external world of sense 
experience. "It should not astonish us ... that vulgar economy feels 
Particularly at home in the estranged outward appearances of economic 
relations ... and that these relations seem tho more self-evident the 
more their internal relationships are concealed from it ... But all 
science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence
or thine, directly coincided." 0967, HI:017) U k e  Ileecl, (tax
v , , v« o+nHHed as it presents itself in concreteBelieves that freedom can be stud.ea as av ^
r . it,*,, s+udv can reveal what Hegel calls,forra in society; further, this
"the actually present Idea of the universal, of * and perfect".
0975,92) That is, science can llluninat. tho eternal aspects of
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realityî the elements which display the actual shape of the future. 
"In all societies", notes Marx,
a definite quantity of surplus-labour is required 
as insurance against accidents, and by the necessary 
and progressive expansion of the process of repro­
duction in keeping with the development of the 
needs and the growth of population, which is called 
accumulation from the point of view of the capitalist.
It is one of the civilizing aspects of capital that 
it enforces this surplus-labour in a manner and 
under conditions which are more advantageous to the 
development of the productive forces, social 
relations, and the creation of the elements for a 
new and higher form than under the preceding forms 
of slavery, serfdom, etc. Thus it gives rise to a 
stage, on the one hand, in which coercion and mono­
polization of social development (including its 
material and intellectual advantages) by one portion 
of society at the expense of the other are eliminated} 
on the other hand, it creates the material means and 
embryonic conditions, making It possible^ a higher 
form of society to combine this surplus-labour with 
a greater reduction of time devoted to material 
labour in general. 096?» XIIs819)
Kant’s principle of non-contradiction has obtained a strong grip 
on contemporary Western mrxism. "The fundamental principle of 
Materialism and science", writes Colletti, "is the principle of non­
contradiction." If Karxisa is to be scientific, then, it must adhere 
to this principle, nevertheless, admits Collotti, "for Karx, 
capitalism is contradictory not because it is a reality and all 
realities are contradictory, hut because it ia;aa inverted
reality..." (A strange .-fundamental principle" indeed, if it does not> 
even apply to the object of a "scientific Karxiem", the bourgeois
Mod© of production!) in Colletti’s opinion,Marx’s recognition of
contradiction within capitalism, "confias the existence of two aspects 
in ferX! that of the scientist and that of the philosopher". (1?75. 
28-29) Jtarr, however, could not have advanced a single step either m  ; 
- scientist or a philosopher had he accepted the "fundamental principle
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of materialism", Kant's principle of non-contradiction.
Marx's entire conception of history as well as his concrete 
analysis of the categories of bourgeois political economy is grounded 
precisely on the principle of contradiction. The basis for this prin­
ciple is constructed by Hegel. As I have shown in Chapters 2 and 4, 
contradiction for Kegel is the essential principle of all living
things; thus appetite itself, the desire of a human being to overcome 
hunger and thirst, is simply an aspect of contradiction? for in the 
condition of hunger both of the following (contradictory) statements 
are possible? "I am a self-sufficient unity»} "I am not a self-
sufficient unity." Writes Hegel»
Where a self-identical something bears within it a 
contradiction and is charged with the feeling of its 
intrinsic self-identity as well as the opposite 
feelinr of its internal contradiction, there neces­
sarily emerges the impulse to remove this contradiction.
(1969:167)
The satisfaction of appetite itself represents the unity of the self­
identical human being with the object which satisfied the impulse of 
hunger; the Individual becomes "an identity of itself and its 
difference"?
_ .. . . + gubiect behold3 its own lack, its
In tne °hj , sees in it something which belongsown one-sidedness,^sees ^  ^  lg lacking, in ltt
to its own es- * . .  to remove this contradiction
Self-consclousn being, but absolute activity;
since it is ¿session of the otjeciand it removes I X J y  'taking ^  ^ ^  §
whose independence since it is self-
Itself In the process. 09i9H60)
The absolute activity of the individual tan» bains, however, 
involves »ore than Just the satisfaction of appetite, which, after ail. 
"is always destructive, and in its content selfish, and as the satis­
faction has only happened in the individual (and that is transient)
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the appetite is again generated in the act of satisfaction*'. (1969* 
-I69) a much more important aspect of contradiction involves the 
struggle of the individual to assert his or her freedom and indepen­
dence over and against other individuals who den£ them. This contra­
diction, this struggle, forms an essential aspect of human history. 
"... The fight for recognition ... constitutes a necessary moment in 
the development of the hnman spirit.” (Hegel, 1569*17?) *or Hegel, 
the struggle for freedom is a reflection of the fact that the social 
reality of certain individuals represents a contradiction between what 
they taow to be their essential nature and what they actually are in 
society. Thus in ancient Some, two contradictory sutemente were 
possible and equally valid, "slaves are inferior and have no claim to
iual rights"; "slaves are equal to others and are entitled to equal 
ights".
The reason for the possibility aftd even the necessity of contra-
ictlon in h.m.»n society lies in the inherent characteristic, of the
iving individual. ”... living beings as such», notes Hegel,
possess within them a universal vitality, which over­
passes and includes the single model and thus, as they 
maintain themselves in the negativ^ot themselves, they 
feel the contradiction to « 1st within them. But the
I t a within them only in so far as one and
the sLe subject includes both the £  thelr
sense of life, and the indi'idual ”’cxle whlch is ln 
negation with it, (1975.97)
he young Kara applies this concept to the degraded situation of the 
roletariat ln the mid-nineteenth century. »The class of the proleta-
iat", he writes,
itltsTwi^ eleM
PTn the words of Hegel* the class of the
S l e u t i t t  is in indkEaiiiTl at that aSaSe,Mnt> »
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indignation to which it is necessarily driven by 
the contradiction between its human nature and its 
conditions of life, which is the outright, decisive 
and comprehensive negation of that nature,
(1971:143)
The limitation an individual may feel in his or her social 
position represents the consciousness of an unlimited and universal 
mode of existence —  one which would make possible the fulfilment and 
self-realization of the individual. "A very little consideration 
might show that to call a thing finite or limited proves by implica­
tion the very presence of the infinite and unlimited, and that our 
knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is on this side 
in consciousness." (Hegel, 1975*92) The unlimited which Hegel 
suggests is "on this side in consciousness is outlined by Jarx,
The realm of freedom actually begins only where 
iahrm-r which is determined by necessity and mundane 
c S s ILiaUona ceases, thus in the very nature of 
thin***? it li£s beyond th© sphsr© or &cvu&l 
S t a t i o n  ... JVeedom can only consist in 
cocinlised man, the associated producer., rationally 
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing 
it under their common control, inatead of being 
ruled by it as by the blind forces .of Nature, and 
achieving this with the least erpenditure of energy 
and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy 
of their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a 
realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that develop­
ment of human energy which ie an end in Itself, the 
true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossomforth only with this realm of necessity at its
basis. The Softening of the working day is its 
basic prerequisite. (1967, H  * '
For Hegel, as well as for Farr, the modern notion of freedom and 
equality for all men and women is nothing but the result and reflection 
of the principle of. struggle and contradiction. Moreover, freedom and 
equality require not only their achievement for the particular indivi­
dual, but also his or her recognition of these rights for others: in 
itself a contradiction. Kotos Hegel,
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I am only truly free when the other is also free 
and recognized by me a3 free ••• Freedom demands* 
therefore, that the self-conscious subject should 
not heed his own natural existence or tolerate the 
natural existence of others; on the contrary, he 
should in his individual, immediate actions stake 
his own life and the lives of others to win 
freedom. Only through struggle, therefore, can 
freedom be won! the assertion that one is free 
does not suffice to make one so ... (1969.171-172)
The necessity for freedom to be universal in order to be real for the
Individual is emphasized by Karri "In the.United States of America,
every independent workers' movement was paralysed eo lone as slavery
disfigured a part of the republic. labour in a white skin cannot
emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.” (1976.414)
In the course of history, the fight for independence and freedom
union". (Hegel, 1969*17?) "The family le the first precondition of
for the individual, however, "ends In the first instance as a one-sided
»s social life and the commencement of political
in the way in which it has been a-*. 
The formation of the state, in tur 
development of the economy and culajid culture of a nation; it "creates a
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permanent means and a provision which takes care for and secures the 
future". ( 1 9 6 9 : 7 4 )
Hegel’s theory of the relationship between contradiction, 
struggle and human freedom is, of course, a basic element in Marx’s 
materialist conception of history. "The history of all hitherto
existing society", Marx declares in the Communist Manifesto.
is the history of class struggles,
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord 
and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition 
to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now 
hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, 
either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society 
at large, or in the common ruin of the contending 
classes ... The modem bourgeois society that has 
sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not 
done away with class antagonisms. It has but 
established new classes, new conditions Of oppression, 
new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, 
possesses, however, this distinctive feature} it has 
simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole 
is more and more splitting up into two great hostile 
camns into two great classes directly facing one 
another: BourgeSsie and Proletariat. 0969, I:10&-109)
Hegel points out that the notion of abstract identity and equality 
treasured by the understanding consciousness, with its naive faith in
the principle of non-contradiction, leaves it completely unable to
grasp the discordant and contradictory reality of modem bourgeois 
society. The capitalist mode of production is founded on what Hegel 
calls, the “rights of particularity"! that is, the "concept ..." of 
"bourgeois society" ( M ,  1975:885) 1» « »  Principle of self-seeking 
aggrandisement and the pursuit of private wealth. Given this "parti­
cularity", inequality is inevitable. “The objective right of the
‘ticularlty of mind", writes Hegel,
is contained in the Idea. Ken are made unequal by 
nature, where inequality is in its element, and in
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civil society the right of particularity is so far 
from annulling this natural inequality that it 
produces it out of mind and raises it to an 
inequality of skill and resources, and even to one 
of moral and intellectual attainment. To oppose 
to this a demand for equality is a folly of the 
Understanding which takes as real and rational its 
abstract equality and its "ought to be".
(1976:130)
For the bourgeois mind, however, even the "existence of ’classes'
generally" is in question} and the denial of the reality of classes
is "drawn from the consideration of the State in its ’aspect’ of
abstract equity". But equality in bourgeois society, notes Hegel,
is something absolutely impossible? for individual 
distinctions of sex and age will always assert 
themselves: and even if an equal share in government 
is accorded to all citizens, women and children are
immediately passed by, and remain excluded. The
distinction between poverty and riches, the influence 
of skill and talent, can be as little ignored .
utterly refuting those abstract assertions, (1956:145)
For Hegel, the evolution of animate nature, unlike that of
society, is a peaceful>a gradual process which nevertheless eludes
the abstract categories of the understanding like "quality, cause and
effect, composition, constituents end so on". 0975.90) tad if the
bourgeois mind cannot grasp the evolution of things in nature, it is
, ,, i.. romorehend the contradictory progress ofso much the more unlikely to comp*
. n-,^ 1 i« an end in itself, and "in thesociety. The animal, notes Hegel, w  an.“ «.*
... . i, _ ftv'g.l cause is a moulding principle and anliving organism ... the ii*-ax w
every member is in its turn a means energy immanent in the matter, and every
. , ?,.89n The notioh that animate nature developsas well as an end".
according to a teleological principle, to imer design, was first
suggested by Kant. But it was abandoned *  empirical science in
„ ' , or. ,1T) nnc© again by Darwin in the middle ofHegel»o time, only to be taken up cnee o '
, A nm> nrinciple 01 inward adaptation or design,the nineteenth century. j-ne v  . .
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had it been kept to and carried out in scientific application," Hegel 
observes, "would have led to a different and higher method of observing
nature." (1975s
St contrast with nature, the evolution of society is based on 
splits. antagonisms and contradiction. "The spiritual is distinguished 
from the natural, and more especially from the animal, life, in the 
circumstance that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but 
sunders itself to self-realization." Contemporary bourgeois society 
is itself the result and illustration of the antagonistic development 
of the human spirit} but it is not the final goal of humankind, nor 
is its existence likely to be eternal. "... This position of severed 
life has in its turn to be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own 
act to win its way to concord again ... The disunion that appears 
throughout humanity is not a condition to rest in." (1975.*43)
For the understanding consciousness of bourgeois and Marxist
alike, the state of nature which characterised early man and woman was 
a blissful life of equality. But this notion, on which the under­
standing bases its abstract demand for equality, ia completely
mistaken.
the result precisely bl the ffegt that the of the state of
nature are still in force and have not g t
■ « » 1  vo^en. "The sphere of particularity",national imnulse of men and women. *
x society, "which fancies itselfwrites Ilegel, referring to bourgeois ooci jr,
. relatively identical with the universal, the universal, is still only r
. x T-r.+iirs in itself the particularity ofand consequently it still retains m  x
„  in rtther words the relics of tho state nature, i.e. arbitrariness, or in otncr
* „ society, like "nature in every partof nature." (1976:130) Bourjois socie j ,
is in the bonds of individualism''; it is a "state of inward breach" 
in which "man pursues ends of his own and draws from himself the 
material of his conduct. While he pursues these aims to the uttermost, 
while his knowledge and will seek himself, his own narrow self apart 
from the universal, be is evil? and his evil is to be subjective." 
0975:44) There are, of course, natural qualities in the individual 
such as "social or benevolent inclinations, love, sympathy, and others,
reaching beyond his selfish isolation". But under capitalism, these 
qualities in the individual are subservient and restricted*. "... so 
long as these tendencies are instinctive, their virtual universality
of scope and purport is vitiated by the subjective form which always 
allows free play to self-seeking and random action." (1975*45)
Par from the harmonious development pictured by the understanding 
consciousness in accordance with its sacred principle of non-centradlo- 
Won, the progress of bourgeois society Is f o ^ e d  «" «>• alienation of
human skills m i  talents —  thslr transforation into commodities 
°Uernai to and independent of the individual vho possesses them. "The 
fteld 0f vision” of "the Cnderstanding ... is limited ... to the 
Uleama •either a thing or not a thins' where a -thins' is contrasted 
“ith the 'person' as such", and "means ... that ‘-hose determinate 
character lies in Its pure externality". In bourfeois society, however 
''Attainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned 
V  free j,*., the Individual, "and are something internal and
not external to it, hut even so, by «pressing them it may embody them
end in this way they are
h something eateral and alienate —  ^ , then,
into the category of ’things v 
)ecojse3 very large indeedt :
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Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even 
thing-s ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, 
consecration of votive objects), inventions, and so 
forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to 
a parity, through being bought and sold, with things 
recognised as things. (Hegel, 1976*40—41)
Accordingly, the absolute principle of bourgeois, society is actually
the principle of contradiction: "My labour -or ideality is a part of
ffie} « _  jty labour or ideality is a thing." The result of this
alienation is pointed out by Marx:
The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every 
occupation hitherto honoured and looked upon with 
reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the 
lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, 
into its paid wage-labourers. (1969» It1H)
Where the understanding sees only harmony and non-contradiction,
capitalism proceeds by tearing apart and crushing the very basis of
harmony, the family. "Originally”, writes Hegel,
the family is the substantive whole w^se p o t i o n  is 
to provide for the individual on his particular side 
by riving him either the means and the skill necessary 
t o  o L b U  him to earn his lining out of the resources 
of society or else subsistence and maintenance in the 
event^^hlo^uffcring a disability. But civil 
society tears ths indfridoal from his_fM l ly ties,
¡sirLies ths members of the family from one another, 
and recornises them as self-subsistent persons.
Father frr the oatetml soil and the external 
Further, * 1 f nature from which the individual
S e d  5 s  Uvelihoo“  fr substitutions own soil
I permanent existence of even the
® t i ™ S l y  to dependence on itself and contlneency.
(1976:143)
, . . i. v,nfl +£y-n. away from the family its centi**'Again, Marx: "The bourgeois e has .om ^
* b a family relation to a mere money mental veil, and has reduced the iamixy ^
, ■ ~ as for Marx, capitalism creates therelation." (1969*111) IiCKei* a
,, educative role of the family isconditions in which the traw-i.io**«
, . cells, "the universal family": .usurped by society, by what Le^-i *
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In its character as a universal family, civil 
society has the right and duty of superintending 
and influencing education, inasmuch as education 
bears upon the child’s capacity to become a member 
of society. Society’s right here is paramount over 
the arbitrary and contingent preferences of 
parents ,.. Society must provide public educational 
facilities so far as is practicable ,,, The chief 
opposition to any form of public education usually 
comes from parents and it is they who talk and make 
an outcry about teachers and schools because they 
have a faddish dislike to them, Nohe the less 
society has a right to act on principles tested by 
its experience and to compel parents to send their 
children to school, to have them vaccinated and so 
forth, (1976:148, 2?7)
Hegel’s observations are taken up by Marx in the Manifesto: "But
you will say", writes Marx, referring to the opponents of communism,
we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we 
replace home education by social ,,, The bourgeois 
clap-trap about the family and education, about the 
hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes 
all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of 
Modern Industry, all family ties among the proleta­
rians are torn asunder, and their children transformed 
into simple articles of commerce and instruments of 
labour. (1969, 1:123-124)
Hegel, too, is keenly aware of the exploitation and degradation of 
children under the bourgeois mode of production. "Children are poten­
tially free," he writes, "and their life directly embodies nothing save 
Potential freedom. Consequently they are not things and cannot be the 
Property either of their parents or others," In a society where slave 
labour and indentured service by working-class children was the nils 
rather than the exception, Hegel's (and Marx’s) insistence on public 
education is much more radical than it sounds today. "The sendees 
which may be demanded from children", declares Hegel, "should ... have 
education as their sole end and be relevant thereto} they must not be 
en<3a in themselves, since a child in slavery is the most unethical of 
all situations whatever." (1976*117» 265)
298
The contradictions of bourgeois society which dissolve the family 
also undermine the foundations of both the domestic servitude of women 
and the sexual double standard. "Since”, writes Hegel, "the community 
gets itself subsistence only by breaking in upon family happiness, and 
dissolving self-consciousness into the universal, it creates its own
enemy within it3 own gates, creates in it what it suppresses, and what
is at the same time essential to i t — womankind in general." (19671 
496) In bourgeois marriage, Hegel observes, "the wife is without the 
moment of knowing herself as this particular self in and through an
other." (1967:476) While the husband may carve a place for himself in
an other, the social universe, the universe of the wife is limited and 
restricted to the family alone:
... man has his actual substantive l i f e  i n  the state 
in learning and so forth, as well as in labour and * 
in struggle with the external world and with himself 
so that it is only out of M s  self-diremption that he 
fights his way to self-subaistent u n i t y  with himself.
In the family he has a tranquil intuition of this 
■unity, and there he lives a subjective ethical life 
on the plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, 
has her substantive destiny in the family, and to b© 
imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of 
mind. (1976:114)
identification of the husband with society or the universal, and 
the restriction of the role of the wife to the family alone results i n
the bourreois double standard.
It must be noticed in connection with sex-relations
that a' girl' in surrendering her body loses her; : .: « 
honour. With a man, however, the_cassia otherwise,
• because be has a field f o r  ethical activity^outside 
the family. A girl is.des-fcine<J in essence for the
marriage tie and for that only? ■ „
demanded of her that here love^shall take tne form of 
marriage and that the different moments in love shall 
attain their true rational relation to each other.
(1976:263)
299
But the comfortable bourgeois assumptions about women and their 
place in society are destroyed by the contradictions of bourgeois 
society itself. The life of a woman in bourgeois society, is "a life 
which has not yet attained its full actualization". (1976:115) This 
actualization is achieved by the dissolution of the family under
capitalism. For Hegel, the distinction between the sexes within the 
family relation is "natural" rather than rational} and bourgeois 
society absolutely destroys this immediate and natural family relation. 
The family is splintered into its independent members and the 
opposition between individuals on the basis of their sex and role in 
the family disappears. "The two 'self-conscious factors' within the 
family, i.e., husband and wife, "passes over into the absolute self­
existence of mere single self-consciousness." (1967:484) Accordingly, 
bourgeois society is characterized by the dialectical development and 
struggle of the individual self-consciousness of women: "The univer­
sal spirit of the particular individual", write#.Hegel,
finds its existence, in woman, . ^ ® ^ ^ fnjSa,tion
TOrealizedne^ 0!^^1^ ^^!!^, and rises out of the
n- - " ? rd real°of universal spirit ... ^  ^  o 
existence. (1967:492)
^  i f i-pjaVinwhich characterizes bourgeoisThe "subjective seli->ceKin;j
, .LV, Hnn the dependence of individuals on onesociety increases at the ..a^e tim
another. An r a »  put. it. "The genera! interact Is precise* the 
Generality of eelf-seelcing interest.11 0973.245) "... Subjective
self-seeki.ng", Hegel observes,
t-^ hM+ion to the satisfaction of the turns into a contribution to  ^^  ^  &
needs of .everyone * a self-seeking turns
dialectical-advanc.)ar^ |cuiar through the
into the mediation ^  lhat'each1'roan in earning,universal, with t^.e r -
producing, and enjoying on his own account ia eo 
ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of 
everyone else. The compulsion which brings this 
about is rooted in the complex interdependence of 
each on all, and it now reveals itself to each as 
the universal permanent capital ... which gives 
each the opportunity, by the exercise of his 
education and skill, to draw a share from it and 
so be assured of his livelihood, while what he 
thus earns by means of his work maintains and 
increases the general capital. 129-130)
Here, in other words, is the trinity relation already discussed 
in Chapter 4: the unity of the extremes of finite and infinite, parti­
cular and universal, thought to be impossible by the understanding 
consciousness and its abstract principle of non-contradiction. For
what ia revealed in this relation ia simply another aspect of the chief 
contradiction which permeates bourgeois society the contradiction 
that resides in the commodity relation and the alienation of human 
productive powers this relation entails, ffi» Individual in teurgeols. 
society is supremely Independent, but also supremely deoendent_. 
Becognition of this contradiction had, of course, a great impact on
Marx ;
Exchange, when mediated by exchange value and money, 
presupposes the all-round dependence of the producers 
on one another, together with the total isolation of 
their private interests from one another, as well as 
a division of social labour whose unity and mutual 
complementarity exist in the form of a natural 
relation as it were, external to the individuals and 
indenendent^f them ... tt. very necessity of first 
transforming individual products or activities into 
exchange value, into money, so that they obtain and 
demonstrate~^heir social £ower in this ...
form, proves two things: individual® now
produce only for society and in society; U )  that 
production is not directly social, is not the 
offspring of association", which distributes labour 
integrally. Individuals are subsumed under social 
Production: social production exists outside them as
their fate; but social production is not ... manage­
able by them as their common wealth. (1975.158)
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Kant’s adherence to the abstract identity of the bourgeois mind 
trapped him in the proposition I«I; the individual is simple and self, 
same. The individual» however» is not simple and self-same » but
rather the ’’identity which posits difference » the absolute activity
of ideality or revolutionizing practice. It is precisely this 
activity which unites the individual with society, while at the same 
time making him or her appear to be independent of society. Life
is that inner existence which does not remain abstractly inner but 
enters wholly into its manifestation.” (Hegel, 19695164) The indivi­
dual is above all the embodiment of productive and creative activity, 
the absolute force which changes external reality according to his or 
her needs and desires, and therefore creates a living unity between the 
object of activity and consciousness. "A person", says Hegel, "must 
translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as
Idea.” (1976:40)
Possession.is the first manifestation of the activity of the
Individual, and "To Impose a form on a thing”, i.e., to work, on and
create something -1. the mode of taking possession most in conformity
with the Idea to this extent, that it implies a union of subject and
object ..." (1976:47) Through his or her conscious activity in
, ■ , __ t, w i 7inr practice —  the individualsociety —  ideality or revolutionizi-t, w-5*
posits a relation which Hegel calls, Reason or Idea. But under 
capitalism, this relation appears as a social reality independent of
&nd opposed to the individuals
4tna -Her .. as it ... appears Cin bourgeois 
Reason, as 4„. _n_l • meaning that the distinction
society] ,ls( to betaken ■ u  mlfl„  has the
between n o t i o n b e t w e e n  the »If--
special , r consciousness, and the objectconcentrated notion or co.isc
subsisting external to it. (1 ' W >
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In bourgeois society, as Marx points out, "the objective conditions 
of labour assume an ever more colossal independence, represented by 
its very extent, opposite living labour, and that social wealth 
confronts labour in more powerful portions as an alien and dominant
power. The emphasis comes to be placed not on the state of being 
objectified, but on the state of being alienated, dispossessed, sold
..." (1973:831)
The apparent externality to the individuals of the very objects 
which they create leads precisely to the Kantian definition of objec­
tivity: "My idea is corréct merely if it agrees with the object, even 
when the latter only remotely corresponds to its Notion and hence has 
hardly any truth at all." (Kegel. W s 1 7 B )  But the third, Hegelian 
font of objectivity -  the union of consciousness with its object as 
achieved through Ileason or ideality -  has to be transferred to 
society as a whole. Society must be ¡jade subject to-ffiMCo in the
_ ____and creates in its own ljna£0 - the'same manner as reason transí on _ _  — — —  ■—  ■—
objects of the external world.
True liberty, in the shape of moral [social] life,
irue lioer y, fir ding its purpose in a
consists in the will f -ding^ ^  or selfish
universal 0 < a t « W  »»* conte„í lg only possible in
interests. But su .. it belongs to the
thought and 'fr0^ ttbb^ in ‘should make its Notion,
Idea of content or aim, when
which is Elective mind [the rational
it does this it becomes freedom,
state] , cons itruct* for Hseir a j  . m U t
and thus J ^ e v e s thi8 aim only by
existence. But viir “ atract] individuality, by 
ridding itself of i - t tmpncit universality
developing its ln and for itself,
into a content that is 
(1969:228-229)
. that forra of society which MarxWhat Hegel has in nina here is “ “
, . trfn rlace of the old bourgeois society, calls, communist society: "¿n PiaC0 01
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with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, 
in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all.” (1969» 1*127)
The understanding or bourgeois consciousness is utterly repelled 
by, and incapable of grasping, this absolute union of the very 
extremes, individual and society, which the bourgeois mode of produc­
tion actually does unite if only in an abstract and accidental manner. 
But this bourgeois incomprehension is based on the most far-reaching 
illusion of all within capitalism? the mystique of equality and free 
exchange which governs the relations of commodities. As Kane suggests, 
equality of exchange in the market is the basis of freedom and equality 
in bourgeois society as a whole.
When the economic form, exchange, posits the all- 
¡ided eouality of its subjects, then the content, the 
i v i S  as veil as the objective material which 
drives towards exchange, is free^. ajmlity and  ^
freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based., 
overcharge values but. a l s o t h e  exchang of exchange 
values is the productive, real basis of all ,
1 L  sure ideas they are merely the
^ T ? E r l i n r e s s i o n s  of this basis as developed in 
u r i d y l  Vlitioal, social relations they are merely
this basis to a higher power. (1973.245)
This free exchange la so far fro» inequality and privilege- that it is 
their very opposite: "A worker who buys commodities for 3s. appears 
to the seller in the sane function, in the save equality -  in the form 
Of } , .  _  as the king who does the same. All distinction between them 
is extinguished." 0975:246) Accordingly, it is in the realm of
, . , „ nm-contradiction reaches its highestexchange that the principle of non-con^ 
expression. .
For the abstract understanding, the fundamental !aw of thought is
that of identity, M .  But the fundamental law of capitalist production
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eludes this equation. Instead of identity, there is an identity which 
posits difference. Thus, the capitalist invests his or her money (m ) 
into commodities ( c ) ,  not in order to satisfy the fundamental law 
identity, jfaM, but rather to achieve an altogether different result, 
where "The capitalist knows", writes Marx, "that all
commodities ... are in faith and in truth money ... and what is more, 
a wonderful means for making still more money out of money." (1976s 
256) In fact, money becomes capital, only on condition that it 
creates more money. "In itself ... money may only be defined as 
capital if it is employed, spent, with the aim of Increasing it, if
it is spent expressly to Increase if. In the case of the sum of value 
or money this phenomenon is its ■ ¿eating, its inner law, its tendency, 
while to the capitalist, i.e. the owner.of the sum of money, in whose 
hands it shall acquire its function, it appears as Intention,
purpose." The transformation of money into more money seems to
involve neither its transformation into commodities nor the production
process itself.
It is for this reason that the character, the specific
nature of capitalist
simple and abstract. capital and fulfils
into x +&x, i*c* into aIts purpose y s the original sum + a
quantum of mon y iRal sura< In other words, it is
balance o v e T  . the^given amount of money + additional 
transformed into the + slirplus-value. The
money, into —  which includes the
^  value advanced —  appearspreservation of^the origi^ purposS| the drlvlnff
therefore as th ^ ] t  of the capitalist process
force and the
of production ... (Karx, 1976*976)
. , M b  money is every bit as mysterious for The relation of money with money *
x, , as is the relation of the Holy Trinitythe understanding consciousness as x
itself, notes Marx,
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... in the circulation M-C-M, value suddenly presents 
itself as a self-moving substance which passes 
through a process of its own, and for which commodities 
and money are both mere forms. But there is more to 
comes instead of simply representing the relatione of 
commodities, it now enters into a private relationship 
with itself, as it were. It differentiates itself as 
original value from itself as surplus-value, just as 
God the Father differentiates himself from God the Son, 
although both are of the same age and fora, in fact 
one single person? for only by the surplus-value of 
[e.g.3 £10 does the £100 originally advanced become 
capital, and as soon as this has happened, as soon a3 
the son has been created and, through the son, the 
father, their difference vanishes again, and both 
become one* £110« 0976*250
What Ilegel calls, "the general capital" of society (1976:130) —  
and what Marx terns, "social capital" —  is actually the product of 
the labour of all individuals in society, nevertheless, it appears 
in bourgeois society as "the means of production monopolized by a 
certain section of society, confronting living labour power as products 
and working conditions rendered independent of this very labour power, 
[and] personified through this antithesis in capital". (Marx, 1967,
1X1:815) The process by which capital accumulates magnificently in
society, and yet remains the property of an ever-diminishing group of 
private individuals, is another of the great mysteries encountered by
the principle of non-contradiction and its bourgeois exponents. For 
the bourgeois mind, the exchange of commodities is based -  as pointed 
out above -  on the principle of identity. The individual sells his
, who employs that labour-power,or her labour-power to the capitalist, -iu * ^
a salary in exchange, Yet at the and the individual is & v e n  0T & *
„ fvanitalist is possessed of commodities end of the labour process, the capital^
, the capitalist originally advanced,which represent a larger value than tne cay
In Marx's ferula, ve have (where "C" represents "capital"). 0=0'. 
(1976:977) Where now is Collettl's "fundamental principle of
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materialism and science"? And what has happened to ¿Cant’s and
Popper’s absolute law of non-contradiction? And what, moreover, has
happened to liberty and equality?
Karx suggests an answer as follows!
In present bourgeois society as a whole, this positing 
of prices ana their circulation etc, appears a3 a 
surface process, beneath which, however, in the depths, 
entirely different processes go on, in which this 
apparent individual equality and liberty disappear ...
Thus what all wisdom comes down to is the attempt to 
stick fast at the simplest economic relations, which 
conceived by themselves are pure abstractions} but 
these relations are, in reality, mediated by the 
deepest antithesis, and represent only one side, in 
which the full expression of the antithesis is obscured,
(1973:248)
The surface appearance is the quintessence of the bourgeois world of 
abstraction. But beneath this real« of shades, processes are at work 
which turn an identity around into its very opposite. "... Exchange 
value or, more precisely, the money system is in fact the system of 
equality and freedom, and ... the disturbances ... [encountered] in the 
further development of the system are disturbances Inherent in it, are
merely the realisation of eaBliiX “ 4 wMch Pr°Ve t0 be
inequality and unfreedom." (Marx, 1973.248-549) Bor the vulgar
economist, the sycophant of the bourgeoisie, there is no difference
between capital as it is advanced by the capitalist, and capital plus
, - „ it, production process. Profit is theprofit as it emerges from the proauc.nu» *
* tTv,rt after all. risked his or her natural reward of the capitalist vno, alter a ,
. -ir-eruitv. applied his or her rationality,capital, employed his or her ingenow,
' . ..e+ nononertts of the system, who are asend bo on. For the socialist opponent .
. th ir opponents, "there is, unfortunately,imprisoned by abstractions as tnexr
a , , u+j5 there ought not to be", (Marx, 1973:258)a difference, but by rights, tneie
307
Marx’s analysis of the bourgeois mode of production follows the 
organic process of capitalist production itself* it is aimed at 
uncovering the inner dialectic of capital* the contradiction* CssC’s 
the identity which in exchange posits a difference between it and 
itself. As Hegel points out, however, '’the identity which posits 
difference" can only be the human individual? things lack the ability 
to withstand contradiction, and cannot advance out of negativity or 
opposition. Moreover, things have no creative capacity or energy: as 
discussed In Chapter 4, a thing does not have Its end in Itself -  It 
can achieve only Imperfect activity, activity the subject of which 
lies outside It. Production is human precisely In so far as it accords 
with human ends and design: "The purposive form of the product Is the 
only trace left beiiind by the purposive labour ...” (Harr, 1976:900) 
Karr's Investigation, therefore, leads him precisely to the nature of 
individual human ideality, or -  as it appears predominantly under 
capitalism —  Individual human labour-power.
The starting point of Karr's analysis is the commodity, the 
ultimate being or identity of capitalise: "Capitalist production is 
the first to make the commodity into the general form of all produce." 
(1976:951) Karr's examination of the commodity follows the guidelines 
suggested by Hegel in his dialectical analysis of the categories of 
thought in the boric. There Kegel observes that an identity, an 
Object, Should be studied only in so far as it includes difference.
To look at a thing in its character as an identity and ignore ether
(contradictory) categories, such as difference and diversity, is the
x This abstract method "maymethod of the abstract understarmn0
features which are found In the concrete 
neglect a part of the multiple feature
3G0
thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of them; or 
neglecting their variety", it "may concentrate the multiplicity into 
one". (1975:166) Hegel's observation is echoed by Marx, who notes 
that for bourgeois commentators on the nature of capital, "... 
identity is proved by holding fast to the features common to all 
processes of production, while neglecting their specific dUfgrentlae. 
The identity is proved by abstracting from the differences." (1976:982) 
A commodity for Marx is certainly a self-identical thing; it "is 
first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities 
satisfies human needs of whatever kind". But a commodity is not only
a self-identical thing, it also includes difference. "Every useful 
thing is a whole composed of many properties; it can therefore be 
used in various ways. The discovery of these ways and hence of the 
manifold use of the thing is the work of history." (Marx, 1976:125)
Hegel remarks that philosophy "lays bare the nothingness of the 
abstract, undifferentiated identity, known to the understanding"j 
nevertheless, "it also undoubtedly urges Its disciples not to rest at 
mere diversity, but to ascertain the inner unity of all existence." 
(1975:71) Thus Marx points out that a commodity is certainly self­
identical in that it represents a unity, i.e., value. But value 
itself is a unity which breaks down into difference, uce-value (the
commodity's Intrinsic usefulness for the consumer), "the material
„ 9nd exchange-value: "the quantitativecontent of wealth" (1976*1267 a a u io
which use-values of one kind exchange Eolation, the proportion, in wnic
for use-values of another kind". (19(6*126)
„ . , „ Atmrn e v Into what must be arnon£ the great. Here we begin, a JQHSSX ¿Hsc---— ■—
. . , ____ _ pr.r Marx's analysis of the
mysteries of intellectual higlSSC» - ■; ,;
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commodity, and, as I will show, his theory of surplus-value and e v e n of 
-'the transition from capitalism into communism is, or seems to be, taken
over directly from similar discussions In Hegel. Aether Karx is aware 
of the similarity between his views and those of Hegel will never be 
known. Perhaps it is Safe to say that since Karx adopts Hegel's dialec­
tic method, he is led to the same discoveries made by Hegel a generation 
before him. Marx himself admits that in Capital "I ... openly avowed 
myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, [Hegel] and even, here and 
there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode 
of expression peculiar to him.« (1976.102-103) But Marx le lees than 
honest either with his resdere or with himself. The "chapter on 
value" Marx refers to is "Chapter 1. The Commodity"s this chapter, cr 
at least that part of It devoted to the analysis of the commodity, 
simply reproduces Hegel's similar discussions in the Philosophy of 
Rlfirt (1976), and the Phllosogg. of M n d  (1969). These discussions,
In turn, are found, though In a much more abstract form, In the
Phenomenology (1967.424-438)
t 4» %/ft*1 tijarf-pi 0I3SOTV63 in c o n tracmu^' tho In the Philosophy of Hina.» ^
^  «vf'hmre —  "there is put into the thing act of buying and selling, or exchange
or performance", 1.«., the object of exchange, "a distinction between 
U s  specific Quality" or use-value "and its substantial being or valne,
„■M+ative terms into which that qualitative meaning by value the quantitative m i b h
, . * - its exchange-value. "One piece offeature has been translated", i.e. its
___~.,hi e with another, and may be made equi— property is thus made conparabl
, „„,n+v] wholly heterogeneous. It isvalent to a thing which is (in quality; vnox *
a t abstract, universal thing or commodity." ;
thus treated in general as an
t * philosophy of Right, Hegel contrasts the
(1969:245) Similarly, in the —
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value of a "thing in use" with its "universality" or the property 
which makes it possible to exchange the thing for other objects of 
utility. "This, the thing's universality, whose simple determinate 
character arises from the particularity of the thing, so that it is eo 
ipso abstracted from the thing's specific quality, is the thing's 
value, wherein its genuine substantiality becomes determinate and an 
object of consciousness. As full owner of the thing, I am eo i£so 
owner of its value as well as of its use." In fact, for Hegel as for 
Marx, the commodity —  a thing with use-value and also exchange-value 
—  is the vital element which separates the capitalist mode of produc­
tion from the economy of the feudal period! "The distinctive character 
of the property of a feudal tenant is that he is supposed to be the 
owner of the nee only, not of the [exchange-]value of a thing." (1?76,
52)
One thing separates Karr's discussion of the commodity from that 
Of Hegel. Hegel does not use the term "value" to refer to the useful­
ness of things, hut uses It to refer only to value In exchange. What 
Marx calls a thing's "use-value" Is described by Hegel as "the specific 
need which It satisfies", a need which "Is at the same time need In 
general [i.e., social need] and thus is comparable cn Its particular
' ’ i.y.f, +hlr£T in virtue of the same conaidera-side with other needs, while the tmng m
tions is comparable with things meeting other needs." (1576.51) Given 
this difference in their treatment of the concept of the commodity, It
. J Louis Althusser say3 about Marx'sis instructive to look at what louih ^
.. Altbu«ser states that Marx's accountdiscussion of the commodity.
,, „ and the most evident influencederives from ... Hegelian prejudice ,
, v,rr'a use of the term "use-value". "Theof this prejudice appears in Marx s ^
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fact is”, declares Althusser, ’’that Marx had not taken the precaution 
of eliminating the word value from the expression 'use-value* and of 
speaking as he should have done simply of the social J^efuLieag, of the 
products.” (1971:87, 91) Of course, had Marx done what Althusser 
suggests, then Marx would indeed have been a victim of «Hegelian 
prejudice"' It only remains to be said, that Althusser's account of 
the relationship of Mari to Hegel suffers from the small difficulty 
that Althusser, like most Western Marxists, knows nothing of Hegel.
For Hegel, "the true Identity ... contains Being and its charac­
teristics ideally transfigured in it ..." (1975!«») What Hegel means
is that identity includes, among other things, the commodity —  that is, 
an object produced for the purpose of exchange in the market, an object 
containing the result, or consisting of human Ub o u r - H wer cr lJeaHty.
"... Identity", Hegel continues, "is undoubtedly a negative —  not 
however an abstract empty Sought, but the negation of Being and its 
characteristics. Being so, Identity is at the same time self-relation
1, what is more, negative self-relation, in other words, it draws a 
rtinction between it and itself." (1975,169) Hegel's observation
elaborated by Marx
i f  discard the use-value of a commodity, only
one property remains, that of being products of labour.
But even the product of labour has already been trans­
formed in our hands. If we make abstraction from its 
use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents 
Z  i S S ’which make it a use-value. It is no longer a 
m hmise a piece of y a m  or any other useful
thiJff! All its sensuous characteristics are extinguished, 
other words, abstracting from its use-value, the commodity represents 
ly exchange-value or "human labour in the abstract" (Marx, 1976,170),
1 therefore in the production of exchange-value, human ideality or
,our "draws a distinction between it and itself".
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The exchange value of a commodity, in turn, represents ’’the amount 
of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for 
its production ... Commodities which contain equal quantities of 
labour, or which can be produced in the same time, have therefore the 
same value". Further, this necessary labour-time "is determined by a 
wide range of circumstancest it is determined amongst other things by 
the workers’ average degree of skill, the level of development of 
science and its technological application, the social organization of 
production, the extent and effectiveness of the means of production, 
and the conditions found in the natural environment”, (Marx, 19 7 6!
129-130)
Under capitalism, human labour-power is a commodity like any 
other; it is bought and sold on the market according to the principle 
of identity or non-contradiction. Thus labour-power is purchased on 
the market at its full price; l.e., the wages or salary paid by the 
capitalist to the Individual who alienates hie or her labour-power,
equals the exchange-value of labour-power. Equivalent is matched by 
equivalent; I.I. Ko k o v« ,  both the capitalist and the worker are
independent individuals, and meet on the market in a spirit of freed« 
® d  equality. "... labour", writes Marx in a passage where he refers to 
Hegel's similar discussion in the rhllosojsiar of night (1976-54).
... labour can appear on the market as a commodity only 
if, and in so far as, its possessor, the individual 
whose labour-power it is, offers ft for sale or sells 
it as a commodity. In order that its possessor ray 
sell it as a commodity, be must have it at M s  disposal, 
he^must be tho°free proprietor of his own labour-
nf hisnereon. He and the owner of 
capacity, n°,ve and enter into relations with
«  on a' footing of equality as owners of eacn outr c difference that one is a
b^er! theSotLr a seller, both arc therefore equal in
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the eyes of the law. For this relation to continue, 
the proprietor of labour-power must always sell it 
for a limited period only, for if he were to sell it 
in a lump, once and for all, he would be selling 
himself, converting himself from a free man into a 
slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity.
(1976:271)
Harx distinguishes a personas labour from his or her labour—power, since 
the capitalist only purchases a person's ability to labour for a parti­
cular period. Only a slave owner purchases labour, i.e., the entire 
substance of a slave. Referring to the contract between the buyer of 
labour-power and its seller, Hegel writes, "It is only when use is 
restricted.that a distinction between use and substance arises. So 
here, the use of my powers differs from my powers and therefore from 
myself, only In so far as it is quantitatively restricted. 097«s54)
The worker differs from the capitalist In that "this worker must 
be free in the double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of 
his labour-power as a commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has 
no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all 
the objects needed for the realisation ... of his labour-power."
(ferx, 1076:272-273) Referring to the production process In bourgeois
i a. „  , , mint: "In this ... process . . .  depen-soc ety, Hegel makes the same po-tn
, turn.-and-the materia! to meet these isdence and want increase aa *
„ because it consists of externalPermanently barred to the needy man oo .«
A . -Vi-nracter of being property, the embodiment ofobjects with the special characte
' „ , from his point of view its recalci-the free will of others, and hence from r
 ^ .«ay T-ven freedom, then, is a contradictiontrance is absolute." { W S t U B )  LVe
4 . a +*e ultimate realization of freedom is ...in capitalist society; and t..e uxxx
,,. Ko w a ¿-e-lab our.when its own materialalienation: ”... Work can only be ^e x wu  ^ —
... „ iM+nnomous powers, alien property, value ■: ,conditions confront it as auto t
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existing for itself and maintaining itself, in short as capital.” 
(Marx, 1976:1006) Moreover, as Hegel emphasizes in the passage above, 
this type of freedom is the result of an historical process —  the 
absolute dependence of the worker or needy man on the owner of private 
property is a product of the evolution of the capitalist mode of pro­
duction itself. Motes Marx,
Nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money 
or commodities, and on the other hand men possessing 
nothing but their labour-power. This relation has no 
basis in natural history, nor does it have a social 
basis common to all periods of human history. It is 
clearly the result of a past historical development, 
the product of many economic revolutions, of the 
extinction of a whole series of older formations of 
social production. (1976:273)
Like any commodity, the exchange-value of-labour is determined by 
the labour-time socially necessary for its production; and this labour­
time ”is the same as that necessary for the production of the means of
subsistence; in other words, the value of labour-power is the value of 
the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the owner". 
(1976:274) .The„means of subsistence, however, includes much more than 
just the bare requirements of life. Writes Inrx,
necessary ar* themselves the product of
hisio“ e S d  depend therefore to a great extent on
civilization attained by a country ... the level of civix^a ^  th£? cas0 of other
In contrast, therefor^, it^^ ^  the value of
commodities, th® historical and moral element,labour-power contains a h i s t o ^  ^  ^ given porlodf
Nevertheless, in E  deans of subsistence
the averag^amoxmt of 'th (1976:275)
necessary f o r  a worker
^ labour closely follows that given byMarx's definition of the value of i D iu
T, . „„ai necessary for a member of societyHegel for the «subsistence level ... ncces *
, .¡a n-p-uiated automatically” and is basedThis level, says Hegel, as regu+
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on "the sense of right and wrong ••• honesty and self-respect which 
makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort 
..." (1976-150) Below this minimum is "the lowest subsistence level,
that of a rabble of paupers", which is also "fixed automatically, but 
the minimum varies considerably in different countries. In England, 
even the very poorest believe that they have rights? this is 
different from what satisfies the poor in other countries”. (1976s277)
According to Karr, the price of labour-power is in addition deter­
mined by the time and energy spent by the individual to acquire his or 
her particular skills and training. "In order to modify the general 
nature of the human organism in such a way that it acquires skill and 
dexterity in a given branch of industry, and becomes labour-power of a 
developed and specific kind, a special education or training is needed, 
and this in t o m  costs an equivalent in commodities of a greater or 
lesser amount." (1976*276)
The value of labour-power Is subject to two countervailing or
contradictory pressures under the bourgeois mode of production. The
first is what Marx calls, "the reserve army of unemployed", a
„ , rwYnniation" created by the increasing"relatively redundant working pOi-u xx  w j
cvcles# and so on. "The working popula- productivity of labour, trace cyci^» **
., , accumulation of capital and the means bytion see produces botn the at-c
, _citin’ll • and it does this to an extentwhich it is made relatively superfluous, ana
„ /iq7<i7S2-783) The surplus populationwhich is always increasing. \ •?(
. __ it helps to put pressure on wagesoffers two advantages to capital
v r ready to work for less than those*>y creating a group of vor^ero y
f a readily available supply of workers 
already employed. And it Oai
c The second force in determining wages isfor periods of expansion, the
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the trade unions J "The trade unions aim at nothing less than to 
prevent the reduction of wages below the level that is traditionally 
maintained in the various branches of industry.M (1976i1069) By 
maintaining and increasing the level of wages, however, trade uhions 
also encourage the development of machinery to raise the productivity 
of labour and therefore increase the number of unemployed. By a 
dialectical advance, therefore, the demand for higher wages assures 
the increasing productivity and progress of the capitalist mode of 
production.
Hunan labour power is distinguished from other commodities In that 
Its "use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of 
value, whose actual consumption Is therefore an objectification ... of 
labour, hence a creation of value". (Karr. 1976=270) The same notion
is put ;
But at point of sale»of sale, labour-power is simply a capacity on the part of 
labour-power is not manifested or consumed except in the
his labour-power to ti
consume it before he : 
Everywhere the worker 
( I 9 7 6 t 2 7 8 )
allows credit to the capitalist.
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*Pbat our geoi.s society is on© in which the less fortunate con**" 
stantly lend commodities in the shape of labour-power to the rich is, 
of course, only another aspect of the ’’non-contradictory" reality 
which escapes the notice of the understanding consciousness. But the 
root, the fundamental contradiction within the bourgeois world of 
abstraction has yet to toe explored. So far the analysis has lingered 
on appearances, on the ghostly world of exchange, identity and non­
contradiction. The elements of this shadowy world are outlined by 
Marx;
The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange within 
whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power 
goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of 
man. It is the exclusive realm of I'reedom, Equality, 
Property and Bentham. Preedom, because both buyer and 
seller of a commodity, let us say of labour—power, are 
determined by their own free will ... Equality, because 
each enters into relation with the other, as with a 
simple owner of cowsodlties, and they exchange equi­
valent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes 
only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each 
looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing 
them together, and putting them into relation with each 
other, is the selfishness, the gain, and the private 
interest of each. (1976*280)
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CHAPTER 7
CAPITALISM, CLASS AND PBOFIT
1, Capitalism and. Abstract Freedom
Under capitalism, writes Marx, "individuals are ... ruled by abstrac­
tions, whereas earlier they depended on one another. The abstraction, 
or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of 
those material relations which are their lord and master." (1975*164) 
Bourgeois society is the kingdom of abstraction —  of commodities 
expressed as abstract values, and as value itself expressed by that 
supreme abstraction, money. -"If wo consider the concept.of value",
notes Hegel,
we must look on the thing itself only as a symbol,* 
it counts not as itself but as what it is worth, \  
bill of exchange, for instance, does not represent 
what it really is — - paper; it is only a symbol of 
another universal ■— value. The value of a thing may 
be very heterogeneous; it depends on need. But if 
you want to express the value of a thing not in a 
specific case but in the abstract, then it is .money 
which expresses this, Money represents m y  and every 
thing, though since itdoes not portray the.need 
itself but is only a..symbol - of it, it is itself 
controlled by the specific value {.of the commodity].
Money, as an abstraction, merely expresses this 
value. ( 1 9 7 6 :2 4 0 )
S i n c e  abstraction is the ruling principle of capitalist society, 
ike relations between individuals themselves take on the mystified 
°loak of abstraction. In civil or bourgeois society, notes Hegel,
Heeds and means [of production] ... become something 
which has being for others by whose needs and work 
satisfaction for all U  .like condition*!. When n«de 
and means become abstract in quality... abstraction 
is also a character of the reciprocal relations of 
individuals to one another. This abstract character,
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universality, is the character of being recognized 
and is the moment which makes concrete, i.e., 
social, the isolated and abstract needs and their 
ways and means of satisfaction. (1976*127)
But the abstract or universal character of exchange and production
relations in bourgeois society also involves a civilizing force. The
abstract character of social relations simply expresses the universal
dependence of individuals on one another. Notes Hegel,
1116 fact that I must direct my conduct by reference 
to othere introduces hero the form of universality,
. It is from others that I acquire the means of satis­
faction and I must a c c o r d in g l y  accept their views.
At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce 
means for the satisfaction of others. We play into 
each other's hands and so hang together. To this 
extent everything private becomes social. In dress 
fashions and hours of meals, there are certain 
conventions which we have to accept because in these 
things it is not worth the trouble to insist on 
displaying one's own discernment. The wisest thing 
here is to do as others do. (1976:269)
Given the universal and abstract character of bourgeois society, 
freedom itself takes on the fora of abstraction.— - free exchange, free
competition, and free choice. The relation expressed by these 
abstract, contentless freedoms is "only ... the illusory reflection of 
bhe capitalist relation underlying it". (Karx, 1976:1063) They
reflect
nothing more than free development on a limited basis 
—  the basi3 of the rale of capital. This xind of 
individual freedom is therefore at the came time the 
nost complete suspension of all indivld^l frecdorn, 
nni t*e nost complete subjugation of “u  iudivi„oal3 
under social conditions which assume the form of ■ 
oble^tive "ewers even of overpowering objects —  of 
thirds independent of the relations anong individuals
themselves. (Kiirx, 1973*65 )
The buying surf selling of labour power presents the illusion of an
ev~v, v x a. &-vn,T and independent individuals. In this*• Xvhange between two equal ana *
„„ , _ ennfront "an independent individual,exchange, the worker appears to coi.irw.* ----------
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It is clear that this is not his relation to the existence of capital 
as capital, i.e. to the capitalist class. Nevertheless, in this way 
everything touching on the individual, real person leaves him a wide 
field of choice, of arbitrary will, and hence of formal freedom”.
(Marx, 19735464)
For Kant, and the bourgeois mind in general, free choice is the 
essence of freedom, ’’The categories of freedom”, he writes, "... are 
elementary practical concepts which determine the free faculty of 
choice..." (1956:68) This conception of freedom remains dominant,
as Flamenatz suggests, "In Bigland and other English-speaking countries 
[where] the philosopher has turned his mind to two closely connected 
though not identical ideas of freedom: freedom aa absence of con-
x a 1 « rhoice.” (1975*30) But Kant’s notionstraint by others and freedom of choice. /
. A society, is formal freedom only,of freedom, the freedom of bourgeois ^  jr,
Tx 3 x _ 4t,q+„ rentent and therefore relies entirelyIt abstracts from any determinate content ax
« a . " r i v e n  either from within or from without",on a content and material given
Heg.1 , 1976,27) Even if the individual in heurgeoie society can 
h o c .  hi.-or her Job. o r select iron, scone a variety of consumer goods, 
r vote for the candidate of hie or her choice -  the i t «  of choice
nd selection itself 1. external to and independent of the individual.
. . other than the form of the will" of thehe choice, in other words, "is other vuu
x + e, (Ferel, 1976*28) By leaving thehdividual "and therefore finite . U- Ce
the actual functioning of capitalist ill of the individual outside the a c w
, „ to an economic system which
°clety, by making him or her 0 «*
, ^dividual, the freedom of bourgeois 
perates independently of the in
, xov-r-tl • a freedom cf choice, ociety is merely formal anu externa .
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Freedom of choice is arbitrary, since the content of choice is 
not dependent on the will of the individual, but rather the individual 
is dependent on it. "The man on the street thinks he is free if it is 
open to him to do as he pleases but his very arbitrariness implies that 
he is not free." (Hegel,1976:230) Nevertheless, this formal freedom, 
"the capacity for determining ourselves toward one thing or another,
Is undoubtedly a vital element of the will". (Hegel, 1975:206) How;
ever flawed this type of freedom may be, it, is, a, 2 ê £SÆ,-3JŒ. JHHl .$ssen~
tial element of human freedom. Consequently in Hegel’s 1831 essay on 
the English reform bill, he criticizes the lack in Britain of "the 
modern principle in accordance with which only the abstract will of 
the individual as such is to be represented". The absence of the 
principle of free choice along with "the purely formal principle of 
equality" creates a situation in which the country is ruled by the 
"privileged class": . "the crass ignorance of fox-hunters and landed 
gentry" and the other "great interests of the realm". "Nowhere more 
than in England", notes Kegel in a passage still apposite today, "is
,, ■ ■ ■ , ’ „„{vs that if birth and wealth give athe prejudice so fixed and so naive
. A M n  vroins." The bribery and corruption roan office they also give him brains.
 ^vs tom in the nineteenth century are endemic to the British political ~y
«dominated by ... dexterity of reasoning characteristic of a nation dOminavcu j
, , -nd fcv ... shallowness of principle", andin terms of ... prejudices and ty
, , „ rs-rndirious wealth and utterly embarrassedwhere "the contrast between p-oaigi
it 325, 316, 510» 513, 312, 325)penury is enormous ... ( 1 / O  j t
,irfe^ l  is ... among the first political ¿\vineri ofcssrvos t*i&t ** ^
t suffrage in a modern society would
theorists to recognize that cure
from that envisaged by the advocates of
create a system very dif*e-Ul
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such a system of direct representation." (197 2:163) Hegel's 
critique, however, does not centre on direct suffrage itself, but on 
the nature of the right to vote in the abstract context of bourgeois 
society. His criticisms ot capitalist democracy contrast strongly 
with the optimism expressed by Marx and Engels regarding extension 
of the franchise to the working class. "Thus in 1852 CKarx] could 
write that: 'Universal suffrage is the equivalent of political power 
for the working class of England ... Its Inevitable result, here is 
the political supremacy of the working class."' (Jones, 1973.35) It
. , 1mrtes+ pndearinfdy naive approach of Westernis symptomatic of the almost endearing
, ,. . Herel and the founders of historicalMarxism to the relation between ueG»* «■*
materialism that the optimism Marx and Engels entertain for the 
franchise is attributed by a leading Marxist writer to the pernicious 
influence of ... Hegel! (Jones, 1973:17-36) Hegel's view, however,
is diametrically opposed here to that of Marx and Engels.
notes Herel. "that the exercise of the "... Experience proves , notes *
a , x -t+wtive as to provoke strong claims-or theright to vote is not so attrac
A x . . . + w  „iVe rise. On the contrary, what seems to ovement3 to which they £lve 1
, . ¿treat indifference ..." The ordinaryrevail in the electorate is great, j.»«
.tizens in British society
. +hMr ri£rht a property which aocruea to the
benefit of those alone who wish to be elected to
Denexxt o altar of whose personal
J S  interest everything implicit in opinion, whim and inv government and
this right of participating in e l1964,m \ 
legislation is to he sacrificed. (19MIJ17;
ie r,3Ult of direct suffrage in bourgeois society, writes Hegel, "in 
likely to be the opposite of what was Intended, election actually
ills m t o  the power of a few, of a caucus, and so of the particular 
mtingent interest which is precisely to have been neutralised".
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(Quoted in Avlneri, 1972:1&-1« )  As ftot puta U  ln 1871 ' ™ iar 
capitalism the vote comes down "to deciding onoo in three or oix 
years which member of the ruling class Cis] to misrepresent the 
people ln Parliament ..." (1966:69) More even than Harr and Engels,
however, Hegel anticipates the contemporary situation where "under 
conditions of relative but nevertheless considerable political free­
dom, the parties of the working classes, the parties explicitly 
pledged to the defence and the liberation of the subordinate classes, 
have generally done much less well politically than their more or 
less conservative rivals, whose own purpose has preeminently Included 
the maintenance of the capitalist system". (Miliband, 1973:162)
Hegel observes that the apathy of the voters toward their own 
political prerogative is clearly cut of tune "with the fact that It 
is in this right that there lies the right of the people to partici­
pate in public affairs and in the higher interests of state and 
government". (1964:318) nevertheless this apathy is understandable 
Given the extremely limited effectiveness of a single vote in the 
highly atomized and fractionated electorate within bourgeois society.
In Prance, for instance, notes Hegel,
The number of voters to be on the roll under the : 
new IVanch electoral law is assessed at 200,000} 
the number of members to be elected i* given in 
round fibres as 450. It follows that one vote is
a two-hundred-thousandth part of the total voting 
power and the ninety-millionth part of one o r  the
three branches of the legislative power. (1964018)
The result of the atomistic principle concealed in the heart of univer-
3al suffrage as it appears in capitalist society is aptly outlined by
liberalism ... sets up ... this atomistic principle 
that which insists upon the sway of individual wills 
Asserting this formal side of freedom —  this
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abstraction —  the party in question allows no 
political organization to be firmly established.
The particular arrangements of the government are 
f t h  opposed by the advocates of liberty as 
the mandates of a particular will, and branded a3 
displays of arbitrary power. The will of the Many 
expels the Ministry from power, and those who had 
formed the Opposition fill the vacant places? but 
the latter having now become the government, meet 
with hostility from the Many, and share the same 
fate This agitation and unrest are perpetuated.
This‘collision, this nodus, this problem is that 
with which history is now occupied, and whose 
solution it has to work out in the future.
(1956:452)
Given the futility and irrelevance of the vote to,the concrete
needs of the individual, the call for the individual to step out of
indifference and apathy and to vote, no matter for whom, is likely to
fall on deaf ears. ”... Sound common sense", Hegel suggests,
i s  glad to stop at what is effective. If the 
individual has brought before him the usual story that, 
if everyone thought so indolently, the state s 
existence~and, above all, freedom itself would+be ^
iecoardized, he is bound to remind himself just as much 
of the principle on which his duty^and his whole 
right to freedom is built, namely that he should let 
S S e W  bfguided not by considering 
hut <?nlplv bv his own will, and that what is finally 
S J l S i : « ,  whatsis eve, dulyas hi, sovereign, 
is his own personal volition. (19o4*319)
t m  if tho individual gets hoys"« the «g*«1“  ft“ »0« 4 Wr the gone of 
Political musical chairs in government and the sense of insignificance 
connected with the limited power of a single vote, he or she must still 
merely vote for an individual or a party. The actual content of legis­
lation -  the law of the lend -  is erpressly excluded from the voting 
rights of the Individual. "Only", writes Kegel, “in the French demo­
cratic constitution of the year III under Kobesplerre —  a constitution 
adopted by the whole people but of course all the less carried into 
effect —  was it prescribed that laws on public affairs were to be
325
brought before the individual citizens for confirmation.1 (l964.319)
If freedom is interpreted by the bourgeois consciousness as free­
dom of choice, it is also connected, as Flamenatz suggests in the 
quotation given above, with absence of constraint. Room this view­
point, duty appears as the negation of freedom. This, of course, is 
precisely the definition of freedom adduced by that bourgeois thinker 
Par excellence. Kant. For Kant, the individual is a "thing-in-itself", 
a "causa noumenen", "the determination of which no physical explana­
tion can be given". (1956157, 103) As noted in the preceding chapter, 
the individual, in Kant's theory, is guided by moral laws "which are
independent of all empirical conditions end which therefore belong to 
the autonomy of pure reason". (1956'«) Individuals are able to act 
outside "the natural laws of appearances Cphenomena] in their mutual 
relations, l.o. the law of causality. Such independence", Kant con­
tinues, "is called freedom in the strictest, i.e. transcendental 
sense". (1556.28) We have seen, however, that Kant never gives any
,, e +vw» ir,nra.1 laws and even his famous categorical content to his notion of the moraa
Imperative is simply an abstraction. “So act that the maxim of your
Will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing
Universal law." (1956.30) Hegel «opts a variation of this principle
. - r.. U4-. «»Tip a nerson and respect others asin the Philosophy .of Je a p
Persons,"* (157oí3T)
Hegel, however, makes Kant's maxim, only the beginning of his con­
crete analysis of the modern state, while Kant employs it as the basis
„ , „ . orives it no social content whatever,of his moral philosophy and giv—  ix
v . T,omJi "would he admirable if we already hadKant’s principle, notes Ilegei, v o u j .
, , That is to nay, to demand of adeterminate principles of conduct.
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principle that it shall be able to serve in addition as a determinate 
of universal legislation is to presuppose that it already possesses a 
content. Given the content, then of course the application of the 
principle would be a simple matter». (1976:254) In Kant»a philo­
sophy, duty, understood as conforaity to the moral law, is simply a 
restriction on the freedom of the individual. And «chill duty”, as 
Hegel puts it, "is the final undigested lump left within the stomach, 
the revelation given to Reason". (1896:461) Accordingly, even duty 
and the free will become for Kant, externalities and ¿¿«tranticm 
opposed to the interests of the individual;
The stage of morality on which man ... stands is 
«opect for the moral law. The disposition which 
obliges him to obey it is: to obey it from duty and 
not^from spontaneous inclination or from an _ 
endeavour unbidden but gladly undertaken, (Kant,
1956:87)
The bourgeois notion of duty an a restriction on individual free­
dom ia a natural consequence of the external and alienated character 
of capitalist society: -..here objective reality la seen aa indepen­
dent of art an other to the «ill of the individual, then any kind of duty 
must appear as a burden and a fetter on the isolated Individual.
Duty of the type outlined by Kant, Ilefjel arcuos, oan only be dis­
pensed with when the individual perceives him or herself as achieving 
a concrete personal identity «¿Hi o^d through society. •'... The con­
summation of the realisation of the Motion of objective mind, is
, .. a c+,te in which mind develops its freedom into aachieved only in the State, in
„ , ,  ^ . ti-Mf into the ethical Ceocial] world." (1969*world posited by mind itseit,
... *„+*> TT^ /rpl refers to is precisely what Marx22) As I will show, .the ¿ H H .  f i i — — - —  —  .
. mhis state, says Hegel, "exists when galls.-communist society, -inis »
. J ~ moved to action by respect and reverenceindividuals, instead of being moveu
for the institutions of the state and of the fatherland, from their 
own convictions, and after moral deliberation, come of themselves to 
a decision, and determine their actions accordingly". (1894:96)
This conforms, of course, to Giddens’s account of -Marx's- notion of 
socialist society. Here, writes Giddens,
’ the character of moral authority will not demand the
maintenance of the Kantian eleme;» of obligation or 
dutv insofar as this is linked with the necessity of 
moral no^s Jhich the individual finds antipathetic. 
(1977:222)
As shown in Chapter 6, the basis for freedom of choice and the 
other cherished freedoms of bourgeois society inheres in the relation 
between commodity owners -  the objective relation of contract, where 
one commodity owner, the worker, exchanges his or her labour power for 
commodities in the form of wages ..or money provided by the capitalist.
 ^ drive- toward fascism or unfreedom asSo far from containing an-inner „... _ . —  .... ...;---;---- ;----
4-m « franitalist) relation is the absolute Western Marxism supposes, this ------- - -------- -
2 S S 1  of abstract jYecdom. Unto capitally, notes Birr, “The 
general interact la precisely the generality. of self-seeking Interests. 
Therefore, «hen the economic form. exchange, pesite the all-sided 
equality of its subjects, then the content, the individual as well as 
the objective material which drives towards the exchange is freed«.
„ , „ iv,,q not only respected in exchange based on .Equality and freedom are thus x y
■ . , a l w , the exchange of exchange values Is; the pro-.:exchange values but, iso» ‘v
. a .. ' , . -  nf »11 pmiality and freedom. (1973:245) Jlogel \ -ductive, real basis oi a n — ...--- - .
. + n thiS free and equal relation of contract observes, however, that eve uj-w
■ » diction. Contract concerns not only the .involves the element of contra
. : r , „0 the will of the persons who make the ; .commodity exchanged but ai^o
„.«»ihle only on condition that ownerchip : r exchange; .and--.exchange, is. po-s Die-cm j *■
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of a thine means «2. not to own U. "Contract is the pro­
cess in which there is revealed and mediated the contradiction that I 
am and remain the independent owner of something from which I exclude 
the will of another only in no far as in identifying my will with the
will of another I cease to he an owner." (1976;50)
Under the feudal mode of production, contract was impossible 
since a person could not alienate or sell his or her property. Accor­
dingly, the individual was not the owner of the value of property since 
a person can only be the owner of something if he or she can also be 
its seller. But the contradiction in the relation between buyer and
,»11« of labour-power goes further than its appearance in the mere 
'orm of a contract between equals. First of all in the exchange 
,etween the worker and the capitalist, the capitalist provides commo- 
lities in the universal form of money, but the worker provides labour-
. +,1T~ produces commodities so that the worker>ower. Labour-power, in turn, prauu<w
ransforms the capital of the employer into commodities. The commodi­
ties produced, therefore, are not produced by the capitalist but 
•ather by the worker. At the end of the labour process, the employer 
.s presented with an increased amount of capital while the worker has
. this situation very simply: workers.>nly waces. ICalecki suns up tma
¡pend what they get; capitalists get what they spend. (1960,45-47)
M s  "equal" relation, then, crystallizes into a class relation, a
•elation between unequal^. Writes Larx.
, n  +v>Q worker produces his produce as 
Thus, while t „^talis/reproduces the worker as wa^e
<2£ÌJSÌ. d hence as Ìhe Ìendor of his labour. S T  
Tf u f o S  wÌo merely sell commodities is
relation of Pjop own labour objectified in
that they exch ?„ ----However, the sale and purchase
different use-values. ’t result of the
of labour-power, as the c o n s w i w
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capitalist process of production, im p l i e s that the 
worker must constantly buy back a portion of his 
own produce in exchange for his living labour. This 
dispels the illusion that we are concerned here 
merely with relations between commodity owners.
Instead of a relation between free and independent individuals, the
■buying and selling of labour power produces a relation of dependence
of the worker on the capitalist, a class relation.
The constant renewal of the relationship of sale -and 
purchase merely ensures the perpetuation of the
specific relationship of dependency, endowing it with
the deceptive illusion of a transaction, of a 
contract between equally free and equally matched 
commodity owners. This Initial relationship itself 
now appears as an integral feature of the rule of 
objectified labour [capital] over living labour that 
is created in capitalist production, (1976:1063-1064)
. O the Individual in Capitalist Society
For Farx as for Hegel, society "is no solid crystal, but an 
organism capable of change, and constantly in.the process of change". 
(Karx, 1°76:93) Both writers are fascinated with the conception of 
the living cell and its relationship with the organic body. "... For 
bourgeois society", notes Farx, "the commodity-form of the product of 
labour, or the value-fom of a commodity, is the economic cell-form." 
(I976i90) Hegel uses the notion of a living cell to explain the pro­
duction and reproduction of class and other social relations.in; 
society:
Kush the same as this ideality of moments in 
the state ocenrs with life in the physical orrw.isr 
life Is present in e v e r y cell. There is only one liie 
in all the cells and nothing withstands it. Separated :
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from that life, every cell dies. This is the same 
as the ideality of every single class, power, and 
Corporation as soon as they have the impulse to 
subsist and be independent. It is with them as it 
is with the belly of an organism. It too, asserts 
its independence, but at the same time its indepen­
dence is set aside and it is sacrificed and 
absorbed within the whole. (1976:287)
The organic image utilized by Hegel and Marx is much more than a
simple metaphor; it expresses rather the identity between the
consciousness and will of individual men and women —  who, after all
are organic beings —  and the manifestation of their rational activity
their ideality, In the living totality of society. Thus In the Russian
review of Capital, which Marx quotes approvingly in the Preface to the
second German edition of Capital, Marx's depiction of economic life ia
said to "'offer us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution
in other branches of biology"’. The reviewer goes on to observe that,
"... The old economists misunderstood the nature of 
economic laws when they likened them to the laws of 
physics.and chemistry. A more thorough analysis 
of the phenomena shows that social organisms differ 
among themselves as fundamentally as plants or 
animals. Indeed, one and the same phenomenon falls 
under quite different laws in consequence of the 
different general structure of these organisms, the 
variation of their individual organs, and the 
different conditions in which those organs function,"
(1976:101)
Marx's conception of capitalism as a living system, an organic 
^¿ty, is an essential element in the dialectic method which he took 
°ver from Hegel. The Russian reviewer, states Marx, "... pictures what 
he takes to be my own actual method, In a striking and, as far as con­
cerns my own application of it, generous way. Hut what else is ho 
depicting but the dialectic method?" (1976:102) The Russian commen­
tator, however, observes that "'Marx treats the social movement as a 
Process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of
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human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the con­
trary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence.'» (1976! 
101) Marx seems to lend credence to the reviewer's notion that human 
ideality takes no part in the formation and function of the bourgeois 
mode of production. "I do not by any means", t e  points out.
on
depict the capitalist and landowner in rosy colours.
But individuals are dealt with here only in so far 
as they are the personification of economic categories, 
the bearers ... of particular class relations and 
interests. VSy standpoint, from which the development 
of the economic formation of society is viewed as a 
process of natural history, can less than any other 
make the individual responsible for relations whose 
creature he remains, socially speaking, however much 
S  may subjectively raise himself above them.
(1976*92)
ut even in the abstract realm of the cauitalict mode of groduotl 
individual, consciousness and will is B ^ a n t i a l  basis of social 
elationa. The individual in the living cell within the social 
rganism, and the function of the individual cannot be reduced to a 
ecbanical and determinate relation —  however congenial and easy to 
rasp this relation may be to the alienated consciousness of Kantista
nd their opponents alike.
The notion of the consciousness and will —  the ideality or 
evolutionism,- practice -  of the individual has certainly dropped 
ut of the discourse of Western Marxism, Just as has the concept of 
ociety as a living organism. Wile rejecting economic determinism -  
r anyway appearing to reject it -  modem Marxism relies almost 
ntirely on a somewhat mechanical model of class and class struggle 
o expían society and its development. This tendency in Ueste« 
xrxism is only a reflection of the alienated consciousness typical 
f individuals within bourgeois society. It is even more typical of
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the minds of people within the socialist republics whose raison d * etre 
it should be recalled, is to "catch up" with the advanced capitalist 
democracies. In these countries, writes Claudin, "the decisive factor 
in bringing Ccommunism] about became ’economic competition’ between" 
capitalism and socialism, "which was destined to.be crowned by the ' 
victory of Soviet »Communism’ ... On the level of theory, official 
Marxism was completely transformed into a rigid system of dogmas and 
stereotyped formulas; on the political level it became a narrow
empiricism with a reformist content." (1975:622)
Whereas Marx begins Caoital with the commodity, Ilegel begins the 
Philosophy of flight with the free will of the individual. Neverthe­
less, the focus of both works is on what Hegel calls, "abstract right" 
or the property relation. Moreover, throughout Capital Marx never 
loses sight of the consciousness and will the ideality —  of the 
individual. This aspect of Marx’s work, however, is ignored by most 
commentators. Sydney Hook’s I^om Hflffil to Marx affords a convenient 
example of what has become the dominant Western Marxist mode of
explanation of capitalism and its development. "Through cla^s con­
sciousness”, declares Hook,
society attains self-consciousnes3. Consciousness 
implies activity. As a result of the activityof 
class consciousness the interacting social whole
«v1“* s£3£n:i+V10 historical process* the carrier of the trans— 
rL 5  ie principle. M e  social environment is the 
S o f  the historical process, the natter trans- 
S i e i  in
humanMature^which are the result of the evolution
^ t h e  forces of production produce sudden changes 
l *  Lcial relations of production. Sudden changes 
Jn the social relations of production can be effected 
1 W  «n-Htieal revolution. In class societies 
eooLl evolution is impossible without Political revolu- 
tion at some point in the process. (1976.74-75)
Â3 Kant suggests, "in the restless and continuous ascent from the 
conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air, 
[empiricism] can find no satisfaction.» (1S95i2?J) Modem Western 
Marxism is no exception. Ultimately, for this type of Marxism, the 
explanation of social change lies in "the evolution of the forces of 
production". This "engineer's model" of social change finds its de­
finitive basis in the machinery, technology and expertise of a parti­
cular social formation. It terminates in the fantasy much indulged by 
the Althusserian school where society is conceived as a multi-layered 
monolith composed of structures and superstructures, determined or 
over-determined in the last instance by the economic foundation. The 
warrant for this incredible vision is provided by Marx himself. "My 
view”, he observes,
+h.+ each particular mode of production and the
reuîîonsof Reduction corresponding to it at each
relations v  hort «the economic structure of
given nomen , foundation, on which arises a
society", is the tructuxe and to which
legal and p ,t iornjS of social consciousness”,
^ T n h  m fe^f production of materiaMlife
S S L *  the general process o social, political
and intellectual lif® • ' ^
Marx, however, is aware that the forces of production themselves
mnen^ii'iness of the individuals who design, may be reduced to the co sciousn x
ran „ forces. "... Real wealth", he writes,manufacture and utilize these iorces. ...
"is the developed productive power of all individuals." (1973.700)
"... The productive power of labour [is] itself the greatest produo
tive power." (1973.711) "® »  mystification implicit in the relations 
of capital aa a whole" prevents people from seeing that capital itself
individual worker or of the workers is the "productive power of the mai va
ax . , ru- riroces3 of production", (19T6î1024) Etc., etc.joined toother in the proee-s .o*
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But this aspect of the "productive forces" is ignored by Marxists. 
Thus rondel suggests that "... capital is the historic result of the 
growth of the productivity of human labour ..." (1968:89) But what
briars about "growth in the Productivity of t o m  lhtour" if got the 
development of Individual human consciousness  or ideality?
No less than Farr, Hegel is aware that human consciousness U  
conditioned by its social environment. "Consciousness”, he writes, 
"knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience! 
for what is found in experience is merely spiritual substance 
[society], and, moreover, object of its self." (1967:96) But the 
social environment itself is * £ .  S S 'H .  ES2ti=al i ™ E £  2£«2iiZ. 
revolutionising practice. And tether, changes In society are to be 
traced in the last instance to the rational activity of Individual
, „ _ „ »the Dialectical principle constitutes thehuman beings. For Hegel, xm. » * * *
,, ■ . 4.^4« T>ropressn? and the purpose of dialeoticlife and soul of scientific progres  ,
, (n their own being and movement". Themethod "is.to study things i n o
„ ir, tUrn, is "the universal and irresistibleessence of dialectic, n u
' ' . , . can stay, however stable and. secure it maypower before which nothing *> »
.4*7 «Phis essence is nothin* otherdeem itself". ■ (1975*116* } ~----------------~ —
emnn(™nmf“!S or ideality. For human conscious-.. than individual human conscj^nenegs ,
ness alone exhibits the character of the rational principle, i.e., it ;
alone, and not the "forces of production", "is unconditioned, self- p
_.of-determining". (1975*120) contained, and thus ... sell
^pr-minlng element of individual human con- vVithout the self-aetermx x
„+_i thecrotical category, the method of Westernsciousness as a fundamental theoxcxx.a
. a form of thought which always has "one Marxism is sheer empiricism, 
foot in .the air"! a dualism which oscillates between "class" and "the
335
forces of production" as basic explanatory categories. But to admit
the Individual as the principle of dialectic is not to abandon the
notion that the consciousness of the individual is a function of its
social environment. The individual is identical with as well as
distinct from society; neither can be explain ed without the other.
For example, the cynical mode of life adopted by the ancient Greek
philosopher Diogenes, writes Hegel,
was nothing more or less than ».product g e n i a n  
so pi0.1 life, and what determined it was the way of 
thinking against which his whole manner protested, 
ieioe if w S  not independent of social conditions 
tot -imply their result! it was a rude product of 
-ih n luxury is at its height, distress and 
S S h U y  are equally extra«., and in such circum­
stances Cynicism is the outcome of opposition to 
refinement, (1976*269)
S. S. Drawer perceptively observes that "in face of the German
idealist tradition which culminated in Hegel, a tradition in which
■spirit' and 'idea' were seen as fundamental, ultimate reality, Hex*
may well have felt compelled to overemphasize the 'conditioning'
power exerted by relations of production and the 'deteminlng' power
of man's social being''. 0976=258) But if mode™ tourceois society
betrayed the ideal of the goat French «evolution of it also
betrayed the culmination of that ideal in the gliosojhy of Cerman
idealism. After Hegel, the understanding or bourgeois consciousness
is. vurY manng©d bo seize a. part of the tradition reigned supreme; only rarx manageu
And in the hands of Marx*a followers thewhich culminated with Hegel,
life in this tradition fled leaving only the dry husks of "class'' and
"class struggle".
The triumph of the understanding consciousness was already an
' ■ . „ beran his scientific work. Indeed, Hegelestablished fact when Harx oegan
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and the idealist tradition generally were entirely dismissed by Marx's
contemporaries; and Marx himself was under great pressure from the 
ruling positivism of the age. Marx resents the "ill humoured, 
arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German 
circles'* and who "... take pleasure in treating Hegel as a 'dead dog"*. 
Nevertheless, he is careful to distance himself from "that mighty 
thinker". (1976*102-103) The German reviewers of Capital, Marx 
informs us, "cry out against my 'Hegelian sophistry"’, and even the 
sympathetic Russian reviewer finds it necessary to defend him from the 
charge that "Marx is the most idealist of philosophers, and indeed in 
the German, i.e. the bad sense of the word". (1976*100) Today, Hegel 
and not Marx is seen "as the most idealist of philosophers, and indeed 
in the German, i.e. the bad sense of the word". Marx dodffid the tajv
•ush of idealism, hut since Kegel stood directly. behtod. him, the 
iSttlt of Karx's manoeuvre was inevitable. The more "materialist"
.rx's theory of history and society is felt to be, the more "idealist" 
gel's philosophy is made to appear. But to see that the fundamental 
gelian categories of ideality and individual will are also the 
imary categories employed by Marx one has only to consult the pages
1 Cab*tal.
For ran, the individual capitalist is the -conscious bearer" of 
. movement of capital. “His Person, or rather his pocket, is the 
int from which the movement starts, and to which it returns." Profit 
the "subjective purpose" of the capitalist "it is only in so far 
the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the drivins 
roe behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as 
nital personified and endowed with consciousness and will." (19761254)
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The capitalist 13 no »ere pawn of the capitalist system itself! 
rather, the driving force of capital lies in the rational avarice —  
the consciousness and will -  of the individuals vhd personify capital. 
"This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after 
value, is common to the capitalist and to the miser, but while the 
miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist Is a rational 
miser. The ceaseless augmentation of value, which the miser seeks to
attain by saving his money from circulation, is achieved by the more 
acute capitalist by means of throwing his money again end again into 
circulation." (1976,244-245) 32. capitalist, to other words, has a
rational othic, a driving spirit, which finds egression in, and helps 
produce and reproduce the capitalist mode of g oductlm. Thus, the 
amount of capital the capitalist decides to Invest is not an amount
altogether determined by forces external to the capitalist, "It 1b 
the owner of surplus-value, the capitalist, who makes this division.
It is an act of his will." (19?6s7J®)
Hor did the spirit and the rationality of the capitalist arise
from the mere mechanical functioning of the capitalist mode of produo-
tion. This spirit and ratlona!^ existed gi°r to the E U f f i j M
_ . iv,a anuw m.ther than the result of theof capitalism, and -were the causa ---------— . —  — . —  —
bourgeois mode of production. The beginnings of capitalism may be
found in the old feudal mode of production, but the rapid transforma-
y. occurred after and not before thetion of the forces of pronuction ocliu.
emergence of capitalism. «... »  by no moans suffices", notes Par*, 
"for capital to take over the labour process In Its given or hlstori-
Cally transmitted shape, 
order to produce profit.
and then simply to prolong its duration" in, 
"The technical and social conditions of the
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process and consequently the mode of production itself must be 
revolutionized before the productivity of labour can be increased.” 
(1976:432) In its beginnings capitalist production differed from the 
handicraft trade of the guilds only "by the greater number of workmen 
simultaneously employed by one and the same individual capital. It 
is merely an enlargement of the workshop of the master craftsmen of 
the guilds«'. (1976:139) S s «  the changes which charactg^:zed the 
dissolution of the feudal system were brought about & -thg. ra&onal.- 
and organising activity of «1Ì2. JKat"».
A theory of social change based on the struggle between classes 
may certainly explain (to a degree) transformations from one political
„ , , wsvnlutions of 1789 and 1917 are classicsystem to another: the re oJ. x uus. ui. •
. '„<-4« and'development of classes themselvesinstances. But the origin a
remains to be accounted for. Karx suggests that the genesis of the 
industrial capitalist class by no means corresponded "with the mail's 
pace of advance" connected with the dissolution of the feudal system, 
feudalism nevertheless allowed for the creation of two forms of ,
. and merchant's capital". These forms ofcapital: "usurer’s capital a
n-Wantare "of the new world market, whichcapital were able to take aavanxaguui  ^ »
««overies of the end of the fifteenth had been created, by the great disc
century". In other words, we are back with Hegel's theory, outlined ( 
in Chapter 4, that the development of bourgeois society may be attri- . j
, 1 . r* „¿venture and rationality v/hich, amongbuted to the new spirit ,01: aa i v «-
,, , v ^Mvolrv with “the romance of commerce". (1896:159)other things, replaced chival y u. ■ ' v
Writes Marx: :
. «#>' wild - and silver in .America,, th©The discovery ^  ent0mbment.in mines of
extirpation, ; 0 _,.i- + 40n of that continent, the
begi“ ifsnor3thePoon9uest and plunder .of India, and
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the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the 
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things 
which characterize the dawn of the era of 
capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings 
are the chief moments of primitive accumulation.
(1976:915)
Even after the establishment of the capitalist mode of production,
the role of the consciousness and will of individuals remains para­
mount. Thus the theories of bourgeois economists, which were accepted 
and acted upon by individual capitalists, had a direct bearing on the
further development of capitalisms
It was of decisive importance for the bourgeois 
economists, when confronted with the habitual mode 
of life of the old nobility, which, as Hegel 
rightly says, "consists in consuming what is 
available", and is displayed in the luxury of 
personal retainers, to promulgate the doctrine 
that the accumulation of capital is the first duty 
of every citizen, and to preach unceasingly that 
accumulation is impossible if a man eats up all 
his revenue, instead of spending a good part of it 
on the acquisition of additional workers, who 
bring  in more than they C03t. (1976:735)
Throughout Cardial Karx emphasizes the managerial and'supervisory
ictivity of the individual capitalist; the vital part played by the 
» J d u u . f i »  oreanUine and ratlonaUilrc the production process: 
the capitalist's ability to S H i S U 5 £  and enforce discipline lo 
■ital." (1970986) The activity of the capitalist is nowhere
x , u,. „injure and mechanical function of class postulated¡resented as the mindless ana .*
. ■ , t>’e capitalist is active and rational —>y Western Harxism; insteaa u.e
, j. fM c rromrammes on the basis of rationalie or she carries out speciiic progae»
, , , , »gbit a capitalist should command on the fieldcalculation, etc#, etc* iaa y
,t  production ia now aa indispensable ae that a eeneral shonld c « m » d  
,n the field of battle." (Karr, 1J7M4B) Similarly, the whole 
■otivity of the Individ»! capitalist la aimed at avoiding the
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objective social laws that govern the process of capitalist produc­
tion. Yet it is precisely through the capitalist's consciousness and 
will that these laws are realized. As Hegel puts it, "... the law is 
no agent; it is only the actual human being who acts." (1976s100) 
Under capitalism, for example, there is an absolute tendency for 
commodities to become cheaper, and this law "becomes manifest as the
desire of the individual capitalist, who in his wish to render this 
law ineffectual, or to outwit it and turn it to its own advantage, 
reduces the Individual value of his product to a point where it falls 
below the socially determined value. (1976s1038) After Marx, of 
course, individual capitalists have consciously striven to lower the 
cost of their commodities for toe consumer, and not only for the 
capitalist. This is the secret of the modem consumer economy 
definitively opened up by Henry Ford in the early twentieth century
with the production of the.Model "T" Ford.
Consciousness and will are not just the property of the capital­
ist; they are equally an aspect of the individual worker. The modem
worker, writes Marx, "is ... a person who is something for himself 
HSlt from his labour, and who alienates his life expression only as
, .. n-Tp« (Marx, 1973*289) The consciousness anda. means, toward his own m e  •
Will Of the worker confront the capitalist first, as the labour power
. . .. Tvn~cVia.ses on the market and utilizes in thewrnch the capitalise ru. u.<i-
„ 1 o-'irx-n'i p° active resistance to the exploitivelabour process, and ££££[£» £
~ both the worker and the capitalist form anpower of capital, nut ton. ^
■ * 1 ~ ,,-i+v* the capitalist cannot be aessential, if antagonistic, unity. e
, „ ,,rTVf.T and the wage or salary worker cannot becapitalist without the verke*,
u Their unity is what Hegel calls, thesuch without tne capitalist,.
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unity of opposites: “Both are in essential relation to one another; 
and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the other
from it, and thus relates itself thereto." (1975:174) The notion of 
—  SiiiX °£ ShS. vith the ¡wrher is an essential element
il «¡2221 ££ nlans in both ¡»¿el and &rx. In lisp,!., terminology, 
their relation is one of opposition; but “In opposition, the different
is not confronted by any other, but by its other," {1975:173) rhi„
relation is outlined by Hegel in the teaser Logic as follows*
... the essential difference, as a difference is 
only the difference of it from itself, and thus 
contains the identical: so that to essential and 
actual difference there belongs itself as well as 
identity. As self-relating difference it is 
likewise virtually enunciated as the self-identical 
And the opposite is in general that which includes 
the one and its other, itself and its opposite,
(1975:175)
For Hegel, Ideality or revolutionizing practice, is an "existence 
rwhich] agrees with its notion", (1975:155) The ideality of the 
individual capitalist, therefore, includes the worker? and the - 
ideality of the worker includes the capitalist. Together they fora an 
organic unity. "Capital and wage labour (it is thus we designate the 
iabour of the worker who sells his ora labour power)," writes Marx 
"Only express two aspects of the self-same relationship." (1976:
1005-1006) Most commentators on Eegel do not understand his conception 
°f social class precisely because they do not relate Hegel's dialec­
tical analysis of the categories in speculative logic to his concrete 
discussion of society in the Philosophy o f Eight. Put the Ihiloecphy
$1 Right must be rend as a concrete application of Heed's dialectic
Si.thod; read outside tbis context, the work simply cannot be compre-
icnded. jn this bock", states Ilegel in the Preface to the
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Philosophy of Bight, "I am presupposing that philosophy's mode of 
progression from one topic to another and its mode of scientific
proof __ this whole speculative way of knowing —  is essentially
distinct from any other way of knowing. ... It will be obvious from
the work itself”, he continues,
that the whole, like the formation of its parts, 
rests on the logical spirit. It is also from this 
point of view above all that I should like my book 
to be taken and judged. What we have to do with 
here is philosophical science, and in such science 
content is essentially bound up with form. (1976:2)
With regard to social class, writes Avineri, "Hegel's point of
departure is the exact opposite of Karx's”. As a result, "one looks
in vain for ... (the working] class in Hegel's system of estates.
Obviously the worker is not part of the peasantry nor does he belong
to the civil service. But neither does the commercial class, the class
of businessmen, include him." - (1972:109) Another recent commentator,
utators to see that the worker is actually a 
from their unspoken assumption
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(perhaps prejudice) that the worker is a simple pawn in a system of 
production dominated and controlled by the capitalist. This assump­
tion, however, is not shared by Hegel. His definition of the business
class is worth quoting in fulls
The business class has for its task the adoption 
of raw materials and for its means of livelihood it 
is thrown back on its work, on reflection and 
intelligence, and essentially on the mediation of 
one man's needs and work with those of others. For 
what this class produces and enjoys, it has mainly 
itself, its own industry, to thank. The task of 
this class is subdivided into
(<*) work to satisfy single needs in a comparatively
concrete way and to supply single orders ---
craftmanshipj
((3) work of a more abstract kind, mass-production to 
satisfy single needs, but needs in more universal 
demand — *• manufacture}
(>) the business of exchange, whereby separate
utilities are exchanged the one for the other, 
rrH nr.irally through the use of the universal medium
Hegel's definition of the business class, therefore, would include
. -v^irre the labour process under capitalism process it is necessary to j
p the dynamic of thi
it is elucidated by
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suggests, is ’’objectively and intrinsically determined, and, hence 
self-acting", and, moreover, includes "the universal or notion of 
will". (1975:177-173) Accordingly, Karx defines human labour-power 
as "a self-acting capacity, a labour-power that expresses itself 
purposively by converting the means of production into the material 
object of its activity, transforming them from their original form 
into the new form of the product". (1976:960)
For Hegel, the work performed by the individual in the modern
labour process is ideal, it demonstrates the "unity of notion and
objectivity ... its ’real' content is only the exhibition which the
notion gives itself in the form of external existence, while yet, by
enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and no
keeps itself in it". (1975:274-275) "At the end of every labour
process", notes tfarx in an already quoted passage,
a result emerges which had already been conceived by 
the worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally Han not only affects a change of form in 
the materials of naturej he also realizes ... his own
nurno-e in those materials. And this is a.purpose he 
is conscious of, it determines the mode of M s  
activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must 
subordinate his will to it. This subordination is
no mere momentary act. . Apart^from the^exertion of
the workine oreans, “  S " “  forthe entire duration of the work. (1976.,.0,)
Employing the means of production provided by the capitalist, the 
worker transform the raw material into the finished product, the com­
modity. '•-nat virtually happens in the realising of the End", noted 
Hegel, "is that the onesided subjectivity and the show of objective 
independence confronting it are both cancelled. In laying hold of the
means, the notion,» i . C  * «  W “ 1« *  °f 41,0 UOlte>
itself the very implicit essence of the object." (1975>273) The
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relation theoretically expressed by Hegel is given concrete form by
Marx ;
In the labour process the worker enters as worker 
into the normal active relationship with the means 
of production determined by the nature and purpose 
of the work itself. Re takes possession of the 
means of production and handles them simply as the 
means and materials of his own work. The autonomous 
nature of the means of production, the way they 
hold fast to their independence and display a mind 
of their own, their separation from labour —  all 
this is now abolished ... in practice. The 
material conditions of labour now enter into a 
normal unity with labour itself; they form the 
material, the organs requisite for its creative 
activity. The worker treats the hide he is tanning 
simply as the object of his creative activity, and 
not as capital. He does not tan the hide for the 
capitalist. {197 6 s1007)
The commodity, therefore, is the worker's product; it contains 
the result of his or her ideality, which has now become "the very 
implicit essence of the object". It is the coyote, result of the 
creative activity of the worker. "... Heal labour", notes Karx, "is 
what the worker really gives to the capitalist in exchange for the 
purchase price of labour, that part of capital that is translated into 
a wage. It is the expenditure of.his life's energy, the realization
of hie productive faculties; It is his movement and not the 
capitalists’. Looked at as a personal function, in its reality,
labour is the function of the worker, and not of the capitalist.".....
(1976,903) To the bourgeois mind, however, the product -  the commodity 
*—  appears- to be the property of the capitalist. The commodity, writes
Karx, "does not appear a s  the productive rower of labour, or even that ;
. wt+h capital. And least of all does itPart of it that Is identical vi-n.ca*-
-f *h e individual worker cr of theappear as the productive r*ower of - ,
. process of production", (1976:1034}workers joined together in the >roce.a :.r.
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Accordingly, under capitalism "the means of production appear not juct 
as the means for accomplishing work, but as the means for the exploita­
tion of the labour of others". (1976:1019) The result of this 
exploitation in that the product of the labour of the worker appears as 
an alien object, a power set over against the individual: "... Since
the labour has ceased to belong to the worker even before he starts to 
work, what objectified itself for him is alien labour and hence a 
vaiue, capital, independent of his labour-power. The product belongs 
to the capitalist and in the eyes of the worker it is as much a part 
of capital as the elements of production." (Marx, 1976:1016)
In the labour process, the worker creates commodities, objectified
labour, part of which appears as consumption goods for the worker, but 
the other part of which takes the form of consumption goods for the 
capitalist and investment goods, i.e. means of production which will 
then be used to re-employ the worker. "... When we consider the 
individual commodity we find that a certain proportion of it represents 
unpaid labour, and when we .take the mass of■ cc2S oddties..as■>- whole we 
find simultaneously that a certain proportion of that also represents 
unpaid labour. In short, it turns out to be a product that costs the 
capitalist nothing.” (19T«<10»).:;2» 22S2SESSSSa 22»<a2iSla
r her subsistence g>al£, 0 0 . alS° a g t o - H l l E .  E ° m  S H  
»Placement of the means of gejaetto ”££l H2 la
or the c a M t s U c t . The worker, then, has create! "alien, autonomous 
ewers ... value -  objectified labour -  which treats living labour 
s a mere ».tr.s whereby to maintain and increase itself". (1976.1006) 
ere, then, is the secret of the mystery Crf' -  the identity which
posits difference.
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"The product of capitalist production", writes Marx, "is neither
a mere product (a use-value), nor just a commodity, i.e. a product 
with an exchange-value, but a product specific to Itself, namely 
surplus-value. Its product is commodities that possess more exchange- 
value, i.e. represent more labour than was invested for their produc­
tion in the shape of money or commodities." (1976*1001) And the only 
element in the labour process capable of creating value, of expanding 
the given amount of value represented in the means of production and 
raw material, is what Marx calls, "variable capital*, i.e., living 
labour-power* "... the only real component of capital to enter the 
process of production is the living factor, labour-power itself." 
(1976*994) Labour-power is "the value-creating activity, the activity 
of the living factor embodied in the valorization process", (Marx,
1976*987) Without human ideality, without labour-power, machinery
which is itself simply objectified, past, dead labour —  is incapnble 
of producing value* "A machine which is not active in the labour 
process is useless. In addition, it falls prey to the destractive 
power of natural processes. Iron rusts? wood rots. Yarn with which 
we neither weave nor knit is cotton wasted. Living labour must seize
on these things, awaken 
possible into real and
them from the dead, change them from merely 
effective use-values." (1976*289) As Hegel
5uts it in an already quoted passage*
The means of acquiring the particularized 
means appropriate to our similarly particularized 
need3 is work. Through work the.raw material 
directly supplied by nature is specifically 
adapted to these numerous ends by all sorts of 
different processes. Now thisformative change 
c o n f e r s value on means and gives them their
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•utility, and hence man in what he consumes is 
mainly concerned with the products of men. It 
is the products of human effort which man consumes. 
(1976**129)
3, Profit, Private Property and Freedom
It Is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Marx 
—  whose entire mode of approach to the study of the capitalist system 
is taken over from Hegel —  it Is a great irony that Marx himself did 
not realize that the exoloitive relationship of the capitalist toward 
the worker that he describes in such detail in Capital had been worked 
out before him bv liege1, In fact, Marx misunderstands Hegel ao
thoroughly that he describes Hegel's approach to the labour process as 
"comical". "According to this", says Marx, "man as an individual must 
endow M s  will with reality as the soul of external-nature and make it 
his private property." (»967, IH.S15) In hi. toaon and 
the »HeeeUar, Marxist" Marcuse follow, »rr's lead! "The notion of 
freedom in the Philosophy of S U U  ••• Jo5es «..erlUeal content and 
comes to sorvo ao a metaphysical justification of private property."
(1973:169) for Kegel ■ heuever, the moat important astget of Private 
proriertv that with the development of thin social relation, the 
individual wan net fto. to the-«rtent that even M s  or her late'SSffi 
or ideality could be M s  or SSE 221 g A B i £  IS SPSU g - » 1 »  ^  ® e  
world-historical significance of. private property, that the indivi-
dual's labour can no longer be the property of another, either in the
shape of slavery or feudal serfdom. The importance of this development,
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of course, is emphasized by Marx:
In the slave relation [the worker] belongs to the 
individual, particular owner, and is his labouring 
machine ... he is a thing ... belonging to another, 
and hence does not relate as subject to his parti­
cular expenditure of force, nor to the act of living 
labour. In the serf relation he appears as the 
moment of property in the land itself, is an 
appendage of the soil, exactly like draught cattle 
... The totality of the free worker’s labour 
capacity appears to him as his property, as one of 
his moments, over which he, as subject, exercises 
domination, and which he maintains by expending it. 
( 1973:464- 465)
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the worker in bourgeois 
society does not sell or alienate his or her labour, i.e„ the worker’s
¿hole being and life, but merely his or her labour-power. Both Hegel 
ind Narx emphasize the importance of this distinction, But while Karx 
credits Hegel with the discovery of this distinction, he does not go 
m  to examine Hegel's definition of private property in the context of 
the notion of free labour-power. I W s failure to ace t ate HeggT[s
theoretical analysis:of private ¿H221 HI M l '
recognize in Hegel's mature .works the fundamental concejxfc of the
Tegellan dialectic: l&allj&v.
Possession, for Hegel, is commodity ownership; and commodity
ownership is obtained by ideality, by conscious hum,an practice:
A person by distinguishing himself from himself 
relates himself to another person, and it is only
*1^ + the two persons really exist for 
as owner_ <T>heir implicit identity is realized 
«  of property fro» one to
the°other in conforaity with a canon will and 
SthoS detricont to the rights of either, Ihi. 
is contract. (19?6:>1^ /
, . . A _  ,Mp never a right over a person, but only a rightContract, in turn, is nevi~
. t0 a person or something which he can>vcr something external 10 ^
,, , v^r-^owe^, "always a right over a thing". (19 76* 40)ilienate", e.g., lahour-*-owtr,
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Por Hegel, the right of property indicates a social relation that goes 
well beyond the mere satisfaction of human needs. This satisfaction 
could be obtained under earlier modes of production which involved no 
private property; but private property represents a value that could 
not be achieved under earlier forms of society, namely the value of 
human -personality. "The rationale of property is to be found not in 
the satisfaction of needs but in the supersession of the pure subjec­
tivity of personality. In his property a person exists for the first 
time as reason." (1976*235-236) In a society where private property 
is the norm, the significance of this social relation loses its impact 
in the minds of people within that society.. But private property is 
precisely the external manifestation of a £ersonJj. freedom; ¿Vis-the 
manifestation of his or her own consciousness and will. It represents 
an extension of the person’s individuality and personality; an,
extension that is inviolable.
For Hegel, the notion that the private property of individuals . 
should ho held and shared in common is simply an abstraction.'of the 
understanding consciousness. Each Individual is entitled to, and has 
the right of, private property. If people sot about to share thoir 
goods in common, instead of beeping then under their own control, this 
simply indicates that they distrust one another. A perfect trust and 
a sharing attitude would retire no prior agreement between individuals
a... rrorerty is a determination ofto share their property. ¿XiHl® --- £ ---------- -— ------ -
Individual freedom; the lack of £rivat£ E 2 2 2 M  “2 H Ü  St SSt CEElii™.
of that freedom. "The general prinoiple of Plato's ideal state”, notes
Hegel, ■ ■. :
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violates the right of personality by forbidding 
the holding of private property. The idea of a 
pious or friendly and even compulsory brotherhood 
of men holding their goods in common and rejecting 
the principle of private property may readily 
present itself to the disposition which mistakes 
the true nature of the freedom of mind and right 
and fails to apprehend it in its determinate 
moments. As for the moral or religious view 
behind this idea, when Epicurus’s friends proposed 
to form such an association holding goods in 
common, he forbade them, precisely on the ground 
that their proposal betrayed distrust and that 
those who distrusted each other were not friends.
(1976*. 42-43)
Private property is a low form of human freedom or personality, since 
it is characterized by its externality, to the owner of property. But 
it is a necessary and essential aspect of human freedom. Moreover, it 
IS. the only form of concrete and real freedom possible in the ahstract 
context of bourgeois society: '’Even if my freedom is here realized
first of all in an external thing and so falsely realized, nevertheless 
abstract personality in its immediacy can have no other embodiment
save one characterised by immediacy.” (Kecel, 1976:23«)
In embodying his or her will in an object which becomes the private
the individual finds a real existence, In the property relation reason
property of a person, the individual actually translates his or her 





individual’s freedom in pr 
individuals. Petes Hegel,
freedom in property is recognized and respected by other
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A person must translate his freedom into an 
external sphere in order to exist as Idea#
Personality is the first, still wholly abstract, 
determination of the absolute and infinite will, 
and therefore this sphere distinct from the 
person, the sphere capable of embodying his 
freedom, is likewise determined as what is 
immediately different and separable from him.
(1976:40)
A person obtains private property by possessing or appropriating 
a thing in order to satisfy natural needs, impulse or even individual 
caprice. But the vital element or moment in appropriation is ideality; 
”... 'to appropriate' means at bottom only to manifest the pre-eminence 
of my will over a thing and to prove that it is not absolute,' is not 
an end in itself. This is manifest when I endow the thing with some
purpose not directly its own ... The free will, therefore, is the 
idealism which does not take things as they are to be absolute ...” 
(1976:236) For Hegel, possession is essentially an aspect of the human 
will} a person possesses something only in so far as his or her will 
is embodied in the object. Even the body of a person remains the 
possession of that person just so far as his or her will is shown in 
it; "I possess the members of my body, my life, only so long as I will 
to possess then., -to animal cannot maim or destroy itself, but a can 
can." (1976:45) But freedom is not an ataract quality which can be 
embodied in the individual will alone! for a person to be truly free, 
he or she must be recoded as such by others. "To be free from the
„ identical to being free in my determinatepoint of view of others is icn.ini.u~j.
existence." Freedom as expressed In the possession of an external 
object is distinct from freedom in the person of the individual, 
because the will is intrinsic to the body and personality of the indivi 
dual, but external to the object.
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If my body is touched or suffers violence, then, 
because I feel, I am touched myself actually, here 
and now. This creates the distinction between 
personal injury and damage to my external 
property, for in such property my will is not 
actually present in this direct fashion.
(Hegel, 1976i44)
To steal a person’s property is to violate ah external embodiment of 
that person's free will; but «murder, slavery, enforced religious 
observance, etc." absolutely abolish the victim’s freedom. (Hegel, 
1976:68) As Marx suggests, «the presupposition of the master-servant 
relation is the appropriation of an alien win.« (1973;500-501)
For Hegel, the disappearance of slavery and serfdom in the modem 
world is a direct result of the apprehension by men and,women that 
their body, as well as their ideality or labour-power, is their own 
private property, and not the possession of someone else. This
sible to take it away. To argue .against slavery on the basis of the
this argument recognizes «the absolute starting-point« that freedom is
awareness was not easily achieved, but once established it is impos-
natural rights of the individual is correct, says Hegel, in so far as
He"el, nature is in the chains of accident and
caprice, and a natural exj-su 
their natural state men and 1 
4id not regard slavery as an absolute negation of their own person.
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Had they done b o, slavery would have been inconceivable. A truly free 
people would die rather than be enslaved! Hitler's attempt to crush 
Europe and Russia, no less than the U.o* effort to impose an alien 
order in Southeast Asia, were doomed from the start precisely because 
they failed to recognize this fundamental principle. "If we imagined 
a conqueror in Europe", notes Hegel, "who acted on caprice and it 
struck him to make half his subjects slaves, we would realize at once 
that this was impossible, however great the force behind the project." 
(1976S316) In human history, slavery was relatively justified because 
the peoples who were enslaved had not reached the point where they 
recognized themselves as free and independent individuals. It was 
precisely the event of slavery itself which brought about the conscious- *1
■»ess in people that they should and must be free, 'Writes Ilegel,
To adhere to man's absolute freedom — • one 
aspect of the matter —  is eo inso to condemn 
slavery. Yet if a man is a slave, his own will is 
responsible for his slavery, just as it is its 
will which is responsible if a people is subjugated.
Herce the wrong of slavery lies at the door not . :
simply of enslavers or conquerors but of the slaves 
and of the consuered themselves.. ;Slavery occurs 
in nan’s transition from the state of nature to 
genuinely *tWcal [social] conaltionsi It .occur, 
in a world where a wrong is still a right. At t..at 
stage wrong has validity and so is necessarily in
place. (197^ *239/.;'.
level's view in echoed by Ka«V "the n a ^ s e r v a n t  ra t ion ... forms
1 necessary ferment for the development and the decline and fall of all 
original relations of property and production, just as it also expresses
;hoir limited nature." (1973*501)
, n r private property so far discussed —  the ownership In the sphere of privaw  y y  •>
. e v<, her own body and the producta of his or her by an individual oi ^
The natural ideality of different
ideality ■— ■ ££!ì2ii^£ is IT-ean'‘n,;-‘ie
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persons is far from equal: everyone has different talents, abilities, 
desires and so on. In this sphere, freedom simply demands that 
"everyone must have property"; but the concept of abstract ideality 
itself means that "particularity is just the sphere where there is 
room for inequality and where equality would be wrong". (1976:237) 
Everyone has different capacities by nature, but "We may not speak of 
the injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and 
resources, since nature is not free and therefore is neither just nor 
unjust." (1976:44) Those who demand equality in the abstract sphere 
of private property, "call to mind", as Marx suggests, though in a 
different context, "the advice given by the good Dogberry to the night- 
watchman Seacoal ... 'To be a well-favoured man is the gift of 
fortune; but reading and writing comes by nature.«" (1976:177)
In common with many commentators, Marcuse interprets Hegel's 
dictum that "«Right is unconcerned about differences in individuals»" 
as one of the "regressive features of his Philosophy of Right".
Hegel’s attitude, Marcuse assures his readers, "typifies a social 
practice wherein the preservation of the whole is reached only by dis­
regarding the human essence of the individual". (1973H94) But 
Hegel's concern is precisely to uphold "the human essence bf the 
individual" since difference rather than equality, is what distinguishes
one individual from another.
, ~ * * thim? "implies a ... universal relation toFor Hegel, use of a wing ***+
. a when it is used, the thing in its particularitythe thing, because, wnen it ■*-
. a is negated by the user". (1976:239) Conse-is not recognized but  jr
„ , ' tt mv full use or employment of a thing isquently, Hegel observes, ••• 1UA
• so that if I have the full use of a thing Ithe thing in its entirety, so
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am its owner. Over and above the entirety of its use, there is nothing 
of the thing which could be the property of another,” (1 9 7 6 :5 0 ) It
is precisely at this point that Hegel embarks on a devastating critique
of capitalist private property —  the property relation thought to be
absolute by; the understanding or bourgeois consciousness, «If the
whole and entire use of a thing were mine”, Hegel declares,
while the abstract ownership was supposed to be 
someone else’s, then the thing as mine would be 
penetrated through and through by my will ... and 
at the same time there would remain in the thing 
something impenetrable by me, namely the will, the 
empty will of another. As a positive will, I would 
be at one and the sane time objective arid not 
objective to myself in the thing —  an absolute 
contradiction. Ownership therefore is in essence 
free and complete, (1976?50)
The modern worker in "laying hold of the means” of production, as 
Hegel puts it in the Lesser Logic (1975*273) is in effect laying claim 
to the ownership of the means of production. The commodities he or she 
produces embody the will of the producer and not the "abstract will” 
of the capitalist. Th£X are therefore the private of the
worker. For Hegel, the relation between the worker and the moans of 
production in capitalist society is totally alienated and con trad to t o ^ . 
It is a relation of necessity: a product of a society ruled and 
governed by abstractions. Here the creative impulse and ideality of 
the individual represent only “inner capacity, .ore possibilities",
r t'nvtp’T.il. inorganic nature, the knowledge of a this is the realm of 'external,
.. . . aHpn force and the like”. (1975:197) The distinctionthird person, alien ic-iov «-
. . >»** tween the abstract ownership of capitalposited by the bourgeois ml-.d » e w * *  ------------------------ - ----
, 4 ideality of the moons of production by theand the flesh and_ bloog. ----------- -
' . - +^an an «»insanity of personality"'. Hegel'sworker is nothing ic^s w,*~
..g.^ -c racitalist private property, is worth quoting in corrosive critique o* car
full:
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To distinguish 'between the right of the whole and 
entire use of a thing and ownership in the abstract 
is the work of the empty Understanding for which 
the Idea —  i.e, in this Instance the unity of (a) 
ownership (or even the person’s will as such) and 
(b) its realization —  is not the truth, but for 
which these two moments in their separation from 
one another pass as something which is true.
Vihat Hegel means is that the bourgeois mind distinguishes between
ownership as possession and ideality, i.e., the labour of the worker,
and ownership of the product of this relation, i.e., the ownership by
the capitalist of the commodities produced by the worker. '»This
distinction, then," he continues,
as a relation in the world of fact Ci.e., in the 
bourgeois world of commodity production] is that of 
overlord to nothing, and this might be called 
"insanity of personality" (if we may mean by "insanity" 
not merely the presence of a direct contradiction 
between a man’s purely subjective ideas and the 
actual facts of his life), because "mine" as applied 
to a «•iivle object would have to mean the direct 
presence°in it of both my single exclusive will and 
also the single exclusive will of someone else.
(1976:50)
According to Hegel, therefore, the m o d e m  capitalist is an "over 
lord to nothing", Infected by an "Insanity of personality". And the 
distinction between the property of the capitalist and that of the 
worker is completely mpty -  » mystified creation of the bourgeois
, distinction that Js criticized bymind, Tt is precisely this £¿5----,— — - — —  .-X
, , . -after'Fee-el, "... The transformation of
Marx almost a half ££T!a H2; 1-----
money into capital", notes I.nrx,
W icS down into two wholly distinct, autonomous
spheres, two entirely separate processes, <*» f
the realm of the circulation oj
and is acted out in the market place.■immodities ana a , l-v«,,,» ««««■«
t is the gale ana *— —  .





The second is the consumption of the labour 
power that has been acquired, i.e. the process 
of production itself.
This is the sphere which Hegel refers to as "ownership through use".
... The first process, the sale and purchase of 
labour p ower displays to us the capitalist and 
worker only as buyer and seller of commodities ...
What distinguishes the worker from the vendors of 
other commodities is only the specific nature, the 
specific use-value, of the commodity he sells ,..
In order to demonstrate, therefore, that the 
relationship between capitalist and worker is nothing 
but a relationship between commodity owners who 
exchange money and commodities with a free contract 
and to their mutual advantage, it suffices to 
isolate the first process and cleave to its formal 
character. This simple device is no sorcery, but 
it contains the entire wisdom of the vulgar 
economist. {197 6!1002
Disease for Hegel is any kind of alIgnation of a part of an
organic system from the whole; the result of disease is "impotence 
and dependence on an alien power". The bourgeois mind.Is diseased in 
precisely this sense! it is an alienation and division of conscious­
ness which constantly reproduces this alienation and division in the 
objects of consciousness. In its attitude to private property the 
alienation of bourgeois consciousness reaches its most extrema form: 
it becomes an "insanity of personality”. The mind of an insane 
person, observes Hegel, "is shifted out from the centre of its actor!
. m «till retains a consciousness of this world,world and, since it also s u u
; „ +v,p remainder of its rati oral consciousnesshas two centres, one in tne re,..un.t --------
. —  ^  ¿„raty-cd idea". (I90:115t The apotheosisand the other in its 2££s--Li—
v ex bourreois mind is px'ecisely the notion ofof the deranged idea of tae p w b
. . . .. „„<„*** rrorerty. The "insanity of personality"abstract capitalist *—■Ji
v,,* t'-vv calls, the "empty" and'formal character" Which results from w.nat I-a*x c-na,
___„cv+v mean3 that "all material wealth confrontsof bourgeois private pro,«?-^ - -----------------
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the worker as the property of commodity possessors« What is proposed 
here is that he works as a non-proprietor and that the conditions of 
his labour confront him as alien property." The contradictory and 
alien nature of bourgeois private property creates a situation where 
"The objective conditions essential to the realization of labour are 
alienated from the worker and become manifest as fetishes endowed with 
a will and soul of their own ... It is not the worker who buys the 
means of production and subsistence, but the means of production that 
buys the worker to incorporate him into the means of production."
(Marx, 1976:1003-1004)
According to Hegel, the contract between the worker and the 
capitalist is a formal contract only, since the exchange between them 
is not the same as that between two equal commodity owners. In the 
capitalist exchange relation only one of the contractors receives 
property: the capitalistî. the worker receives only wages which, far
fill his or her immediate consumption requirements. Writes Hegel,
from being property, are only adequate to keep the worker alive and
becomes tne real 
created
The
the means of production, and the valueh 01
I am eo .
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But the worker gets only a part of the value he or she creates, the 
capitalist pockets the rest. This formal relation Hegel refers to as 
(llaesio enormis", a relation which "annuls the obligation arising out 
of the making of a contract". (1976:59) The only real contract, 
says Hegel, is one where
each party retains the sane property with which he 
enters the contract and which at the same time he 
surrenders, what thus remains identical throughout 
as the property implicit in the contract is 
distinct from the external things whose owners 
alter when the exchange is made. What remains 
identical is the value, in respect of which the 
subjects of the contract are equal to ono another 
whatever the qualitative differences of the things 
exchanged. Value is the universal in which the 
subjects of the contract participate. Tt076iS0? 
my emphasis)
Marx —  without recognizing that Hegel had already theorized the 
exploitive relation between capitalist and worker (although Hegel's 
theory may have operated as an unconscious sub-text in Knrx’o mind) —  
flarx, as we have seen, calls the excess value created by the worker in 
the labour process and pocketed by the capitalist, "surplus-value":
The past labour embodied in the labour-power [of 
the worker] and the living labour it can perform, and . 
the daily cost of maintaining labour-power and its. 
daily expenditure in work, are two totally different 
things. ' The former''determines the', exchange-value of ■ 
labour-power, the latter its use-value. The fact \ 
that half a day’s labour is necessary to keep the 
worker alive during 24 hours does not in any way 
prevent him from working the whole day. Therefore 
the value of labour-power, and the value which that 
labour-power valorizes ... in the labour-process, are 
two entirely different magnitudes ... (1976:500)
For Harx, the process of valorization is simply the continuation of the 
creation of value in the labour process beyond the amount of value 
necessary to pay the worker’s wages. "If the process is not carried 
beyond the point where the value paid by the capitalist for the. labour U
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process is replaced by an exact equivalent, it is simply the process 
of creating value; but if it in continued beyond that point it 
becomes the process of valorization." (1976:302) Under the capitalist
mode of production, then, "the labour process is only the means whereby 
the valorisation is implemented and the valorization process is essen­
tially the production of surplus-value, i.e, the obJ,£9tt.|^ S.§,tl,S?I!. ££ 
unpaid labour." (1976:991)
Karx’s solution to the dilemma posed by the exploitation of the
worker by the capitalist is well known: the workers must seize the 
means of production and replace capitalism with communist society. 
Although Hegel’s critique of capitalist private property has gone 
virtually unrecognized by all commentators, not least Marx himself, 
Hegel’s radical analysis of bourgeois society, which will be outlined 
in the following chapter is familiar to most writers on Hegel. But 
Hegel, in contrast with Marx, is supposed to be without a solution.
”At the height of his critical awareness of the horrors of industrial 
society'’, claims Avineri, "Hegel ultimately remains quietistic ... his 
failure to find a solution to it within his system seems to R a t i f y  a 
, . , „ Aovp.OO 10-5) Avineri’s account of Hegel’s'theorynagging doubt.” v V / **.•’/» ,vy/
of the state contains not the slifthtest appreciation of Hegel-e 
dialectic method and speculative logic. Co .cogently Avineri finds in 
Hegel only what is already present in Avineri-. Bind! nod the major 
surprise for Avineri is that Kegel knew what Avineri knows. Unfortu­
nately, about Hege! anyway, Avineri does not know much. The same
ignorance about Hegel pulses through 
Marcuse• "The tone Ccf} the entire 
Marcuse, marks "the resignation of a
tho work of the "Hegelian Marxist 
Philosophy of Bight11, declares 
man who knows that the truth he
II
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represents has drawn to its close and that it can no longer invigorate 
the world.” (1)73:103) Another expert on Hegel, Hayraond Plant,
su g g e sts  that Hegel's "self-acknowledged failure to explain ... the 
problem of poverty ... demonstrated very clearly the limitations, even 
on its own terms, of the Hegelian enterprise in social and political 
philosophy". (1977:113) I* is not in Marx's time that Hegel is
treated as a "dead dog"I Even while the mourners collect, around the
coffin, however, reports of the death-of-the "Hegelian enterprise"
are, in Park Twain's Phrase, "greatly exaggerated".
Hegel's solution to the dilemma of bourgeois society is identical 
to that of Marx, with this difference: Hegel offers a much more 
concrete solution than Marx ever manages to achieve, . This solution 
will be outlined in the final Chapter. For now, however, it is neces­
sary to return to Hegel’s analysis of bourgeois private property.
Hegel suggests that insofar as the capitalist plays a direct role in
the production process, in terms of the rational and decision-making
activity described, for example, by Marx, his or her relation to the 
of production i. not entirely attract. “Viore there nothine",
writes Heeol, -in. these two relationships" to the means of production
■ , . . ,n,*0*i?v'tion" between the real ownership of the"except that rigid distinction .««v
'a '+u* ^ reiv'formal ownership of the capitalist, "in its rigid worker and the merely ,*0i
. ■ V.- 1n tviem we would not have two overlords (doninij inabstraction, then m - * -. x owner on the one hand", i.e,, the worker, "andthe strict sense, but an own^  on
. overlord of nothing", i.e., the capitalist,the overlord who w«» Xue-
p"jt on the score of the burdens imposed there are two"on the other,-
owners standing In re ation to each other." (1976:51î my eophasis)
[’he resolution of the contradiction between the worker and the
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capitalist, therefore, can only go in one direction: "Although their 
relation is not that of being cordon owners of a property, still the 
transition from it to common ownership is_ ver% e a sy ..." (my emphasis). 
Hegel argues that this transition has already taken place with the 
remnants of feudal property, where the actual proceeds of the use of
property are recognized as the property of the working tenant, while 
the landowner retains only the abstract ownership of the land. The
transition to common ownership, states Hegel,
has already begun in dominium directum when 
the yield of the property is calculated and 
looked upon as the essential thing, while that 
incalculable factor in the overlordship of 
property, the factor which has perhaps been 
regarded as the honourable thing about property, 
is subordinated to the utile which here is the
rational factor. (1976«51;
Par from being "quiescent", Hegel completes his discussion of 
capitalist private property and its necessary, because rational, / 
transition to common ownership of the means of production, by pointing 
out the difficulties and the length of time which will be Involved in
this transition: ,
1+ is about a millennium and a half since the 
freedom of personality began through the spread of 
ghri «-tianity to blossom and gain recognition as a 
Snivirsal Principle from a part, though still a small 
m r t  of the human race. But it was only yesterday, 
wÎ fflrht say, that the principle of the freedom of 
property hecimo recognized in some places [i.e., in 
V > e r e  the revolution swept away all feudal 
î ^ b i a n - e s  and privilege]. This » ^ j l e  fron
sü?î ? »  S f  S S T l a
{T97bTbTî r.y emphasis)
The reason th. transition tram capitalist to comm ownership of
, fl V iix in Hegel’s phrase, be "very easy" io the means of .production » 1
1 ' ^resented by liarxIcogently and convincin0ly r-
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The transformation of scattered private 
property resting on the personal labour of the 
individuals themselves into capitalist private 
property is naturally an incomparably more 
protracted, violent and difficult process than 
the transformation of capitalist private property, 
which in fact already rests or. the carrying on of 
production by society, into social property. In 
the former case, it was a matter of expropriation 
of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; but 
in this case we have the expropriation of a few 
usurpers by the maos of the people. (1976:930)
Moreover, this transition will depend, not on the "evolution of the 
forces of production" as modern Marxism would have it, but rather, as
Hegel suggests, on the "progress [of] self-consciousness":
The recognition by [the worker] of the products [of 
labour] as its own, and the judgement that the 
separation from the conditions of its realisation is 
improper —  forcibly imposed —  is an enormous 
[advance in] awareness ... itself the product of the 
mode of production resting on capital, and as much 
the knell of its doom as, with the slave’s awareness 
that he cannot be the property of another, with hi3 
consciousness of himself as a person, the existence 
of slavery becomes a mere artificial, vegetative 
existence, and ceases to be able to prevail: aa the 
basis of production. (Marx, 1973*463)
Even once the transition to common ownership of the means of pro-
duction is
individual:
achi evcd, however 
;» The means of p
# this ownership will remain that of 
roduetion will not become the property of
the state, as has occurred in the socialist republics, J a i f f i t e :
the private property £ f all the individuals who employ the moans of
produ
,, ^ to abate "ownership 3inply reintroduces thection. i r a n s * ..— j j - ' , i" 11 * .
t xhA individual and the means of production, only inalienation between tne i.‘U
/•»v-n Tt is more extreme, precisely because the 
3. much more extreme ¿£13*
, .. . , . - ,rv chance at all of appropriating the recults of hieindividual loses any e.w-
i. the reason why Hegel in the Philosophy of 
or her own. labour. ■ ........ ”3 "”  g
„ , , v.s+Moon the business class and the "universalRight distinguishes between xne u
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class" of civil servants. The power of the state bureaucracy must be 
countered by the independent social power of the business class in
order to "effectually prevent it from acquiring the isolated position 
of an aristocracy and using its education and skill as means to an
arbitrary tyranny". (Kegel, 1976:193) For Hegel, common ownership 
simply implies a contract between individuals which is dissoluble only
by the individuals involved.
Since ray will, as the will of a person, and so 
as a single will, becomes objective to rao in property, 
property"acquires the character of private property? 
and* common property of such a nature that it may be 
owned by separate persons acquires the character of an 
inherently dissoluble partnership in which the 
retention of my share is explicitly a matter of my 
arbitrary preference. (1976:42)
Private property can be abrogated in certain, instances, but only
by the state itself. And in a rational society, where the transition 
to common ownership of the means of production is complete, the inter­
ference of.the state with the institution of private property must be 
minimal, "--- Exceptions to private property cannot be grounded.in
chance, in private caprice, or private .advantage, but only in the 
rational organisa of the state.” (Heed, 1976:42) IIeecl's insistence 
on the maintenance of individual property in the rational or conmranict
society is echoed by i*irx:
The capitalist mode of appropriation, which springs 
fron the capitalist mode of production, produces 
capitalist private property. This is the first negation 
nf individual private property, as founded.: on the labour 
of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, 
with the inexorability of a natural process, its own 
negation. This is the negation of;the negation. It
does not re-establish private property, but it does
indeed establish f orl 53 °T
the achievements of the capitalist era:, namely
—  th#» p o s se s s io n  in common of the land
S  SfníaL of (1976:
929; : my emphasis) -
Communism has nothing to do with state ownership of the means of pro­
duction as is the rule in the m o d e m  socialist republics; communism 
merely '’replaces the isolation of the workers, due to competition, with 
their revolutionary combination, due to association". (Karx, 1976:950; 
my emphasis) To paraphrase Iïegôl, the socialist republics, it ia true 
"stand immediately in front of the idea" of communism; "but what thus 
stands on the threshold often for that reason ia least adequate".
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CHAPTER 8
THE EXTERNAL CAPITALIST STATE
1. The Corporation and the External State
It is usually supposed by commentators that Hegel’s discussion of 
the state in the Philosophy of Right refers to the actual Prussian 
state of his time. MTo a considerable extent”, writes Hareuse,
"Hegel's Philosophy of Right expresses the official theory of the ... 
Restoration.” (1973:211) For Hegel, however, Prussia, in common with 
the other states of continental Western Europe and Britain, was an 
"external state" —  the state of the bourgeoisie and its fading 
partner, the landed aristocracy. Civil or bourgeois society, notes 
Hegel, "may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state 
based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it". (1976:
123) The "external state" Hegel refers to is precisely «the m o d e m  
representative State« which Harx describes as "a committee for 
managing the common affair.' of the whole bourgeoisie”. (1K3, 1: 
110-111) For Hegel as for Kara, capitalist or civil society incor­
porates "the right of subjective freedom", aright which "has become 
the universal effective principle of a ncwform of civilization", (Kegel, 
1976:84) But the "new fora of civilisation" Hegel refers to is 
certainly not bourgeois aoci.tyi the external state of the bour-
. , *1,. of transition to a new society. Thegeoisie is simply the po*nx
alienation of the individual and the inversion of property rights
, , , , , .«iwi-tulisra is only,characteristic of
as Karx observes,
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the indispensable transition without which wealth 
as such, i.e. the relentless productive forces of 
social labour, which can form the material base 
of a free human society, could not possibly be 
created by force at the expense of the majority.
This antagonistic stage cannot be avoided, any more 
than it is possible for man to avoid the stage in 
which his spiritual energies are given a religious 
definition as powers independent of himself.
(1976:990)
Hegel's critique of the external state of bourgeois society 
follows the came lines as that later worked out by Marx. In fact,
Hegel’s examination of civil society anticipates developments in 
modern-day society not even suspected by Marx. But what has escaped 
the notice of virtually all commentators on Hegel is that in order for
Hege!»s analysis to so closely resemble Marxes, Hegel must have 
adopted a theoretical framework much t h e same an the one emidoyed 
Karx. As I have shown in Chapter 7, this is precisely the case, More­
over, since Hegel and Marx employ identical models of society, it is 
not surprising that their conclusions on the fate of capitalist 
society are also similar. In Hegel’s terminology, the external
capitalist state is rarely a show, an appearance thresh which the 
theoriat may perceive the glimmerings of a rev civilisation. Civil or. 
bourgeois society, for Ilegel, is a manifestly evil system, and "error 
arises when we take Evil as a permanent positive, instead of what it 
really is -  a negative which, though It would fain assert Itself, has 
, . , „ „ 1  i» in fact, only tho absolute sham-existenceno real persistence, ana is, *
of negativity Itself." (1975*56) «°eIet7 ls the "abstract
moment ... [the] moment of reality" (1976*12?) the development of
/• w  as such it is a form which will onlyindividual human freedom, ^  *
, . „ free state, "The development we arelater coalesce into a ra-ic*.ai,
, , , , . wVprebY the abstract forms reveal themselves not asstudying is that
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self-subsistent but as false.” (1976:233)
Hegel argues that "it is the separation between one man and 
another which makes civil society what it is”. (1976:281) In bour­
geois society the natural inequalities between individuals are allowed 
to take root, develop and attain absolutely free scope; the result 
is vast wealth at one end of the social scale and absolute penury at 
the other. "In these contrasts and their complexity, civil society 
affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as the physical 
and ethical degeneration common to them both." (1976:123) For the 
capitalist, civil society is simply the arena of "abstract need" or 
profit. Everything is subordinated to the pursuit of profit-making; 
and since the key to these is production, production for profit
becomes an end in itself.
When civil society is in a state of unimpeded 
activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in 
population and industry. The amassing of wealth is 
intensified by generalizing (a) the linkage of men 
by their needs, and (b) the methods of preparing 
and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, 
because it is from this double process ofproms are ¿erlved. ,
(1976:149? Wf emphasis)
To the capitalist, nothing could matter less than how his or her 
products are const»»* provided they are sold at a profit. "A lari;e 
part of the annual product ... consists of the most tawdry products ... 
desired to cratify the most impoverished appetites and fancies.”
(Karr, 1576:1045) And commodities are produced and sold precisely ... 
to produce and sell more commodities. "Accumulate, accumulate!” writes 
Marx in an extraordinary passage in Capital.
is poses and the prophets! "Industry furnishes 
^.^miterial which savinrt accumulates’. Therefore
tiK ‘"c* ' » „ r^-convert the greatest possible
I 7 un-value or surplus-product into ......portion o i .
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capitalÎ Accumulation for the sake of accumula­
tion, production for the sake of production: 
this was the formula in which classical economics 
expressed the historical mission of the 
bourgeoisie ... (1976**742)
The same idea is expressed, though in more prosaic and theoretical
terras, by Hegel. He observes that the external, alienated character
of capitalist production is based on finite or limited designs and
ends, i.e., profit. And
In finite design ... even the executed Sid [the 
commodity] ha3 the sane radical rift or flaw as 
had the I'can3 and the initial End [the design or 
plan of the commodity]. V/e have got therefore only 
a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing 
material: and this form, by reason of the limited 
content of the End, is also a contingent charac­
teristic. The Bid achieved consequently is only 
an object, which again becomes a Keans or material, 
for other Ends, and so on for ever. (1975:273)
The drive for profit transforms the capitalist into "a machine for
the transformation of surplus-value into surplus capital”. (Knrx, 19 7 6: 
742) -For Hegel, the capitalist "experiences a ’drowning in possessions 
and particularity', a'serfdom' ... to money ...» (Quoted in Avincrl,
1972:107) • If the worker at least protests against the alienation ho
or she experiences under capitalism, the capitalist "has his roots in
the proceed of alienation and fir.de absolute satisfaction in it ...»
is a result, states Fare, "the worker stands on a hither plane than the
capitalist iron the cutset ...» Profit, Farr observe.,
is therefore the deterrdninc, da-sinatinj and cver- 
r.umoce of the capitalist, it n  U  
S S t a t f S u v .  and content of his activity, tod
content which makes it plain that the 
iu-t as enslaved by the relationships 
capitalist is ju op.,oslto pole, the worker,
:ih“ t to a l u i l  different tanner. , (19T6.590)
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According to Hegel, it is precisely the alienation involved in 
the abstract pursuit of profit and riches, as well as the desire to 
establish a stable source of capital, which ultimately gives rise to
the large corporation in m o d e m  society. The movement of civil 
society, and especially the development of international trade and 
imperialism, creates giant firms and monopolies which drive out 
smaller businesses. »Wealth, like any other mass makes itself into a 
power. Accumulation of wealth takes place partly by chance, partly 
through the universal mode of production and distribution. Wealth is 
a point of attraction ... It collects everything around itself —  
just like a large mass attracts to itself the smaller one ... Acqui­
sition becomes a many-sided system which develops into areas from 
which smaller businesses cannot profit.» (Hegel, Quoted in Avineri,
T976s97) Sut the very creation of wealth leads the owners into a
search for respectability. "Unless he is a member of an authorized 
Corporation (and it is only by being authorized that an association
becomes a Corporation),» writes Hegel,
an individual is without rank or dignity, his isolation 
- e ’uces his business to mere self-seeking, and his 
livelihood and satisfaction become insecure, ^onse- 
rmentiv he has to try to gain recognition for himself 
b”- living external proofs of his success in his 
W i n e -  and to these proofs no limits can be set.
live in the manner of M s  class, for no 
n y  exists for him, since in civil society it 
is only"something common to particular persons which 
?V «viqt- i.e., something legally constituted 
and Vcco^ized. Hence he cannot achieve for himself 
T L l  of life proper to his class and less idiosyn­
cratic. (1976:153-154)
The t ran. a forma t i on of the old-ctyle capitalist, as exemplified by
the »robber barons» of the U.S.A., into the respectable m o d e m  corpora-
v . ^,¡»6 is enhanced by the »philanthropic» foundation , (a 
tion manager., vnose
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transformation discussed also by Harx (1967» 111:436) ) is anticipated
by Hegel. The "conspicuous consumption" of the wealthy has become an 
object of contempt rather than of pride, as Kegel predicts it would: 
"The wealthy perform their duties to their fellow associates and thus 
riches cease to inspire either pride or envy, pride in their owners,
envy in others. In these conditions rectitude obtains its proper 
recognition and respect." (1976:154) The displays of wealth indulged 
by tycoons of an earlier era, have become to the modem day big 
businessman "merely vulgar display and cheap shenanigans". (Baran and 
Cweezy, 1966:31) An Henry Ford II puts it (perhaps, less than candidly: 
he has been reported as saying to his employees: "Remember whose name 
is on the front of the building'):
The modem corporation or joint-venture capitalism 
has largely replaced tycoon capitalism. The one-man- 
band owner-manager is fast being replaced by a new 
cla-t’ of professional managers, dedicated more to the 
advance of the company than to the enrichment of a : 
few owners, (Quoted in Baron and Sweezy, 1966*.30)
In his la te Capitalism» Handel suggests that "whereas the average 
capitalist In the 19th century respected the law as a natter of course,
in the interests of the orderly peace and quiet of his own business,
,, of the 2Cth century lives more and more on thethe average capitaxise w
margin of tho Uw, if not in actual contravention of it." (1968.
511-512) Handel goes on to refer to the bulky files of U.S. government
. , tV,„ Federal Trade Commission, and to the Watergate anagencies, such as the i-e*.e*a*
vie noint. The sunny picture Kandel paints of Tanaka Affairs to prove his poim.
is against all evidence of the period.nineteenth-century capitally
, „ „u-arasterized from its birth by the fact thatCapitalism has been chara-i^ -^
. „„-t,,. r-.nr-ny or exchange-value for the capitalist; commodities represent onlj ’
J . „ . „ are not intrinsically commoditiesand eveh things wnicn «•* "may be
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converted into commodities by being exchanged for money. Hence,” says 
Marx, ’the connection between venality and corruption and the money 
relationship. Since money Is the transformed shape of the commodity 
it does not reveal what has been transformed into it: whether 
conscience, virginity or horse dung." (1976:1075) Further, ”if money 
»comes into the world with a congenital bloodstain on one cheek', 
capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood 
and dirt.” (Marx, 1976:925-926) In any case, the scandals and 
violations Handel refers to are such simply because a law, and the 
appropriate investigating agencies, now exist to expose and deal with 
them, however inadequately. Bribery, scandal, murder and corruption 
are not new to capitalism, but their exposure, publication and punich-
lent are.
The emergence of the giant corporation within bourgeois society 
iroduces a whole series of government agencies designed to control and 
-egulate its activity. As Marx suggests, the corporation ”eatabUehes 
, monopoly in certain spheres and thereby requires state interference”, 
1967, 1 1 1:438) Subjective and contingent actions may be tolerated by 
;ociety when they occur within individual small firms, but they cannot 
ie allowed in large corporations where a single decision is likely to
.ffect large numbers of people.
the subjective willing which is permissible in 
” ilOTS toiful j»r se and in the private use of 
r m M r t v  also cosies into external relation vith 
otte' ïiîe Persons, as veil as with public 
ÎÎHÎtutïfns, other than lav courts, established lnatiunuw * external end. This universal
for ^ rÏÏes^ private actions a matter of contingency aspect m  a<rent'8 control and which eitherwhich escape,.» tn 0 „ , .rronr them (Vc^e'idoes or may injure others *r.d wrong tnem.
1976:146)
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The extent and scope of the activities of public agencies vis à vis 
business is a problem for the bourgeois mind, rather than for the 
theorist. "These details are determined by custom, the spirit of the . 
rest of the constitution, contemporary conditions, the crisis of the 
hour, and so forth." (Kegel, 1976:146) In wartime, however, the 
authority of the external state over business is likely to be very 
Croat, since "many a thine, harmless at other times, has to be regarded 
as harmful". (Hegel» 1976:27c)
For Hegel, the proliferation of government agencies to regulate 
and control industry —  a proliferation especially remarkable in the 
North American heartland of the modern multi-national corporation, where 
consumer products are sublet to health and safety controls almost 
unknown in many countries —  is to be expected. "When reflective", 
i.e., bourgeois, "thinking is very highly developed the public 
authority may draw into its orbit everything it possibly can, for in 
everything some factor may be found which might make it dangerous in 
one of its bearings." (1976:276)
Unlike îarx, Hegel is keenly aware of the factors in bourgeois
society which are likely to increase the rational control of the public 
authority over the corporations. Kuch of this development is not anti­
cipated in Narx's writings and it is under^ phasized even in the 
recent writings of Western Karxistz, mainly because Western Karxicm 
lacks the theoretical tools required to comprehend it. The reason for ^
. .. __ ♦«..-w it this regard is that Hegel1n chiefHegel 1 a anteriority over --- - — T  .
• ni, the rrowth of rati oral conncionongss or ¿geology. in the concern 3a with the —— » -*~
. . «,.*«• within -the external capitalist state. Inmind of the individual, even --• -—   ------- 1— '—  --- —
jtnT ivfr his life-time at least, Marx gives thethe writings published d^ xr.0
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impression that he did not expect capitalism to survive for long, and 
he therefore left off considering many developments, perhaps supposing 
them to be impossible in bourgeois society. This tendency, of course, 
is far from absolute and the Grundrisse and the planned Part Seven of 
Volume 1 of Capital (1976:948-1004) contain many brilliant anticipa­
tions of novel developments within modern capitalism. In this respect, 
Karx is much more imaginative than are his present-day followers.
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel foresees a whole range of 
developments in civil society which are only now coming into fruition. 
Thus the modem consumer movement, which has achieved a strong and
increasing grip especially in North America, is anticipated by Hegel,
"The differing interests of producers and consumers", he observes, "may 
come into collision with each other, and although a fair balance 
between them on the whole may be brought about automatically, still 
their adjustment also requires a control which stands above both and is
>nsciously undertaken." Until quite recently, of course, the notion 
r "let the buyer beware" was shared by business and consumers alike, 
it the great shift in the outlook of consumers which occurred in the 
irly 1960's in North America, and which focused initially on automobile 
lfety and food prices, realised an advar.ee in consciousness urSed by
The right to the exercise'of ... Cpublic] control in 
a single case (e.g, in the f i x i n g  of prices of the 
commonest necessaries of life) depends on the fact 
that, by being publicly exposed for., sale,- goods in 
absolutely daily demand are offered not so much to an 
: individual as such but rather: to a universal 
purchaser, the public?, and thus both the defence of 
the public’s right not to be defrauded, and also the 
management of goods inspection, may lie, as a common ■ 
concern with a public authority. (1976:147)
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In addition to these activities, of course, the external 
capitalist state is also extended to include a whole range of services 
which facilitate the scope, expansion and efficiency of industry, as 
well as economic direction ner se, which will be discussed below.
Also the state takes a larger and larger role in such areas as public 
health, social administration, and so on. "These universal activities 
and organizations of general utility call for the oversight and care 
of the public authority." (1976:14?) In Hegel’s time, as in our own, 
a debate raged as to the extent to which government should be allowed 
to interfere in civil society. For Hegel, however, the public 
responsibility of the state always takes precedence over the acciden­
tal and capricious sphere of business and commerce. "The individual 
must have a right 'to work for his bread as he pleases, but the public 
also has the right to insist the essential tasks shall be properly 
done. Both points of view must be satisfied, and freedom of trade ■ 
Should not bo ouch as to jeopardise tho general good." (1976:277)
,  n-,r.e- Corsonotion, end Freed on In the actomal State
I, j reJi.0ts the notion, such as that put forward by i n n  in tho 
Co„m i st rnnifesto, that the rule of law in bourgeois society is 
sinply "the will of (the capitalist] class nade into a law for all, a 
will, whose essential character « 4  direction are detained by the
of existence of [the bourgeoisie]". (1969, I*
economical condi
___ 3 the rational aspect a of the external123) : Hegel is concerned vixu w «  ------ - - ~ u _  ■.
. „ v« n  aware that bad states exist, but what 
capitalist state; he i- ■
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merely exists also in due time ceases to do so. Hegel’s critique of 
the British state in 1831, for example, rivals in vehemence Harx's 
dissection of the French regime in The Civil V/ar in France (1966). 
Consider, for instance, Hegel’s account of the condition of the Irish 
under British rule:
It is well known that the majority of the Irish 
population adheres to the Catholic Church. The 
property that once belonged to it, the churches 
themselves, tithes, the obligation of parishioners 
to keep the church buildings in good repair and to 
provide furnishings for worship and wages for 
sextons, etc., all this has been taken away from 
it by right of conquest and made the property of 
the Anglican Church ... Even the Turks have 
generally left alone the churches of their Christian, 
Armenian, and Jewish subjects; even where these 
subjects have been forbidden to repair their 
churches when dilapidated, they were still;allowed 
leave to buy permission to do so. But the English 
have taken all the churches away from their 
conquered Catholic population ... The Irish, whose 
poverty and misery and consequential degradation 
and demoralization is a standing theme in Parliament, 
acknowledged by every Kinistry, are compelled, out 
of the few pence they may have, to pay their own 
priest and construct a place for their services.
(1964:306) :
But a critique of the state is. not a theory of the state..- While
Ilarx's writings are replete with devastating analyses of particular
states, he proviles no overall theory of the state. Nevertheless, his
criticisms of the capitalist state are taken by his followers for an
overall theory of the state, rather than a guide for the construction
of such a theory. A critique of the state can only be ultimately
. • u  r-trried cut within the framework of some notion ofconvincing if it is u -.xj.-'-v.v.
what a state is. In the writing of Vestern fhrrisa, however, this
notion is left extremely W£ue, U  lo at a U -
hoc-el outlines his approach to the theory of the state as follows,
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In considering the Idea of the state, we must not 
have our eyes on particular states or on particular 
institutions ... On some principle or other, any 
state my be shown to be bad, this or that defect 
nay be found in it,* and yet, at any rate if one of 
the nature states of our epoch is in question, it 
has in it the moments essential to the existence of 
the state. But since it is easier to find defects 
tSan:to'understand the affirmative, we nay readily 
fall into the mistake of looking at isolated 
aspects of the state and so forgetting its inward 
organic life. The state is no ideal work of art; 
it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance,* and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure 
it in many respects ... The affirmative, life, subsists despite , defects, and it is this 
affirmative factor which i3 our theme here.
(1976:279; my emphasis)
Marx's view of the capitalist state as expressed in the Communist
Manifesto is carried over to the present by thinkers liko Mamie! (1J78t
475) and Italph Miliband (1977=90) who argue that the state and law
under capitalism constitute a repressive apparatus designed mainly to
serve the interests of the ruling capitalist class, i'ar from being
original to however, this view represents common sen.«
thinking on the subject and fails to explain even the first aspect of
the state. Ironically, many of the leading exponents of,Wes tern :
Marxism hold positions in that state-supported institution jot
excellence, the university; and all of then are dependent on the state
to such an extent that if the services provided by the state wore noth
available to then they might even begin to revise their theory of the
. * „ aroarent sentiment towards the state", writes Kegel, :
. . u« distinguished from what they really will? : ;
^  oxdiv they really will the thing, but they cling 
f  f S l s  M d  take iellght in the vanity of 
to detail . better. We are confident that
r  in etust s^eiet and that in It alone can 
the state - tB j,e secured. But habit blind3
particul.-r * ^  our whole existence depends.
“beik-ewllk the streets at night in safety, it does
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not strike us that this night be otherwise. This 
habit of feeling safe has become second nature, and 
we do not reflect on just how this is due solely 
to the working of special institutions. Common­
place thinking often has the impression that force 
holds the state together, but in fact its only 
bond is the fundamental sense of order which every­
body possesses. (197^*232)
The notion that force holds the capitalist state together is, of 
course, Lenin's position. For Lenin, "the state is an instrument for 
the exploitation of the oppressed class « 097®, Ilsc94) Conne—
ouently, Lenin advocates that the bourgeois state should be destroyed 
and replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet one of the 
incontestable results of the Russian Revolution was the falsification 
of the Leninist theory of the state. "Lenin", writes Trotsky, »did not 
succeed ... either in his chief work dedicated to this question (State 
and Revolution), or in the programme of the party, in drawing all the 
necessary conclusions as to the character of the state from the 
economic backwardness and isolatedness of CRusslaJ.’ (1970.58) The 
state is not simply the instrument of the ruling class —  a superstruc­
ture standing above society -  so much as it is an organism which ; 
expresses the level of consciousness and the needs of alX:its members, 
Lenin’s failure to smash the :Russian state follows from this fact.
„ , «» has a mass of serfs on the one hand and a mass"Russia», states liege 1,
oi rulers on toe other." (1976:291) The Soviet State which ercore ed
from toe «.volution of W  recrestei* *•“ « *  8  leTOl*
. elation between the people and their rulerc. Itthis subservient rej.av4.un
a. , at the Twentieth Congress of the C.F.S.L., "acreated, as aoiuivveu <*
' . -i police autocracy", a regime in which people continued ; ibureaucratic ana ajv.
• „ _  +hir>ing far thermselves". : (Claudin, 1975{C<6) ; >■"the habit of never t n-*..«*
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As Fernando Claudio points out, the Russian Revolution took place 
"in a backward country where the overwhelming majority of the people 
were peasants and where there were no democratic traditions or 
institutions". (1975:11?) In the Eighteenth Brroaire of Louis, 
Napoleon, Marx points out that a nation of peasants is unlikely to 
develop an independent class- or self-consciousness among its members, 
a fact which makes it vulnerable to autocratic rule. "Insofar", writes
Marx of the French peasantry,
as millions of families live under economic conditions 
of existence that separate their mode of life, their 
interests and their culture from those of other 
classes, and put them in a hostile opposition to the 
latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely 
local interconnection among these smallholding 
peasants, and the identity of their interests begets 
no community, no national bond and no political 
organization araong them, they do not form a class.
(1969, 1:479)
For Marx, class consciousness is an indispensable requirement for the
development of what he calls a class in and for itself, an active 
class, capable and willing to put its interests into action on the 
political stage. The peasantry remains a class in itself, and fails 
to create an independent political consciousness among its individual 
members. A state based predominantly; on thjs class, as was Russia in
an« m ss. m ini- «ai s°p.»°i<»"rae. °£
. . . . .  , a t least, are unable to think forindividuals who, £ 0 U t l c a i i £  a* — ----■---- --------- -
themselves.
For both nes.1 eni H«*, claESe3 ln ”°aern soolety " *  ta8ed on
th. relationship of groups of people to the "system of needs», or the
means of production. »The infinitely complex, criss-cross, movements
, , . - ¿ irtion' and exchange, and the equally infinite multi*of reciprocal proaucxiu., ~
plicity of means", notes Hegel,
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become crystallized, owing to the universality 
inherent in their content, and distinguished into 
general groups. A3 a result, the entire complex 
is built up into particular systems of needs, 
means, and types of work relative to these needs, 
modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and 
practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or 
other of which individuals are assigned —  in 
other words, into class divisions. (1976:130-131)
The agricultural class within civil society, the class of landowners
and peasants, is dependent on nature and the soil, as well as on demands
for its produce which are generated outside their circle of life. As a
result, no independent or reflective consciousness is created within
its members. "The agricultural ... conditions of life", says Hegel,
"brings with it the relation of lord and serf." (1956:420) Unlike the
other classes in civil society the agricultural class is incapable of
developing a "particularity become objective to itself". (Hegel, 1976:
132) That is, it remains, as Marx puts it, a class in itself, "The
a g ric u ltu ra l mode of subsistence", writes Hegel,
remains one which owes comparatively little to 
reflection and independence of will, and this mode 
of life is in general such that this class has the 
substantial disposition of an ethical life which is 
immediate, resting on family relationship and trust,
(1976:130
When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia they found themselves 
in control precisely of a nation of peasants. Even the Russian working 
class itself was at a low level of development: "... Side by side with 
the dreamer and the hero", writes Beutscher, "there lived in the 
r, • , „ slave: the lazy, cursing, squalid slave, bearingRusoian worker the ,
■ „ -u* « /'1965.1:321) The peasants, of course, werethe stigmata of his past. /
even core backward than vorkin,; claee. 0*. Bolshevik leader, 
Byatakcv, «elalned about Hucslan peasant, newly recruited as nlners.
, t iliterates! Even-we did not know what a savage "'Idiots! Barbarians! IlUterau s.
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nation we had made a revolution with.'" 'Quoted in Deutscher, 1977s 
55) The suspicious temperament of the peasant pervaded the entire 
ruling stratum of the Russian Communist Party, so that even in 1921, 
when the Revolution was still young, incidents occurred which make the 
paranoid Nixon Presidency look like a paragon of rationality. 'i 
"Brandier", writes Deutscher, referring to the leader of the German 
Communist Party in 1921-23» "recalls a telephone conversation he had 
with Lenin in 1921. There were crackling noises on the line all the 
time, and Lenin said: 'Again some idiot is trying to listen in.' 
Brandler adds that everybody was eavesdropping on everybody —  even 
Dzerzhinsky's [the head of the secret police] phone was tapped,"
(1977:53)
According to Hegel, every individual within bourgeois society
must belong to a social class, for only through such membership does a 
person become "something definite, i.e. something specifically parti­
cularized". As a result, everyone must restrict "himself exclusively 
to one of the particular spheres of need'« (197^:133) The class
membership of an individual is a vital aspect of his or her life and
personality, "In this class system", Hegel observes,
the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude 
and esprit de corps, i.e, the disposition to make 
oneself a member of one of the moments of civil 
society by one's own act, through one's energy, 
industry, and skill, to maintain oneself in this 
position, and to find oneself in this position, 
and to fend for oneself only through this prooess 
of mediating oneself with the universal Csociety], 
while in this way gaining recognition both in 
one's own eyes and the eyes of others, (1976:153)
Social class, In other words, is the radiating institution between the 
individual m.J society! It is the link which assures the essential 
identity of a person with society.
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The progressive movement of bourgeois society extinguishes the 
differences in temperament between the members of the agricultural 
class and those of the business class. The substantial content of the 
activity of the agricultural class, i.e., farming, remains the same, 
but the consciousness and the social relations of this class, "its form 
and ... its power of reflection" are raised to the level of the
business class, (Hegel, 1976sl32)
The business class, which as argued above, includes both the
capitalist and the worker, has an entirely different ideology or con'
sciousness from the agricultural class. Its relation to the system of 
needs is rational and self-determining, and the rationality developed 
through work is reflected in the political sphere as well. Membership 
in the business class of the external capitalist state is conditioned 
"partly by ... unearned principal (... capital) and partly by ... 
skill ..." (Hegel, 1976:130) Wealth and capital, of course, are 
restricted to an ever diminishing group within the business class, but 
nevertheless, in contrast with the agricultural class, the business 
class is characterized by social mobility and job changes from one 
sphere to another. "... ^  Happens here by inner necessity occurs at 
the same time by the mediation of an arbitrary will, and to the
conscious subject it has the shape of beine his own will." ('976.
152) Capitalist society diffets from Indian caste society as well as 
from feudalism in that here even within particular classes "their 
members can maintain their individuality". In India, however, "we are 
met ... by the peculiar circumstance that the individual belonCs to
such a class essentially by birth, and is bound to it for life,"
If• • ♦ The individual", notes Hegel,
"ought properly to be empowered to
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choose his own occupation." (1956s1441 147) And however limited this
choice may be in bourgeois society, it is nevertheless real.
Hegel's emphasis on the importance of social mobility and 
versatility of skill among the members of the business class is also 
found in Marx, although it is largely absent from the writings of
Western Marxists. Under capitalism, observes Marx,
there is scope for variation (within narrow limits) 
to allow for the worker's individuality, so that 
partly as between different trades, partly in the 
same one, we find that wages vary depending on the 
diligence, skill or strength of the worker, and to 
some extent of his actual personal achievement ... 
Although, as we have shown, the latter do not 
affect the general relationship between capital and 
labour ... the result differs for the individual 
worker, and it does so in accordance with his parti­
cular achievement .... Certain though it may be 
that the mass of work must be performed by more or 
less •unskilled labour ... it nevertheless remains 
open to individuals to raise themselves to higher 
spheres by exhibiting a particular talent or 
energy. In the same way there is an abstract 
possibility that this or that worker might 
rnnceivablv become a capitalist and the exploiter 
o? the labour of others. (1976:1052)
For Hegel as for Marx, the mediation of the arbitrary will of the indi­
vidual with civil society and the state, as achieved through social
mobility and the versatility of skill of the individual, "is the more 
precise definition of what is primarily meant by freedom in common
parlance". (Hegel, 1976*133)
Marx never fully worked out his theory of social class, and the 
only comprehensive attempt he made to do so remains a fragment at the
conclusion of Volume III of Ca ^ i M *  There V* TX dl8cussea "th® th*ee 
big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of pro­
duction", namely, "wage-labourers, capitalists and landowners", tike 
Hegel, Marx suggests that "landed property" will be transformed "into
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the form of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode of 
production". But Marx offers no sustained discussion of class beyond 
some very general remarks regarding the source of income of the three 
great classes, and the difficulty of fitting "physicians and 
officials" into these categories. (196?, 111:885-886)
By contrast, Hegel's discussion of class in the fhilosophy of 
Hipftt is thorough and comprehensive. But the difficulty in grounding 
Hegel's theory of class into a Marxist framework is that Hegel, as 
pointed out in the last chapter, does not distinguish between the 
worker and the capitalist, but treats them as an identity within a 
contradictory or polar unity. Consequently, Ilegel does not distinguish 
between the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie and that of the 
proletariat as, of course, is done in virtually all Marxist accounts 
of class and class consciousness. The reason for this is that Hegel 
believes that the consciousness of the two groups is, or will become, 
virtually identical. It is this belief which leads Ilegel to suggest 
that the bourgeois mode of production along with the legal system 
which expresses its property relations —  "the state as civil society, 
or state external" (1?69!S57) —  “H I  eventually be transformed into 
the rational state where common ownership of the means of production 
by Individuals will prevail, { ' W W )
rcr Iicg-T. ^11 w W  is- HgU-asix its. a£ssa is. ¡Sis* «a.
consciousness of the worker and that of the capitalist are educated
, into the rational —  or communist---through conflict and, strigSH- —  - ------ —  —  — ----
t.t It is part of the dialectic movement, eays Hegel, "... that 
. -finite do not merely come from without: thatthe limitations of the ij-uj.
. tv,- cause of its abrogation, and that by its own act its own nature is the cau-v. i ..
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it passes into its counterpart." (1975:116) This belief is also 
implicit in Marx's discussion of capitalism, especially in the 
Grundrisse (1973) and the planned Part Seven of Capital. Volume I, 
entitled "Pesults of the Immediate Process of Production". (1976) 
Along with the business and agricultural classes, Ilegel, as I will 
outline below, also discusses a class rarely mentioned by Western 
Marxism, the "universal class" —  that of civil servants *— • and also 
the poor, a group Marx refers to in Capital as the "lumpenproleta­
riat". (1976:797) Both these groups are for Hegel, a growing and 
progressively more predominant section within civil or bourgeois
society.
A chief problem for Marxist accounts of class and class struggle
in bourgeois society is the integration or "bourgeoisification" of the 
worker into modem capitalist society. This problem is particularly 
acute in North America where veiy large and politically conscious 
groups have forced changes on the existing system with little or no 
assistance from the organized working class movement. Moreover, 
Marxists have found themselves outflanked by advances initiated by
both management and the workers in the actual production system. liar* 
observes that this processive movement was also occurring to mid- 
nineteenth century bourgeois society. For liar*, however, this pheno­
menon is not "vulgar reformism" or a "band-aid approach" to the 
contradictions of capitalism as it is for the epigones within Western 
Marxism. Bather it is a herald of the new communist society. "...
Those members of the ruling classes", he writes,
■ ■ intelligent enough to perceive the imposai-
bïîity of continuing the present system —  and they 
bilxty oi become the obtrusive and full-
mouthed^apostles of co-operative production. If
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co-operative production is not to remain a sham and 
a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist 
system; if united co-operative societies are to 
regulate national production upon a common plan, 
thus taking it under their own control, and 
putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical 
convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist 
production —  what else, gentlemen, would it be but 
Communism, "possible" Communism? (1966*73)
One result of the real advances achieved by individuals in 
bourgeois society is that the progressive element within the educated 
middle class, which more and more secures employment in the state, finds 
itself isolated from the organized working class and at the same time 
allied with the poor and the dispossessed in the struggle for social 
change. The dynamic of this process is presciently outlined by Kant.
"Skill", he writes,
can hardly be developed in the human race otherwise 
than by means of inequality between men. For the 
majority, in a mechanical kind of way that calls for 
no special art, provide the necessaries of life for 
the ease and convenience of others who apply them­
selves to the less necessary branches of culture in 
science and art. These keep the masses in a state 
of oppression, with hard work and little enjoyment, 
though in the course of time much of the culture of 
the higher classes spreads to them also. But with 
the advance of this culture —  the culminating
of which, where devotion to what is superfluous 
bLins to be prejudicial to what is indispensable, 
is called luxury —  misfortunes increase equally on 
both sides. With the lower classes they arise by 
force of domination from without, with the unoer
^sffdh?incigsi ns73*95i•*x —  »■- i - “
emphasis)
A great irony of modem politics is that the radical intellectuals 
within the middle class cling to the Marxist theory of the polarita- 
tlon of bourgeoisie and proletariat and the dirarreorar.ee of lnter^ 
veninr classes, the more tenaciously, the less adequate that model Is
for contemporary
social conditions. As Hegel suggests, the educated
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middle class "is ... in general ... most open to ... abstractions" 
which "consist in general ideas about freedom, equality, the people, 
its sovereignty, etc." (1964*330) The affinity of the middle class 
for abstractions is as evident today as it was in Hegel's time} and 
it is expressed in the cries about the "betrayal perpetrated by social 
democracy" which the intellectuals see at work in most Western 
countries. This "betrayal" is characteristic even of Communist 
Parties which are approaching power, as they are in Prance and Italy. 
Social democracy, however, is not a betrayal but the realization of 
the values of the. organized working class, or at least the attempt to 
put these values into practice. The fact that social democracy makes 
compromises with the bourgeoisie, and carries out programmes favour­
able to capitalist interests, simply illustrates Hegel's thesis that 
the ideology or cohocioucneoa of the owners and the workers is not 
poles apart, as suggested by orthodox Marxist theory. In other words, 
it is not the reality, but the theory which is at variance with the 
facts. Social democracy is active, politics, the unity of theory with 
reality, and reality is often unkind to attractions.
The situation in which Western'Marxism finds itself today bears 
an uncanny resemblance to one described by Heeel almost 150 years ago. 
He observes that the Relish Refers, Bill of 1831 Jeopardized the 
interests of "the class that has hitherto dominated Parliament, the
class that afforded to every Mnistry ready-made material for
[maintaining] the existing syetem of social life”. This class of
, '„«a +he biff bourgeoisie "will suffer modification landed aristocrats and the Dig
as a result of introducing [into Parliament] now. men and different 
principles". Jbese democratic recruits to Parliament are likely to
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bring with them ‘'claims of a new kind, which hitherto have scarcely 
come to halting and involuntary expression and have been not so much 
demanded as vaguely feared ..." This is precisely the situation in 
Western Europe today with the introduction of social democracy into 
government. But the fact that social democracy is halting and even 
retrograde in its enaction of its own principles has little to do with 
betrayal, conscious or otherwise, of working-class interests. “If", 
notes Hegel,
we grasp this hitherto different character of an 
opposition as it appears in France, it is most 
distinctively expressed in the surprise, expressed 
recently in France at every change of Ministry, 
that individuals coming out of opposition into 
power now acted on almost the same maxims as their 
supplanted successors. In French opposition 
papers we read naive complaints that so many 
excellent individuals become backsliders as a 
result of their progress through office and become 
false to the left to which they belonged earlier, 
i e that, while of course they had previously
in abstracto that there had to be a govern­
ment they-"have nowleamt what a government really 
is and that something more is needed for it than 
principles. (1964:328-329)
If modern social democracy fails In the end to bring about the 
changes for which it has a mandate, It will have to turn once again to 
the working class and the sectarian parties of the radical middle
The result will be as Hegel describes?
alienated or
Marxist theories of tne sxaw **
lated or external view of the state. As in Hegel's time, the
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only rational postyre toward the state is supposed to be a critical 
or hostile one; expressions favourable to the state are felt to be 
’•reformist" or even reactionary. "At the present time," writes 
Hegel, "the idea that freedom of thought, and of mind generally, 
evinces itself only in divergence from, indeed in hostility to, what 
is publicly recognized, might seem to be most firmly rooted in 
connexion with the state ..." (1976:4) Hegel argues, however, that
the state embodies human rationality, and that the problem of philo­
sophy, or social science, is to discover the elements of that 
rationality. As we have seen, this is not to deny that there are bad 
states or unhealthy governments, or that the state is not altogether
what it could be. "... The intelligent observer may meet much that 
fails to satisfy the general requirements of right; for who is not 
acute enough to see a great deal in his own surroundings which is 
really far from what it ought to be?" (1975:10) nevertheless, as 
He<rel puts it, "'The laws regulating ... civil society are the insti­
tutions of the rational order which glimmers in them." (1976:281)
The consciousness and interests of all the people within a state
are the elements of cohesion which hold the state together. If it
lacks this essential aspect of cohesion, remarks Hegel,
the state is left in the air. The state is actual 
nniv when its members have a feeling of their own 
self-hood and it is stable only when public and
private ends are identical. It has often been
S i d  that the end of the state is the happiness 
nf its citizens. That is perfectly true. If all 
7- not well with them, if their subjective aims
are not satisfied, if they do not find that the
as Such is the means to their satisfaction, 
then the footing of the state itself is insecure.
(1976:281)
ho constitution of a state is perpetually reproduced hy ’Hi«*- a a I  1 v f i
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efforts of the individuals within it. But "If the state and its
constitution fall apart, if the various members of the organism free
themselves, then the unity produced by the constitution is no longer
an established fact." (1976*282)
"mat is rational is actual," writes Hegel in the Philosophy of
Ri£ht, "and what is actual is rational." (1976:10) This statement
expresses the core of the dialectic method. But it has led to much
misunderstanding of Hegel’s position, especially as expressed in the
belief that Hegel is here offering a carte blanche for the existing
system. In fact, however, Hegel's statement simply refers to the
essential relationship between individual, his or her social class, and
the state. Hegel writes in the History of Philosophy that the function
of the state is to fill "man's requirements. For what is real, is
rational. The point to know, however," Ilegel continues,
is what exactly is real; in common life all is 
real but there is a difference between the 
phenomenal world and reality * The real has an
external existence, which displays arbitrariness
and contingency, Hk® a tree> J house, a plant, 
uhirh in nature come into existence. V/hat is on 
T e  J t z T e  in the moral [social] sphere, men's 
ijnn involves much that is evil, and might in 
other°vays he hotter, men will ever he wicked 
and depraved, but this is not the Idea. If the 
walitv of the substance is recognized, the 
surface where the passions battle must be
The temporal and the transitory 
c e rte ln ly  exists and may cause us trouble enough, 
butin spite of this it is no true reality ...
(1894s96)
The external capitalist state, like any other, fills the recrements 
of the individuals within it. And alone with Its neeative elements,
, holow. it contains the glimmerings, the aspects of which are detailed oeio ,
' . ' rven the constitutional monarchy of Hegel's period,a rational order. Fven w «
* for Hegel —  as I will demonstrate in thea system of government wbicn
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concluding chapter —  is merely a transitory form of the state» even
this state has its rational aspects» "... The right", notes Hegel,
that there must he one man at the head of affairs 
seems contingent ... if it is treated as abstract 
and as posited. This right, however, is inevitably 
present both as a felt want and as a requirement 
of the situation. Monarchs are not exactly 
distinguished for bodily prowess or intellectual 
gifts,"and yet millions submit to their rule. How 
to say that men allow themselves to be ruled 
cotinter to their own interests is preposterous.
Ken are not so stupid. It.is their need, the inner 
might of the Idea, which, even against what they 
appear to think, constrains them to obedience and 
keeps them in that relation. (1976s289i my 
emphasis)
The external state of the bourgeoisie is not, as Western Marxists 
suppose, an illusion foisted on the workers to keep them in their 
place. If it is an illusion, it is a shared illusion of the worker 
and the capitalist alike. An example from recent history might serve 
to illustrate this poiht. The force of the illusion of the external 
capitalist state persuaded the working class in the United States to 
brush aside the leadership of the Communist Party in the 1930’s and 
opt instead for Roosevelt’s Bew Deal. The D.S. workers and capitalists 
alike later provided the vital war material necessary for the Red Army 
to contain and turn back fascism; later they Joined with the Soviets 
to liberate Europe. The deolsion of the C.S. working class to reject 
both fascism and communism may well have stemmed from an illusion, but 
it was, in Marx’s phrase, »a UJarion-. (1973:509) More­
over, considering the theoretical and practical poverty of Western 
Marxism at that time, not to mention the barbaric nature of the Soviet 
alternative it held up so hopefully to the U.S. workers, who is to sajr
numbed to an illusion? No doubt possibilities and that the workers, succum,— . —  - ---
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more possibilities could be raised to refute this argument. But as 
Hegel says, "Everything ... is as impossible as it is possible." The 
thing, however, is to "stick to the actual ..." (1975:203-204) And
the actual in this case meant the defeat of fascism in Europe.
The Western Marxist notion that the working class is held in 
thrall by, and integrated into, the external capitalist state by the 
conscious or unconscious manipulation of the bourgeoisie merely 
conceals a middle class elitism common to intellectuals. This elitism 
forms an essential element of Western Marxist theory and does not 
help to popularize the socialist alternative in the U.S. and Canadian
working class, which unlike its European counterpart, admitB no 
superiority to the intellectuals. Contrary to Western Marxist opinion, 
the working class is not deceived by the capitalists: nor is it any 
more prey to false consciousness than are the theorists of Western 
Marxism. The goals of bourgeois society are also the goals of the 
workers within it. "A great genius," writes Hegel, Ironically
referring to Frederick the Great,
propounded as a problem for a public^essay 
competition «whether it be permissible to deceive 
_eooie« jke answer must have been that a people 
does not ¿Uow itself to be deceived about its 
substantive basis, the essence and specific 
rhjjracterof its mind. On the other hand, it is 
self-deceived about the manner of its knowledge 
ofthese things and about its corresponding 
Judgment of its actions, experiences, etc.
(1976:205)
i^rx the worker and the capitalist, as well as the According to mrx,
, . _b,aT.« the same distorted vision of capital and thepolitical economist, share
„ mhe capitalist, the worker and the politicallabour process.
+hn nhvsical elements of the labour process economist .. all think ox « x . j— —
as capital Just because of their physical characteristics." (1976.1007
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1008) Similarly, the worker entertains an illusory view of the state 
which is more or less identical to that of the bourgeoisie and its 
apologists; a view which "is of course consolidated, nourished and 
inculcated by the ruling classes by all means available". (Marx, 1973: 
165) If for the capitalist "money becomes an end rather than a means 
..." (Marx, 1 973x332) it is also an end for the workers. "The more 
production becomes the production of commodities", writes Marx, "the 
more each person has to, and wishes to, become a dealer in commodities, 
then the more everyone wants to make money, either from a product, or 
from his services, and this money-making appears as the ultimate 
purpose of activity of any kind." (1976:1041) The organic relation 
between the worker and the capitalist is recreated in the Btate, since 
"every form of production creates its own legal relations, form of 
government, etc."» the mode of production and the state, therefore, 
"are organically related". Moreover, if the worker is subordinated to 
the capitalist in the production process, this relation also appears 
in the state itself: «the right of the stronger prevails in ... 
•constitutional republics' as well- as in otter types of government,
"only in another form". (Itirr,
The essential question, however, is not whether the state is an 
instrument for the oppression of the worker, since this oppression is 
pre-supposed in the economic system itself. Tte e s p i a l 'question 
is. rather, what are the elements in the state through which the 
worker- „Q than the capitalist, finds egression ate E S E i M  iEE.
his or her «virtuality, the answer to this question will provide
. 4 . ration for the external capitalist state, but alsonot only the — ~
- ex, „n^iv transitory and phenomenal existence. "The the reason for its -----
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state", says Hegel,
is actual, and its actuality consists in this 
that the interest of the whole is realized in 
and through particular ends. Actuality is always 
the unity of universal and particular, the 
universal dismembered in the particulars which 
seem to be self-subsistent, although they really 
are upheld and maintained only in the whole 
(1976:283)
Hegel distinguishes the state in the "strictly political" sense,
i.e. as the government and constitution, from the state as such, i.e.,
society in general with its network of laws,- customs and social
relations. (1976:163) ”... The state, as the mind of a nation," he
writes, "is both the law permeating all relationships within the
state and also at the same time the manners and consciousness of its
citizens." In the same way, however, "the constitution", i.e., the
political embodiment of the state, "depends on the character and
development of [the nation’s] self-consciousness". Accordingly, the
constitution merely reflects the development of the self-consciousness
or political awareness of the individuals within a state, "ln its
self-consciousness its [the nation’s] subjective freedom is rooted and
so, therefore, is the actuality of its constitution," (1976:178-79)
U.S.S.R. and the other socialist republics have highly advanced
constitutions, but these constitutions remain dead and lifeless,
precisely because they fail to reflect the actual (low) political and
self-conscious awareness of the mass of individuals within these
states, "A constitution", remarks Hegel,
is not just something manufactured; it is the 
work of centuries, it is the Idea, the conscious­
ness of rationality so far as that consciousness 
is developed in a particular nation ,,. a 
nation’s constitution must embody its feeling for 
its rights and its position, otherwise there
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may be a constitution there in an external 
way, but it is meaningless and valueless.
(1976:286-287)
2 ler>gth of time required for the development of the 
consciousness of individuals within a nation explains the perennial 
¿ig^P.ointment experienced by radicals in the West at the Perversion 
socialist principles whenever they are applied through revolution 
in backward countries. The abstract theory propounded by Western 
Marxists leads them to believe that a transformation in the mode of 
production ought to lead to an equivalent transformation in the 
ideological superstructure. This is merely what Hegel would call a 
dream of the understanding or bourgeois consciousness which is prey 
to the notion that ideas or ideology as they appear in the minds of 
individuals "are nothing but chimeras" as opposed to what the bour­
geois mind takes to be concrete, actual reality, "The divorce between
idea and reality", notes Hegel,
is especially dear to.the analytic understanding 
«Ainh looks upon its own abstractions, dreams
, ■ „ first, because it fails to adequatelycular danger to ¿Hein, >
, , / V ♦wo.nrize) the presence and achievement of rationalityacknowledge (,anu rutuij- j
granted, an
and freedom
d therefore jeopardizing their further existence (as the
the early 1930*0 (Claudin, 1975*127-165))} 
g exaggerated importance on. revolutions.>
oral politics in the Vest, it only
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undermines inthe eyes of the workers in the capitalist countries the 
liberating- potential of communism and communist ideas, and theoreti­
cally negates ihe real achievements of the very workers whose cause 
they claim to support.
The rationality and freedom achieved in the Western capitalist 
democracies, however limited they m y  be, and however flawed their 
application, are the result precisely of the educational process 
experienced by individuals in bourgeois society through their labour 
and activity in the production system. This liberating and educational 
effeCt of labour under capitalism is for both Hegel and Marx, the keg 
factor in the transition to a new and higher form of civilization,
»... The severe discipline of capital, acting on succeeding genera­
tions», writes Marx, "develops general industriousness as the general 
property of the new species..." The »ceaseless striving» of capital 
»towards the general form of wealth», he continues,
drives labour beyond the limits of natural paltriness 
... and thus creates the material elements of the 
rich individuality which is as all-sided in production 
as in consumption, and whose labour also therefore 
appears no longer as labour, but as. the development 
of activity itself ... This is why capital is 
■ ' ■ . productive; i.e, an essential relation for TTTa 
development of the social productive' forces' ~
A fundamental aspect of the dialectic method is that it emphasises 
the Positive and creative aspects of the development of individual 
human consciousness in history. Thus the external, negative and criti 
cal methodology of Western Marxism is the reverse of the dialectic
method. Instead, therefore, of 
capitalism, as do Hegel and flarx
emphasizing the liberating effects of 
, Western Marxism concentrates on the
, impending approach the "death agony" of "late capitalism" —  a mode
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of production which is supposed to collapse under the sheer weight of 
its own contradictions. It is, of course, easy to find the negative 
factors which are supposed to lead to the disappearance of a social 
system; it is more difficult, as well as more scientific, to look for 
the positive features which will eventually cause the system to
transcend itself.
Marx's writings on the capitalist mode of production, especially 
in the Grundrisse (1973) &nd Part Seven of Capital (1976), should he 
read as a dialogue with Hegel. Marx's emphasis on the liberating 
effects of capitalism, for example, merely repeats a similar emphasis 
in Hegel's Philosophy of RigHt« For Hegel, civil or bourgeois society 
is devoted to satisfying the particular needs of individuals; never­
theless the universal relationships formed in bourgeois society give 
it a rational or social character. "The aim" of capitalist society,
writes Hegel,
is the satisfaction of. subjective particularity 
but the universal asserts itself in the bearing 
which this satisfaction has on the needs of others 
and their free and arbitrary wills,-. The show of 
rationality thus produced in this sphere of 
finitude is the Understanding, and this la the 
aspect which is of most Importance in considering 
this sphere and which itself constitutes the 6 
reconciling element within it. (1976s126}
Marx repeats Hegel's observation in a similar passage in the Crundri®8e*'
... capital creates the bourgeois society, and the
universal appropriation of nature as well as of
the social bond itself by members of society.■*Eence
the great civilising influence of capital; its ""
production of a stage of society in comparison to 
which all earlier ones appear as mere local 
developments of humanity,... (1973•*4OS'HiO)
The most dramatic feature of capitalism 13 its constant creation
of new n e e d s and the means for their satisfaction. This richne-’«' in
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production and consumption leads to a corresponding richness in the 
individuality of persons within capitalism. The identity between 
production and consumption leads Hegel to suggest that only under 
bourgeois society does the "concrete, i.e. social" individual —  the 
"universal person" (1976:12?, 134) become a reality. "Here at the 
standpoint of" civil society, writes Hegel, "what we have before us is 
the composite idea which we call man. This is the first time, and 
indeed properly the only time, to speak of man in this sense." (1976*127) 
For Hegel, the many-sided production and consumption, the creation 
of new branches of industry, and so on, within bourgeois society pro­
duce in the individual a sense of "refinement, i.e. a discrimination 
between these multiplied needs, and judgement on the suitability of 
means to their ends", (1976:127) Koreover, the universality of social 
needs, their dependence on the ideas and opinions of individuals them­
selves rather than on external necessity, have in them "the aspect of 
liberation". (1976:126) This liberating aspect of capitalism is also 
pointed out by Marx, who observes that the bourgeois mode of production
leads to
the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new 
needs arising from society itself, the cultivation 
of all the qualities of the social human being 
production of the same in a form as rich as ^  
possible in needs, because rich in qualities and 
' relations —  production of this being as the most 
total and universal possible social product for 
in order to take gratification i n  a many-sided V  
way, he must be capable of many pleasures 
hence cultured to a high degree ... ***
For liarx, the creation of the "social human being* is not something
which must await the coming of communism, rather it _V 13 a condition n-r
..
■productJon founded on £9?^fell (1973:409? my emphasis)
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The Western Harxist critics of the external capitalist state have 
all but ignored this humanizing moment, and echo their bourgeois 
opponents who lament the existence of "self-satisfied materialism and 
consumerism" among the masses. Baran and Sweezy, for example, believe 
that "advertising, product differentiation, artificial obsolescence, 
model changing, and all the other devices of the sales effort" are 
superfluous creations of a monopoly capitalism driven to any means to 
preserve itself and prevent stagnation. (1966:141) While paying lip- 
service to the civilizing aspects of consumer society, Handel draws 
essentially the same conclusions as Baron and Cweezy. The factors in 
consumer society which have made possible the liberation of women and 
children, for example, are for Handel signs of "decay" and "the 
historical decline of an entire social system and mode of production".
(1978:502, 570) Accordingly, Handel laments "the rapid decline of the 
production of immediate use-values within the family, previously cared 
for by the worker's Oic.'] wife (sic.'], mother [ s i c ! ]  and daughter 
[sic,»]". As a result of this decline, "the material basis of the 
individual family disappears in the sphere of consumption ..." Witness
)f this decline, states Handel,
is provided by the rise of a pronounced "teenager" 
market, the growing consumption of working class 
youth outside the working class family, the -
increasingly sharp separation of the generation of 
pensioners from the generation of adults, and so 
on. There is no need to stress the serious psychic 
damage resulting from such atomization (neglected 
children, lonely adults, old people wasting avm v)
(1970:391)
The critique o f consumer society by the exponents of Western
Marxism contrasts strongly not only with the writings of Hegel and Harx 
>ut also with classical Harxism, as expressed, for-example,"by Trotsky
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For Trotsky, the freedon of consumption in capitalist a o c le t y  is 
precisely what differentiates it from the authoritarianism of the 
U.S.S.B. "... The very scope of human demands”, he writes, "changes 
fundamentally with the growth of world technique. The contemporaries 
of Harx knew nothing of automobiles, radios, moving pictures, aero­
planes. A socialist society, however, is unthinkable without the free 
enjoyment of these goods." Trotsky argues that capitalist society in 
the 19^0*3 was approaching "'The lowest stage of Communism*", and he 
bitterly contrasts the privileged consumption of the Russian bureau­
cracy with the generalized consumption which was even then appearing in
V/estern capitalist society:
IIow many years are needed in order to make it 
possible for every Soviet citizen to use an auto­
mobile in any direction he chooses, refilling his 
gas tank without difficulty en route? In 
barbarian society the rider and the pedestrian 
constituted two classes. The automobile differen­
tiates society no less than the saddle horse. So 
long as even a modest "Ford" remains the privilege 
of a minority, there survive all the relations and  
customs proper to a bourgeois society. And 
together with them there remains the guardian of 
inequality, the state, C1970:57"53)
The critique of consumerism stems from the. assumption that the 
working-class individual is somehow different from his or her bourgeois 
counterpart. But the worker and the bourgeois are not really so 
different, and the goal of bourgeois striving is also the goal of the 
worker. Thus the "keeping up with the Jones's" syndrome so obvious in 
advanced capitalist societies is simply bourgeois striving as it 
appears in working class and middle class individuals» This syndrome 
is precisely manifestation of the demnnd for equality among 
individuals within civil society. The development of the social
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relations of the individual stimulated by production and consumption
under capitalism "becomes”, writes Hegel,
a particular end-determinant for means in them­
selves and their acquisition, as well as for the 
maimer in which needs are satisfied. Further, it 
directly involves the demand for equality of 
satisfaction with others. The need for this” 
equality and for emulation, which is the equalizing 
of oneself with others, as well as the other need ^ 
also present here, the need of the particular to 
assert itself in some distinctive way, become 
themselves a fruitful source of the multiplication 
of needs and their satisfaction, (1976:i27-128f my 
emphasis)
The widening of the consumer choice of the worker in bourgeois
society, the greater flexibility in purchases, as well as the increased 
access to production and goods made possible by the extension of con­
sumer credit to the working class individual in the form of universal 
credit cards, are not portents of the decay of capitalism as Western 
Marxism contends, but rather necessary and. predictable moments of
capitalist production itself. They; are also heralds of the free gooda 
soclety op the future, where individual cfnsumntfçn will be disciplined 
and controlled the cultured and civilized ' conajiloumesa of the 
social individual. In this society, notes Trotsky, "money will become 
ordinary paper slips, like trolley or theatre tickets", which, inciden­
tally, have already been made almost obsolescent in North America by 
the credit card. "As Socialism advances", Trotsky continues, "these 
slips will disappear, » 3  control oyer individual consumption —  whether 
ly money or administration -  will no lonCer be necessary when there is
.. „„.„„h of everything for everybody!" (19641217)more than enough o* .
"... Free exchange among individuals", states Farx, "who are
■ nf common appropriation and control of the means associated on the basis
s the development of material and cultural
of production ... pre— PP
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conditions" within the capitalist mode of production. (1973:159)
These conditions are outlined by Hegel: The "intelligence" of the
individual within civil society,
with its grasp of distinctions, multiplies 
human needs, and since taste and utility become 
criteria of judgement, even the needs themselves 
are affected thereby. Finally, it is no longer 
need but opinion which has to be satisfied, and 
it is just the educated man who analyses the 
concrete into particulars. The very multiolieatlnn 
2 l  needs involves a check on desire, because when—
E22X  l a  the urge to o b t H n l ^ T T ^
thing which might be needed, is less strong/Imd---
this is a sign that want altogether is’ not” so—  
imperious. (T970V269; my "emphasis) ‘ ’ —
As Karx puts it, it is precisely through the consumption and expendi­
ture habits of the free worker that "He learns to control himself, in 
contrast to the slave, who needs a master." (1976:1033)
Contemporary Marxist critics of capitalist society often focus on 
advertising and distribution costs under capitalism. "... it can bQ 
accepted without further ado”, writes Handel, "that the majority of 
these expenditures are not determined by the interests of consumers 
but by specific condition and contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production." (1978:399) Handel points out that these costs absorb 
more than 5C£j of U.S. national income. There is, no doubt, much 
wastage involved in advertising, packaging and distribution costs, but 
it is symptomatic of the abstraction of the Marxist mind that it ignores 
the incredible e f f i c i e n c y  and rationality brought about by the Uorth 
American marketing and distribution e f f o r t . What immediately strikes 
the U . S .  o r Canadian citizen abroad is precisely the wastage in ■ th*..... ’Mi« «m « —■ - n- *
energy/ o f the consumer involved in inefficient marketing distribution 
and research. One reason for the myopia of Marxist theory in this 
respect is its tendency to discount or ignore anything which relates to
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the time and effort of the domestic purchaser, who, of course, is 
usually a woman, and whose effort therefore is outside the purview of 
the "theoretician”, who is usually a man. Trotsky who, alone among 
the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution, maintained close contacts 
with events in the U.S.A. and Canada, also recognized the value of the
U.3. consumer market effort:
Nowhere else has the study of the internal market 
reached such intensity as in the United States,
It ha3 been done by your banks, trusts, individual 
business men, merchants, travelling salesmen, and 
farmers as part of their stock in trade.
A socialist government in the U.S.A., Trotsky adds,
will simply abolish all trade secrets, will combine 
all the findings of these researches for individual 
profit, and will transform them into a scientific 
system of economic planning. In this your govern­
ment will be helped by the existence of a lar^e 
class of cultured and critical consumers. 
combining the nationalized key industries, your 
private businesses and democratic consumer 
cooperation, you will quickly develop a highly 
flexible system for serving the needs of your 
population, (1964*217)
Along with many other critics, Mandel complains that the sover­
eignty 
a myth
of the consumer much touted by bourgeois apologists is actually 
since "these »sovereign consumers * first have to be persuaded
of their new needs through advertising". (1972*598) Both Marx and
egel, however, observe that the essence of universal rather'than 
erely necessary human needs is preciselx that must be stimulated 
id goaded through advertising and example, otherwise thgs elrn^Lg.-would 
2t exist, "bhat the ShglisH call 'comfort*«, writes Hegel,
^ I T c r a f o r t " * ;  any stags is dlscoafort, m i  
the-c discoveries never cose to an end. ner.ee 
l hebeed for ercater effort doe. not exactly
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arise from within you directly; it is suggested 
to you by those who hope to make a profit from 
its creation. (1976:269)
For Marx, consumer advertising reflects nothing less than an essential 
aspect of the civilizing moment of capitalism. Thus where Western 
Marxism sees advertising as part of the "irrational system" and a ploy 
to avoid economic stagnation by foisting consumption on the worker 
(Baran and Sweezy, 1966:128-131 ) » * '!nrx views it as a necessary and pro­
gressive force which allows the worker "his only share of civilization 
which distinguishes him from the slave ..." The capitalist, cays Marx,
searches for means to spur [the worker] to consumption, 
t o s s i v o  his wares new charms, to inspire them with 
new needs by constant chatter etc. It is precisely 
this side of the relation of capital and labour which 
is arf essential civilizing moment, and on which the 
Justification, but also the contemporary 
capi tal"-rests. (1972:28? 5 ray emphasis)
The development of the consumer society in the advanced Western
. . „ „ r w + e  end strengthens the foundation of democracycountries si rani y *■*-  -------- -— ;----------- -------------- -— — “*
and individuai freedom in the external capitalist state. This relation, 
entirely „«looted ty »«tern forato, ls repeatedly stressed by both
wording to Marx, the competition between capitalists liege 1 ana iiarx« AvV
+i ^  ^-nes of the worker means that the individual capitalist
, , . .. a ,,m *ker as an ecual. The competition of the capitalistsrelates to the voider —
, fragments their class power and seta up afor the worker's
. «V r.o^oetin" social powers. "... It is the pluralistic network of c o - p e ^  *  ^ ' ---
• -  ^* — * q»*)j ■f.tila"« writes Marx,competition among cayiraio. t
i d i f f e r e n c e  to and independence .of one
the!frtì which brings it about that the individual anotner, * * nf the entire- i t a l  relates to the workers of the entire 
raining capital not as to workers ... What 
Wisely distinguishes capital from the master- 
relation is that the worker confronts 







and that in the form of the possessor of money, 
in the form of money he becomes a simple centre 
of circulation —  one of its infinitely many 
centres, in which his specificity as a worker is 
extinguished. (1973 .'420-421)
Money procures to the worker a certain social power which he or 
she can exercise in the market place. The worker receives his or her 
wages "in the shape of money, exchange-value, the abstract social form 
of wealth". And this "exchange-value, abstract wealth" remains in the 
worker's
mind as something more than a particular use-value 
hedged round with traditional and local restrictions.
It is the worker himself who converts the money into 
whatever use-value he desires; it is he who buys 
commodities as he wishes and, as the owner of money, 
as the buyer of goods,he stands in precisely the 
came relationship to the sellers of goods as any 
other buyer. Of course, the conditions of his 
existence —  and the limited amount of money he can
earn __ compel him to make his purchases from a
fairly restricted selection of goods. But some 
variation is possible as we can see from the fact 
that newspapers, for example, form part of the essen­
tial purchases of the urban English worker, He can 
cave or hoard a little. Or else he can squander his 
money on drink. Dut even so he acts as a.free 
arent; he must pay his own way; he is responsible 
to himself for the way he spends his wages. (Marx,
197*621033)
»die the purchasing power of the worker is severely linitea, It is 
nevertheless a social 22HSI BS& H m S a
of the worker:
rm,e o-eneral exchange of activities and products,
Chiefhas become a vital condition for each ,
T m Hdual —  their mutual interconnection —  here 
ln ic something alien to them, autonomous, as 
i f  exchange value, the social connection; 
a a is transformed into a social
re‘l"uon between thinSs! personal capacity into^ 
f7 7  ‘ „--ith.' The less social power the medium
... «» th.
0f "7 theoomunity which binds the individuals.
C e i h e k  ihe patriarchal relation, the connunlty
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of antiquity, feudalism and the guild system. [But 
under capitalism] each individual possesses social 
power in the form cf a thing I my
emphasis)
Before 1917* the great mass of the Russian people lacked precisely this 
autonomous power, this medium of exchange, and the institutions of 
Czardom reflected its absence. In this society, individuals could make 
their collective will felt only by violence. "In despotisms", Hegel 
argues: "where there are only rulers and the people, the people is 
effective, if at all, only as a mass destructive of the organization of 
the state." (1976:292) But the new Soviet state which arose out of 
the destruction of the old regime failed to place any effective social 
power in the hands of the individual. But as Trotsky points out, 
socialism roust be based precisely on individual centres of social
power expressed as money( otherwise it degenerates into autocracy.
Socialism in the United States, ho writes,
will be made to work, not by bureaucracy and hot bv 
policement, but by hard cold cash. Your almighty 
dollar will play a principal part in making your new 
soviet system work. It is a great mistake to try to 
nix a "planned economy" with a "managed currency"
Your money must act as regulator with which to ^ * 
measure the success or failure of your planning 
Your "radical" professors are dead wrong in their 
devotion to "managed money". It is an academic idea 
which could easily wreck your entire system of 
distribution and production. That is the great 
l e s s o n  to be derived from the Soviet Union,"’ where 
bitter necessity has been converted into official 
virtue in the monetary realm. (1964:217)
In the Soviet Union all power went to the state in a vast effort 
of social development; individual consumption requirements were sacri­
ficed to the immediate demands of large-scale industry, or what Karx 
calls "fixed capital". This situation, however, is the exact opposite 
of what i s  n e c e s s a r y  to.the development of a socialist or even a
40Q
communist society. Communist society cannot be based on large-scale 
industry to the detriment of the needs of consumers. The development 
of the productive forces under communism must be based first of all on 
an economy which already provider? adequate consumer goods for
individuals.
The part of production which is oriented towards the 
production of fixed capital does not produce direct 
objects of individual gratification, nor direct 
exchange values. Hence, only when a certain decree 
of productivity has already been r e a c h e ? ^ ^ ^ ^ v ^ T  
a 2l  production time is sufficient fnr i^Cdfete
production —  can an increasingly large part'lie-- '— ^
gPPjjgij to the production of profet ion
This requires that society be able to wait; that a 
large part of the wealth already created can be 
withdrawn both from immediate consumption, in order 
to employ this part for labour which is not 
im m e d ia te ly productive, (1973:707) ---
But Russia was in no way "able to wait", and its course of development
followed the lines already suggested by Ifogels;
The process of the replacement of no less than 500 000 
large landowners and approximately 80 million peasants 
can only be accomplished at the cost of terrible 
suffering and convulsions. History is the cruellest 
of goddesses, and she drives her chariot of triumph 
over mountains of corpses —  not only in war, but also 
in "peaceful” economic development. (Quoted in 
Rosdolsky, 1277*464)
Under Soviet "communism”, the individual had no access to autonomous 
social power in the t o m  of exchange-value and money. The result was 
predictable: "Rob the thing of this social power," says Iiarx, "and you 
must give it to persons to exercise over persons." (1973:158)
The modern socialist republics are generally considered to be 
Instances of "the dictatorship of the proletariat”, or even of the 
dictatorship of a "new class”. In fact, however, as I pointed out in 
Chapter 7, they are instances of the autocratic rule of what Hegel 
calls, "the middle class, the class in which the consciousness of right
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and the developed intelligence of the mass of the people is found". 
( 1 9 7 6 :1 9 3 ) According- to Hegel, the-raiddle class should be distinguished 
from the business and agricultural classes, for it is the middle class 
which supplies the bulk of recruits to the "universal class" of civil 
servants and the professions. "The universal class he writes,
"has for its task the universal interests of the community. It must 
therefore be relieved from direct labour to satisfy its needs, either 
by having private means or by receiving an allowance from the state 
which claims its industry, with the result that the private interest 
finds its satisfaction in its work for the universal Csociety]." (1976$ 
1 3 2 ) A s we have seen, Hegel argues that the middle class must be counter­
balanced by the business class from below and also by the head of state 
from above. Only these forces "effectually prevent it from acquiring 
the isolated position of an aristocracy and using its education and skill 
as an arbitrary tyranny”. (1976:193) The middle class, notes Ilegel, la 
an essential element in the modem state for "a state without a middle 
class must ... remain on a low level”. Hut the middle class can be
developed in a healthy sta^e,
only by giving authority to spheres of particular 
internets, which are relatively independent, and by 
appointing an army of officials whose personal 
arbitrariness is broken against such authorized 
bodies? Action in accordance with everyone's rights, 
the habit of such action, is a consequence of 
munterpoise of officialdom which independent and 
self-subsistent bodies create, (1976:291)
The socialist republics and many Third World countries are lacking
■ , nl«ments of civil society capable of countervailing theprecisely the element
' e-bleated middle class. The result is an "arbitrarypower, of the eaueaxt-u.
„ Jvi+ailirentsiaj ana since no one is less tolerant of tyranny of the anx^j.-*-o
p Overrent ideas than the intellectual, the freethe expression of divexgunv
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exchange of ideas in the communist countries is severely limited. Under 
Stalin, the strength of the middle class in the U.S.3.R, waa continually 
decimated precisely to curb its growing power. "It was one of the 
effects of the purges", Deutschcr points out, "that they prevented the 
managerial groups from consolidation a3 a social stratum. Stalin 
whetted their acquisitive instincts and wrung their necks." The middle 
class was prohibited by Stalin from becoming a possessing class, a 
business class —  "they could not start accumulating capital while 
they were hovering between their offices and the concentration camps", 
Moreover, the middle class in the U.S.S.E. is unlikely to develop into 
a possessing class, even without Stalin, since its "power and 
privileges is bound up with the national ownership of the productive 
resources ... » (Deutscher, 1965, 111:306-507, 305) Western Marxism 
itself tends to represent not the working class, but rather the radical 
elements of the middle class posing as a universal class, the represen­
tative of the worker and the poor. This leads to the failure of 
Western Marxism to theorize and appreciate the reality of bourgeois 
society as well as the role of the capitalist and the worker in its 
progressive development.
3 Wr.rk and the Social Individual in Capitalist Society 
For Pegel, the external capitalist state is the sphere in which
the "particularity" of the individual "is educated up to-subjectivity".
Capitalism constitutes a "barrier" under which the social individual
.... «r <-he "overcomes it ahd attains" his or her matures until he or
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"objective reality in the finite". The universal interests of society- 
are unknown to the individual in bourgeois society since he or she looks 
after only purely personal and selfish interests. As a result, even 
education itself is treated as "a acre means” to the satisfaction of 
needs, "the pleasures and comforts of private life". The education 
achieved by the individual attains only the level of the understanding 
or bourgeois mind; and freedom remains merely formal since civil 
society "is implicitly inimical to mind’s appointed end, freedom". 
Nevertheless, education teaches the individual that in society "it has 
to do here only with what it has itself produced and stamped with its 
own seal". Education within capitalism is the hard struggle of work 
and self-realization; it in a cljlgn struggle, where the individual 
attains sclf-consciousness within the framework of his or her social 
role in the system of production. "The final purpose of education",
remarks Hegel,
is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation 
education is the absolute transition from an ethical suWan* 
tiality which is immediate and natural to one which i 
lectual and so infinitely subjective and lofty enough to * 
have attained universality of form. In the individual
this liberation is theJmrd struggle-against.pure subjeoUvi+y'
of demeanour, against the immediacy of desire, a^ain-t + * * y 
empty subjectivity of feeling and the caprice of^desire,
The result of education under capitalism, then, is the social individual
"the infinitely free subjectivity", an "individuality" which is k
"genuinely existent in its own eyes". (1-976* 125-126) In the Crundrtsne
ilarx repeats Ilegel’s observations on the educational movement of capital
—  the creation of the social individual. The result of bourgeois pro­
duction, writes Farx,
terdeutially and potentially general development 
r ihV forces cf production —  of wealth as such —  as 
0 , • * The basis as /the possibility of the
* dorsal*development of the individual, and the realUÏ
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development of the individuals from this basis as 
a constant suspension of its barrier, which is 
recognized as a barrier, not taken for a sacred 
limit. Ilot an ideal or imagined universality of 
the individual, but the universality of his real 
and ideal relations. Hence also the grasping of 
his own history as a process, and the recognition 
of nature ... as his real body. (1973:542)
F o r both Hegel and Karx, education in capitalist s o c i e t y  i s  
"practical education acquired through working". This education, says 
Hegel,
consists first in the automatically recurrent need 
forsomething to do and the habit of simply being 
bu*y* next, in the strict adaptation of one’s 
activity according not only to the nature of the 
material worked on, but also, and especially, to the 
pleasure of other workers; and finally in a habit, 
n-oduced by this discipline, of objective activity 
and universally recognized aptitudes. (1976:129)
Ilegel emphasizes the "flexibility and rapidity of mind" developed by
the worker in the labour process, the "ability to pass from one idea 
to another, to grasp general and complex relations, and so on". (1976: 
129) Marx also stresses this development; moreover, he is convinced. 
that the flexibility and versatility of the worker is most highly 
developed in North America,. "Ve can see this versatility, this perfect 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  towards the particular content of work and the free
transition from one b ra n ch  o f industry to the next, most obviously in 
North America, w here the development of wage labour has been relatively 
untrammelled by the vestiges of the guild system, etc," (1976:1034) 
Although Marx"refers here only to the United States, much the same 
development has also occurred in Canada, as is evidenced in the close 
relations of the U.S. and Canadian labour movement.
For Marx, the versatility of the individual worker in north America 
stems precisely from the fact that rooneg, rather than the nature of the
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work itself, is the absolute goal of the worker. If the capitalist is 
driven by the desire for money, so is the worker; both share the same 
bourgeois values. The worker, writes Marx, is driven by "the eompul- 
sion to perform surplus labour"; this compulsion, in turn, "implies 
also the necessity of forming needs, and creating the means of satis­
fying them, and of supplying quantities of produce well in excess of 
the traditional requirements of the worker". (1976:1026) The drive 
for profit under capitalism, then, also implies vastly Increased living 
standards among the workers. Capital is infinitely versatile, and 
shows complete indifference to the type of production it finances; 
this indifference "is extended by capital to the worker. He is 
required to be capable of the same flexibility or versatility in the way 
he applies his labour-power". (1976:1013) The worker in advanced 
capitalist society loses interest in the work itself; the influence of 
traditional craftsmanship vanishes. The worker is no longer a shoemaker 
or a baker; he or she is motivated only by money and the "leisure time" 
required to develop his or her universal interests "independently of 
material production ..." (I97«t1026) "Jnat an capital", notes Kara,
views with indifference the particular physical
^ilse in which labour appears in the labour process, 
whether as a steam engine, dung heap or silk, so too 
+he worker looks upon the particular content of hia 
labour with equal indifference. Ills wort, belongs, to 
•,„1 ft is only the use-value of the commodity 
S  he’h“  ¡¡M, and he has only sold it to acquire
W . , ,  _________ A . V i  a  r r i f t - t n e  -  ft
¿ C ?  ¿ ¿ W K *  . . r
money and, with money, the means of subsistence. A
change ' ” ’'v --- + + „ twm
because evta-j- — - 
different development of his labour-power. (1976:1013)
J|U| “*• --- „ .
in his mode of labour interests hi  only 
every specific mode of labour requires a----— f •tni’dr.
- +v\o worker for self-improvement, and the ambitionThe desire of the .wor^
t .. 0 tt-i-nitalist mode of production, forms a vital aspect of spurred on by the cap*«-
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his or her relationship to the new generation of workers. "The free 
worker", states Karx, "is in principle ready and willing to accept 
every possible variation of his labour-power and activity which 
promised higher rewards ..." (197^.1034) But should these higher
rewards evade the worker's grasp he or she will encourage the rising 
generation to become educated and thereby increase its versatility and 
earning power in industry. If the worker's "indifference to the parti­
cular content of his work does not give him the power to vary his 
labour-power to order, he will express his indifference by inducing 
his replacements, the rising generation, to move from one branch of 
industry to the next, depending on the state of the market". The 
versatility of the worker is expressed in the ability of capital itself 
to invade new areas of production and conquer new territory for the 
capitalist system. "The more highly capitalist production is 
developed in a country, the greater the demand will be for versatility 
in labour-power, the more Indifferent the worker will be towards the 
speclflc content of his work and the more fluid will be the movement of *v
capital from one sphere to the next." (1976s 1 0 1 3-10 14)
The traits Marx perceives in the worker are nowhere more developed 
that, in north Africa! » f“ t vhich makes the traditional notion of 
socialism —  with its ascetic and authoritarian tinge —  much less 
appealing to the North imerican working class than to its European
x .. The fundamental character of the community”, Hegel counterpart. •••
v to the U.S.A., is "... the endeavour of the indivi-observes, referring, ,Hnn commercial profit, and gain; the predominance dual after acqaisn-Au«,
a. sovntinr itself to that of the community only for of private interests, devoting
.. But these traits are vital to theits own advantage." U ~ —  ----------;---------- *-------
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development of the independent self-consciousness of the social 
individual and, therefore, to the development of a new social order. 
As Hegel observes, "America is the land of the Future, where, in the 
ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall 
reveal itself ..." (1956: 86 ) "... The free worker's work", states
Harr, is "more intensive, more continuous, more flexible and skilled 
than that of the slave, quite apart from the fact that they fit him 
for a quite different historical role.» (1976:1033'} ray emphasis)
Karx'i'. observations on the relation of labour and capital in the 
United States, and its contrast with that relation in Europe and
England, are worth quoting in full precisely because Harx here 
emphasises the identity of the consciousness of the capitalist and the
worker, an identity ignored by Western Marxist theory:
Nowhere docs the fluidity of capital, the versatility
of labour and the indifference of the worker to the 
content of his work appear more vividly than in the 
United States of ... America, In Europe, even in 
England, capitalist production is still affected and 
distorted by hangovers from feudalism. The fact 
that baking, shoemaking, etc. are only just bein~ put 
on a capitalist basis in England is entirely duetto 
the circumstance that English capital cherished 
feudal preconceptions of "respectability", it Wa3 
"respectable" to sell Negroes into slavery, but it 
was not respectable to make sausages, boots or 
bread. Hence all the machinery which conquers the 
"unrespectable" branches of capitalism comes from 
A n e rica ..  B y the same token, nowhere are people so 
indifferent to the type of work they do as in the 
United States, nowhere are people so aware that 
their labour always produces the same product, 
money, and nowhere do they pass through the mo3t 
divergent kinds of work with the same nonchalance
(1976:1014)
The versatility of the U.S. worker is reflected today in the attitudes 
of college and university graduates. The unemployment rate for 
graduates in the United States is lower than in Western Europe precisely
416
because one-half of U.S. graduates have taken jobs in which they are 
underemployed relative to their education. They are, in other words, 
indifferent to the nature of their jobs and willing to work alongside 
men and women with a lower educational level. ”... American students”, 
write Cookson and Walker, "are much more flexible in their job 
ambitions than ... their counterparts in J3urope." (1978:VTI)
For Karx, Forth America i3 important, not because capitalism is 
there about to enter its '»final death agony”, but because a flourishing 
capitalist economy offers the best evidence for the inevitability and 
the future power of socialism. As Colletti suggests, "in any genuine 
Marxist perspective, the United States of America should be the 
naturest society in the world for a socialist transformation ...” 
(1977*347) Marx argues that a socialist s°ciety is one "in which indi­
viduals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where 
the specific kind is a matter of chance for then, hence indifference”, 
Labour is nothing but the means to create wealth, and a society where 
wealth and gain are the paramount ambitions is also the most advanced 
society. There labour no longer dominates the individual, but rather 
the individual dominates labour; labour "has ceased.to be organically
linked with individuals in any specific for». Such a state of
«is at its most developed in the most modemaffairs”, Karx continues, 1» ax a w  «. v
. . „ '<• hmrrmeois society —  in the United States."form of existence, of ixnugcux.. j
(1973:104)
■ ,,q «nnhasis on the educational aspects of modemKarx's and Iiegei s e.Ji Ji.-
insistence that education is an historiccapitalism, as well a. tnexr x
,, u t.vr.c venerations to achieve, may yet influence modem product.which takeo o
„ , , t0 abandon its abstract adulation of " M o U l i o *  ns itWestern marxism ao
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appears either in the Soviet Union or China. "One could say that this
indifference towards particular kinds of labour," notes Marx, as though
anticipating the neo-Stalinist and Maoist tendencies in the modern left,
appears e.g. among the aussians as a spontaneous 
inclination. But there is a devil of a difference 
between barbarians who are fit by nature to be used 
for anything, and civilized people who apply them­
selves to everything. And then in practice the 
Russian indifference to the specific character of 
labour corresponds to being embedded by tradition 
within a very specific kind of labour, from which 
only external influence can jar them loose.
(1973:105)
In the Grundrisse flarx suggests that "in Prance, owing to its peculiar 
social formation, many a thing is considered socialism that counts in 
England as political economy." (1973:805) With equal validity one 
could say tint many a thing is considered socialism in the U.S.S.R, and 
China that counts as political economy in the United States and Canada.
This observation is verified in that the U.S.S.R. at least has made 
catching up with the U.S.A. a national goal, (Handel, 1977?514)
indifference to specific types of labour shown by; the modern 
y°rken prepares the way; for the replacement of labour by; machinery and 
automatic processes. The versatility of the worker means that the 
division of labour in industry can proceed without encountering 
resistance from the worker. "The road” to automatic processes, notes
Karx,
¿„ ' dissection ... through the division of labour, 
which'gradually transforms the workers’ operations 
into*more and more mechanical ones, so that at a 
certain point a mechanism can step into their places 
labour no longer appears so much to be included 
Clthin the production process? rather the human
„ come3 to relate more as a watchman and regulator 
the production process itself ... He steps to the 
of the production process instead of being its
chief actor. (1973:784-705)
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The introduction of automatic processes. In turn, undermines the basis 
of capitalist production since this production is based precisely on 
the exchange-values created by the worker. Where the worker no longer 
takes a direct role in production, and where the number of workers 
required to produce commodities is constantly diminished relative to 
the amount of production itself, then the capitalist no longer has an 
adequate market for his or her commodities. At the same time, the 
reliance of capitalist production on automatic processes show3 the 
absolute dependence of the capitalist on what Marx calls, "the social 
intellect". Capital no longer appears as the achievement of single 
capitalists, but rather as the collective achievement of society, or 
the social individual, as embodied in the science and technology 
employed by the giant corporation. IcoordingljC, the responsibility 
for research and development in advanced capitalist societies is more 
and more becoming the prerogative, of the state. "In the production of 
large-scale industry," states Marx,
ixrt as the conquest of the forces of nature by 
th e social intellect is the precondition of the 
productive power of the means of labour as developed 
into the automatic process, on the one side, so, on 
the other, is the labour of the Individual in its
nresence posited as suspended individual, 1.e«
Thus the ... basis of this mode
Marx's «triking analysis of the development of automatic processes
under capitalism, which shows precisely how the positive movement of
capital in a booming bourgeois economy leads to the suspension or
e tha capitalist mode of production, is taken from a transcendence 01 wiw r
sinllar in .Haul's I W l o s o ^  of nijjvt. '"ïhe universal and
objective clement in w r k \  writes Begel,
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... lies in the abstracting process which effects 
the subdivision of needs and moans and thereby eo 
ipso subdivides production and brings about the 
division of labour. By this division, the work of 
the individual becomes less complex, and consequently 
his skill at hi3 section of the job increases, like 
his output. At the same time, this abstraction of 
one man’s skill and means of production from 
another's completes and makes necessary everywhere 
the dependence of men on one another and their 
reciprocal relation in the satisfaction of their 
needs. Further, the abstraction of one man's produc­
tion from another's makes work more and more 
mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside 
and install machines in his place. (1976:129)
4 . Inw and Justice in the External Capitalist State
According to Ilegel, the deve lopm ent and education of the indivi­
dual within the business class through work and industry creates a 
rational and self«-dependent consciousness in the individual, This con­
sciousness is shared by both the capitalist and the worker} thus the 
"bourgeois values" ef law, liberty and indiviaual freedom are no less 
the worker’s than they are the capitalist’s, "In the business class",
notes Ilegel,
intelligence is the essential thing ... the 
individual is throvsi back on himself, and this 
feeling of self-hood is most intimately connected 
with law and order. The sense of freedom and 
order has therefore arisen above all in the towns.
(19765270)
notion of law and order strikes the abstract
Westem Marxism as a mere 
of the capitalist class.
shibboleth for the defence of the privileges 
Indeed, in bourgeois society, where
inequality an* disparities of wealth and Power are the rule rather 
than the exception,. the rule of law is hound to reflect these
4 2 0
disparities. Notes Hegel,
That the citizens are equal before the law contains 
a great truth, but which so expressed is a 
tautology: it only states that the legal status 
in general exists, that the laws rule. But, as 
regards the concrete, the citizens —  besides their 
personality —  are equal before the law only in 
these points when they are otherwise equal outside 
the law. Only that equality which (in whatever way 
it be) they, as it happens, otherwise have in 
property, age, physical strength, talent, skill, 
etc. ... only it can make them ... equal in the 
concrete ... The laws themselves, except in so far 
as they concern that narrow circle of personality, 
presuppose unequal conditions, and provide for the 
unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting 
therefrom. (1969s266)
While "law and order" has certainly been employed as a means to 
combat the claims of the workers; it is also an essential element in 
the defence and envelopment of these claims. The following passages 
from Ilarx's discussion of the English Factory Acts in Capital provide 
an example of the fundamental importance of law and legislation for 
the working class:
A3 soon as the working class, stunned at first hv 
the noise and turmoil of the new system of production 
had recovered its senses to some extent, it beran to ’ 
offer resistance, first of all in England, the native 
land of large-scale industry. For three decade- 
however, the concessions wrung from industry by"the 
working class remined purely nominal. Parliament 
passed five labour Laws between 1802 and 1833 but w 
shrewd enough not to vote a penny for their cimpulaoS 
implementation, for the necessary official personnel 
etc. They remained a dead letter .... The factory ’ 
workers, especially since 1038, ... made the Ten Hours 
Bill their economic,'as they ... made the Charter 
[w h ic h  c a l l e d  for universal male suffrage and various 
electoral reforms, their political election cry. Some 
of the manufacturers, even, who had run their factories 
in conformity with the Act of 1033, overwhelmed 
Parliament with representations on the Immoral "com­
petition" of their "false brethren", who were able to 
break the law because of their greater impudence or 
their more fortunate local circumstances.
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The victories eventually achieved by the working class were reflected 
in the details of work legislation enacted by Parliament. "... These 
highly detailed specifications'*, notes Marx,
which regulate, with military uniformity, the times 
the limits and pauses of work by the stroke of the * 
clock, were by no means a product of the fantasy of 
Members of Parliament. They developed gradually out 
of circumstances as natural laws of the modem mode 
of production. Their formulation, official recog­
nition and proclamation by the state were the result 
of a long class struggle. (1976:390-395}
A s Marx points out, bourgeois respectability, liberty, and law 
and order are vital aspects of the consciousness of the modem worker. 
The worker, no less than the capitalist, is anxious for law and liberty,* 
he or she desires to have responsibility for the products of labour, and 
is keen to ensure that the commodities he or she produces are satis­
factory to the consumer. "The free worker", says 3'arx,
is impelled by his wants. The consciousness (or 
better: the idea) of free self-determination, of 
liberty, makes a much better worker of the £free 
individual] than of the [s l a v e ] , as does the 
related feeling (sense) of responsibility: since 
he, like any seller of wares, is responsible for 
the goods he delivers and for the quality which he 
must provide, he must strive to ensure that he is 
not driven from the field by other sellers of the 
same type as himself ... tand] must maintain his own 
position, since hi3 existence and that of his 
family depends on M s  ability continuously to renew 
the sale of his labour-power to the capitalist. 
(1976:1031)
Hegel argues that the development of the United States in particular 
may be understood in terms of the shared values held by the worker and 
the capitalist for law, liberty and individual freedom. The United 
States was colonized by "industrious Europeans, who betook themselves 
to agriculture, tobacco and cotton planting, etc." The interests of 
those Indivis«!» »vas.Civon to labour, and the W o  or their erfotenco
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as a united body lay in the necessities that bind man to man, the
desire or repose, the establishment of civil rip-ht-1 riento, security and free­
dom, and a community arising: from the aggregation of individuals as 
atomic constituents! so that the state « s  merely something external 
for the protection of property". (1556:84! my emphasis)
Hegel's views on the United States are shared by Harr and Ihgels. 
"Everything in America", exclaims Engels, "has to he new, everything 
has to be rational, everything has to be practical, consequently every­
thing is different from the way it is with us." ((¡noted in Kapp, 1976: 
270) Marx is particularly fascinated with the national ethos of the 
United States —  with what he calls, "Yankee universality". (197J?
888) The U.S.A., he writes, is
a country where bourgeois society did not develop 
on the foundation of the feudal system, but ^ 
developed rather from itself; where this society 
appears not as the surviving; result of a centuries- 
old movement, but rather as the starting point of 
a new movement, where the state, in contrast to all 
earlier national formations, was from the beginning 
subordinate to bourgeois society, to its production 
and never could make the pretence of being an end- * 
in-itself; where, finally, bourgeois society itself 
linking up with the enormous natural terrain of a * 
new one, ha3 developed to unheard-of freedom of 
movement, has far outstripped all previous work in 
the conquest of the forces of nature, and where 
finally, even the antitheses of bourgeois society 
itself appear only as vanishing moments. (1973:004)
The peculiar fascination exercised by law and civil liberties over 
the U.S. national consciousness results precisely from the ethic of 
law, liberty and freedom spawned by a bourgeois mode of production 
untrammelled by feudal remnants and given a vast virgin territory in 
which to spread its wings. Uut for Hegel, capitalist 4urisprudenc© as 
expressed, for example, in the U.S,A,, no less than bourgeois economy, 
is a product of the development of individual consciousness and
4 ¿3
rationality. If bourgeois production pavos the way for communist 
production relations, bourgeols law has within it the elements of a 
rational or communist .jurisprudence. The administration of justice 
under capitalism is essentially a process of struggle and education; 
it is through knowledge about the law and its application that men and 
women attain consciousness of their individual rights and freedoms, as 
well as of their responsibilities. Without this necessary process of 
development, the transformation to a higher form of civilization is 
impossible. "It is as a result of the discipline of comprehending the 
right that the right first becomes capable of universality." (llcgel, 
1976’271) Bourgeois law or right is far from perfect, and it is this 
imperfection which leads to the call for "systematization, i.e, 
elevation to the universal, which our time is pressing for without 
limit". (Hegel, 1976*2?1) But it is in that bourgeois society, par 
excellence, the United States, that —  especially after the great civil 
rights movement and struggle of the I960's —  individual rights and 
freedoms have reached their highest attainment in the modem world; 
and this achievement is based on education about the rule of low;
It is part of education, of thinking as the 
consciousness of the single in the form of univer­
sality that the ego cones to be apprehended as a 
imlver’al person in which all are identical. A man 
A n t  A s  a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not 
f  , " A e  is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, 
etc. Tliis is an assertioh which thinking 
ratifies and to be conscious of it ie of infinite
importance. '(1976*134)
Por Hegel, modem bourgeois society is based on the rule of law;
, _  +hfi> of the external state of civil society which first and it was in«- j-»1*
. nrotection to the rights of the individual. "The state",began to oiler
he points out,
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io universal in foxin, a form whose essential 
principle is thought. This explains why it wa" 
in the state that freedom and science had their 
origin. It was a church, on the other hand 
which burnt Giordano Bruno, forced Galileo to 
recant on his knees his exposition of the 
Copemican view of the solar system, and so 
forth. (1?76j172)
In its critique of the state, of course, Western Kanlom has ever
before its eyes the example proviaed by the fascist states of Italy,
Germany and Spain. These, however, were not capitalist democracies but
crude dictatorships which conformed hardly at all to the concept of
the external capitalist state. Buploylnff the fascist state as a moans
to criticize the notion of the bourgeois state is like comparing an
abortion to a living person, "If", notes Iiegel,
on considering the huraah organization in its 
concrete aspect, we assert that,brain, heart, and 
so forth is essential to its organic life, some 
miserable abortion may be adduced, which has on 
the whole the human form, or parts of it —  which 
has been conceived in a human body and has 
breathed after birth therefrom in which never­
theless no brain and no heart is found. If such 
an instance is quoted against the general 
conception of a human being — * the objector 
persisting in using the name, coupled with a ' 
superficial idea respecting i t — it can be 
proved that a real concrete human being is a 
truly different object,* that such a being must 
have a brain in its head, and a heart in its 
breast. (1956:65)
Modem communism sight have been spared the disgusting.spectacle affor­
ded by the Moscow Trials in the 1920’s and the execution or assassina­
tion of every surviving leader of the Russian Revolution (with the 
exception, of c o u r s e , of Stalin), if it had not so blatantly thrown 
aside the ’’corrupt bourgeois law" of the external capitalist state.
The first requirement of law, notes Kegel, is that it be"known by 
the ordinary citizen. "Law is concerned with freedom, the worthiest
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and holiest thing in man, the thing man must know if it is to have 
obligatory force for him.” (1976:273) haw must be rational, and the 
mark of rationality is clarity and simplicity of expression, "Thought 
is ... simply its manifestation; clearness is its nature and itself,"
(Hegel, 1892:89) Hegel criticizes the modern situation in which 
"knowledge of the law of the land is accessible only to those who have 
made it their professional study". (1976:138) Por Hegel, the vulgar 
££ lililH ¿ a M agd the legal profession j,a one of the 
greatest shortcomings of the administration of justice in civil society. 
"The legal profession, possessed of a special knowledge of the law, 
often claims this knowledge as its monopoly and refuses to allow any 
layman to discuss the subject." (1976:272) The legal profession
"makes itself an exclusive clique by the use of a terminology like a
foreign tcogo. to those »hose rights are at Issue". Par iron, belns a 
frivolous restriction of trade, the le^l monopoly violates the . J t
fundamental rights of the citizen:
the members of civil society ... are kept s t a m p s
to the law ... and they become the wards, or oven i n  
a sense, the bondsmen, of the legal' profession. Thev 
may indeed have the right to appear in court in 
person and to "stand" there (in j u d i ^  staro)f ,but 
their bodily presence is a trifle if theiFltfnds are : 
not there also, if they are not to follow the n-0- 
ceedings with their owh knowledge, and if the justice 
they receive remains in their eyes a doom pronounced** 
ab extra. (1976:145)
With the development of civil society and the universal inter­
connection of individuals, violation of the law cnn«'-’-’Mt-w vo oe neon as "a
danger to society and therefore the magnitude of the wrongdoing U  
increased". Crime is no Icr.ger viewed as a violation of the «or.,on of 
a particular individual, tut rather the abrogation of the rights of 
every person within society. B y contrast, in ancient times, "the
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citizens did not feel themselves injured by wrongs which members of
the royal house did to one another." (1976:140) Yet it is just
because of the inner strength and universality of the mature civil
society that punishment for crime is far less extreme than in earlier
social forms. "While", states Ilegel,
it would be impossible for society to leave a crime 
unpunished, since that would be to posit it as a 
right, still since society is sure of itself, a 
crime must always be something idiosyncratic in 
comparison, something unstable and exceptional ...
In this light, c r im e acquires a milder status, and 
for this reason its punishment too becomes milder.
(1976:274)
The degree of punishment attached to a crime is a function of the 
development of the consciousness of the social individual: the higher 
the general education of all individuals, the lower the punishment.
"... With the advance of education opinions about crime become less 
harsh, and to-day a criminal is not so severely punished as he was a 
hundred years ago. It is not exactly crimes or punishment which 
change but the relation between them." (1976:246) At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, when Hegel was writing, almost 200 crimes on the 
English statute books called for the death sentence.
Just as the use-value of commodities in civil society is expressed 
as exchange—value, or money, the punishment of crime also takes on an 
abstract, universal value. The identity between crime and punishment 
"i3 not an equality between the specific character of crime and that of 
its negation! on the contrary, the two injuries are equal only in 
respect of their implicit character, i.e. in respect of their ’value'», 
(Hegel, 1976:72) Thus prison sentences replace corporal punishment in 
bourgeois society, and the more barbarous forms of punishment, like 
flogging, amputation, torture and so forth, disappear (or are carried
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on surreptitiously against political suspects as by the British in 
Northern Ireland, and by the West Germans). Eventually, as in most 
'Western countries, even capital punishment disappears or becomes "rarer 
as in fact should be the case with this most extreme punishment". 
(Hegel, 1976:247)
5* Imperialism and the External G^italiat
If bourgeois society creates an abundance of consumer goods, 
raises living standards, fosters the interests of law, liberty and 
(capitalist) private property, it also —  and no less inexorably —  
produces an ever-increasing mass of the dispossessed and the 
unorganized. "In this same process", writes Hegel, in an already 
cited passage,
... dependence and want increase ad Infinitum, an,* 
the material to meet these needs is permanently 
barred to the needy man because it consists of 
external objects with the special character of being 
property, the embodiment of the free will 0f others 
and hence from his point of view its recalcitrance ' 
is absolute, (1976 :1 2 8 )
The liberation achieved in consumer society, as Hegel observes is 
"abstract since the particularity of the ends remains fits] basic 
content". (1976:128) Private property is "the reality of the free 
will of a person, and for that reason [it is] ... for any other person 
inviolable"; it Is the means whereby "mind attains to being-for-self, 
the objectivity of mind receives [through private property] its due". 
Nevertheless, "the full realization of ... freedom ... in property is 
still incomplete, still [only] formal ..." (1969:21-22) If, as in
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the U.S.A., individuals are motivated only by their om, self-interest; 
and if this self-interest is realized only in property, in external 
‘ obJects* then those vh£> ^ v e  no access to property are ignored, 
repressed and humiliated. -If you're so smart, why aren't you rich?" 
becomes the national slogan. The abstraction of value is concretely 
registered in money and theoretically achieved in the notion of God, a 
strange unity expressed on every greenback: "in God we trust." The 
externality of property,, the vanity of ¿^-interest, and the j^ etti-.
£ L  Pe.r.l?nality makes the P.S.A.. anions the most religious 
countries in the world.
Since the bourgeois concept of the state is the "state external" 
(Hegel, 1969=257) —  an institution devoted merely to the protection 
of property —  the universal interests of society are lenored in favour 
of the particularity of the individual. As a result, in a society of
abundance, like the U.S.A. the essential social services of the state
are relatively starved and neglected. This contradiction, which as
Kandel suggests is "now admitted even by liberals" (1978:507} was
foreseen long ago by Hegel. It is the result precisely of a society
which produces a great mass of poor on the one hand, and a nation of
bourgeois individuals (capitalists and workers) on the other. The
bourgeois individual, notes Hegel,
knows himself as a property owner, not only because 
he possesses it, but also because it i s  his right *—  
s o  he assumes; he knows himself to be recognized by 
his particularity. Unlike the peasant, he does not 
enjoy his glass of beer or wine in a rough fashion, 
as a ray of elevating himself out of his dullness 
but because Che wants] to show by his suit and the *' 
finery of hi3 wife and children that he is as good 
as the other man and that he has really made it. In
this he enjoys himself, his value and his righteous­ness; for this did he toil and this has he achieved.
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He enjoys not the pleasures of enjoyment but 
1972?i09)f M S  Self“esteem* (Quoted in Avineri,
Avineri declares that -Hegel's paradigm of the burgher spirit carmct, 
of course, relate to the worker." (1972:109) But as I have argued, 
for both Hegel and .Marx, this s£lrlt does aorl*; to the free worker. 
and It is a crucial mistake In any political analysis to overlook this 
fact.
The absolute tendency of bourgeois society is to create abundance, 
but it Is an abundance shared une?ually, which eventually breaks down 
into luxury and cynicism at one pole and poverty at the other. "When 
social conditions", notes Hegel, "tend to multiply and subdivide needs, 
means, and enjoyments indefinitely —  a process which, like natural and 
refined needs, has no qualitative limits —  this is luxury." (1976* 
128) Yet even the external capitalist state must guarantee to each of 
its members, not only the safety of person and property, but also the 
right to work and a decent living. (Hegel, 1976*146) Accordingly, 
civil society begins to turh its attention, however reluctantly, to 
the most glaring problem within capitalism, that of poverty. E v e r y  
individual in bourgeois society Is independent, declares Hegel, «but 
he also plays his part in the system of civil society, and while every 
man has the right to demand subsistence from it, it must at the same 
time protect him from himself. It is not simply starvation which is 
at issue? the further end in view is to prevent the formation of a 
pauperised rabble,” (1976:277) But civil society is hamstrung In its 
approach to poverty, first because capital itself produces and repro­
duces poverty among those without "skill, health, capital, and so 
forth”, and second, because it is exposed to "the danger of upheavals
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arising from clashing interests and to" the tension caused by the 
’’working of a necessity of which” the members of civil society "them­
selves know nothing”. (Hegel, 1976:148)
The necessity Hegel refers to is the problem of over-production 
which arises within a system which profits from the use-value of human 
labour-power, but which fails to provide the worker with the exchange- 
value required to purchase all the products of hla or her labour. "... 
The evil”, states Hegel, "consists precisely in an excess of production 
and in the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are them­
selves also producers (1976:150) This contradiction constantly
produces a mass of surplus workers unable to find work or to provide 
for the means of subsistence. "Only", writes Karx, "in the mode of 
production based on capital does pauperism appear a3 the result of 
labour itself, of the development of the productive powers of labour." 
The free worker is "a virtual pauper" since "the concept of the free 
labourer” (1973:604) means that the worker relates to the means of 
production only accidentally, only through the mediation of the 
capitalist, of what Hegel calls, "the overlord to nothing". (1976:51) 
In periods of crisis, therefore, this relation is expressed as ;
unemployment.
Capital by its nature, says I'larx, "... posits a barrier to labour 
and value creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them 
boundlessly. And in as much as it posits a barrier specific to itself, 
and on the other side equally drives over and beyond every barrier, it 
is the living contradiction". (1973:421) The result of over-produc­
t s  __ the barrier to capital — * is the "destruction of capital”
(3‘larx, 1973:446)» thG wastaCe on a STand scale of raw materials,
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commodities, and human labour-power which continues until capital i3 
once again ready to resume a new period of economic growth, accumula­
tion and increased employment. In periods of economic crisis, 
observes Kegel, "it ... becomes apparent that despite an excess of 
wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. it3 own resources are 
insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a 
penurious rabble," (1976:150) Hegel’s observation is repeated by 
Marx in the Communist Manifesto; "In these crises there breaks out an 
epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity —  
the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself back 
into a state of momentary barbarism ... and why? Because there is too 
much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, 
too much commerce." (1969, 1:114)
Although, as I have argued in Chapter 6, the C o m u t  i ^ e n t o  
is everywhere influenced by Hegel's discussion of civil society in the 
I M l psophy of M r h t ,  Marx did not penetrate the secret of the distinc­
tion between use-value and exchange-value until ten years later, when 
guided by Hegel’s writings, he plunged into the study of classical 
political economy, "By the way," Marx writes in a letter to Engels in 
January, 1G53, »things are developing nicely. For instance I have 
thrown overboard the whole doctrine of profit as it existed up to now 
In the method of treatment the fact that by mere accident I glanced 
through Hegel’s Logic has been of great service to me.» (1965:100)
In 1857-5° Marx was labouring on the Grundrisse. a work which shows 
traces not only of the Logic, but of all three volumes of the
ikicvclomedla as well as the Philosophy of Right.
In the Gnmdvisse, Marx shows that classical political economy
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could not grasp the slgumeanoe of economic crises and over-produc­
tion precisely because it did not distinguish between use-value and 
exchange-value, the bourgeois economists had adopted "the standpoint 
of simple exchange" between capitalict and worker (1973:424), a 
standpoint Hegel associates with the empty understanding which confuses 
ownership through use with the abstract ownership of capital. Since 
simple exchange involves no contradiction, classical economics imagined 
that over-production is impossible. "The nonsense about the impoesi- 
bility of over-production", writes Marx,
has been expressed ... by James Mill, in the 
formula that supplyaits own demand, that supply 
and demand therefore balance, which means in * 
other words the same thing as that value is 
determined by labour time, and hence that exchan*-* 
adds nothing to it, and which forgets only~thaT*^" 
exchange does have to take place and that this 
depends in the final instance on the use value 
Too much and too little concerns not the eocchange* 
value, but the use value. More of the supplied 
product exists than is "needed"; this is what it 
boils down to. Hence that overproduction comes 
from use value and therefore from exchange itself 
(1973:423-424)
Hegel's analysis of over-production in bourgeois society is 
regarded by many commentators as the happy accident of a philosophical 
genius, who could not really be bothered with the mundane details of 
economics. Because most writers on Hegel are unaware that the Lq^ic 
itself deals, as 1 have shown in earlier chapters, with the labour 
process and bourgeois production, they tend to underrate the importance 
of economics in Hegel's system as a whole. In fact, however, the 
labour process is a component of ideality, itself the key concept lh 
Hegel's thought. "The mechanics of" Hegel's theory of economic crisis, 
declares Plant, "are rather obscure ..." (1977:112) "... Hegel",
notes Plamenatz demurely, "was not an economist ... He makes these
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suggestions'* about poverty and economic crises "merely in passing, and 
Without attributing much importance to them. Were they suggested to 
him by what he himself observed, or did he pick them up from someone 
else? I do not know. They are crumbs from his table which become 
loaves in the social theory of Karx." (1 9 7 6 :2 4 7 ,  2 4 9 -2 5 0 ) Par from 
being a dilettante in economics, as Plamenatz seems to believe he was, 
H£££l the "unique synthesis of lUcardo and Sj rcnondi”
(Itosdolsky, 1977:459,' my emphasis), .which and
2 Il r2  £2holax on the subject attribute exclusively to J%rx. "The 
£2£ial theory of ferx" is nothing £ut an encounter with Hegel.
"... How ubiquitous Hegel is in Karx's work right up to the end ...», 
exclaims Prawer. (197^ :310)
For Hegel, the contradiction between exchange-value and use-value 
lies at the very heart of capitalist production. Consequently, civil 
society is incapable of overcoming poverty and crises of over-produc­
tion, even with the aid of the external bourgeois state. Kegel 
observes that any attempt to assist the poor, or to provide them with 
employment simply intensifies the contradiction between use-value and 
exchange-value under capitalism. Besides violating "the principle of 
civil society and the feeling of individual independence and self- 
respect of its individual members”, assistance to the poor would also 
simply re-create poverty, because this assistance would stimulate the 
economy and lead eventually to further crises of over-production.
Direct job-creation by the state (a remedy favoured by, the U.S. and 
especially the Canadian governments today) would also be of no use for 
the same reasons. Tho poor, says Hegel, "might be given assistance 
indirectly through being given work, i.e. the opportunity to work. In
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this event the vol«e of production would he increased, but the evil 
consists precisely in an excess of production and in the lack of a 
proportionate rubber of consumers who are themselves also producers ..." 
(1976:150) However inadequate, however, these measures are at least 
more humane than the solutions offered by the covcmments of Hegel's 
time:
In Britain, particularly in Scotland, the most 
direct measure against poverty and especially araln^t 
the loss of shame and self-respect —  the subjective 
basis of society —  as well as against laziness and 
extravagance, etc., the begetters of the rabble has 
turned out to be to leave the poor to their fate and 
instruct them to beg in the streets. (1976:150)
Even the briefest acquaintance with modern social conditions in Scot­
land, and all the more in Glasgow, would convince an observer that 
things have not changed very much in 150 years.
The economic problems grappled with by Hegel and later by Harx, 
were to be ignored by conventional economics until a century after 
Hegel’s death. It required "the Keynesian devolution", the establinh- 
ment of the welfare state, and so on, before bourgeois society began to 
take seriously the problem of poverty and the lack of "effective 
demand". This concern, reflected for example in the ill-fated U.S 
"war on poverty", is anticipated by Ilegel. "Poverty", he points out, 
leaves individuals
more or less deprived of all the advantages of 
society, of the opportunity of acquiring skill or 
education of any kind, as well as the administration 
of justice, the public health services, and even 
the consolations of religion, and so forth, The 
public authority takes the place of the family where 
the poor are concerned in respect not only of their 
immediate wants but also of laziness of disposition, 
malignity, and the other vices which arise out of 
their plight and sense of wrong. (1976:149)
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A  healthy and flourish!nr capitalist economy not only creates
poverty, it also dehumanizes and alienates the worker within the pro-
cess of production. "One side of the picture", Hegel suggests, is the 
ever-expanding production of needs, commodities and profit. "The other 
side is the subdivision and restriction of jobs. This results in the 
dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort, and
these again entail inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and 
especially the intellectual benefits of civil society." (1 9 7 6:1 5 0) If 
the division of labour under capitalism creates a free and versatile 
worker, capable of many tasks, and infinitely adaptable to all forms of 
labour, it also produces and reproduces a fractured, maimed, dehumanized 
and alienated s^ ption of the working class. "Factory work", states 
I-larx, "exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost? at the same time 
it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates 
every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity," The 
worker is turned into a slave of the machine "which dominates and soaks
up living labour-power ... The special skill of each individual 
machine operator, vho has now been deprived of all siprffioance, vanishes 
as an infinitesimal quantity" before "the machinery, which const! 
tirtoo the power of the 'mister'". (l?7i.'Mi’-549) The labour conditions 
described by Harr have been brought to a fever pitch in modem times by 
the application of scientific management and Taylorism in both the 
advanced capitalist countries and the socialist economies, (Braverman 
1974) And the impact of mass production on the worker remains the same 
as it was over 1C0 years ago:
Every sense organ is injured by the artificiallyhigh temperatures, by the dust-laden atmosphere by 
the deafening noise, not to mention the danger to
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life and limb among machines which are so closely 
crowded^together, a danger which, with the 
regularity of the seasons, produces its list of 
those k i l l e d  and wounded in the industrial bat+to 
(Marx, 1976:552) Tie*
The "increasing mechanization of labour" (Hegel, 1976:153) TOder 
capitalism swells the profits of the owners on one hand, and creates a 
mass of structural unemployed on the other. (Hegel, 1976:153. MarXf 
1976:567-568) These workers join what Marx calls, "the sphere of 
pauperism ... the hospital of the,.active labour-army and the dead 
weight of the industrial reserve array" of the unemployed. (1976:797) 
Both Marx and Hegel stress that these degraded poor are in no way a 
revolutionary force; deprived of their livelihood and self-respect, 
they are more likely to turn to crime, gambling, and reactionary 
politics than they are to embrace progressive ideas and movements. 
(Marx, 1969, 1:118) "Poverty in itself does not make men into a 
rabble," Hegel explains,
a rabble is created only when there is joined to 
poverty a d i s p o s i t i o n  of mind, an inner indignation 
against the rich, against society, against the 
government, etc. A further consequence of this 
attitude is that through their dependence on chance 
men become frivolous and idle, like the Neapolitan 
lazcaroni for example. In this way there is born 
in the rabble the evil of lacking self-respect enough 
to secure subsistence by its own labour and yet at 
the same time of claiming to receive subsistence as 
a right. (1976:277)
Poverty is not the result of the evils of human nature or the inherent 
laziness of the poor, etc. "Once society is established," Hegel 
declares, "poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one 
class by another." (1976:277-278) Poverty is a form of class war.
Hegel's incisive analysis of what he calls, "the inner dialectic 
of civil society" leads him to formulate the theory of imperialism,
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which plays little or no role in Bint's work, and which was not fully 
developed until the turn cf the twentieth century. According to Hegel, 
the twin pressures of over-production and poverty »’drives civil 
society ... to push beyond its Halts and seek markets, and so its 
necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either 
deficient in the goods it has over-produced, or else generally back­
ward in Industry, etc.” (1976:151) After Hegel, J. A. Hobson and 
Lenin were the first to observe the connection between systematic 
colonization and the over-production endemic to a highly monopolized 
capitalist economy. Imperialism for them, as for Hegel, means more 
than the mere export of manufactured goods; it means securing captive 
markets for the production of advanced capitalist economies, the mono­
polization of raw materials vital to industry, and also an assured 
field for the investment of surplus capital. "Typical of the old 
capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway,” notes Lenin,
"was the export of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, 
when monopolies rule, is the export of capital. 11 (1970, 1 *715)
When llarx wrote his 1 ajor economic works, imperialism and 
colonization were generally considered to be'antithetical to the 
development of capitalism. '"The colonies'”, Disraeli declared in 
1852, '"are millstones round our necks.»” (Quoted in Lenin, 1970:
728) Ilegel, however, witnessed the first aggressively expansionist 
development of capitalism,'which occurred before the "flourishing 
period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e. between 1840 and 
I860”. (Lenin, 1*72?) Hegel distinguishes "systematic colonization” 
from the »'sporadic” form of colonization which is "particularly 
characteristic of Germany. The emigrants withdraw to Russia or
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America and remain there with no home ties, and so prove useless to 
their native lands. The second and entirely different type of 
colonization", he continues, "is the systematic; the state undertakes 
it, is aware of the proper method of carrying it out and regulates it 
accordingly." (1976:278) Under systematic colonization, surplus 
people, goods and capital are pressed by the State on the colonies 
opened up by trade and merchant adventure, and made accessible by the 
sea links which created "commercial connexions between different 
countries";
This far-flung connecting link affords the 
means for colonizing activity —  sporadic or 
systematic —  to which the mature civil society is 
driven and by which it supplies to a part"of its—  
population a return to life on the family basis in 
a new land and so also supplies itself with a new 
demand and field for its industry. (1976:151 ?~my 
emphasis)
According to Lenin, imperialism is the "highest stage of 
capitalism", it is "capitalism in transition, or, more precisely 
moribund capitalism ... parasitic and decaying capitalism", etc,
(1970, 1:766, 764-765) But Hegel does not consider that completion 
of the phase of active colonization will exhaust the capacity of 
bourgeois society, "Colonial independence", he suggests, "proves to 
be of the greatest advantage to the mother country, just as the emanci­
pation of the slaves turns out to the greatest advantage of the 
owners." (1976:278) Of course, now that colonialism has faded from
the world scene, hestem Marxism is busily at work showing how, 
indubitably, the disappearance of "neo-colonialism" will signal the 
death of capitalism, etc. But modern capitalism will also survive the 
demise of neo-colonialism; the rise of independent oil cartels among 
the Arab states, for example, have tripped up advanced capitalism but
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they will not subdue it.
The development of trade and imperialism in civil society, Hegel 
argues, is connected with the strengthening of the external state and 
the emergence of the corporation. For Hegel, the capitalist state is 
compelled to take an increasingly large role in civil society, "and 
its control takes the form of an external system and organization for
the protection and security of particular ends en masse, inasmuch as 
these interests subsist only in this universal." (1976:152) The 
cohtradictions of bourgeois society which produce poverty and the 
"conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of dispropor­
tionate wealth in a few hands", (1976:150) as well as economic crises 
and over-production, force the external state to intervene in the 
economic realm. The interests of private choice and self-seeking 
militate against state intervention, but "the more blindly [civil 
society] sinks into self-seeking aims, the more it requires such 
control to bring it back into the universal". The state's presence 
is required to soften class conflicts and to shorten the period of 
extreme economic contraction and depression. (1976:147-146) Kore- 
over, the activity of international business itself elicits further 
economic involvement by a state already expanded and developed through
the administration of colonial affairs:
... Public care and direction are most of all 
necessary in the case of the larger branches of 
industry, because these are dependent on conditions 
abroad and on combinations of distant circumstances 
which cannot be grasped as a whole by the ’
individuals tied to these industries for a living 
(1976:147)
Neither Farx nor Hegel anticipate the massive war economy which 
has developed within contemporary capitalist and socialist states, and
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which plays a dominant part in government economic intervention in 
the West. Nor did they foresee the giant cataclysms which shook 
bourgeois society in 1914-18 and 1939-45. But even so, they would be 
unlikely to accept the Western Marxist notion that the emergence of the 
powerful state is simply another sign of capitalism’s "death agony": 
"The greater the intervention of the State in the capitalist economic 
system," Handel writes, "the clearer does it become that this system is
afflicted with an incurable malady." The strengthening of the external 
capitalist state is certainly an aspect of the transition of bourgeois 
society to communism, but it is not a development foreign to the inner 
dialectic of the capitalist system. Further, the power of the state 
does not simply reflect, as Handel claims, "capitalism’s increasing 
lack of confidence in its ability to extend or consolidate its rule by 
automatic economic processes". (1970:486) Clearly, this is an 
element in the growth of the state, but a much more vital aspect of 
this growth is the desire felt by individuals from all classes;to con­
trol and dominate the workings of a system which seems alien to and 
independent of the consciousness of Its members.
For Marx, the intervention of the state in the economy, the
development of economic statistics, and so on, are "efforts made 
to overcome ... alienation ..." They reflect at once the fact that 
capitalist production is "an objective relation which is independent of" 
individuals, and.also the movement toward socialist relations of'
production. "Although on the given standpoint, alienation is not over­
come by these means, nevertheless relations and connections are intro­
duced thereby which include the possibility of suspending the old 
standpoint." (1973s161) It is this view of the function of the state : 
which prompts Marx to write in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon
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that,
... In countries with a developed formation of 
classes, with modern conditions of production and 
with an intellectual consciousness in which all 
traditional ideas have been dissolved by the work 
of centuries, the republic signifies Jn general 
J&e M j t ical form of revol uti o n 7 f f ,
society ... (1969, 1:405) !— ----
Karx never adopts the abstract notion of the state held by most Western 
Marxists. Thus if he continually emphasises the importance of legisla­
tion for the condition of the working class, he also details the work 
of the factory inspectors, the "guardians" of the Factory Act (1976: 
549) who continued their "legal proceedings against the 'pro-slavery 
rebellion'" of the owners, even after the Home Secretary suspended the 
Act. (1976:401) Marx's account of the character of the factory 
inspectors is reminiscent of Hegel's description of the civil servant 
as "dispassionate, upright and polite" in the Philosophy of Right 
(1976:193) In the view of both Hegel and Marx, the civil service is 
not simply the tool of the ruling class, but rather it Is an active 
"counterpoise" (Marx, 1976:91) to the despotism of capitalism. "We 
should be appalled at our own circumstances", notes Marx referring to 
the Germans and other Western'Europeans,'
.. if,- as in England, our governments and parliaments 
periodically appointed commissions of inquiry into
economic conditions? if these commissions were armed 
with the same plenary powers to get at the truth; if 
it were possible to find for this purpose men as
V competent, as free from partisanship and respect of
persons as are England's factory inspectors, her 
medical reporters on health, her commissions of 
inquiry into the exploitation of women and children, 
into conditions of housing and nourishment, and 80 on,
■ ' (1976:91)
For Marx as for Hegel, the state is. essentially the instrument- 
for the self-education of the social individual? the development of the
State is parallel with the development of the political consciousness
of the individual worker. Accordingly, the organization of the state
jgteraine the conditions leading to the overthrow of the
nation of capital. "In England", declares M arx in the "Preface to
the First Edition" of Capital.
the process of transformation is palpably evident.
When it has reached a certain point, it must 
react on the Continent. There it will take a fora 
more brutal or humane, according to the degree of 
the development of the working class itself 
Apart from any higher motives, then, the most ba^ic 
interests of the present ruling classes dictate to 
them that they clear away all the legally removable 
obstacles to the development of the working clas*
For this reason, among others, I have devoted a 
great deal of space in this volume to the history 
the details, and the results of the English FcctcXr 
legislation. (1976*92) C factory
If the state is essentially an aspect of the development of the
consciousness of the social individual, and a means to counteract the
alienation imposed by an economic system which seems'independent of
his or her will, the same argument applies to the emergence of the
multi-national corporation. For both Hegel and Marx, the development
of the corporation is as significant for the construction of the
rational or communist state as was "the introduction of agriculture and
private property in another sphere", (Hegel, 1976sI55) Aa Jiarx r-
suggests, the corporation "is the abolition of capital as private v
p r o p e r t y within the framework of capitalist production itself ,, and
hence a self-dissolving contradiction, which prima facie reowB^ta
m ere p h a se of transition to a new form of production", ( î ^ C j III*
437-428) In the corporation, management is divorced from the function
of the capitalist who now appears "redundant" in relation to the
process of production.* "the mere manager who has no title whatever to
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the capital, whether through borrowing it or otherwise, performs all 
the real functions pertaining to the functioning capitalist as such, 
only the functionary remains and the capitalist disappears as super­
fluous in the production process." (1967, 111*387-388) Accordingly, 
even under the capitalist mode of production the relations of work are 
"made rational instead of natural. That is to say, it becomes freed 
from personal opinion and contingency, saved from endangering either 
the individual worker or others, recognized, guaranteed, and at the 
same time elevated to conscious effort for a common end”. (Hegel 
197^:154)
With the development of the bourgeois mode of production, the
domination of the worker by the arbitrary will of a single capitalist
gives way to a system in which the worker has increasing authority and
control over the conditions of work. Under capitalism, writesMarx,
it remains true, of course, that the relations of 
production themselves create a ... relation of 
supremacy and subordination (and this also has 
political expression). But the more capitalist 
production sticks fast in this formal relationship 
the less the relationship will evolve, since for * 
the most part it is based on small capitalists who 
differ only slightly from the workers in their 
education and their activities. (1976:1027)
The various schemes put forward by modern-day corporations, in co­
operation with the labour unions, to reduce the alienation of the indi­
vidual worker, such as flexible hours,Job-enrichment, involvement in 
management, and so on, are necessary products of the development of 
capitalism itself. However inadequate and illusory they may be, they 
spring from the fact that the form of the relation of supremacy and 
subordination under advanced capitalism "becomes freer, because it is 
objective in nature, voluntary in appearance, purely economic1»-
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(Marx, 1976:1020)
The corporation, Hegel argues, becomes a "second family" ±n  
bourgeois society, replacing the family as the foundation of the modem 
state. (1976:153, 154) It provides the means of technical education 
for the worker, attempts to protect the individual against the contin­
gencies of the labour market, etc. The individual within the 
corporation derives a sense of personal worth, and a sense of stability 
—  "evidence that he is a somebody. It is also recognized", Hegel 
continues, "that he belongs to a whole which is itself an organ of the 
entire society, and that he is actively concerned in promoting the 
comparatively disinterested end of this whole. Thus he commands the 
respect due to one in his social position." Within the corporation, 
the individual worker no longer has the aspect of "a day labourer or ... 
a man who is prepared to undertake casual employment on a single 
occasion." The individual finds a place "for the whole range, the 
universality, of his personal livelihood". (1976:155) Hegel, of 
course, is not referring to the actual reality of the corporation, but 
to its historical tendencies, tendencies reflected, however inade­
quately, in the modem corporation with its job protection schemes, 
retirement and health plans and so forth. These aspects, along with 
the universal scope of the modem corporation, distinguish it 
dramatically from the narrow character of the early capitalist firm 
which denied absolutely the rights of the worker and offered little in 
return.
For Avineri, as for most commentators, Hegel is different from I'arx 
"since no radical call of action follows his harsh analysis of civil 
society". (1972:107) Hegel, says Avineri, advocates only "external
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control” of economic activity in civil society and does not urge inter 
vention of the state into civil society as does Karx. If Hegel had 
done so, his "distinction between civil society and the state would 
disappear, and the whole system of mediation and dialectical process 
towards integration through differentiation would collapse". (Avineri, 
197^151) No less than Karx, however, Hegel ia convinced that the 
modem corporation is the means through which capitalist society will 
pass into the rational state where common ownership of the means of 
production by the associated producers will prevail. It is through 
the external state and the corporation, declares Hegel, that "the 
sphere of civil society passes over into the state", The bourgeois 
state, in relation to the corporation, is just "an external organiza­
tion involving a separation and merely relative identity of controller 
and controlled". But both these institutions "find their truth in 
the absolutely universal end and ita absolute actuality", i.e., in the 
rational or communist state. (1976*154)
In the rational state, Hegel remarks, "the universal, which in 
the first instance is the right only" of private property, "has to be 
extended over the whole field of particularity", i.e,f over the whole 
of civil society. The corporation in the rational state "changes into 
a known and thoughtful mode of life". (1976:275) Nevertheless, 
"Corporations must fall under the higher surveillance of the state, 
because otherwise they would ossify, build themselves in, and decline 
into a miserable system of castes." (1976:278) Both the external 
capitalist state and the modern corporation turn out to be the
w/iw riCiiins
whereby the individual in civil society is educated through class 
struggle to'independent self-consciousness, to a "form of thought
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whereby mind is objective and actual to itself as an organic totality
in laws and institutions which are its will in terras of thought''.
(1976:155) This is the same transformation theorized by Marx:
In stock companies the function is divorced from 
capital ownership, hence also labour is entirely 
divorced from ownership of the means of production 
and surplus-labour. This result of the ultimate 
development of capitalist production is a 
necessary transitional phase-' towards the reconver­
sion of capital into the property of the producers 
although no longer as the private property of the * 
individual producers, but rather a3 the property 
of the associated producers, a3 outright social 
property. On the other hand, the stock company is 
a transition towards the conversion of all functions 
in the reproduction process which still remain 
linked with capitalist property, into mere functions 
of associated producers, into social functions 
(1967,111:437)
As Hegel suggests in an already quoted passage, "the transition from 
[capitalism] to common ownership is very easy ..." (1976:51)
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CHATTER 9
DIALECTIC AND THE RATIONAL STATE 
1, The Dialectic Method
If the Trinity is the principal mystery of Christianity, the dial- 
ectic is the chief mystery of modem Western Marxism. (Hook, 1976s6o) 
Much of the confusion which surrounds the dialectic is due to Marx's 
observation that the dialectic as if appears in Hegel's writings "is 
standing on its head". (1976:103) Marx's depiction of the contrast 
between his and Hegel's use of the dialectic is worth quoting in full-
My dialectic method is, ln lts foundations, not 
only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite
to i t .  For Hegel, the process o f th inking which heeven transforms into an independent subject, under + w  
name of "the Idea”, is the creator of the real world 
and the real world is only the external appearance of 
the idea. With me, the reverse is true: the ideal 
is nothing but the material world reflected in the 
mind of man, and translated into forms of though*
(1976:102) ^  *
■Qua. o L  the conclusions of this study j3 that Marx is fundamentally 
2S2Bfi ii!2. jfegjija Marx accepts uncritically Feuer­
bach's critique of Hegel, and does not revise his own early and mistaken 
opinion about Hegel's idealism. Both Feuerbach and Marx fail to com­
prehend Hegel's distinction between the three levels of consciousness 
or ideology, where consciousness is considered as "the relation of 
thought to its object”. (Hegel, 1954*164) Yet this distinction, as 
Hegel himself observes, is "of capital importance for understanding the 
nature and kinds of knowledge", (1975:29)
Feuerbach remains confined to the first level of objectivity —  
the crude materialist celebration of sense perception, which takes the
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categories of.thought to be merely a reflection of the external v/orld. 
The second level is represented by Kant's philosophy which holds that 
sense perception is guided and In fo rm e d by the a priori categories of 
mind. Marx accepts Hegel's thesis that the mind, understood as 
conscious human practice, is active rather than passive in relation to 
the outside world. But while he makes use of Ilegel's notion of this 
third level of objectivity, he does not recognize its application by 
Hegel to epistemology and the study of nature and society. Hence he 
views Hegel's "Idea" as simply a form of thought, instead of what it 
really is —  an expression both of the concrete reality of society and 
the modes of thought which create and correspond to that reality.
¿agjc principle of Hegel's thought, and of the dialectic 
E£thod, as well, is the unity between the subject and object of know- 
ledge no achieved through ideality or revolutionising practice. 
Conscious human practice or ideality, says Hegel, "cancels the anti­
thesis between the objective which would be and stay an objective only, 
and the subjective which in like manner would be and stay a subjective 
only". (1975s269) The nature of human ideality, notes Ilegel, has 
been presented in his philosophy "often enough, fet it could not be 
too often repeated, if the intention were really to put an end to the 
stale and purely malicious misconception of this identity" of subject 
and object as obtained through practice. (1975*258)
In the "Introduction" to the Grundrisse. where Marx works out 
the elements of dialectic method, he observes that "the economic 
categories ... express the forms of being, the characteristics of 
existence, and often only the individual sides of this specific 
society, this subject." (1 9 7 3 11 0 6 ) B u t  i f  the cater-orien express the
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relations of a society, this is only because they also create them —  
through the mediation of concrete human practice. Ideas and knowledge 
—  ideology —  therefore, do not merely reflect, but are inseparable 
from, the objects and manifestations of human thinking activity, or 
ideality. This dialectical relationship is applied by Marx to the 
notion of capital itself. "The development of fixed capital", he 
writes,
indicates to what degree general social knowledge has 
become a direct force of production, and to what 
degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social 
life itself have come under the control of the general 
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.
To what degree the powers of social production have 
been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but 
also as immediate organs of social practice, of the 
real life process. (1973*706)
Ernest Handel argues that the "economic categories" studied by 
Marx "are just forms of material existence, of material reality as 
perceived and simplified by the human mind". (1976:22) Handel, 
however, refers only to the "subjective" side of the categories and 
forgets their "objective" side; he, along with most Marxist and 
bourgeois writers, ignores the unity of objective and subjective
achieved through human practice, which is the most important aspect of 
the dialectic method. The economic category of labour, for example, 
which abstracts from the content of any particular type of work "is 
not merely", states Marx, "the mental product of a concrete totality 
of labours". Kather, it refers to "the indifference to specific 
labours" characteristic of "a form of society in which individuals can 
transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a 
matter of choice for them, hence of indifference". The United States 
—  "the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society" is thus
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also the society where "for the first time, the point of departure of 
modem economics, namely the abstraction of the category 'labour', 
'labour as such', labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice." 
(1975*104-105)
The dialectic method as gmployed by both Hegel- and Marx does not. 
of course, deny the objective reality of the external world. "The
sun, the moon, rivers, and the natural objects of all kinds by which 
we are surrounded," states Hegel,
are. For consciousness they have the authority 
not only of mere being but also of possessing a 
particular nature which it accepts and to which 
it adjusts itself in dealing with them, using 
them, or in being otherwise concerned with them.(1976:106)
nevertheless, the categories of science, through which men and women 
interpret, explain and utilize the objects of external nature and 
discover their laws, are the products of human ideality and determine 
the relation of individuals to nature. Scientific categories are 
devoted not to the external manifestation of natural phenomena, but to 
their inner connection which can be grasped only through the power of
thought. If the categories merely reflected natural objects, asks
Marx, "what need would there be of science?" (1965:191) The'dialec­
tic method employed by Hegel's philosophy of nature differs from 
natural science merely in that this method "brings before our mind the 
adequate forms of the notion in the physical world". .(H e g e l, -1975*40) 
While the categories of thought express and create through 
revolutionizing practice the social world of individuals, this is not 
because men and women consciously employ these pure categories in 
their everyday activities. The forms of thought studied by; dialectic 
method are ideal determinations raised by science out of their merely
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implicit existence and manifestation in society. The pure economic 
category of labour, for example, does not determine the conscious 
practice of men and women in advanced capitalist society. It simply 
expresses what people do, not what they think. Before the categories 
of method in their pure form can be studied, they must exist in 
implicit or unconscious form in society. "... The stage of philoso­
phical knowledge", Hegel observes, "is the richest in material and 
organisation, and therefore, as it came before us in the shape of a 
result, it presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of 
consciousness, such as individual and social morality, art and 
religion." (1975*46) The development of the categories of method —  
the "objective thoughts" of society, or what Karx calls, "the power 
of knowledge objectified" (1975*706) —  "must so to speak, £o on 
behind consciousness, since those facts are the essential n u c le u s  
which is raised into consciousness". (Hegel, 1975:46) The men and 
women who emigrated to a new land in North America brought with them 
the bourgeois notion of making money, no matter howj they threw aside 
feudal conceptions of the identity of a person with his or her craft 
or trade, and plunged into a social world where labour is a means to 
an end, rather tiian an end in itself. The theoretical expression of 
their practice is the simple economic category, labour.
In his essay, "Lenin before Hegel", Louis Althusser draws atten­
tion to Lenin’s aphorism that "it i s  impossible completely to under­
stand Harx’s Capital ... without having thoroughly understood the 
whole of Hegel’s Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of 
the Marxists understood Narx*}" (Althusser, 19?1*108) But Althusser 
perceptively reverses this aphorism* "A century a n d a half 3ater no
4 5  2
one has -understood Hegel because it jg impossible to understand Hegel 
without having thoroughly read and understood 'Capital111 (1971:109)
This leads to the second major conclusion of this study: Marx'a 
mature work cannot be understood other than as a dialogue with Hegel, 
By contrast, Marx's early writings constitute a humanist critique of 
society (and Hegelian philosophy) based on the crude materialism of 
Feuerbach, In his later writings, Marx develops and concretizes many 
of Hegel's observations on bourgeois society, and utilizes his know­
ledge of Hegel's dialectic in the formulation of historical 
materialism,
Marx's insights into Hegel make it possible to comprehend those 
aspects of Hegel which Marx himself overlooks and misinterprets.
These aspects include, as I have shown, Hegel's notion of ideality, 
which is identical with and much more developed than Marx's concept 
of revolutionizing practice, a3 well as Hegel's critique and analysis 
of religion, natural science and bourgeois thought. Further, since 
Ilegel had already worked out the essential distinction between use- 
value and exchange-value, this enables him to develop a profound 
critique of bourgeois private property, capitalist economic crises and 
imperialism, which anticipates and, in some cases, goes beyond Marx, 
Also, ilegel develops a theory of the state, social class, and the 
modern corporation which remains only implicit in Marx's writings, 
and which, as I will demonstrate below, provides the theoretical 
outlines of the new form of civilization which both thinkers nee 
emerging from the capitalist mode of production.
In his essay "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of 
Marxism", Lenin argues that "the genius of Marx consists precisely In
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his having furnished answers to questions already presented by the 
foremost minds of mankind." Marx, therefore, is "the legitimate 
successor to the best that man has produced in the nineteenth century, 
as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and 
French socialism". (1970, 1 :66) Lenin's view is widely accepted, but 
it is mistaken. Before Marx. ITegel had already fused German Idealism 
with British political economy and the ideals of the French Revolution. 
Hegel's influence was therefore crucial in Marx's decision to study 
and criticize the classics of political economy (Marx, 1970:20) and 
the conclusions Marx drew from this study are identical with those of 
Ilegel.
Marx himself is well aware of his enormous debt to Hegel: "You 
will understand my dear fellow," he writes to Engels in 1866, "that in 
a work like mine", i.e., Capitalt "there must be many shortcomings of 
detail. But the composition of the whole, the way it all hangs 
together, is a triumph of German scholarship to which an individual 
German may confess since the merit belongs not to him but to the whole 
nation." (Quoted in Frawer, 1976:369) Before Marx, of course, no one 
had contributed more to "German scholarship" than Hegel. In any case, 
Marx's letter to Engels repeats an observation Hegel makes about his 
own work: "I could not of course imagine that the method ... I have 
followed ... is not capable of much improvement, of much elaboration 
in detail; but at the same time I know that it is the only true 
method." (1954:191)
Lenin's estimate of the Marxist theoretical heritage has led to 
the assumption among V/e stern Marxist writers that everything before 
Marx is "bourgeois", including especially the work of Hegel, and
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therefore of only peripheral interest for the development of Marxist 
theory. But Marx accomplished "no more than a fraction of the project 
which, in early adulthood, he determined to set himself", (Giddeno 
1977:207) He never developed Hegel’s seminal insights into psycho­
logy, religion, ideology, logic, aesthetics, the state, class and so 
forth. These insights, which result from Hegel’s own familiarity 
with the classics of philosophy and modern social thought remain
¿¡X KSSiSi Si S. 2hf!S it is. virdbuall^; strangled
hy its own lack of theoretical resources. Paraphrasing Marx, it is 
possible to write that modem Western Marxism "is altogether a 
literature of epigones, reproduction, greater elaboration of form, 
wider application of material, exaggeration, popularization, synopsis, 
elaboration of details; lack of decisive leaps in phases of develop­
ment, incorporation of the inventory on one side, new growth at 
individual points on the other", (1973:883) And the most striking 
aspect of the theoretical endeavour of Western Marxism is its complete 
misapprehension of what it professes most stridently to separate it 
from "bourgeois social science" —  the dialectic method.
Ignorance of the dialectic method, of course, is not confined to 
Western Marxism, which manages at least to grasp some of its fundamen­
tals. For example, Walter Kauftnann, who provides a lucid introduction 
to Hegel, writes that T a n  not so much rejecting the dialectic as I 
say: there is none. Lock for it by all means ... but you will not 
find any plain method that you could adopt if you wanted to," (I97G 1 
160) Kaufmann's difficulty in finding the dialectic method is under­
standable since the point of this method is to "present to the mind 
the picture of a methodically ordered whole, although the soul of the
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structure, the method itself (which lives in dialectic), would not 
be apparent in it”. (Hegel, 1954*194)
Among Western Marxists, Karl Korsch presents a thorough dis­
cussion of the dialectic method and observes that the dialectic 
concerns "the question of the relationship between the totality of 
historical being and all historically prevalent forms of conscious­
ness". (1970:135) Lukács (1971) and Gramsci (1971) also approach 
the dialectic from this angle, although both thinkers assimilate the 
dialectic into a discussion of the class consciousness of the prole­
tariat. "For", declares Lukács, "the Marxist method, the dialectical 
materialist knowledge of reality, can arise only from the point of 
view of a class, from the point of view of the struggle of the 
proletariat." (Lukács, 1971*21) This (Leninist) account of the 
dialectic tends to degenerate into an elitist conception of history, 
according to which the developing consciousness of the workers is 
guided by an omnipotent Party of middle class intellectuals who pro­
vide the "reasons" for the "faith" of the workers. (Gramsci, 1971*339) 
In this form, the Marxist dialectic has become "a doctrine 
exploited by the alienated intelligentsia of the underdeveloped 
countries to win support for, and justify, their modernizing dictator­
ships ..." (Hunt, 1975*342) But it also appeals to the radical 
middle class intelligentsia of the advanced capitalist countries who 
are impatient with what they perceive as a co-opted, bourgeoisified 
and consumerist working class. By a strange dialectical twist, the 
elitist view implicit in Western Marxism leads to a conception in 
which the individual intellectual finds him or herself determined by 
the action of the masses. Thus Althusser enjoins the revolutionary
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intellectual "to think for himself and about ... what is in prepara­
tion among the masses, for it is they and not the philosophers who 
make history". C1971:120) This advice, of course, prepares the 
foundation for a despotism which flatters "the masses" while strangling 
its opponents. (Hegel, 1976:293) Anyway, says Hegel, "... it is a 
dangerous and false prejudice, that the People alone have reason and 
insight, and know what justice 1 b ; for each popular faction may 
represent itself as the People ..." (1956:43) Marx's advice is
strikingly different from that of Althusser: "'Follow your own course, 
and let the people say what they will."» (Quoted in Prawer, 1976:330)
As I have argued throughout this study, the method of both Hegel 
and Marx ultimately concerns the consciousness not of a class, but of 
the social individual or the free worker. Thu3 for Karx, the defect 
of capitalist production is precisely that "the growth of ... material 
wealth is brought about in contradiction to and at the expense of the 
individual human being." (1976:1037) The role of civil or bourgeois 
society in the education and development, through struggle, of the 
social individual provides the historical justification for, and 
brings about the dissolution of, the capitalist mode of production.
For both Hegel and Marx, the dialectic method can only be applied 
to a given concrete reality} its object "is always what is given, in 
the head as well as in reality". (Marx, 1973:106) Neither thinker is, 
in Marx's words, "writing recipes ... for the cookshops of the future", 
(1976:99) The "objective thoughts" —  or social facts — * studied by 
dialectical science are "the truth ... which is ... the absolute 
object of philosophy ..." (Hegel, 1975:45) And truth "means that con­
cept and external reality correspond". (Hegel, 1976:231) But at the
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same time, dialectic method is not limited by what Hegel calls, the 
"finite" categories of the understanding. These categories are finite 
because "they are only subjective and the antithesis of an objective 
clings to them". In other words, they cannot comprehend the dynamic 
unity of subject and object obtained through ideality or revolutioniz- 
ing practice, hereover, the categories of the understanding "are 
always of restricted content, and so persist in antithesis to one 
another and still more to the Absolute". (1975.45)
The "Absolute" is simply Hegel's term for the rational state in 
which reason and reality will absolutely correspond. The understand­
ing, however, is fettered by the alienation and irrationality of 
capitalist society and cannot come to terms with this society's 
transient character. Thus the understanding fails "to point out how 
Cits] categories and their whole sphere", i.c., the society to which 
they correspond, "pass into a higier», (Hegel,: 1975,22; my emphasis) 
One of the findings of this study is that what Hegel means by 
«je "understanding" is precisely what Karx indicates with the term, 
"bourgeois". This form of thought, Harx declares, "views the 
capitalist order as the absolute and ultimate form of social produc­
tion, instead of a historically transient stage of development ..." 
(1976:96) The categories employed by Western Harxism are no less 
finite than those of their bourgeois antagonists; and the outlook of 
Western Karxist writers, therefore, is as alienated as that of its 
bourgeois opposite. "... It Is from conforming to finite categories 
in thought and action", writes Hegel, "that all deception originates.'« 
(1975:41)
There are three aspects or moments of dialectic method. The "
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first is recognition of the dialectic as it appears in the Eubject
matter itself —  the dynamic movement of the "self-originating and
self-actualizing" organic whole under study "which accomplishes its
manifestation in its own element, not in an alien material”. (Hegel,
1989s5» 18) The second aspect of dialectic method is method proper.
which includes the appropriation of the facts and laws of other
sciences. (Hegel, 1975*18) The third moment of dialectic is
exposition —  the logical ordering and presentation of the movement
of the object discovered through method. Of course, the dialectic
method actually embraces all three moments into its "unity ... of
distinct determinations". (1969:163) The three aspects of the
dialectic method are outlined by Hegel in the Ihenoraenology;
The subject matter treated by scientific inquiry 
is not exhausted by any aim, but only by the way 
things are worked out in detail; nor is the result 
the actual whole, but only the result together with 
its becoming. The aim, taken by itself, is a 
lifeless generality? the tendency is a mere drift 
which lacks actuality; and the naked result is 
the corpse which has left the tendency behind.
(1988*370-372)
The meaning of this passage is amplified by Karx in Capital:
Of course the method of presentation must differ in 
form from that of inquiry. The latter has to 
appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its 
different forms of development and to track down 
their inner connection. Only after this work has 
been done can the real movement be appropriately 
presented. If this is done successfully, if the 
life of the subject matter is now reflected back 
in the ideas, then it may appear as if we had 
before u3 an a priori construction. (1976*102)
In the following discussion I will outline the first two moments 
of dialectic —  recognition and method proper. The third aspect, 
exposition, will be dealt with in the next and concluding section of
thi3 study.
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The first moment of dialectic method —  recognition —  is the 
M m  l££g»PP.?4tion of method which Hegel calls, «the consciousness 
of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of the content" 
or subject matter of science. (1954:190) Marx refers to this pre­
supposition when he writes in Capital that "My standpoint [views] 
the development of society ... as a process of natural history ...” 
According to this presupposition, then, society is «an organism 
capable of change, and constantly engaged in the process of change", 
(1976:92-95) The dialectic method, therefore, presupposes that its 
object is an oggnism driven b£ the dynamic of contradiction. "The 
movement of capitalist society", says Marx, "is m i . o f  contradic­
tions." (1976:103)
The dialectic within the object of study constitutes the 
"general laws with which [the] life and mutations" of the object "are 
governed". (Hegel, 1954:187) This might be called "bio-dialectic"| 
and it is the bio-dialectic of bourgeois society which is studied by 
Marx in Capital. "... The ultimate aim of this work", declares Marx, 
is "to reveal the economic law of motion of modem society." (1976: 
92) The presupposition of dialectic method can only be confirmed by 
the results achieved through it: "The very point of view, which 
originally is taken on its own evidence only, must in the course of 
science be converted into a result —  the ultimate result in which 
philosophy returns to itself and reaches the point with which it 
began." (Hegel, 1975*23)
The dialectic method as employed by Hegel and Marx presupposes 
that society is inherently rational. or governed by laws. In this 
sense, society resembles nature, for society is not constituted by
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"the formations and accidents evident to the superficial observer", 
but —  like nature —  is formed and governed by laws which may be 
discovered by science. (Hegel, 197654) There are, however, two vital 
differences between the laws of society and those of nature. The 
first difference is that the laws of society can be discovered only 
through thought and theory; the sensuous methodology of natural 
science can play no part in the discovery of social laws. As Marx 
puts it, "... in the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes 
nor chemical reagents are of assistance. The power of abstraction must 
replace both." (1976*90)
The second distinction between the laws of nature and those of 
society is that the latter originate from the conscious activity of 
men and women and may also be changed by their activity. (Hegel, 1976: 
224) Moreover, while the laws of nature are rigid and remain 
unaffected by our knowledge of them, the transformation of social 
laws can be made possible, or, in any case, easier, by knowledge of 
these laws. "Even when a society", Marx observes, "has begun to 
track down the natural laws of its movement ... it can neither leap 
over the natural phases of its development nor remove them by decree.
But it can shorten and lessen the birth pangs." (1976:92)
Discovery of the laws of society inevitably involves contradiction. 
antagonism and struggle within society. And it is precisely the 
conscious element in society which accounts for the sharpness of con­
tradiction there as compared to nature. "In nature", Hegel observes,
the highest truth is that there is a law; in the 
law of the land, the thing is not valid simply 
because it exists; on the contrary, everyone 
demands that it shall comply with M s  private 
criterion. Here then an antagonism is possible
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between what ought to be and what is, between the 
absolutely right which stands unaltered and the 
arbitrary deteimination of what is to be recog­
nized as right. A schism and a conflict of this 
sort is to be found only in the territory of 
mind. (1976*224)
The principle of law whether of nature or society — * is that law 
involves a necessary interconnection between diverse phenomenaj the 
law of gravity, for example, requires that all objects must fall to 
the ground at a given rate of acceleration; the law of value in 
bourgeois society means that all commodities have exchange-value and 
use-value; criminal law states that all crimes involve punishment. 
(Hegel, 1969*163) But legislative and criminal law differs from that 
of nature and society in that the former is deliberately framed by 
individuals while natural and social laws unfold outside the conscious 
intent of men and women. In a rational or communist society, however, 
the distinction between laws framed by individuals and social laws 
will disappear, and all laws relating to society will be under the 
conscious control of its members. "«,» In its mature phase", writes 
Hegel, the consciousness of the social individual "is the k w  of the 
Phenomenon",. (1975 s1
There are two related, but incorrect, conceptions about what I 
have called the-second-moment of dialectic method — - method proper.
The f i r s t  is that dialectic simply concerns the study of society as a 
progressive series of stages, one leading naturally to another. The 
second is that dialectic is essentially negative and critical. Both 
these notions express only one-sided aspects of dialectic method. For 
Hegel, the belief that dialectic concerns the study of society "as an 
issuing of the more perfect from the less perfect ... does prejudice 
to the method of philosophy", (1975*221) Dialectic method
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investigates the immanent or self-originating development of the 
social organism, i.e., of what Marx calls, "the organic social body 
within which individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as 
social individuals”, (1973:832) And if an organism may be seen as 
a series of progressive transformations which ultimately reveal its 
mature form, it can also be viewed as the explicit determination of 
what already implicitly existed in embryo or germ. In other words, 
the form of the new social organism is already contained in the old 
one. This is what Hegel refers to as the- ’’double movement” or 
"doubling process" of the dialectic. (1975:295? 1892:22) The 
"superficial thoughts of more imperfect and more perfect", states 
Hegel, "simply indicate the distinction" between each stage or form 
of consciousness and society from the next? they have nothing to do 
with its inner movement, {1975*221
The standpoint of Western Marxism towards communist society, 
which views it simply as the next stage of society after capitalism, 
is, like Kant's notion of the "good", simply "something which merely 
ought to be, and which at the same time is not real — • a mere article 
of faith, possessing a subjective certainty, but without truth. This
contradiction", Ilegel adds, "may seem to be disguised by adjourning 
the realization of the Idea to a future, to a time when the Idea will 
also be," Time, however, is merely a sensuous conception, and does 
not remove the obligation of the theorist to prove what is held out 
to be the truth, (1975*915 The only proof of the development of the 
new society lies in the present,.in the concrete, living actuality 
which science has for Its object, "... The only way to secure any 
growth and progress in knowledge Is to hold results fast In their
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truth." (1975s133) Consequently, the problem of method is to find 
and disclose the rational elements within the present which presage 
the future. "Rationality", states Hegel,
enters upon external existence simultaneously with 
its actualization, it emerges with an infinite 
wealth of forms, shapes, and appearances. Around 
its heart it throws a motley covering with which 
consciousness is at home to begin with, a covering 
which the concept has first to penetrate before 
it can find the inward pulse and feel it still 
beating in the outward appearances. (1976:10-11)
lhe same idea is expressed by Marx in the Grundrisse: Capitalism, he 
writes,
the most extreme form of alienation ... is a 
necessary point of transition —  and therefore 
already contains in itself, in a still only 
inverted form, turned on its head, the dissolution 
of all limited presuppositions of production, and 
moreover creates and produces the unconditional 
presuppositions of production, and. therewith the 
full material conditions for the total, universal 
development of the productive forces of the 
individual. (1973:515)
The pivotal idea which guides the dialectic method of both Hegel 
and Marx is Kant's notion "that man alone is the final end and aim" 
of the natural and social order. (Kant. 1893:251 $ my emphasis) The 
development of society, therefore, concerns the process in which the 
human individual who "is implicitly rational ... must also become 
explicitly so by struggle to create himself but also by bringing him­
self up within". (Hegel, 1976:229) It is this struggle which forma 
the object and content of dialectic method, rather than a mere survey 
of the progressive stages of society. What distinguishes bourgeois 
society from earlier social forms.is that its principle of private 
property — ■ especially the free ownership of one1s 1abour-power —  is 
the motive force behind the education and increased self-consciousnecs
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or rationality of the individuals within it. This struggle implies 
the growing control over social forces even within the bourgeois mode 
of production, and is likely to turn aside all predictions of 
capitalism’s imminent collapse. Capital itself, to use Marx’s phrase, 
is a "permanent revolution", (Quoted in Miliband, 1978*158) "...
Every degree of the development of the social forces of production, 
of intercourse, of knowledge, etc, appears to it only as a barrier 
which it strives to overpower." (Marx, 1973s541)
The reason for the transitional nature of capitalism is its con­
tradictory character which "appears in such a way that the working 
individual alienates himself ... relates to the conditions brought out 
of him by his own labour as those not of his own, but of an alien 
wealth and of his own poverty". (Marx, 1973*541) But this alienation 
is abolished within capitalism itself; in fact, the abolition of 
alienation is the presupposition of the rational or communist state. 
"The recognition" by the individual, says Marx in a previously quoted 
passage, "of the products" of labour "as its own, and the Judgement 
that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper 
— * forcibly imposed —  is an enormous ... awareness ... itself the 
product of the mode ofproduction resting on capital and ... the knell 
to its doom,” (1973*463) The same notion is expressed by Hegel* 
"Every thing that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the 
life of God and all the deeds of the time," he writes,
are the struggles for Mind [the consciousness of 
the social individual] to know itself, to make 
itself objective to itself, and finally to unite 
itself to itself; it is alienated and divided, but 
only so as to be able thus to find itself and return 
to itself. Only in this way does Kind attain its 
freedom, for that is free which is not connected 
with or dependent on another. (1892*23)
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Individual self-awareness or rationality brings about what Hegel
calls the "truth of necessity ... Freedom". Under a mature form of
capitalism, which is the point of transition to the rational state,
It then appears that the members linked to one another, 
are not really foreign to each other, but only 
elements of one whole, each of them, in its connection 
with the other, being, as it were, at home, and 
combining with itself. In this way necessity is 
transfigured into freedom —  not In the freedom that 
consists in abstract negation, but freedom concrete 
and positive. (19758220)
This is the same concrete and positive freedom which is advocated by Marx:
Freedom ... can only consist in socialized man, the 
associated producers, rationally regulating their 
interchange with Nature, bringing it under their 
conscious control, instead of being ruled by it as 
by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this 
with the least expenditure of energy and under 
conditions favourable to, and worthy of, their 
human nature. (1967* 111:820)
Thinkers in the Western Marxist tradition are correct In their
belief that the dialectic method is negative and critical toward
existing society. "... The action of thought", states Hegel, "has ...
a negative effect on its basis ..." (1975: 81) Dialectical science,
says Marx in a previously cited passage,
includes in its positive understanding of what exists 
a simultaneous recognition of its negation, Its 
inevitable destruction; it regards every historically 
developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, 
and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well;
... it does not let itself be impressed by anything, 
being in its very essence critical and revolutionary.
(1976:105)
Both Hegel and Marx are engaged in demonstrating that the capitalist 
mode of production is arbitrary rather than rational in its system. And 
this arbitrariness, which results precisely In the alienation of the 
worker from his or her property and will, contains the contradictions of 
wealth and poverty, overproduction, imperialism and dehumanization which
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propel capitalist society toward the rational or communist state. "It 
is the bad side”, writes Marx, "that produces movement which makes 
history, by providing a struggle." (PP:116) Or, as Hegel puts it,
"... Everything which is not reasonable must on that account cease to 
be actual." (1975s201)
For both Hegel and Marx, however, the negative and critical aspect 
of the dialectic is only a part, and not even the most important part, 
of scientific method, "Out attitude", declares Hegel, "... must ... 
contain an affirmative side and a negative." However, "We get to know 
the affirmative side later on both in life and in science; thus we 
find it easier to refute than to justify." (1092JJO) Marx also 
emphasizes that dialectic contains "the positive understanding of what 
exists". (1976i103) But dialectic is not simply the alternation of a 
positive and negative attitude toward consciousness and society, what 
Marx calls, referring to Proudhon, the "point of view ... composed of 
On The One Hand and On The Other Hand". {1965s157) The dialectic 
method is ultimately a positive or affirmative approach to the study 
of society. "The negativity of finite things", states Hegel, "... is 
their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain it we must pay atten­
tion to their positive content," (1975s270)
The purpose of dialectic is to study the process of becoming« or 
the development of the, at first only implicit,rationality of the 
social individual. Capital, for example, is nothing but the objecti­
fied essence of the developing power of the social individuali "... 
real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals .... 
The full development of the individual ... reacts back upon the produc­
tive power of labour as itself the greatest productive power." (Marx,
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1973s709* 711) Even the study of the economic aspects of bourgeois 
society, therefore, presupposes that it is also the study of the 
organic development of the social individual: ”... The final result 
of the process of production always appears as the society itself, 
i.e. the human being itself in its social relations,” (1973:712)
The process of becoming studied by dialectic method involves the 
absorption, as well as the transcendence, of all earlier stages of a 
developing and conscious organism by its most mature stage. "Each 
stage", says Hegel, ”... is an image of the absolute,” i.e., of the 
rational society or the Idea, "but at first in a limited mode, and 
thus it is forced onwards to the whole, the evolution of which is what 
we termed Method." (1975*293) Accordingly, the highest and most 
mature phase of the social organism —  the communist or rational state 
—  will contain within itself all the positive or rational aspects of 
earlier social forms. Including capitalist society. To grasp and 
comprehend the transition to the rational state, as well as the 
outline of this society as it glimmers beneath the haze of appearance 
of the old one requires, therefore, probing the positive or rational 
features of the bourgeois mode of production.
Recognition of the positive aspect of the dialectic method is 
what forms the "epistemological break" which, as Althusser suggests, 
separates the work of the young, and the "mature, Marx. (Althusser, 
1969:34-35) Before 1845* Marx was greatly influenced by Feuerbach*s 
criticism of the Hegelian "negation of the negation" or "true affirma­
tion" which, Feuerbach claims, "restored ... theology ... through 
philosophy", Hegel*s writings, declares Feuerbach, conceal their 
reactionary content under a revolutionary guise: "At first everything
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is overthrown, but then everything is put in its former place ..." 
(1966:33-34) The young Marx applauds Feuerbach’s ’’serious, critical 
attitude to the Hegelian dialectic," especially Feuerbach’s opposition 
to "the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute 
positive ..." (1964:172) Ironically, Althusser —  the erstwhile
opponent of the young Marx —  on this issue shows once again the 
intimate connection between his version of Marxism and the views of 
Feuerbach and the young Marx: "Stalin was right, for once," Althusser 
opines, "to suppress ’the negation of the negation' from the laws of 
the dialectic ...» (1971:91)
According to the young Marx, capitalist society will destroy 
itself and the new communist society, "the self-supporting positive", 
will emerge from the ruins. (1964:172, 187) The same apocalyptic 
view, which contrasts strongly with Marx's later ideas on the develop­
ment of the social individual under capitalism, also appears in the 
Communist Manifesto:
The modern labourer ... instead of rising with the 
progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below 
the conditions of existence of his own class. He 
becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more 
rapidly than population and wealth, And here it 
becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any 
longer to be the ruling class in society, and to 
impose its conditions of existence upon society as 
an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it 
is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave 
within his slavery, because it cannot help letting 
him sink into such a state, that it has to feed 
him, instead of being fed by him, (1969, 1:119)
This outlook, with its undertones of despair and pessimism about 
the present, has become the ruling orthodoxy in Western Marxism, The 
"negative philosophy" of Adorno, for example, declares, in its 
convoluted and twisted phraseology, that "the new form can never emerge
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in a true state from an antagonistic society. As long as domination 
reproduces itself, the old quality reappears unrefined in the dis­
solving of the dissolvant: in a radical sense no leap is made at all." 
(1978:245) Similarly, Marcuse denounces Hegel’s "harmonistic inter­
pretation of history, according to which the crossing to a new 
historical form is at the same time a progress to a higher historical 
form ..." Hegel, says Marcuse, "denies the critical implications of 
the dialectic" and indulges "a preposterous interpretation" of society 
"because all the victims of oppression and injustice are against it, 
as are all the vain sufferings and sacrifices of history." (1973*246) 
Adorno and Marcuse, of course, are extreme representatives of the 
pessimistic strain within Western Marxism; but all shades of Marxism 
from Althusser (French C,P.)to Handel (Trotskyist) and myriad others 
continually emphasize the forthcoming doom of capitalism and fail to 
note (or deeply regret) the progressive aspects of modern Western 
democracies. For these thihkers, a search for the positive aspects of 
capitalism represents the ultimate heresy.
The application of negative dialectic, as done by the young Marx 
and the exponents of Western Marxism, represents what Hegel calls, "a 
forcible insistence on a single aspect, and a real effort to obscure 
and remove all consciousness of the other attribute which is involved". 
Contradiction, or opposed characteristics, may be found in any object, 
and the discovery of contradiction indicates no great mental faculty 
on the part of the investigator. But when the understanding conscious­
ness stumbles upon contradiction "the usual inference is, Hence this 
object is nothing". (Hegel, 1975*133) Since capitalism contains a 
mass of contradictions, the understanding mind is led to the conclusion
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that it must inevitably collapse in a terrible cataclysm of hellfire 
and damnation. To support this conclusion facts are gathered, and 
debates break out among the believers about when and how the collapse 
will occur. The collapse theory, of course, is subjected to withering 
criticism by Gramsci in the Prison notebooks, where he argues that in 
a crisis the bourgeoisie rather than the working class is more likely 
to gain the upper hand (1971:211-212), but it retains its grip in more 
or less sophisticated form throughout Western Marxism. It j_n based 
on alienation, on a dependence uoon the same external social laws it 
is certain bourgeois society cannot control. The laws which will 
transform bourgeois society into the rational state, however, are 
internal —  they reside in the developing self-consciousness of the 
social individual.
The abandonment of the positive aspect of the dialectic method 
explains why Western Marxism has been unable to develop the classic 
insights of Marx in the Orundrisee (1975) and In the originally . 
•unpublished "Part Seven" of Capital, I (1976) where he points to the 
overwhelming potential of the bourgeois mode of production. The 
transformation of Marxism from a dynamic and revolutionary fora of 
thought to a fast-frozen, static, and lifeless system of categories 
like "base and superstructure",' "class struggle", and "the proleta­
riat", is the consequence of removing the very element which gives 
classical Marxism its life —  i.e., the positive or rational aspect 
of dialectic. In the Lesser Logic, He,gel observes that "The logic of 
more Understanding. Is involved in Speculative logic, and can at will 
be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting the dialectical 
and ’reasonable’ element." This is precisely what Western Marxism has
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done with the work of Marx, and the result is what Hegel predicts:
"it becomes what the common logic is, a descriptive collection of sundry 
thought-forms and rules which, finite though they are, are taken to be 
something infinite." (1975*120)
For the "common logic" within Western Marxism, the dialectic 
method assumes some type of reciprocity between the economic base and 
the ideological superstructure of society. Beyond a great deal of 
complex word-play and engineering metaphors this is essentially the 
position of Althusser (e.e, 1969:161-218), as well as the position 
of most thinkers within the Western Marxist tradition. It is also the 
standpoint of many interpreters of Marx. Giddens, for example, 
suggests that the "dialectical view" assumes "reciprocal interaction 
of ... ideas with the social organization of 'earthly man' ... the 
active interplay between subject and object ... whereby the individual 
acts upon the world at the same time as the world acts upon him",
(1977:210) Given this assumption, the problem becomes to determine the
j
degree to which the ideological superstructure (i.e,, law, politics, ;
;
religion, and so on) is influenced by the economic base and vice versa, |
Althusser, for example, describes bourgeois society as a "structure in ;j
\
dominance", by which he means that it is determined "in the last .j
instance" by the economic base, although, as he puts it, "the lonely i
hour of the 'last instance* never comes". (1969:113) The economic 
base is considered to be "real” — * i.e,, a sensuous reality ■—  while the 
superstructure is a more or less fantastic reflection of the concrete 
economic relations of society, , This theory constitutes one of the great 
dogmas of Western Marxism; its assured place in .the Marxist system 
rivals that of the Virgin Birth in Christianity. ■
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Hegel observes that dialectic method "tries especially to show 
how the questions men have proposed ... on the nature of Knowledge,
Faith and the like —  questions which they imagine have no connection 
with abstract thoughts —  are really reducible to the simple cate­
gories which first get cleared up in Logic". (1975*46) The questions 
involved in the Marxist interpretation of the dialectic are n6 
exception. The Western Marxist version of the dialectic is simply a 
regressive hybrid of the categories of reciprocity or functionalism 
and causality. These categories, in turn, are the staple diet of the 
understanding or bourgeois consciousness.
Hegel provides a useful analysis of the category of reciprocity 
which reveals why Western Marxism has experienced so much difficulty 
in determining to what degree the economic base is actually primary.
The difficulty arises precisely because, in the relation of reciprocity, 
the elements said to interact tend to disappear and dissolve into one 
another, so that instead of two interacting elements there turns out 
to be only one. "Reciprocal action just means that each characteristic 
we impose," —  in this case, base and superstructure, "is also to be 
suspended and inverted into its opposite, and that in this way the 
essential nullity of the ’moments* is explicitly stated. An effect is 
introduced into the primariness"? i.e, the superstructure is said to 
have an effect on the base, "in other words, the primariness is 
abolished: the action of a cause becomes reaction, and so on". (1975* 
218) The solution suggested for this dilemma by Engels, Althusser, and 
others, namely, that the economy is determinant in "the last instance", 
does one of two things. It either refers the relation between bane and 
superstructure to the sensuous conception of time: i.e., the economy
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is the first (or the second-last element) in the relation of recipro­
city, in which case nothing has been solved at all. Or it leads to the 
abandonment of the relation of reciprocity to the even less satisfactory 
category of causality: i.e., "if the economy, then the superstructure."
The Marxist dogma of the dialectic is founded on the notion that 
there is an Interaction between the conscious subject and its object. 
Thus, the laws or religion of a society which reflect the conscious make­
up of the individuals within it, are supposed to be the result of the 
action of the economic basis of that society, on the minds of the 
individuals. But the notion that consciousness depends upoh and 
interacts with its object is simply false. Human consciousness is above 
all active; thinking, considered as ideality or revolutionizing 
practice, is not dependent on Its object. "With as much truth...M 
writes Hegel, "we may be said to owe eating to the means of nourish­
ment, so long as we can have no eating without them. If we take this 
view, eating is certainly represented as ungrateful; it devours that 
to which it owes itself, Thibking upon this view of its action is 
equally ungrateful." (1975*17) As Marx put3 it in the Theses on 
Feuerbach: "Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which 
mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human 
practice and in the comprehension of this practice#" '(1.969, 1 *15)
The same conscious human practice which creates the "ideological 
superstructure", also creates the "economic base". The reciprocal 
interaction of the two, which undoubtedly exists, Is merely the result 
of the fact that they have an Identical source. "The true category", 
writes Hegel, "is the unity of all these different forms so that it is 
one Mind which manifests Itself in, and impresses itself upon these
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different elements.” (1892:50) Hence, the bourgeois approximation to 
rationality (which turns out to be irrationality) is felt everywhere 
in capitalist society, from the organization of industry to the struc­
ture of the legal system. It is founded on a peculiar interpretation 
of human freedom (Hegel calls it, ”an insanity of personality”) where 
the individual is free to alienate the products of his or her own free 
labour —  which in fact are the property of the individual —  and make 
them over to the "overlord to nothing” (Hegel, 1976:50), to the 
capitalist. This relation has made possible the fantastic growth, the 
richness and complexity of bourgeois society, but the limit of the 
rationality of the capitalist property relation is also the limit Of 
the capitalist mode of production itself.
For the Marxist dogma of the dialectic, the role of the individual 
fades into insignificance when compared with the mighty clash and 
bustle of wrestling bases and superstructures, the rumble of onward 
moving modes of production, the roaring of the "motor” of history —
.the class struggle, and so on. This view, of course, leads to the total 
rejection of the "great man/woman" theory of history (Eg, Althusser, 
1976:99) "It is true that man, generically, makes his own history,” 
declares Sydney Hook, ”It is not true that any individual man makes his 
own history," (1976:59) And a Canadian writer maintains that "in a 
Marxist analysis we are interested neither in the cult of personality 
nor in the great man theory of history," but rather "in ... social 
classes and ... other politically significant categories". (Olsen, 1977* 
199) For a "Marxist analysis", of course, the Individual is not a 
"politically significant category".
The Western Marxist view of the individual, according to which ho
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or she is merely the abstract expression of the more concrete term, 
class, is simply the reverse side of the bourgeois notion, mercilessly 
criticized by Hegel, that the Individual may be reduced to psycho­
logical characteristics. Accordingly, there are bourgeois "psycho- 
histories" which claim, for example, that Napoleon marched to Egypt 
because he suffered from an "inner emptiness", and so on, (Hegel, 
1975:200; 1956:32; 1976:84) The Marxist and the bourgeois mind exhibit 
here once again their essential unity, their alienation expressed as 
externality from the concrete achievements of human ideality or 
revolutionizing practice. For what both the Marxist and the bourgeois 
emphasize is the crude limits, the particularity and nullity of indivi­
dual human consciousness; they cannot grasp the dialectical unity of 
theory and practice as expressed in the concrete thinking activity 
of the social individual,
Hegel's notion of the "world-historical individual" and his much
misunderstood term, "the cunning of reason" are essential elements of
dialectic method and cannot be understood apart from it. For Hegel,
world-historical individuals are revolutionaries: "they derived their
purposes and their vocation", he writes,
from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the 
surface, which, impinging on the outer world as 
on a shell, bursts it into pieces, because it is 
another kernel than that which belonged to the 
shell in question. They are men, therefore, who 
appear to draw the impulse of their life from 
themselves; and whose deeds have produced a 
condition of things and a complex of historical.
. relations which appear to.be only their interest, 
and their work.
World-historical individuals, then, are persons who, though unconscious 
"of the general Idea they were unfolding", nevertheless attained to "an 
insight into the requirements of the time -—  what was ripe for
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development**. These individuals, these revolutionaries, simply 
expressed what was in the minds of all, "but in a state of unconscious­
ness which the {Treat men in question aroused". In other word3, "They 
are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great; 
not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met the case and 
fell in with the needs of the age." (Hegel, 1956:30-31)
As I suggested in earlier chapters, Hegel’s notion of the "cunning 
of reason" (1956:33) is usually taken to mean that individuals are 
simply agents of a higher force called Reason or Spirit which 
irresistibly drives them on to accomplish history’s goal. The ends 
they attain, therefore, are not theirs, but Reason’s. For Hegel, 
however, reason is a property of everyone’s consciousness; its mani­
festation is simply the product of human ideality. "In human knowledge 
and volition, a3 its material element, Reason attains positive 
existence," (1956:33) The goal of history for Hegel, as well as for 
Marx, is a society in which social laws are also the laws of individual 
.rationality: "This essential being is the union of the subjective 
with the rational Will: it is the moral Whole, the State, which is 
that fora of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his free­
dom; but on the condition of his reoognislng. believing In, and 
willing that which is common to the whole." (Hegel, 1956:30? my 
emphasis) The external state of bourgeois society, however, "is an 
imperfect Present"; the ideal organic unity between the social indi­
vidual and the rational state "belongs to the department of speculation 
... But in the.process of the World’s History itself —  a3 still 
incomplete — - the abstract final aim of history is not yet trade the 
distinct object of desire and interest," (Hegel, 1956:61, 25)
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From the standpoint of dialectical science, the actions of 
individuals in history have been aimed at achieving the ultimate goal 
of history, but in a limited form, in the form practicable given the 
development of human rationality at the time. Accordingly, while a 
world-historical individual is able to grasp and achieve the require­
ments of human rationality (the Idea) of his or her own period, the 
ultimate goal of individual human rationality —  communist society —  
may be beyond his or her comprehension. The degree to which this 
goal is directly present in the consciousness of the individual 
depends, of course, on the epoch in which the individual lives.
Hegel, however, also contends that class Interests as well as psycho­
logical ones play a crucial role in the activity of world-historical 
individuals as well as in modem politics. Rational principles are 
only one side of political effort: the other side is that of self- 
interest masquerading as altruism —  "passions and interests essen­
tially subjective, but under the mask of such higher sanctions. The 
pretensions thus contended for as legitimate in the name of 
Reason, pass accordingly, for absolute aims .,.M (1956:35? my 
emphasis)
; No less than Hegel, Marx is conscious of the role of great - 
individuals in history, pointing out that "acceleration and delay" in 
historical progress "are very much dependent upon ... ’accidents', 
including the ’accident' of the character of the people who first head 
the movement". (1 9 6 5:2 6 4) Marx argues, for example, that the French 
Revolution was not only the.product : of the-struggle of the great mass 
of people, but also of the deeds of its heroes. "Camille, Desmoulins, 
Danton, Robespierre, Saint Just, Napoleon, the heroes as well as the
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parties and the masses of the old French Revolution, performed the
task of their time ... the task of unchaining and setting up modem
bourgeois society ..." (1969» Is399) Nor is the problem of the role
of the individual in history simply a problem of heroes and revolution,
"... In the history of the United States," observes Marx in 1862,
... and that of mankind Lincoln will have a place 
immediately behind Washington ... Lincoln is not 
the product of a popular revolution. The ordinary 
play of universal suffrage, unconscious of the 
great destinies it had to decide, brought to the 
top a plebeian who had worked his way up from navvy 
to Illinois senator; a man without intellectual 
sparkle, without outstanding greatness of character, 
without extraordinary importance —  an average man 
of good will. The new world never won a greater 
victory than when it proved that in the context of 
its political and social organization it needs 
only average men of goodwill to perform deeds it 
would take heroes to perform in the old world.
(Quoted in Prawer, 1976:269)
Equipped with its omniscient categories of base and superstructure, 
of course, Western Marxism is able to see through Marx's simplistic 
admiration for Lincoln as well as his view of the potential of 
."reformist"politics in capitalist society. ("We do not deny", Marx 
declares in 1872, "that there are countries such as America, England, 
and I would add Holland ... where the working people may achieve their 
goal by peaceful means." (Quoted in Jones, 1973*35)) Where everything 
is explained by "naked class interests" and so on, thought itself 
becomes a needless accessory for the "theorist". "Marx", explains G. 
Stedman Jones, "... never produced a coherent theory of the political 
superstructures of capitalist social formations ..." This, continues 
Jones —  penetrating to the heart of the matter — »reflects "a 
theoretical limit to the — * unfinished —  work of both Marx and Engels 
at the close of the nineteenth century. The absence, on the theoretical
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plane, of any mechanism to connect the determination in the last 
instance by tho economy and the relative autonomy of superstructures, 
was reproduced on the political plane in an inability to produce a 
systematic theory of revolutionary politics." (1973*35) The judge­
ment of G. Stedman Jones and other Western Marxists on the political 
strategy adopted by Marx and Engels simply reflects "the absence, on 
the theoretical plane", of any knowledge of dialectic method.
The concrete reality of individual nations is usually ignored by 
Western Marxism in favour of the abstractions of base and super­
structure which it blindly applies to each and every society. For 
dialectic method, however, the actuality of a nation or culture is 
crucial to the study of the ultimate object of method, the development 
of the ROcial individual. "The relation of the individual to" his or 
her nation, writes Hegel,
is that he appropriates to himself this substantial 
existence; that it becomes his character and 
capability, enabling him to have a definite place 
in the world —  to be something. For he finds the 
being of the people to which he belongs an already 
established, firm world ■—  objectively present to 
him —  with which he must incorporate himself,
(1956:74)
The ideality of the individual is fused with a particular spirit, a 
particular view of the world which permeates all the aspects of his or 
her culture.
It is within the limitations of this idiosyncrasy 
that the spirit of the nation, concretely manifested, 
expresses every aspect of its consciousness and
will--- the whole cycle of its realization, and even
its science, art, and mechanical skills, all bear 
its stamp. These special peculiarities, find their 
key in that common peculiarity — ■ the particular 
principle that characterizes a people , /(Hegel,
1956: 64)
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Like Hegel, Marx also emphasizes the organic unity of the social
individual with society. Capital, for instance, is not only a study
of the bourgeois mode of production in the abstract; it also concerns
the life and spirit of that classic bourgeois society —  England.
"What I have to examine in this work", writes Marx in the "Preface to
the First Edition of Capital",
is the capitalist mode of production, and the 
relations of production and the forms of inter­
course corresponding to it. Until now, their 
locus classicus has been England. This is the 
reason why England is used as the main illustration 
of the theoretical developments I make. (1976*90)
Similarly, Marx connects the rapid development of the United States
with the enterprising character of the individuals who settled there,
(1968;90-91) These individuals Infused the spirit of the United States
with what Marx, in another context, calls, "one of the delusions
carefully nurtured by Political Economy":
The truth is, that in this bourgeois society every 
workman, if he is an extremely clever and shrewd 
fellow, and gifted with bourgeois instincts and 
favoured by exceptional fortune, can possibly be 
- converted into an exploiteur du travail d'autrui 
["Exploiter of others' labour"}. But»where there 
• was no travail to b® exploit!' there would be no - 
capitalist nor capitalist production, (1976*1079)
Whatever the defects of this dream or delusion it also contains its 
own core of truth* "In the usual formulation" of political economy, 
writes Marx, "».» an industrial people reaches the peak of its produc­
tion at the moment when it arrives at its historical peak generally.
In fact, the industrial peak of a people when its main concern is not 
yet gain, but rather to gain. Thus the Yankees over the English." 
(1973*87) In this passage, Marx echoes a discussion by Hegel, where 
Hegel also refers to the British nation*
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A Nation is moral —  virtuous —  vigorous--
while it is engaged in realizing its grand projects, 
and defends its work against external violence 
during the process of giving to its purposes an 
objective existence. The contradiction between its 
potential, subjective being —  its inner aim and 
life —  and its actual being is removed; it has 
attained full reality, has itself objectively 
present to it. But this having been attained, the 
activity displayed by the Spirit of the people in 
question is no longer needed; it has its desire.
The Nation can still accomplish much in war and 
peace at home and abroad; but the living substan­
tial soul itself may be said to have ceased its 
activity. The essential, supreme interest has 
consequently vanished from its life, for interest 
is present only where there is opposition,
(1956:74)
In order to grasp the spirit of a nation or a people, dialectic 
method studies the supreme Intellectual productions of society —  the 
science and philosophy created within it. Philosophy and science are 
the comprehension in thought of society and therefore represent '’the 
progression of the total actuality involved". (Hegel, 1892:35) The 
object of Marx's theoretical effort, therefore, is not only capitalism, 
but capitalism as it is expressed in the categories of bourgeois 
political economy. A particular philosophy or scientific system 
represents not merely the ideas and reality of its creator, but also 
the entire richness of the social universe of which the thinker is a 
part. "Everything hangs on this," states Hegel, "these forms" of 
science and philosophy "are nothing else than the original distinctions 
in the Idea [society] itself which is what it is only In them." (1892* 
34-35) Feuerbach's and Kant's philosophies, for example, merely 
express in pure form the determinate categories and relations of 
bourgeois thought and reality.
Although science and philosophy are the products of society, they 
are above society in form, since they place society "in the relation
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of object”. The merely formal difference between theoretical pro­
ductions and society, however, becomes an actual difference because 
it is through thought that "Mind makes manifest a distinction between 
knowledge and that which is: this knowledge is thus what produces a 
new form of development.” (Hegel, 1692:55» my emphasis) The 
dialectical science of Hegel and Marx, for example, is a product of 
bourgeois society; but it also anticipates and expresses the develop­
ment of the free and independent social individual who will find his 
or her concrete existence in the rational or communist state.
2, Dialectical Exposition and the Rational State
Dialectical exposition—  the presentation of the results of 
dialectic method —  ia_not historical in character, although the
*
dialectic is commonly (and wrongly) assumed to refer mainly to history.
. Rather than the time-order of events related to the object under study, 
dialectical exposition is concerned with the object’s development as 
a living organism which, as it were, unfolds itself from itself, "In 
order to develop the laws of political economy ...” says Marx, "it Is 
not necessary to write the real history of the relations of production.w 
(1973s460) To present society as an "organic whole" (Marx, 1973*100) 
means to.represent it in a manner "corresponding to its concept”
(Marx, 1973*885) — - or as Kegel puts it, in a manner corresponding to 
"the immanent self-differentiation of the concept". (1976:36) The 
concept, in turn, like the processes within a living body, develops in 
all its parts, not historically or in a certain time-order, but
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simultaneously. "The simultaneity of the process of capital in 
different phases of the process", writes Marx, "is possible only 
through its division and break up into parts, each of which is 
capital, but capital in a different aspect. This change of form and 
matter is like that in the organic body ... the shedding in one form 
and renewal in the other is distributed, takes place simultaneously." 
(1973:661)
Dialectic method may, of course, be applied to history, but the 
exposition of historical development is different from dialectical 
exposition in its pure form. Hegel’s Lesser logic, for example, 
presents the development of the categories of thought in purely neces­
sary, i.e,, rational and non-historical terms. This development, 
however, occurred in the history of philosophy according to the time- 
order of succession rather than to the chronological order. The 
dialectical exposition of development in history "shows the different 
stages and moments in development in time, in manner of occurrence, 
in particular places, in particular people or political circumstances, 
the complications arising thus, and, in short, it shows us the 
empirical form". (Hegel, 1892*, 29-30)
Dialectical exposition must start from the most abstract form of 
the object under study; but also from its most universal and necessary 
aspect. "The Idea", writes Hegel, referring to both consciousness and 
society,
must further determine itself within Itself 
continually, since in the beginning it is no more 
than an abstract concept* But this original 
abstract concept is never abandoned. It merely 
becomes richer in itself and the final determination 
is therefore the richest. - In this process its 
earlier, merely implicit, determinations attain
484
their free self-3ubsistence but in such a way 
that the concept remains the soul which holds 
everything together and attains its own proper 
differentiation only through an immanent process,
(1976:233)
Since dialectical exposition begins with the simplest and most 
abstract categories, the order of appearance of the categories in 
exposition may be similar to their order of appearance in history. 
(Hegel, 1892:30; Marx, 1973:102) But in relation to the application 
of dialectic method this similar!ty is purely fortuitous.
The Absolute Idea in Hegel’s speculative logic—which as I have 
argued, is simply the logical or theoretical expression of the relation 
of the social individual with the rational state—is the final 
category of logic. But it also, of course, includes being —  the first 
category of logic. The Absolute Idea, or the rational state, is 
simply the richest and most developed form of (social) being. Accord- 
dingly, speculative logic concerns "the knowledge that the idea is the 
one systematic whole". (1975:296) Similarly, the ultimate category 
in the Philosophy of Right —- the rational state includes the first 
category discussed in this work, i.e,, "the absolutely free will" of 
the social individual, (1976:37) Marx begins Capital with the 
commodity —  the most abstract and the most universal category within 
capitalist society, "'//hat I start from," states Marx, "is the simplest 
form of the product of labour in present day society, and that is the 
’commodity’". (Quoted in Mandel, 1978:18) The final chapters of 
Capital are concerned with the social relations developed around the 
commodity, i.e,, private property and its abolition both within the 
capitalist mode of production by the monopoly of the capitalist class, 
and by the socialist revolution.
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Dialectical exposition presents the object of method in its 
highest or ideal form; in the same way, the moments or aspects of 
the object are displayed in their most extreme or purest configura­
tions. (Hegel, 1976i35» 196958) The manner of presentation of the 
object of study makes it possible to find in it both the means to 
comprehend less developed social forms as well as the intimations 03? 
fore shadowings of the shape of the future, "... Our method", says 
Marx,
indicates the points where ... bourgeois economy as 
a merely historical form of the production process 
points beyond itself to earlier historical modes of 
production ... These indications , together with 
a correct grasp of the present, then also offer the 
key to the understanding of the past ... This 
correct view likewise leads at the same time to the 
points at which the suspension of the present form 
of production relations gives signs of its becoming 
—  foreshadowings of the future. (1973*460-461)
If the order of the categories in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right has 
nothing to do with their historical succession "in the actual world" 
(Hegel, 19 6 95130), this order is of supreme importance for an under­
standing of Hegel’s theory of the state. For, as Hegel puts It, "A 
philosophical division is far from an external one ..." (1976*36)
The concrete formations in the Philosophy of Right which lead up to 
the theory of the state are the elements which, for Hegel, prove the 
necessity of the rational or communist state. Both the family and 
bourgeois or civil society —  the social categories which precede the 
exposition of the state —  are "stages or factors" which "as 
actualities ... are yet at the same time viewed as forms only, 
collapsing and transient", (l97582*00) Accordingly, Hegel's study of 
right examines the dissolution of the family in civil society along 
with the factors which lead to the "splitting u p" and Integration of
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civil society into the rational state. (Hegel, 1969:130) The family 
and civil society are only the "finite phase" of the rational state, 
a phase which is necessary "only in order" for the consciousness of 
the social individual "to rise above its ideality and become explicit 
as infinite actual mind". (1976:162)
"We should desire", states Hegel, "to have in the state nothing 
except what is an expression of rationality. The state is the world 
which mind has made for itself; its march therefore, is on the lines 
that are fixed and absolute ... The state [is] a secular deity." 
(1976:285) As I have argued, the state Hegel refers to is what Marx 
terms, communist society, i.e., "an association of free men, working 
with the means of production held in common, expending their many 
different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single 
social labour force". In this society, social relations "generally 
present themselves to Cthe individual] in a transparent and rational 
form", and social production is "under [the] conscious and planned 
control" of individuals. (1976:171* 173) But the rational society 
Hegel envisions has nothing to do with the Marxist abstraction of the 
"withering away of the state", (l*enin, 1970, 11:297) The notion 
that the state in communist society must eventually disappear is 
based on the bourgeois conception of the external state, according to 
which the state is supposed to be antithetical and antagonistic to 
the interests of the isolated individual. For both Hegel and Marx, 
however, the state is the chief instrument for the self-education and 
the .protection of the freedoms of the social individual. In communist 
society, therefore, the state does not wither away; rather, the 
antagonistic sphere of civil society is merged into and rationalized
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by the integrated communist state.
Nor is the rational state a classless society. Classes as 
opposed and antagonistic groups, with unequal privileges and wealth, 
do, of course, disappear. But classes as articulated groups of indi­
viduals performing varied and diverse modes of social labour will 
remain; in fact, within the rational state a person’s social class is 
the mediating institution between the individual and the state.
(Hegel, 1976:200) Of course, membership in any social class— which 
in the rational state will be either the class of civil servants or 
the business (working) classes —  is completely open to the individual. 
Wealth and birth will play no part in the distinctions of class within 
the rational state. (1976:201, 290) Eventually, however, as the need 
for labour of any kind disappears with the mechanization and rationaliza­
tion of industry, the distinctions between classes themselves will 
dissolve.
The universal class, or the civil servants, performs the role and 
, function of government; the business class is concerned with the 
system of needs —  the sphere of industry and production. The power of 
the universal class is checked and mediated by that of the freely 
associated individuals in the business class, as well as by the 
executive arm of government represented by the head of state. Leading 
posts within the corporations controlled by the business class are 
allotted to individuals on the basis of free elections within the 
corporation and ratified by the executive of government. (1976:189)
The estates or parliament of the rational state are formed by 
representatives of the corporations and the civil service; these 
representatives in turn are elected by the individuals within the
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corporations and the various bodies within the civil service. In this 
way, the electorate of the rational state avoids the atomization and 
alienation intrinsic to the external capitalist state. (1976:200)
Since the deputies from the corporations are elected by the business 
or working class itself, they "eo ipso adopt the point of view of 
society, and their actual election is therefore either something 
superfluous or else reduced to a trivial play of opinion and caprice 
... The interest itself is actually present in its representative, 
while he himself is there to represent the objective element of his 
own being", (1976:202) Hegel’s outline of the government of the 
rational state, of course, resembles the system of Soviets and workers’ 
factory councils actually proposed during the first years of the Russian 
Revolution,
Hegel's theory of the state is chiefly concerned with the state 
as it will exist in its most concrete, i.e., rational form. But the 
theory results from the analysis of the rational or affirmative 
aspects of already existing states, (1976:279) Accordingly, Hegel is 
concerned to illuminate the reasons for the particular forms taken by 
the states of his time, including, for example, why the class of 
landed property owners exercised great influence over the early 
nineteenth century state. But Hegel is convinced, however, that this 
influence will disappear, along with the form of this class itself, 
(1976:132) Since positions of authority in the rational state should be 
filled according to objective and rational criteria, rather than on 
the basis of wealth or birth, the institution of primogeniture 
associated with the aristocracy "is nothing but a chain on the freedom 
of private rights, and either political meaning is given to it" —
which, as Hegel makes clear, is out of the question in the rational 
state —  "or else it will in due course disappear". (1976s293)
This sketch of Hegel’s theory of the rational state is neces­
sarily brief and can only suggest guidelines for a more comprehensive 
account. Nevertheless one particular aspect of the theory shotild be 
clarified. Dialectic method deals "with that which is" (1956*87) 
and during Hegel’s period, as he observes, "in almost all European 
countries the individual head of state is the monarch ..." (1976:296)
Hegel is impatient with theorists who see nothing rational in the 
institution of constitutional monarchy, and who believe that a demo­
cratic republic is the only reasonable form of government. For Hegel, 
the question as to whether a democracy or a constitutional monarchy 
is most to be preferred "is quite idle", precisely because "such forms 
must be discussed historically or not at all". (1976:177)
For Marcuse, along with most other commentators, Hegel’s account 
of the rational state constitutes "the glorification of the Prussian 
monarchy" and the betrayal of "his highest philosophical ideas. His 
political doctrine surrenders society to nature, freedom to necessity, 
reason, to caprice ...» Freedom becomes identical with the inexorable 
necessity of nature, and reason terminates in an accident of birth". 
(1973*218, 217) But according to Hegel, a monarchy will have no place 
in the rational state. When Hegel observes that the monarch "is 
raised to the dignity of the monarchy in an immediate, natural fashion, 
i.e. through his birth in the course of nature," he is actually 
referring to the finltude and transitory character of the monarchy.
In the constitutional monarchy, Hegel suggests, "birth is the oracle 
-—  something independent of any arbitrary volition." (1956*428) But
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oracles of any kind are only required "when men [have] not yet 
plumbed the depths of self-consciousness or risen out of their undif­
ferentiated unity of substance to their independence , ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 8 4 )
The monarchy is a flawed concept precisely because it lacks the 
character of rationality; it is "a single and natural existent 
without the mediation of a particular content (like a purpose in the 
case of action)". (1976:184) The monarchy is only necessary as a 
counterpoise to the caprice and irrationality which characterizes the 
external state of bourgeois society; it will disappear in the 
rational state. The monarch, notes Hegel, "is ... ungrounded objec­
tive existence (existence being the category which is at home in 
nature) ..." (1976:185) But if this existence "is at home in nature",
i.e., in the state of nature represented by the antagonisms and 
discord of bourgeois society, it will not be "at home" ih the rational 
state. Existence is a poor category since it refers to "finite 
things" which "are changeable and transient, i.e,"... existence is 
associated with them for a season, but that association is neither 
eternal nor inseparable". (1975*259)
Marx’s mature work, as I have argued in this study, is devoted 
not only to the critical analysis of capitalism, but also to the 
investigation of the presuppositions of the rational or communist 
state. He explores the conditions for the transcendence of bourgeois 
society which are formed within the capitalist mode of production 
itself. But Marx never went beyond the economlc study of bourgeois 
society. In particular, he did not produce a comprehensive theory of 
the state; nor did he develop an aesthetics, or a critical examination 
of the history of thought. There is no confrontation with the
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categories of logic in Marx? and the reader will look in vain for
a Marxist psychology or philosophy of nature, or a system of law.
Hegel, however, did produce a great deal of comprehensive work in all
these subjects. Moreover, Hegel’s efforts are the result of the
application of dialectic method —  an application which led him to
the same conclusions as Marx's about bourgeois consciousness and 
\
society.
One reason, of course, for the great superiority of scope and
range in the thought of Hegel over that of Marx is that Marx had no
established income or position, and spent much of his life in
unsettled conditions and strenuous political activity, Hegel had
much more time, and the financial independence provided by state
teaching and university posts, to devote his attention entirely to
theory. But there is another, and perhaps more crucial, difference
in their personal biographies. Hegel’s age was the age of the French
Revolution and the incredible march of Napoleon’s "army of liberation"
.over the whole of Europe, Marx’s age was the age of Louis Bonaparte,
Hegel's contemporaries formed the elite of classical German idealism,
literature and music; Kant, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hölderlin»
Goethe, Beethoven, etc,, were among his coevals, and some of them were
his personal friends, ; .(Kaufmann, 19 78tPasrim) Except for Heine, Marx
had only Engels, Feuerbach and the other members of the Young Hegelians,
However accomplished these thinkers were, they stood nowhere near the
likes of Kant or even Schelling, Most of them are known today only
#through their association with Marx, In England, of course, Marx was
I owe these observations to a conversation with Professor Donald 
MacRae,
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surrounded by the shallowest empiricism.
Marx was intensely aware of his isolation? an isolation made 
all the more bitter because he alone among the thinkers of his genera­
tion had a profound knowledge and grasp of the Hegelian philosophy. 
This grasp, as I have shown, was faulty; but without Marx's insights 
into Hegel's work, the mystery surrounding Hegel's dialectic would, 
no doubt, be impenetrable. In the Philosophical Notebooks, (1965S 
178-179) Benin long ago pointed to the necessity for Marxism to 
recover the heritage it has lost through its ignorance of Hegel. But 
the writings and theory of Western Marxism remain locked in a groove 
dominated by a frozen and mechanical interpretation of Marx, coupled 
with a philosophical outlook which owes much more to the crude 
materialism of Feuerbach and the young Marx than it does to either 
Hegel or the mature Marx. Ignorance of Hegel would be excusable if 
he were merely the exponent of a standpoint transcended by Marx. But 
even Marx did not Imagine Hegel to be a "dead dog”; the treatment of 
Hegel as such by Marx's epigones mu3t be among the great wonders of 
intellectual history,
Marx did not transcend Hegel's philosophy, lie merely developed 
and amplified insights already available in Hegel's discussion of 
civil society in the Philosophy of Right, (1976) That Marx did this 
in a form and manner much more accessible to the intellectual climate 
of developed capitalism than Hegel's more philosophical approach is 
self-evident.
This study ha3 attempted to show that the division commonly made 
between Hegel and Marx is non-existent. The parallels between their 
theories are much more compelling than their differences, 1 have also
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tried to demonstrate that the Western Marxist view of both Hegel and 
the dialectic method has little to recommend it. This view consti­
tutes nothing less than an aspect of the alienated consciousness 
Western Marxism shares with its bourgeois counterpart. But if the 
arguments I have made in this study have any validity, there may be 
a large field of theoretical work and endeavour available to students 
of Marx. A new synthesis of Marx with Hegel might provide signifi­
cant insights into diverse areas of theory and practice —  insights 
which could transform Western Marxism and nourish the struggle for 
individual freedom and the rational state. The dialectic of Hegel 
and Marx, after all, is the only alternative to the sterile thought 




1978 Minima Moraliaj Reflections from Damaged Life. E. F. R,
Jephcott (trans.) London: Verso
Althusser, Louis
For Marx. Ben Brewster (trans.) London: Allen Lane: The 
Penguin Press
Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, Ben Brewster 
(trans.) London: RIB
Politics and History: MontesquiBu, Rousseau, Hegel and 
Marx. Ben Brewster (trans.) London: NLB
Essays in Self-Criticism, Grahame Lock (trans.) London: 
NLB
"Introduction: Unfinished History". Pp, 7-16 in Dominique 
Lecourt, Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko. Ben 
Brewster (trans,) London: KLB
Avineri, Shlomo
1972 Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy
1966 Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economio and
Social Order. New York and London: Monthly Review Press
Benton, Ted
1977 Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies.
London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Blumenburg, Werner
1972 Karl Marx: An Illustrated Biography. Douglas Scott
(trans.) London: Row Left Review Editions
Braverman, Harry
1974 Labor and Monopoly Capital. Rew York and London:
Monthly Review Press
Brazill, William J.









1975 The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform.
Brian Pearce and Frances MacDonagh (trans.) Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex! Penguin Books
Coleman, James A,
1969 Relativity for the Layman. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books
Colletti, Lucio
1972 From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society. 
John Merrington and Judith White (trana.) London: NLB
1973 Marxism and Hegel. Lawrence Garner (trans.) London: NLB
1975 "Marxism and the Dialectic". John Matthews (trans.) New
Left Review 93:3-29
1977 "A Political and Philosophical Interview". Pp. 315-350
in Western Marxism: A Critical Reader. London: NLB
Collingwood, R. G.
1975 The Principles of Art. London: Oxford University Press
Cookson, Clive and David Walker
1978 "Higher Education in America". Times Higher Educational
Supplement 352: VII-VIII
Debray, Regis
1977 "Marxism and the National Question". New Left Review
105:25-41
Deutscher, Isaac
1965, I The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921. (Volume I) New 
York: Vintage Books
1965, III The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky: 1929-1940. (Volume III) 
New York: Vintage Books
1977 "Record of a Discussion with Heinrich Brandler". New
Left Review 105:47-55
Engels, Frederick
1954 Dialectics of Nature. Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House
1967 The German Revolutions: The Peasant War in Germany andRevolution and Counterrevolution. Leonard Krieger (ed.) 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
496
Farber, Leslie H.
1976 Lying, Despair, Jealousy, Envy, Sex, Suicide, Drugs, and
the Good Life. Rev York: Basic Books
Feuerbach, Ludvig
1957 The Essence of Christianity. George Eliot (trans.) Rev
Yorki Harper Torchbook
1966 Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. Manfred H.
Vogel (trans.) Indianapolis and Rev Yorks Bobbs-Merrill 
Company Ltd.
Feyerabend, Paul
197Q Against Methods Outline of An Anarchist Theory of Knov-
ledge. Londons Verso
Freud, Sigmund
1949 Civilization and its Discontents. Londons Hogarth Press
Friedrich, Carl J.
1956 "Introduction" (unpaginated) in G, W. F, Hegel, The Philo­
sophy of History. J. i^bree (trans.) Rev Yorks Dover 
Publications Inc.
Giddens, Anthony
1971 Capitalism and Modem Social Theorys An Analysis of the
Writings of Marx, Durkheia and Max Weber. Cambridges 
Cambridge University Press
.1976 Rev Rules of the Sociological Methods A Positive Critique
of Interpretive Sociologies. Londons Hutchinson and Co,
Glucksman, Andre
1977 "A Ventriloquist Structuralism". Pp, 282-314 in Western
Marxisms A Critical Reader. Londons RLB
Gramsci, Antonio
1971 Selections from the Prison Rotebooks, Quinton Hoars and
Geoffrey Rovell Smith (trans.) Rev Yorks International 
Publishers
Harris, H. S,
1972 Hegel’s Developments Towards the Sunlight 1770-1801•
Londons Oxford University Press
Hegel, G. V. F.1892 Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (3 volumes)
1894 E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simeon (trans.) Londons




















, G. V. F.
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. (Volume 1)
Rev. S. B. Speirs, B.D., and J. Burdon Sanderson (trans.)j 
Rev. E. B. Speirs, B.D. (ed.) London* Routledge and Kegan 
Paul
Early Theological Writings. T, M. Knox (trans.) Chicago* 
University of Chicago Press
The Science of Logic. (Two volumes) W. H. Johnston and 
L. G. Struthers (trans.) London* Allen and Unwin
The Philosophy of Hegel* Hegel’s Basic Writings. Carl 
J. Friedrich (ed.) Hew fork* The Modern Library
The Philosophy of History. J. Sibree (trans.) Hew Yorks 
Dover Publications Inc.
Hegel’s Political Writings. T. M. Knox (trans,) London; 
Oxford University Press
'•The Preface to the Phenomenology", Pp, 363-456 in Walter 
Kaufmann, Hegel, Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, 
London* Weidenfeld and Kicolson
The Phenomenology of Mind. J. B. Baillie (trans.) Hew 
York* Harper Torchbooks
Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind* Being Part Three of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830),
William Wallace (trans,) London* Oxford University Press
Hegel’s Logic* Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830). William Wallace and A. V, 
Miller (trans,) London; Oxford University Press
I ' Hegel’s Aesthetics* Lectures on Fine Art, (Volume One of 
Two Volumes) T, M. Knox (trans.) Oxford* Oxford Univer­
sity Press
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. T, M. Knox (trans,) London* 
Oxford University Press
, Heinrich
The Works of Heinrich Heine (Volume V), "On Germany", 
London* William Heinemann
ChristopherThe World Turned Upside Down* Political Ideas During the 




1976 From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Develop­
ment of Karl Marx. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press
Hint, Richard N,
1974 The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels: Volume One:
Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy: 1810-1850. London: 
The MacMillan Press
Jay, Martin
1973 The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt
School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-50. 
London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.
Jones, G. Stedman
1973 "Engels and the End of Classical German Philosophy”,
New Left Review 79* 17—36
1977 "The Marxism of the Early Lukács”, Pp. 11-60 in Western
Marxism: A Critical Reader, London: NLB
Jordan, Z. A.
1967 The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, London*
MacMillan & Co.
Kalecki, M,
1968 Theory of Economic Dynamics: An Essay on Cyclical and
Long-run Changes in Capitalist Economy, New York and 
London: Modem Reader Paperbacks
Kamenka, Eugene
1970 The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, New York: Praeger
Publishers Inc,
Kant, Immanuel
1883 Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, Ernest Belfort Bax (trans,) London: George 
Bell & Sons
1956 Critique of Practical Reason. Lewis White .Beck (trans.)
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company Ltd.
1973 "Second Part. Critique of Teleological Judgement”, Pp.
1-180 In Critique of Judgement, James Creed Meredith 
(trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press
499
Kapp, Yvonne
1976 Eleanor Marx: Volume Two: The Crowded Years (1884-1898)
London: Lawrence & Wichart
Kaufmann, Walter
1966 Hegel, Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson
1978 Hegel: A Reinterpretation, Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press
Korsch, Karl
1970 Marxism and Philosophy. Pred Halliday (trans.) New York
and London: MR
Lecourt, Dominique
1977 Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko. Ben Brewster
(tran s.) London: NLB
Lenin, V. I.
1963 Collected Works (Volume 38): Philosophical Notebooks.
London: Lawrence and Wichart
1971» I-III Selected Works in Three Volumes, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers
Lichtheim, George
1967 "Introduction”. Pp. xv-xxxv in G. V. F. Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Mind. J. B. Baillie (trans,) New York: 
Harper Torchbooks
1967a The Concept of ideology and Other Essays, New York:
Vintage Books
L8wy, Michael
1977 Lukács and Stalinism. London: NLB
Lukács, Georg
1971 History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist
Dialectics, Rodney Livingstone (trans.) London: Merlin 
Press




1968 Marxist Economic Theory (Volume One of Two Volumes).
Brian Pearce (trans.) New York and London: Monthly 
Review Press
1976 "Introduction”. Pp, 11-86 in Karl Marx, Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy (Volume One). Ben Fowkes 
(trans,) Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books
1978 Late Capitalism. Joris de Eres (trans,) London: Verso
1978 "On the Nature of the Soviet State". New Left Review
108:23-46
Mannheim, Karl
1966 Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Marcuse, Herbert
1962 Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. 
New York: Vintage Books
1973 Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory
(Second Edition). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Marx, Karl, Frederick Engels and V. I, Lenin
1963 Reader in Marxist Philosophy. Howard Selsam and Harry 
Martel (eds.) New York: International Publishers
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels
1959 Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Lewis Feuer
(ed.) Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc.
1565 Selected Correspondence, Moscow: Progress Publishers
1968 The German Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers
1969, I-III Selected Works (in 3 volumes). Moscow: Progress Publishers
1975 Collected Works: Volume 4» London: Lawrence and Wishart
Marx, Karl
1964 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Dirk 
Struik (ed.) New York: International Publishers
1964a Early Writings. T. B. Bottomore (ed.) New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company
1966 The Civil War in France. Peking: Foreign Languages Press




1970 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.




Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right". J. O'Malley 
(ed.) Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press
Economy, Class and Social Revolution. Z. A. Jordan (ed.) 
London: Michael Joseph
Karl Marx: Early Texts. David McLellan (ed. and trans.) 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell
1971a The Cologne Communist Trial. Rodney Livingstone (trana.) 




Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy (Rough Draft). Martin Nicolaus (trans.) 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Volume 1). Ben 
Fowkes (trans.) Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Poverty of Philosophy. Moscow: foreign Languages 
Publishing House (no date)
McLellan, David
1971 "Introduction". Pp. ix-xliii in Karl Marx: Early Texts. 
David McLellan (ed, and trans.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Medawar, P. B. and J. S.
1977 The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology. London:
Wildwood House Ltd.
Mehring, Franz
1969 Karl Marx: The Story of His Life. Edward Fitzgerald
(trans,) Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks
Miliband, Ralph
1973 The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the
Western System of Power. London: Quartet Books Ltd,
1977 Marxism and Politics, Oxford* Oxford University Press
Monod, Jacques
1972 Chance and Necessity, Austryn Wainhouse (trans.) Glasgow: 
William Collins and Sons
Mussachia, M. Mark1977 "On Contradiction in Dialectical Materialism". Science
and Society XLXI, No. 3s 257-280
502
Nicolaus, Martin
1973 "Foreword". Pp. 7 -6 4 in Karl Marx, Grundrisset Foundations
of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft). Martin 
Nicolaus (trans.) Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Nicolaievsky, Boris and Otto Maenchen-He1fen 
1976 Karl Marx: Man and Fighter. Gwenda David and Eric
Mosbacher (trans.) Harmondsvorth; Penguin Books
OED
1971 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
(Volume X: A-0) Toronto: Oxford University Press
Olsen, Dennis
"The State Elites". Pp. 199-224 in Leo Panitch (ed.)
The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press
O’Malley, Joseph
1970 "Introduction". Pp. ix-lxvii in Karl Marx, Critique of
Hegel’s "Philosophy of Right". Joseph O’Malley (ed.) 
Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press
Pelczynski, 2, A.
1964 "Introduction". Pp. 3-137 in G. ¥. F. Hegel, Hegel’s
Political Writings, T. M. Knox (trans.) London: Oxford 
University Press
Plamenatz, John
1975 "History as the Realization of Freedom", Pp, 30-51 in 
Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives. 
Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
1976 Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important
Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx (Volume 2). 
London: Longman Group Ltd,
Plant, Raymond
1977 "Hegel and Political Economy —  II". New Left Review 
104:103-113
Popper, Karl R. and John Eccles1977 The Self and Its Brain, London: Springer International
Popper, Karl R,
1977» I The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume I: Plato,
London: Routledg© and Kegan Paul
503
Popper, Karl R.
1976 Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Poulantzas, Nicos
1973 Political Power and Social Classes. Timothy O’Hagen
(trans.) London; KLB
Rosdolski, Roman
1977 The Making of Marx’s Capital. Pete Burgess (trans.)
London: Pluto Press
Schmidt, Alfred
19 7 1 The Concept of Nature in Marx. Ben Fowkes (trans.)
London: NLB
Seth, Andrew
1892 Hegelianism and Personality. Edinburgh: William Black­
wood and Sons
Stalin, Joseph
1940 Dialectical and Historical Materialism. New York: Inter­
national Publishers
Stirling, J, II.
1865 The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Origin,
Principle, Form and Matter (Volume One of Two Volumes). 
London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green
Taylor, Charles
1975 Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Timpanaro, Sebastiano
1974 "Considerations on Materialism". New Left Review 85:
3-24
Trotsky, Leon
19 64 The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology.
Isaac Deutscher (ed.) New York; Dell Publishing Company 
Inc.











"Introduction”. Pp. vii-lxxxiii in Ludwig Feuerbach, 
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. Manfred H. 
Vogel (trans.) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Kerrill Company Inc.
Paul and Andrew Gamble
From Alienation to Surplus Value. London: Sheed and Ward 
Ltd.
Max
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
Talcott Parsons (trans.) Hew York: Charles Scribner and 
Sons
!•
